NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3733
___________
JOSE PEREZ-BARRON,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES; FBOP; REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF FBOP;
MR. P. JUSTEN, SSIM/BOP; CORNELL COMPANIES, INC.;
MVCC WARDEN,MICHAEL ZENK;
MARIA DAWSON;DR.CONRADA AGRA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00173)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 4, 2012
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 20, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Jose Perez-Barron appeals pro se from a District Court judgment in favor of the
defendants in his civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
I. Background
Jose Perez-Barron is a federal prisoner confined at the Moshannon Valley
Correctional Center (“MVCC”), a private correctional facility in Pennsylvania, owned
and operated by Cornell Companies, Inc. In April 2009, Perez-Barron filed a complaint
against employees of MVCC, the United States of America, the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“FBOP”), employees of FBOP, and Cornell Companies, Inc. In his complaint,
Perez-Barron asserted that defendants denied him proper medical care, which the District
Court interpreted as alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment under Bivens1 and the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.2
In November 2006, prior to his arrest and conviction, Perez-Barron suffered an
accident, in which he lost one-quarter of his skull. He claimed that his general doctor
recommended that he might need reconstructive surgery. Perez-Barron stated that the
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
2
Although Perez-Barron’s complaint states that his claim of the denial of proper
medical care is a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right, the District
Court “look[ed] behind the label” given by the pro se inmate and determined that the
allegations in the complaint should be construed as claims asserting a violation of the
Eighth Amendment and FTCA. See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir.
1999).
2
Government was notified of his medical condition at sentencing, and that he informed
MVCC staff about his medical condition upon his arrival at MVCC in October 2008.
While at MVCC, Perez-Barron stated that he complained of headaches, constant
severe pain, blurred vision, difficulty speaking, difficulty in moving his arm and legs, and
abnormal sleep. He was prescribed naproxyn and Motrin, which he stated provided relief
for only short periods of time.
In November 2008, Perez-Barron filed an inmate informal resolution form,
addressed to Michael Zenk, Warden of MVCC, and P. Justen, requesting better medical
attention because his medical condition had deteriorated. The Medical Administrator
responded, informing Perez-Barron that his medical condition had been properly treated.
Perez-Barron then filed a formal administrative remedy form, explaining his symptoms,
stating that he needs reconstructive surgery, and requesting proper medical care. Zenk
responded, informing Perez-Barron that he had been examined by medical staff, his
headaches are the result of a chronic skull injury from a traumatic event, he should
purchase Motrin from the commissary for his pain, and he would be issued Motrin if he
became indigent. Perez-Barron filed an appeal, which was denied because administrative
review of his medical concerns and pertinent clinical data indicated that he had received
and continued to receive appropriate medical care.
Perez-Barron then filed suit in the District Court against Warden Zenk; Dr. Agra, a
medical doctor at MVCC; Ms. Dawson, Administrative Medical Director; Justen; the
United States of America; FBOP; FBOP Regional Director; FBOP General Counsel
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Director; and Cornell Companies, Inc. He alleged that defendants denied him proper
medical care, claiming that they failed to implement adequate medical treatment, such as
transferring him to a FBOP medical facility where adequate care would be provided;
failed to comply with advice given by his general doctor, who recommended that Perez-
Barron might need reconstructive surgery; and failed to examine his skull. He alleged
that as a result of defendants’ deliberate indifference, he has suffered and continues to
suffer from prolonged and extreme pain, such as frequent headaches, nightmares, sleep
disorder, pupils not reacting to light, blurred vision, and weak joints. He also claimed
that his condition has been further complicated with likely nerve damage and inability to
move joints.
Cornell Companies, Inc., Agra, Dawson, and Zenk (“Cornell defendants”) filed a
motion to dismiss, and Justen, United States of America, FBOP, FBOP Regional
Director, and FBOP General Counsel Director (“federal defendants”) filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to grant the defendants’ motions.3 Perez-
Barron filed a timely appeal. In his reply brief, Perez-Barron asks the Court to appoint
counsel to represent him.
3
The District Court converted the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, to a motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation placed Perez-Barron on notice that the Court was
considering the motion as a motion for summary judgment and Perez-Barron did not
object to the federal defendants’ submission of an affidavit to support their motion. See
Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1996).
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II. Discussion
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, as well as its grant of summary judgment, is
plenary. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).
A. Cornell Defendants
Perez-Barron raised Eighth Amendment claims under Bivens against Cornell
Companies Inc., a private corporation that owns and operates MVCC, and its employees,
Agra, Dawson, and Zenk. Bivens actions, however, may not be brought against private
corporations. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (holding no
action lies under Bivens against a private corporation operating a halfway house under a
contract with the Bureau of Prisons). Additionally, the Supreme Court recently refused
to imply the existence of a Bivens action where “a federal prisoner seeks damages from
privately employed personnel working at a private operated federal prison, where the
conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that
conduct is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law (such
as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue here).” Minneci v. Pollard, ___
U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012). Accordingly, the District Court properly granted
the Cornell defendants’ motion to dismiss, as Perez-Barron’s complaint failed to allege
facts that stated a plausible claim to relief against the Cornell defendants. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
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B. Federal Defendants
Perez-Barron also raised Eighth Amendment claims under Bivens against the
United States, FBOP, and FBOP employees. He alleged that the federal defendants are
liable because they are responsible for all facets of the prison, including the delivery of
medical care to inmates. The United States, FBOP, and the individual FBOP employees
in their official capacity, however, are barred from suit by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805
F.2d 126, 130 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986). Additionally, Perez-Barron’s Bivens claims against the
FBOP employees in their individual capacities fail. Perez-Barron did not allege or
present evidence that the FBOP employees had any personal involvement in the denial of
his medical care, and a Bivens claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat
superior. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49; Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988). Thus, the District Court properly granted the federal defendants’ motion
for summary judgment as to the Bivens claims.
The District Court also properly granted the federal defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to the FTCA claim. Under the FTCA, federal prisoners may
recover damages from the United States for injury sustained during confinement as a
result of the negligent or wrongful act or omission by any Government employee, acting
within the scope of his employment, under circumstances where a private person would
be liable under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2674. The FTCA delineates that a plaintiff may sue only the United States, and
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cannot institute suit until he presents the claim to a federal agency and receives a final
decision on the claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 112 (1993). In their motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, the federal defendants attached an affidavit of Vanessa Herbin-Smith, a FBOP
supervisory paralegal, who stated that based on her review of the FBOP tort claim
database, she determined that Perez-Barron had not filed any administrative tort claims.
Perez-Barron did not contest this finding. Perez-Barron was therefore barred from
bringing a FTCA claim in federal court because he did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Perez-
Barron’s request for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147,
155 (3d Cir. 1993).
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