IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-10088
JAMES B. WOODS,
Plaintiff-Appellant;
versus
RESOLUTION TRUST COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal From the United States District Court
For The Northern District of Texas
(3-94-CV-2350)
November 1, 1995
Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM*:
Plaintiff-Appellant James Woods appeals two final orders of
the district court. The first granted the Resolution Trust
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
Company's (RTC's) unopposed motion to dismiss Woods' complaint and
the second denied Woods' Rule 59(e) motion to vacate that
dismissal. As Woods has now exhausted his administrative remedies
and filed a second suit alleging the same underlying causes of
action in another federal district court, circumstances have
"changed" and we dismiss this appeal as moot.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
James Woods filed suit in state court against the RTC, as the
receiver for Western Gulf Savings and Loan Association, Standard
Federal Savings Association (Standard), and Imco Realty Services,
Inc., alleging that the RTC and Standard had caused his home to be
sold at a foreclosure sale without providing him notice as required
by state law. Woods alleged that the RTC notified him that he was
in default on his loan and gave him 30 days to pay the principal
and interest due. A deed to the property was executed to the RTC
without any prior notice of the sale being given to Woods. Woods
was subsequently unable to refinance the purchase of another
residence because the void foreclosure had been reported to credit
agencies. Woods sought compensatory and exemplary damages.
The RTC timely filed a notice of removal of the action to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
After removal, the RTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on Woods' failure to submit his claims to the RTC for
administrative consideration. Woods did not file a response.
The district court granted the RTC's motion to dismiss because
2
Woods' complaint did not allege that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).1
The district court remanded the case with respect to the remaining
parties who had not joined in the removal petition. On December
12, 1994, the district court entered judgment, dismissing the claim
against the RTC without prejudice. Within 10 days of the entry of
judgment, Woods filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 59(e).
In this motion, Woods conceded that § 1821(d)(6)(A) required
exhaustion and that he had not filed an administrative claim with
the RTC, but urged, nevertheless, that the exhaustion requirement
of § 1821(d)(6)(A) did not apply to his claim. Woods argued that
§ 1821(d)(6)(A) does deprive the district court of jurisdiction in
claims that arise pre-receivership, but does not deprive the
district court of jurisdiction in claims, like his, that arise
post-receivership. In other words, Woods contended that as his
claim arose after the RTC had taken over the banking institution
and not before, he could bring suit against the RTC in federal
district court without first exhausting his administrative
remedies.
In its order denying Woods' motion to vacate, the district
court stated, "[Woods] did not file a response to the RTC's Motion
to Dismiss and his opposition will not be heard at this late date."
Accordingly, the district court denied Woods motion to vacate the
1
Section 1821(d)(6)(A) is jurisdictional and it permits a
claimant to file suit only after filing a claim with the RTC and
then only if the receiver has disallowed the claim or the 180-day
determination period has expired.
3
judgment. Woods timely appealed both the Interlocutory Judgment,
granting the RTC's motion to dismiss, and the order denying his
Rule 59(e) motion to vacate the judgement.
During the pendency of this appeal, Woods pursued and
exhausted his administrative remedies and then refiled his suit
against the RTC. In December 1994, Woods filed a proof of claim
with the RTC. In June 1995, the RTC notified Woods that his claim
for administrative relief had been denied. In August 1995, Woods
filed suit on his claims in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas. As venue was improper, this second
federal suit was transferred to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, where, as of this writing, it
is still pending.
II
DISCUSSION
A. MOOTNESS
If a dispute has been resolved or if it has evanesced because
of changed circumstances, it is moot.2 During the pendency of this
appeal, the circumstances "changed": Woods exhausted his remedies
with the RTC and filed a second law suit that has changed the
exhaustion issue. Thus, we need not address the issues raised in
this appeal. Accordingly, we hold that any jurisdictional issues
in this case, which is the one that originated in the Northern
District of Texas, are moot. "When a case becomes moot on appeal,
2
American Medical Association v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 267, 270
(5th Cir. 1987)(per curiam).
4
the appellate court should vacate the order of the district court
and order dismissal of the action."
The judgment of the district court for the Northern District
of Texas is VACATED3 and this appeal is DISMISSED.
3
We neither express nor imply an opinion on the merits of (1)
the argument advanced by Woods in his Rule 59(e) motion, (2) the
second suit which Woods initiated in the Western District of Texas,
or (3) the transfer of the second suit from the from the Western
District of Texas to the Southern District of Texas. Moreover, as
we dismiss this appeal and vacate the judgment of the Northern
District of Texas, neither the district's court's decision nor ours
on appeal is binding as res judicata, law of the case, collateral
estoppel, or any other theory that might be urged in bar of the
issues in the second suit.
5