NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2639
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DENISE PELLEGRINO,
Appellant
v.
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO, CLC, a labor union
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-00098)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2012
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Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 19, 2012 )
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OPINION
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Denise Pellegrino claims that her former employer, Communications Workers of
America (“CWA”), interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The District Court entered summary judgment
for CWA, and Pellegrino has appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
Pellegrino began employment with CWA in 2005. She was given an employment
manual with copies of the then-current policies regarding FMLA leave and sick leave.
Federal law required CWA to provide FMLA leave (which is unpaid) to eligible
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (d)(1). It did not require CWA to provide paid
sick leave. Neither the FMLA policy nor the sick leave policy restricted the travel of
employees on leave.
In 2006, CWA promulgated a new employment manual. The manual included a
revised Sickness and Absenteeism Policy (the “2006 Policy”) that addressed both FMLA
leave and sick leave, though in separate sections. The sick leave section of the 2006
Policy required that employees on paid sick leave “remain in the immediate vicinity of
their home during the period of such a leave.” J.A. 176. It permitted exceptions to this
rule if employees so requested in writing before their travel. Id. The FMLA section of
the 2006 Policy provided no such restriction. It stated, however, that FMLA leave would
run concurrently with any paid sick leave. Id. at 177.
Affected CWA employees received the 2006 Policy in an email. It instructed
employees that if the 2006 Policy differed from earlier policies, it superseded those
policies to the extent of those differences. Pellegrino stated at her deposition that she did
not recall receiving the email about the 2006 Policy. Id. at 134. Email records, however,
indicate that she was included among the recipients. Id. at 133-34.
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In August 2008, Pellegrino notified CWA that she needed to undergo surgery.
CWA responded with a letter describing Pellegrino’s rights and obligations under the
FMLA. See id. at 268-69. In bold type, the letter stated that “the process of medical
certification for FMLA leave is completely separate from the process for approving
leaves for continued sick pay treatment under CWA’s sick leave policy.” Id. at 269. The
letter enclosed two separate medical certification forms, one for FMLA leave and the
other for paid sick leave. Another enclosure, Department of Labor Form WH-381, stated
in large type: “You will be required to substitute paid leave under CWA’s sick leave
policy for the period of time that you qualify for such benefits.” Id. at 270. The letter did
not, however, enclose the 2006 Policy or note its restriction on travel.
After Pellegrino submitted the required certifications, CWA granted her leave
under the FMLA. Id. at 360. It was to begin on October 2, the date of her surgery, and
last at least four weeks. See id. at 39, 76, 360. During this time, Pellegrino received her
full salary and benefits, as CWA required that paid sick leave run concurrently with
FMLA leave. See id. at 131-32. About two weeks after the surgery, she and three
acquaintances traveled to Cancun, Mexico, where they spent a week. She did not notify
CWA of her trip.
When Pellegrino returned from Cancun, CWA requested that she come to the
office for a meeting on November 3, while she was still on leave. She agreed. At the
meeting, the administrative director of Pellegrino’s office asked her if she had traveled
while on leave, and she conceded that she had. Later that day, CWA sent Pellegrino a
letter terminating her employment because she had violated CWA’s sick leave policy.
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Pellegrino filed this suit in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania in January 2010. After discovery, CWA moved for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The District Court granted its motion,
and this timely appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. However, the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment.” Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (emphasis, citations, and internal
quotation marks omitted). Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
is plenary. Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 653 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. Discussion
A. Notice
Pellegrino’s principal argument on appeal is that CWA did not provide her
sufficient notice of its policy against travel during sick leave and the consequence of
termination. She argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she
received the 2006 Policy. Further, she objects that, even if she received the 2006 Policy,
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it did not state that employees could be terminated for violating its travel prohibition.
She is able to invoke the FMLA because her termination occurred during both sick leave
and FMLA leave.
Pellegrino has asserted an “interference” claim (as opposed to a more burdensome
“retaliation” or “discrimination” claim) under the FMLA. The interference provision
states: “It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1). “In order to assert a claim of interference, an employee must show that
[s]he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that [her] employer illegitimately
prevented [her] from obtaining those benefits.” Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc.,
510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 2007).
“‘[E]very discharge of an employee while she is taking FMLA leave interferes
with an employee’s FMLA rights.’” Bacon v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 550 F.3d 711,
715 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Throneberry v. McGehee Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403 F.3d 972,
980 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, “an employer generally does not violate the FMLA if it
terminates an employee for failing to comply with a policy requiring notice of absences,
even if the absences that the employee failed to report were protected by the FMLA.”
Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in
original). That is because taking FMLA leave generally does not affect an employee’s
obligations under non-FMLA company policy. See id. at 1006-07.
Here, Pellegrino was on both FMLA leave and paid sick leave, as the law allows.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2); Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199,
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1204-06 (11th Cir. 2001). Therefore, she remained bound by CWA’s sick leave policy so
long as it was not inconsistent with the FMLA. “[T]he only issue . . . is whether [CWA]
denied [Pellegrino] of [her] entitlements under the FMLA by enforcing its own sick leave
policies against [her] while [s]he was on leave.” Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117,
120 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[A] company may discipline an employee for violating its internal leave policy
as long as that policy is consistent with the law . . . .”).
CWA’s sick leave policy was not inconsistent with the FMLA; hence, CWA did
not interfere with Pellegrino’s FMLA rights by enforcing it against her. The sick leave
policy “merely sets forth obligations of employees who are on leave, regardless of
whether the leave is pursuant to the FMLA.” Callison, 430 F.3d at 120. “Nothing in the
FMLA prevents employers from ensuring that employees who are on leave from work do
not abuse their leave . . . .” Id. at 121. Indeed, in Callison we approved a city
government’s policy that required employees to call the city each time they came and
went from their homes during leave. See id. at 120-21. If that policy is consistent with
the FMLA, then a policy that forbids vacations during paid sick leave also is consistent
with the FMLA.
Pellegrino protests that, when an employee requests FMLA leave, “[t]he employer
shall also provide the employee with written notice detailing the specific expectations and
obligations of the employee and explaining any consequences of a failure to meet these
obligations.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1) (2008) (emphasis added); see also Conoshenti v.
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 142-45 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing this
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provision). 1 To repeat, she asserts that she never received the 2006 Policy, and if she did,
it did not explain that she could be terminated for travel during leave. Pellegrino did,
however, receive a notice of her obligations under the FMLA. The Department of Labor
provides Form WH-381, which she received, as a standard notice that satisfies the
regulation’s requirements. See Neel v. Mid-Atl. of Fairfield, LLC, 778 F. Supp. 2d 593,
603 (D. Md. 2011) (“[T]his Court agrees that WH-381 suffices as notice under section
825.300(c).”). Those requirements, which the regulation enumerates, are specific to the
FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1)(i)-(viii) (2008). It and its regulations are silent as
to what, if any, notice an employee must receive about corporate paid sick leave policies.
See Bacon, 550 F.3d at 715-16.
Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Pellegrino, we agree with the
District Court that CWA did not interfere with her rights under the FMLA.
B. Spoliation of Evidence
Pellegrino also contends that the District Court improperly ignored a CWA
employee’s spoliation of evidence. She asserts that the CWA employee learned of her
travels from a union member who worked at the Pittsburgh airport, then destroyed a
document that the union member had provided. That alleged spoliation, Pellegrino
continues, undermines the credibility of the CWA employee. The testimony of that
employee, however, is not necessary to our analysis. The sick leave policy, CWA’s
1
We quote the regulation that was in force when Pellegrino took her leave. Since then, it
has been slightly reworded and recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(c)(1). See Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, Effectiveness of Information Collection Requirements, 74
Fed. Reg. 2862 (Jan. 16, 2009).
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disclosures, and Pellegrino’s testimony and travel records are sufficient. We may
conclude that CWA did not interfere with Pellegrino’s FMLA rights without relying in
any way on that testimony. Thus, the alleged spoliation does not render summary
judgment improper.
C. At-Will Employment
Finally, Pellegrino briefly argues that the District Court erred in stating that she
was an at-will employee. On appeal, CWA concedes that the District Court’s statement
was in error. However, it argues that the error is immaterial, as Pellegrino’s collective
bargaining agreement (she was a member of the Office and Professional Employees
International Union) does not preclude termination in this context. CWA’s sick leave
policy states that it governs unless it is inconsistent with an employee’s collective
bargaining agreement, and Pellegrino’s collective bargaining agreement is silent as to
travel during sick leave. We therefore agree with CWA that the error was immaterial to
the FMLA claim before us.
* * * * *
Though Pellegrino’s termination appears harsh, the FMLA is not a law that
remedies her failure to abide by CWA’s sick leave policy. Thus, we affirm the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment.
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