IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 94-10763
Conference Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BOBBY D. EDWARDS, also known as Oogie,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:94-CR-10-A
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(October 18, 1995)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Bobby D. Edwards has appealed the sentence he
received upon his guilty plea of distributing cocaine base
(crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He asserts that
the district court erred by increasing his base offense level by
four levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Edwards argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to
establish that he was a leader or organizer of relevant criminal
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
No. 94-10763
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activity which involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive, as required by § 3B1.1(a). We affirm the
judgment.
"A district court's determination that a defendant is a
§ 3B1.1 leader or organizer is a factual finding, which we review
for clear error." United States v. Ronning, 47 F.3d 710, 711
(5th Cir. 1995). "A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if
it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole." United
States v. Valencia, 44 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1995). The
district court based its ruling principally on the factual
averments of Edwards's presentence report (PSR).
"In making factual determinations [relative to sentencing],
. . . a district court may draw [] inference[s] from a variety of
data, including information in the (PSR). . . . The PSR
generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be
considered as evidence by the district court in resolving
disputed facts [relative to sentencing]." United States v.
Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 242 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, "the court can adopt facts
contained in a PSR without inquiry, if those facts had an
adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present
rebuttal evidence." United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929,
943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 180 (1994).
The PSR states that Edwards had eight people working for
him, naming seven of them. Furthermore, he controlled the flow
of cocaine to the street level distributors selling cocaine at
Bad Boys Auto Detailing, in Arlington, Texas. That Edwards also
No. 94-10763
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determined who would be permitted to sell cocaine at Bad Boys is
shown by the fact that he allowed Roy Lee Simpson to do so
although Simpson did not work for him. Edwards supplied all of
his employees with beepers, and he also supplied all of the drugs
sold at Bad Boys, except some of the drugs that Simpson sold.
Two former employees divulged details of their experiences and
observations while they worked for Edwards, which included being
with him when he manufactured crack from regular cocaine.
Furthermore, the large amount of crack, the firearms, including
an assault rifle and two sawed-off shotguns, the electronic
scales, and other items found at Edwards's residence, indicate
his leadership role in the Bad Boys drug-trafficking
organization. The factual averments contained in the PSR, which
Edwards has not disputed, amply support the four-level increase
pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). See United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d
544, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994).
AFFIRMED.