FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 19, 2012
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-6331
(D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00313-HE-1)
GREGORIO MORALES-MARTINEZ, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Gregorio Morales-Martinez pleaded guilty to two firearm
offenses. Although his plea agreement contained a waiver of his appellate rights,
defendant has filed an appeal challenging his sentence. The government has
moved to enforce defendant’s appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn,
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. The miscarriage-of-justice
prong requires the defendant to show (a) his sentence relied on an impermissible
factor such as race; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the
negotiation of the appeal waiver rendered the waiver invalid; (c) his sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum; or (d) his appeal waiver is otherwise unlawful
and the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted).
Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts, each of which carried a statutory
maximum sentence of sixty months. The district court determined that the
applicable guideline range was 108 to 120 months. The district court was
inclined to have the sentences run consecutively to come within the applicable
guideline range, but the government recommended that the sentences be run
concurrently due to defendant’s substantial assistance in the case. In light of the
government’s request, the district court decided to grant defendant a downward
departure and sentenced defendant to sixty months on each count with the
sentences to run concurrently.
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Defendant’s plea agreement states that he “knowingly and voluntarily
waives his right to . . . [a]ppeal or collaterally challenge his guilty plea, sentence
and restitution imposed, and any other aspect of his conviction.” Mot. to Enforce,
Att. 1 at ¶8. The agreement further states that he waives his right to appeal or
collaterally challenge the “sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in
which the sentence is determined, provided the sentence is within or below the
advisory guideline range determined by the Court.” Id. Although defendant
acknowledges the waiver language in his plea agreement, he contends that he
“cannot be said to have specifically and knowingly waived the issue when, at the
time [he] pled guilty, no one contemplated the possibility that the sentences on
the two counts could be run consecutively.” Resp. to Mot. to Enforce at 3.
According to defendant, “[a]t the time of the plea agreement, it was contemplated
that the maximum possible sentence imposed would be 60 months and that any
downward departure would begin with that 60 month maximum.” Id.
In Hahn, we rejected the argument that “a defendant can never knowingly
and voluntarily waive his appellate rights because he cannot possibly know in
advance what errors a district court might make in the process of arriving at an
appropriate sentence.” 359 F.3d at 1326. As we explained: “The law ordinarily
considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant
fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general
in the circumstances-even though the defendant may not know the specific
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detailed consequences of invoking it.” Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Defendant, therefore, did not need to know exactly how his sentence
would be determined–including the possibility that the sentences on the two
counts could run consecutively–in order to waive his right to appeal his sentence.
Moreover, it is clear from the plea agreement and the plea colloquy that
defendant was on notice that: his sentence had not yet been determined, the
district court would make the final determination about his sentence, and once
that determination was made, defendant would not be able to challenge any aspect
of the sentence (except in limited circumstances not relevant here). See Mot. to
Enforce, Att. 1 at ¶¶7-8 (Plea Agreement); id. Att. 2 at 8-13 (Transcript of Guilty
Plea).
The district court imposed a sentence that was below the advisory guideline
range and within the applicable statutory maximum. The plea agreement and the
plea colloquy demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived
his appellate rights and that the appeal falls within the scope of his appeal waiver.
Defendant’s complaint that the district court’s sentence does not effectuate the
intent of the parties does not demonstrate that enforcing the waiver will result in a
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion to
enforce the appeal waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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