Appeal from orders sustaining separate demurrers to the complaint, upon the ground that several causes of action were improperly united.
The following facts are set forth as the basis of the action: Francis
A. January 3, 1903, Frank R. Duxbury, acting as agent for plaintiffs under the aforesaid contract of employment, negotiated a sale to defendants McCracken and Seeley of the southwest yi, section 17, township 41, range 17, Pine county; that plaintiffs procured and delivered to Frank R. Duxbury a proper deed to the premises, conveying the same to McCracken and Seeley for the consideration of $1,600; that Frank R. Duxbury wrongfully, unlawfully, and for the purpose of cheating and defrauding plaintiffs, delivered the deed to McCracken and Seeley without receiving any consideration other than the sum of $760, and unlawfully and without authority, and for the purpose of defrauding plaintiffs, induced McCracken and Seeley and their wives to execute a mortgage on the premises to defendant John Richards for $840, which was without consideration and void. “That ail the facts aforesaid mentioned in this subdivision A were then and there well known to said defendants William A. Seeley, Mary D. Seeley, William P. McCracken, Henrietta McCracken, and John Richards.”
It is further stated that the mortgage was filed in the office of the register of deeds in Pine county, and that, of the $760 received by Frank R. Duxbury, only $543 was paid for the benefit of plaintiffs, and that the three Duxburys converted the remainder to their own use, on account of which unlawful acts plaintiffs were defrauded out of $1,006.15.
A similar sale is stated in subdivision E to defendant Grayling, and in F, to defendant Dumdie. Subdivision G sets out a like deal with one Henry J. Tammel, who was not made a party defendant, and H recites a similar transaction with defendant E. A. Barr.
Under I the transaction takes a little different form. In this instance Frank R. Duxbury negotiated a sale of eighty acres to defendants E. A. and Arthur Moore for $1,200, and received the proper deed from plaintiffs, which he delivered to the purchasers; but, instead of receiving a cash consideration, a deed was delivered ho certain real estate in Iowa, and a bill of sale of certain personal property in Iowa, the conveyances running to defendant Frank R. Duxbury. It is alleged that all of this was known to defendants Moore, and that, out of plaintiffs’ moneys already in the hands of defendant Frank R. Duxbury, he paid out for plaintiffs’ benefit $271.94 on account of this purchase.
In paragraph 6 it is stated that plaintiffs advanced to defendant Frank R. Duxbury $401.85 for the purpose of aiding and negotiating the sales aforesaid, and that defendants Duxbury have converted to their own use $285 of the amount, and, for the purpose of enabling defendant William R. Duxbury to aid in his employment, plaintiff Hanna assigned to him a certain mortgage on real estate in Spring Valley, Minnesota, amounting to $250, which he unlawfully caused to be assigned and converted to the use of defendants Duxbury.
Paragraph 7 states that February 18, 1903, in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs, defendant Frank R. Duxbury induced plaintiffs to deliver to him a contract for 1,283.38 acres of the land above mentioned, located in Pine county, which contract was taken by Frank R. Duxbury for the benefit of the three Duxburys; that the consideration named in the contract was $7.50 per acre; that plaintiffs executed and delivered the proper deed conveying to Frank R. Duxbury 483.38 acres of land for the stated consideration of $3,625.35, the
Paragraph 8 contains another transaction, to the effect that defendant Frank R. Duxbury, as agent of the plaintiffs, negotiated a sale of one hundred twenty acres of land in Pine county, and upon an examination of the abstract discovered there was an outstanding title adverse to plaintiffs, and, acting upon such knowledge, defendants Duxbury secured a quitclaim deed of such adverse interest running to defendant Frank R. Duxbury, and then instituted suit to quiet title as against plaintiffs’ grantors, with the intent of cheating and defrauding these plaintiffs; and that defendants Duxbury procured titles of adverse interests respecting other lands belonging to plaintiffs, having obtained knowledge thereof in the course of their employment as plaintiffs’ agents and attorneys, and that they hold title to such adverse interests in pursuance of the general conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs oüt of the lands.
The prayer for relief demands a money judgment against defendants Duxbury for the various amounts alleged to have been converted, annulling and canceling the deeds mentioned in paragraph 7, and decreeing that plaintiffs are the owners of the lands therein described, but if the court should find that defendants Duxbury have any title or interest in any tracts of land mentioned in paragraph 7, that their interest be decreed subordinate to that of plaintiffs; that the mortgage executed by defendants McCracken and Seeley, set out in subdivision A, be canceled, and that plaintiffs be decreed to have a lien for $840 upon the premises conveyed to McCracken and Seeley; that defendants Duxbury be directed by the judgment of the court to deliver to plaintiffs the mortgage described in subdivision C of paragraph 4; that the mortgage executed by defendant Daniels be annulled and set aside, and that plaintiffs be decreed to have a lien upon the premises conveyed to Daniels superior to the interests of the defendants; a similar prayer
The complaint was demurred to separately by defendants Francis A. and William R. Duxbury, and defendant Frank R. Duxbury, upon the ground that several causes of action are improperly united, and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Both demurrers were sustained by the trial court, upon the ground that several causes of action were improperly united.
It was no doubt the theory of the pleader that the allegations of fraud and conspiracy alleged to have been designed by defendants Duxbury with respect to the lands under contract in Pine county permeated and entered into every subsequent transaction with the different defendants to such an extent that they may be called to account in connection with the Duxburys. Conceding that as to defendants Duxbury a cause of action is stated which arose out of their failure to carry out the terms of their contract, does it follow that each purchase by the several defendants is a part of and embraced within the same cause of action?
Taking up subdivision A. The pleader sets out in detail a sale and purchase to McCracken and Seeley of one hundred sixty acres of land by plaintiffs, acting through their agent, Frank R. Duxbury. The purchasers agreed to pay for this land two dollars an acre more than the agent was to account for to plaintiffs; that instead of paying the agent the full amount of eight dollars an acre cash, amounting to $1,280, the purchasers gave the agent only $760, and executed a mortgage, running to defendant John Richards, for $840, to secure the remainder. The only allegation to connect defendants McCracken and Seeley with the original transaction between plaintiffs and the Duxburys is this:
That all the facts aforesaid mentioned in this subdivision A were then and there well known to said defendants William A. Seeley, Mary R. Seeley, William P. McCracken, Plenrietta Mc-Cracken, and John Richards.
The same may be said with reference to the facts set forth in subdivisions C, D, E, F, H, and I, of paragraph 4. No doubt, if. the purchasers of the several tracts, McCracken, Seeley, and others, had knowledge of the alleged design and purpose of the Duxburys to obtain title to plaintiffs’ land without accounting for the proceeds according to the terms of their contract, and for the purpose of carrying out such scheme they subsequently became purchasers of parcels of land and paid the purchase price and executed the mortgages to the Duxburys and other parties in furtherance of such scheme, then they could be brought in as parties defendant and compelled to account for their part in the illegal transactions. The pleader, no doubt, proceeded upon this theory, as the citation of authorities would indicate. For instance, in Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 16 N. W. 854, from the opinion in which case counsel quotes the following language: • “Where a -complaint alleges a conspiracy to cheat and defraud plaintiff in respect to his interests as a stockholder in a corporation, all separate acts or transactions of defendants done pursuant to it may be joined in the complaint, although some of them do not affect all the defendants, and none of them affect any two of the defendants to the same extent or degree.” But an examination of the complaint in that case shows that all of the parties were connected with the transaction from the beginning, and that the several acts charged as a part of the conspiracy were not separate and independent transactions, but were merely the various acts committed in connection with the main cause set forth.
The facts pleaded with respect to the sales mentioned under subdivisions A, C, D, E, F, H, and I, paragraph 4, constituted separate and independent transactions as to each other. Each of these separate transactions is in no way connected with the subject of the action involved in each of the other transactions and with the main cause of action pleaded against defendants Duxbury. Such being the case, it may be added that they are improperly joined, for the reason that these several independent causes of action do not affect all the parties to the suit. Section 5260, G. S. 1894, subd. 7, provides that the causes of action so united shall belong to only one of the classes, and affect all the parties to the action. Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 100 (133); Berg v. Stanhope, 43 Minn. 176, 45 N. W. 15; and Langevin v. City of St. Paul, 49 Minn. 189, 51 N. W. 817.
Orders affirmed.