[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11876 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 26, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00437-CV-3-RV-MD
MARGARET PETTAWAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 26, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Margaret Pettaway, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of Pettaway’s application for
disability insurance benefits.* No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether substantial
evidence supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Under this limited standard of
review, we may not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute our
judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
A person who applies for Social Security disability benefits must prove her
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. Disability is the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
*
Pettaway claimed that she was affected by many impairments, including fibromyalgia,
lumbar disc disease, arthritis, obesity, and depression.
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can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
We first address Pettaway’s contention that the ALJ erred in making an
adverse credibility determination about her claims of being affected by pain.
Credibility determinations about subjective testimony generally are reserved to the
ALJ. See Johns v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1987). But if the ALJ
“decides not to credit such testimony, he must articulate explicit and adequate
reasons for doing so.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). In
addition, we have “established a three part ‘pain standard’ that applies when a
claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her own testimony of pain
or other subjective symptoms.” Id. This standard requires these things:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2)
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged
pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of such severity that it can be reasonably
expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
Id.
Here, the ALJ concluded that Pettaway’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the extreme physical and
mental restrictions alleged but that the objective medical evidence did not support
the severity of the alleged limitations. We conclude that substantial evidence
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supports the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. The ALJ provided specific
reasons for discrediting Pettaway’s testimony about the severity of her pain: that
the reports of several specialists (including an orthopedist and a pain management
specialist) who evaluated Pettaway described normal physical examinations with
only mild to moderate limitations and that Pettaway’s testimony about her daily
activities belied her contentions about the severity of her pain. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3) (the ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities when
evaluating her complaints of pain). We see no reversible error in the ALJ’s
assessment of Pettaway’s credibility.
We next address Pettaway’s argument that the ALJ improperly discounted
the opinion of her treating physician (Dr. Hakima) that Pettaway suffered from
marked limitations and virtually incapacitating pain so that Pettaway was restricted
from working. A treating physician’s testimony “must be given substantial or
considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary.” Crawford, 363
F.3d at 1159 (citation omitted). Good cause exists under these circumstances: (1)
the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was
conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). The ALJ clearly must
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articulate reasons for giving less weight to the treating physician’s opinion. Id. at
1241.
In this case, the record shows good cause not to give substantial weight to
Dr. Hakima’s opinion. Dr. Hakima’s assessment went against the balance of
objective medical evidence and was based mainly on Pettaway’s subjective
complaints. Other medical evidence in the record documented predominantly
normal physical examinations with only mild limitations. Dr. Hakima also was not
a specialist; and the ALJ chose to give more credit to specialists’ assessments that
Pettaway was limited to light work. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Hakima’s opinion.
We turn to Pettaway’s argument that the ALJ erred in determining that she
could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. When a
claimant proves that she no longer can perform her past relevant work, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to show that, in the light of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience, “there is other
work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is
able to perform.” Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). “The ALJ
must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and this finding
must be supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.”
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Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227.
The “preferred method” of demonstrating that a claimant can perform other
jobs is through the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. For a VE’s
testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical
question that comprises all of the claimant’s impairments. See Vega v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2001). But the ALJ is not required to
include in the question claims of impairment that he has found to be unsupported.
Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161.
Here, based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Pettaway was
unable to perform her past relevant work, but had the RFC to perform other light or
sedentary unskilled work existing in significant numbers in the national economy,
including positions as a bench assembler, mail clerk, light-duty housekeeper, and
credit card solicitor. The ALJ posed a hypothetical question about the work
abilities of someone with the same educational and vocational history as Pettaway
and that encompassed the limitations described by several of the doctors who
treated and evaluated Pettaway: someone who could perform light work with mild
physical limitations in climbing, kneeling, and crawling, and moderate mental
limitations in concentration, persistence, pace, and the ability to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed instructions. The VE’s opinion was not based on
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the limitations described by Dr. Hakima; but, as noted, the ALJ permissibly
discounted Dr. Hakima’s assessment of Pettaway’s limitations. Because the
hypothetical posed included all the credible physical and mental limitations that the
ALJ determined were supported by the record, the VE’s testimony that Pettaway
could perform a significant number of light, unskilled jobs in the national economy
constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination. See Vega, 265
F.3d at 1220.
AFFIRMED.
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