May 9, 1893, the defendant, by a Minnesota standard policy, insured a building of plaintiff against loss or damage by fire for one year, and June 18th the building was destroyed *188by fire. At the time of and prior to the issuance of the policy, the plaintiff had other insurance on the building, to the amount of $500.
The policy of defendant (the standard policy) contains this condition: “This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void if the insured now has, or shall hereafter make or procure, other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole or in part by this policy,” — and this further condition: “And no officer, agent, or representative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy except such as, by the terms of this policy, may be the subject of agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto; and, as to such provisions and conditions, no officer, a.gent, or representative shall have such power or be deemed or held to have waived such provision or condition unless such waiver, if any, shall be written upon or attached hereto.” There was no indorsement on the policy referring in any way to the other and previous insurance.
The only question in the case is, could an agent of the defendant, notwithstanding the last above quoted condition, waive by parol, and without indorsing on the policy, the condition as to other insurance?
In Lamberton v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 129, (39 N. W. 76,) the court passed upon a condition similar to the condition last above quoted, and held it to be not an attempt to limit or restrict the power of any particular agent or class of agents, but to disable one of the parties to make, even with the consent of the other, an agreement that would otherwise be valid; and the court said: “A contracting- party cannot so tie his own hands, so restrict his own legal capacity for future action, that he has not the power, even with the assent of the other party, to bind or obligate himself by his further action or agreement contrary to the terms of the written contract.” The court decided, in effect, that such a condition was nugatory; that the parties could not bind themselves by any such condition.
The defendant claims that Láws 1889, ch. 217, providing for a uniform policy of fire insurance, to be known as the “Minnesota Standard Policy,” changed the rule of law in that particular; and *189that, by requiring the standard policy to be used, the act not only enables, but enjoins, the parties to bind themselves by the terms, provisions, and conditions contained in it.
No other question on that act is suggested by either party, either as to its validity or construction in any particular, except as above stated; and we ivill pass on nothing but the point thus made as applying to the condition last above quoted.
The standard policy was, under the act, prepared by the Insurance Commissioner, with the assistance of the Attorney General. Its use by insurance companies doing business in this state is made compulsory. The courts must, when called on, interpret it and its various provisions and conditions, and generally by the same rules as though the form of policy were voluntarily adopted by the parties. But in respect to the power of the parties to insert the provisions and conditions that are contained in the standard policy, and the binding effect of them, the act is conclusive; for it would be absurd to say that, while the statute compels the use of a particular condition, the parties cannot or shall not bind themselves by it, but it may be nugatory. By requiring the condition to be inserted, the statute certainly enables the parties to make the condition. It follows that the conditions quoted are valid and binding. In respect to the power of the parties to bind themselves by such conditions, the act changes the rule in the Lamberton Case.
Order reversed.