NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3529
___________
HECTOR HUERTAS,
Appellant
v.
RAYMOND J. SOBINA, SUPERINTENDENT;
DAN HENRY, MAILROOM SUPERVISOR;
DORINA VARNER, CHIEF SECRETARY
OF INMATE GRIEVANCES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-00139)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 20, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 20, 2012)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Hector Huertas, a Pennsylvania prisoner, appeals from the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Dan Henry, against whom
Huertas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.
I
At all times relevant to this action, Huertas was a prisoner confined in the
restricted housing unit (“RHU”) at the State Correctional Institution in Albion,
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Albion”). In 2009 Huertas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against three Pennsylvania Department of Corrections employees: SCI-Albion
Superintendent Raymond Sobina; Chief Secretary of Inmate Grievances Dorina Varner;
and SCI-Albion mailroom supervisor Dan Henry. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, which the District Court granted in part. As a result, Sobina and Varner were
dismissed from the action, leaving only two claims against Henry.
With regard to the remaining claims against Henry, Huertas first alleged that on
three separate occasions (in January, February, and August 2008), Henry opened, read,
and returned to Huertas letters that he had written to his bank. Huertas alleged that this
conduct violated his First Amendment rights. Thereafter, Huertas filed a number of
administrative grievances related to the perceived problems with his mail. Second,
Huertas alleged that because he pursued these complaints, Henry unlawfully retaliated
against him by interfering with and taking contents from his mail.
After the parties completed discovery, during which Huertas was deposed, Henry
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted over Huertas’s
2
objections. Huertas now appeals from that decision.1
II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may affirm on any
grounds supported by the record. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir.
2001). “Our review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we
must apply the same standard the district court was required to apply under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56[].” Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir.
2010). “Thus, we can affirm only ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting former
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)). “A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id.
“In evaluating the evidence, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
With regard to Huertas’s claims that Henry interfered with his three letters to the
bank, the District Court reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate because there
was no evidence in the record that Henry was personally involved in the alleged
mishandling of the letters. We agree. “‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil
1
Huertas raises no challenge to the District Court’s earlier order dismissing his action
against Sobina and Varner.
3
rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot
be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can
be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.’” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). As the District Court explained in
some detail, the evidence in the record -- particularly Huertas’s deposition answers --
demonstrated that, as an RHU resident, Huertas had no first-hand knowledge of what
took place in the mailroom, and that he was unable to produce any evidence whatsoever
showing that Henry interfered with the bank letters, directed his subordinates to do so, or
acquiesced in any misconduct.2
Likewise, the District Court properly granted summary judgment with respect to
Huertas’s retaliation claim. Prison officials may be held liable for retaliatory conduct that
was motivated “‘in substantial part by a desire to punish [the prisoner] for exercise of a
constitutional right,’” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)), such as filing
lawsuits and grievances related to the conditions of incarceration. See Mitchell v. Horn,
318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981).
2
In the same vein, we agree with the District Court that two general statements
Henry made to Huertas in 2006 and 2007 that he “inspect[s] RHU mail and you
receive more than any other inmate down there,” and that he “handles the RHU mail”
were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Henry
mishandled Huertas’s letters to the bank in 2008.
4
To prevail on a retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove: (1) that the conduct leading to
the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an adverse
action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the
decision to discipline him. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Here,
Huertas alleged that because he pursued administrative grievances, Henry: (1) took
photographs from a letter sent by Huertas’s brother; (2) interfered with Huertas’s receipt
of a magazine subscription and related correspondences; (3) interfered with letters to and
from a pen pal service Huertas subscribed to; (4) took letters and photographs sent by and
to Huertas’s friend in England; and (5) confiscated and returned to Huertas’s relatives an
unspecified amount of funds they had sent to Huertas.
In rejecting Huertas’s retaliation claim, the District Court concluded that Huertas
failed to present any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Henry was personally involved in the purportedly retaliatory mishandling of Huertas’s
mail. In reaching this conclusion, however, the District Court overlooked Huertas’s
allegation -- supported by two fellow inmates’ affidavits -- that, on one occasion, Henry
responded to Huertas’s inquiry about missing photographs by stating that Huertas would
not get his photographs if he continued filing grievances. See D. Ct. Doc. No 4, 4, 12; D.
Ct. Doc. No. 71-2, 39. The affidavits, along with Huertas’s deposition testimony, were
arguably sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
Henry engaged in retaliatory conduct.
5
Even so, the record presents a separate basis to affirm the District Court’s
decision. That is, assuming arguendo personal involvement by Henry, the purported
conduct -- interfering with Huertas’s personal mail, confiscating his photographs, and
interfering with his receipt of funds -- was not sufficiently adverse to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from pursuing grievances. Simply put, more serious conduct is
required to make out a retaliation claim under § 1983.3 Compare Haynes v. Stephenson,
588 F.3d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2009) (filing of a disciplinary charge in retaliation for
inmate filing a grievance is adverse for purposes of § 1983 claim), Rauser, 241 F.3d at
333 (inmate presented evidence of adverse retaliatory conduct where he showed “that he
was denied parole, transferred to a distant prison where his family could not visit him
regularly, and penalized financially” when his prison employment pay grade was reduced
to the lowest possible level), and Allah, 229 F.3d at 225-26 (inmate sufficiently alleged
adverse retaliatory conduct, where he claimed he was placed in administrative
3
We note that, in an order dated November 21, 2011, we instructed the parties to
address in their briefs this very issue. To his credit, Huertas complied with our
instruction, although the primary case upon which he relies, Hawkins v. Brooks, 694
F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2010), is readily distinguishable. In Hawkins, the district
court was presented with a situation that was considerably more serious than that
faced by Huertas -- Hawkins, a female inmate, alleged that she was raped and
impregnated by a guard; she alleged that after she filed charges against the officer
involved, other officers not only withheld incoming mail, but they withheld outgoing
mail to the courts and to attorneys from whom she sought representation. See id. at
441-43.
On the other hand, and regrettably, the Attorney General’s Office, representing
Henry, neglected our briefing instruction altogether.
6
segregation and confined to his cell for all but five hours per week, which severely
limited his access to the commissary, recreation, rehabilitative programs, and legal
research materials and assistance), with Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d
Cir. 2011) (a misconduct charge against a prisoner -- which was later dismissed -- for
filing a false report was not sufficiently adverse to serve as the basis of a retaliation
action), and Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1999) (change in
prisoner’s employment, which limited his access to the prison law library to five hours
per week, was not adverse for purposes of a retaliation claim). No reasonable jury could
find that the acts alleged here were sufficiently serious to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his rights.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
7