IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-30436
Summary Calendar
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EARL J. TRAHAN and GEORGETTE TRAHAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(93-CV-107)
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November 3, 1995
Before KING, GARWOOD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Earl and Georgette Trahan appeal a summary judgment in favor
of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (“BellSouth”). We affirm.
I.
Earl Trahan began working for BellSouth in 1972. He is also
*
Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: “The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession.” Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
the owner of a trucking business. In 1991, BellSouth security
personnel received several complaints that Trahan was conducting
his trucking business on company time. BellSouth began an
investigation into the complaints, which culminated on June 2,
1992, with an intensive interview of Trahan.
The following day, Trahan reported out sick, claiming he was
suffering from severe depression caused by the interview; he never
returned to work. Trahan received disability benefits until August
28, 1992, when BellSouth determined that he was no longer qualified
for benefits because he was not totally unable to work. On
November 13, 1992, BellSouth terminated Trahan for failure to
return to work without adequate proof of total disability.
Trahan filed this claim in state court, alleging wrongful
discharge, wrongful denial of benefits, defamation, false imprison-
ment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. BellSouth
removed the case to federal court. In a series of rulings, the
district court granted summary judgment for BellSouth on each of
the claims.
II.
Trahan’s first objection is that the district court incor-
rectly found his wrongful discharge claim preempted by § 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which preempts
state law claims that are “substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
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(1985). The district court found that Trahan’s wrongful discharge
claim depended upon analysis of the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) between BellSouth and the Communications Workers of
America.
We agree that the wrongful discharge claim falls within the
scope of § 301 preemption. But for the CBA, Trahan would have no
claim for wrongful discharge, because Louisiana law makes employees
terminable-at-will. Gilbert v. Tulane Univ., 909 F.2d 124, 126
(5th Cir. 1990) (declaring employees terminable-at-will under
Louisiana law); Mix v. University of New Orleans, 609 So. 2d 958,
961 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff cannot
maintain wrongful discharge claim without contractual exception to
employment-at-will doctrine), writ denied, 612 So. 2d 83 (1993).
The CBA creates an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine by
providing that when "an employee is suspended or discharged, a
charge that the suspension or discharge was without just cause
shall be handled in accordance with the following [grievance
procedure] . . . ." Trahan’s wrongful discharge claim is therefore
dependent upon analysis of the CBA’s “without just cause” provision
and is preempted by § 301.
Trahan argues that preemption is inappropriate because his
claim raises only factual questions. He cites several cases for
the proposition that purely factual disputes that do not require
interpretation of a CBA are not preempted. See Hawaiian Airlines
v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Hirras v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
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Corp., 44 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1995). Trahan fails to note, however,
that all of those cases involved factual disputes about state-law
claims that existed independently of the CBA. See Hawaiian
Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2248 (state-law retaliatory discharge
claim); Lingle, 486 U.S. at 406 (state-law claim for retaliatory
discharge for filing worker’s compensation claim); Hirras, 44 F.3d
at 283 (state-law harassment claim). They do not create an
exception to the requirement that a plaintiff must have an
independent state-law claim. In fact, the Hawaiian Airlines Court
noted that when “the employee’s claim [is] firmly rooted in a
breach of the CBA itself,” preemption is proper. 114 S. Ct. at
2246. Thus, we find Trahan’s objection meritless, as his claim
depends completely on the terms of the CBA.
Trahan also seeks to evade preemption by recasting his
wrongful discharge claim as a claim for retaliatory discharge.
Even if we allowed Trahan to raise a retaliatory discharge claim
for the first time on appeal——he did not raise such a claim in
district court——he could not prevail. Like other wrongful
discharge claims, a claim for retaliatory discharge is subject to
preemption unless it rests on an independent state-law foundation.
Cf. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 406 (“Illinois courts have recognized the
tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation
claim . . . .”); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086,
1089 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that state-law tort for retaliatory
discharge that existed independently of CBA is not preempted).
Trahan alleges that he was discharged in retaliation “for the
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allegedly fraudulent submission of medical claims.” Yet he fails
to identify any Louisiana law, independent of the CBA, that
prohibits discharge in retaliation for submitting fraudulent
medical claims.1 We therefore conclude that § 301 preempts
Trahan’s wrongful discharge claim.
III.
Following the June 2 interview, Trahan claimed that he was
severely depressed and unable to return to work. As a participant
in the BellSouth Sickness and Accident Disability Plan (“the
Plan”), he began receiving disability benefits. The plan
administrator terminated those benefits on August 28, 1992,
however, on the ground that Trahan was not totally unable to work.
In his complaint, Trahan alleged that the decision to terminate
benefits was arbitrary and capricious.2 The district court granted
BellSouth’s motion for summary judgment on this question.
At issue here is the admissibility of Exhibit B to the motion
for summary judgment, which exhibit contained a diary report
compiled by a member of the benefit administrator’s staff and
voluminous notes, memos, faxes, and reports pertaining to Trahan’s
condition. Also attached to the motion for summary judgment was an
affidavit from Nancy Carlisle, BellSouth’s Manager of Benefits
1
The lack of any independent state-law basis for Trahan’s claim is
highlighted by the fact that this section of his brief fails to cite a single
Louisiana case or statute.
2
Trahan also makes this claim on appeal. We address it below.
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Administration, which indicated that, except for certain documents
removed by court order, Exhibit B was “the complete record of Mr.
Trahan’s disability claim and appeal.”
We conclude that Exhibit B was properly admissible under FED.
R. EVID. 803(6), which allows the admission of a “data compilation
. . . if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity.” It is the task of BellSouth’s Benefits Administration
to administer benefits, and “the complete record of [a] disability
claim and appeal” is a data compilation “kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity.” Trahan does not argue that
the record is inadmissible under rule 803, but merely asserts that
the record contains hearsay prohibited by FED. R. EVID. 802.
Because rule 803 expressly contains exceptions to rule 802, we find
no merit in Trahan’s contention.
Trahan also asserts that Exhibit B was inadmissible under FED.
R. CIV. P. 56, which requires that any documents offered in support
of a motion for summary judgment be sworn and certified. Caparelli
v. Proceeds of Freight, 390 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In this instance, BellSouth sought to submit documents on which the
plan relied in administering Trahan’s disability claim to show that
the claim was not administered in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. The authenticity of the documents was established by Nancy
Carlisle’s affidavit, in which which she swore that the documents
were the complete record of Trahan’s disability claim and appeal.
The requirements of rule 56 were met.
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IV.
Trahan raises two additional issues on appeal. First, he
contends that the plan administrator’s decision to terminate
benefits was arbitrary and capricious. Second, he argues that his
claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress should not have been dismissed on summary judgment. With
respect to these issues, Trahan does not raise any arguments that
the district court did not sufficiently address in its opinion.3
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
The district court’s conclusion that the administrator did not act in
an arbitrary and capricious manner is contained in the Memorandum Ruling
entered on March 17, 1994. Its conclusion with respect to the defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims appears in the Memorandum
Ruling entered April 5, 1995, at 7-13.
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