In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1348
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
S ANTOS B AHENA-N AVARRO ,
also known as SANTOS B AHENA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 CR 675—James F. Holderman, Chief Judge.
A RGUED O CTOBER 31, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 24, 2012
Before K ANNE and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
D EG UILIO , District Judge.
K ANNE, Circuit Judge. Following a criminal conviction
in 2001 and again in 2003, Santos Bahena-Navarro, an
illegal immigrant, was deported to Mexico on August 27,
The Honorable Jon E. DeGuilio, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
2 No. 11-1348
2004. Undeterred, Bahena-Navarro unlawfully returned
to the United States in 2008. Less than one year later,
Elgin, Illinois police officers arrested him on suspicion
of domestic violence and obstruction of justice to which
he ultimately pled guilty. A federal grand jury then
returned an indictment charging Bahena-Navarro with
one count of reentry by a previously deported alien in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Following an unfavorable
pretrial ruling, Bahena-Navarro attempted to enter a
conditional guilty plea, but the district court rejected it
on the ground that he was unwilling to knowingly and
voluntarily waive certain trial rights. Bahena-Navarro
proceeded to trial and he was quickly convicted. On
appeal, Bahena-Navarro argues that the district court
erroneously rejected his proposed guilty plea. Finding
no error in the district court’s decision, we affirm.
I. B ACKGROUND
Bahena-Navarro, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered
the United States in 1980. His initial trouble with the law
began in 2001 when he pled guilty to felony delivery of a
controlled substance. Two years later Bahena-Navarro
again pled guilty, this time to possession of a controlled
substance and unlawful possession of a firearm. Fol-
lowing the second round of convictions, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security ordered Bahena-Navarro
removed from the United States. He was deported to
Mexico on August 27, 2004.
At some point during 2008, Bahena-Navarro reentered
the United States. In January 2009, Bahena-Navarro again
No. 11-1348 3
ran afoul of the law when his domestic partner called
Elgin, Illinois police to report a disturbance. Bahena-
Navarro was charged with several counts of domestic
battery and one count of obstruction of justice for pos-
sessing a false photo-identification card. Bahena-Navarro
eventually pled guilty to both charges.
On August 6, 2009, a federal grand jury charged Bahena-
Navarro with one count of reentry by a previously de-
ported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Prior to
trial, defense counsel suggested that Bahena-Navarro
intended to challenge the legality of the 2004 removal
order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).1 In response, the
government filed a motion in limine to preclude Bahena-
Navarro’s collateral attack. The government’s motion
included a signed document also bearing Bahena-
Navarro’s fingerprints indicating that he waived his
right to challenge the 2004 deportation. Nevertheless,
the district court initially denied the government’s
motion and scheduled a pretrial hearing to give Bahena-
Navarro an opportunity to demonstrate how he met
the § 1326(d) elements. Following jury selection but
before the jurors were sworn, the district court held a
June 14, 2010, hearing on the government’s motion. At
1
To successfully challenge the 2004 removal order under
§ 1326(d), Bahena-Navarro must prove that (1) he “exhausted
any administrative remedies that may have been available to
seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings
at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien
of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of
the order was fundamentally unfair.”
4 No. 11-1348
the hearing, Bahena-Navarro focused his testimony on
the impropriety of his 2004 deportation, but the district
court found his testimony lacked credibility and that
he had “not established any of the elements under
[§ 1326(d)].” Accordingly, the district court granted the
government’s renewed motion in limine and ruled that
Bahena-Navarro could not collaterally attack his 2004
removal order.
On June 15, 2010, defense counsel informed the
district court that Bahena-Navarro wished to enter a
guilty plea on the condition that he could appeal the
district court’s unfavorable § 1326(d) ruling. The gov-
ernment consented to the proposed plea and the
district court then confirmed directly with Bahena-
Navarro that he intended to plead guilty. As required
by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Chief Judge Holderman began explaining that a guilty
plea required Bahena-Navarro to waive certain trial
rights, including the right not to incriminate oneself. In
attempting to explain this first waiver, Bahena-Navarro
indicated that he was “a little confused” (Tr. at 230) and
his confusion seemingly multiplied when he asked
whether he could “come back to another court” following
his guilty plea (Id. at 231). In an apparent attempt to
stave off further confusion, the district court permitted
a short recess for Bahena-Navarro to confer with
counsel and a Spanish-speaking interpreter. (Id. at 232.)
As the hearing resumed, the district court reminded
counsel and the defendant that a guilty plea requires
Bahena-Navarro to waive his right against self-incrimina-
No. 11-1348 5
tion even though Bahena-Navarro had just one day
earlier denied wrongdoing during the § 1326(d) hearing.
(Id. at 234.) Despite the recess and the district court’s
explanations, Bahena-Navarro continued to express
confusion, stating, “I don’t want to go to a trial lately.”
(Id.) At this point, the district court suggested that Bahena-
Navarro was feigning his confusion and worse yet,
lying to the court. (Id. at 235.) Exasperated, Chief Judge
Holderman said:
I am going to allow you all of the rights that you’re
entitled to, and you need not waive any rights
at all. We are going to accord you a jury trial.
There is a fair and impartial jury waiting in the
back room to hear your case. That’s what you
wanted when I took over this case . . . .
(Id.) In response, Bahena-Navarro twice said, “Let’s go
to trial.” (Id.) But before finally bringing in the jury,
the district court gave Bahena-Navarro one last oppor-
tunity to knowingly and voluntarily relinquish his
trial rights. (Id. at 235-36.) Bahena-Navarro replied,
“Why can’t I not testify before a jury?” and “I would like
to testify before a jury, because they have not helped me
as representatives.” (Id. at 235-36.) In response, the jury
was sworn, and Bahena-Navarro was duly convicted
of illegally reentering the United States in violation of
§ 1326(a).
Bahena-Navarro moved for a new trial on two
grounds: first, that the district court erred by refusing
to credit his pretrial testimony and second, that the
district court improperly pushed Bahena-Navarro to
6 No. 11-1348
trial. The district court rejected both arguments and
later sentenced him to forty-one months’ imprisonment.
Bahena-Navarro now appeals the district court’s deci-
sion to reject his conditional guilty plea.
II. A NALYSIS
We begin by noting the oft-repeated rule that a crim-
inal defendant has “no absolute right to have a guilty
plea accepted.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971). Rather, district courts “retain[] a large measure
of discretion to decide whether a guilty plea is appro-
priate in the circumstances of a particular case.” United
States v. Rea-Beltran, 457 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2006)
(citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11
(1970)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) (“With the
consent of the court and the government, a de-
fendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . .”).
Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision to
reject Bahena-Navarro’s guilty plea under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Hernandez-
Rivas, 513 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2008); Rea-Beltran, 457
F.3d at 701 (“As a general matter, we trust the district
court’s assessment of a defendant’s knowledge and
voluntariness because of the court’s ability, unlike our
own, to observe the defendant in person and examine
his demeanor.”).
To guide the proper use of a district court’s discretion,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) requires that
district courts engage the defendant in a plea colloquy.
Generally speaking, the plea colloquy is designed to
No. 11-1348 7
ensure that the guilty plea is made in a knowing and
voluntary fashion, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)-(2), and that
it has some “factual basis,” id. at R. 11(b)(3). To ensure
the defendant has knowingly waived his trial rights,
Rule 11(b)(1) outlines fourteen subjects the plea colloquy
must address. Id. at R. 11(b)(1)(A)-(N). Among others,
the defendant must knowingly waive his right to a
jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and his right to testify. To ensure
the defendant’s plea is grounded in fact, we have previ-
ously found that the required factual basis may arise
from the defendant’s admissions and anything else
that appears in the record. Rea-Beltran, 457 F.3d at 701;
United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir. 1991).
On appeal, Bahena-Navarro mistakenly seeks to focus
our attention on the factual basis for his guilty plea.
Although it is certainly possible that Bahena-Navarro
satisfied each element of a § 1326(a) charge, thus giving
his guilty plea a proper factual basis, we need not
decide that issue. Rather, the factual basis for his guilty
plea is ultimately irrelevant because Bahena-Navarro
never knowingly waived his trial rights, despite the dis-
trict court’s numerous attempts to explain those rights.
For example, Bahena-Navarro expressed confusion
about the type of plea he was entering, stating, “I thought
you said that it was going to be a blind plea.” (Tr. at 231.)
Bahena-Navarro also expressed confusion about whether
he was required to waive his right against self-incrimina-
tion. His claimed confusion led to a short recess, after
which he became confused about whether his guilty
plea would permit him to testify before a jury, stating,
8 No. 11-1348
“I would like to testify before a jury . . . .” (Id. at 236.)
A district court cannot accept a defendant’s condi-
tional guilty plea if that defendant does not under-
stand that he is waiving his right to a jury and
his right against self-incrimination. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(1)(C), (E).
For the same reason, Bahena-Navarro is wrong to rely
on our decision in Rea-Beltran. There, we were con-
fronted with a defendant charged with unlawful reentry
by a previously deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), the same offense at issue in this case. Rea-
Beltran, 457 F.3d at 697. At sentencing, Rea-Beltran
attacked his original deportation order by stating that
he thought he had permission to reenter the United
States. Id. at 701. The district court interpreted Rea-
Beltran’s confusion about his reentry status as an unwill-
ingness to admit guilt and thus, grounds to reject his
proposed guilty plea. We reversed and held that Rea-
Beltran’s belief regarding the validity of his reentry is
not an element to a § 1326(a) offense, and accordingly,
the proposed guilty plea had a sufficient factual basis.
Id. at 702. Bahena-Navarro analogizes Rea-Beltran’s
confusion regarding the legality of his reentry to his
own confusion regarding his waived trial rights. To
Bahena-Navarro, we should reverse the district court
because he was confused in the same way as Rea-
Beltran. This is incorrect.
The critical and perhaps obvious difference is that this
case is about Bahena-Navarro’s confusion and ap-
parent unwillingness to waive certain trial rights while
No. 11-1348 9
Rea-Beltran is about the district court’s error in finding
that the defendant’s proposed guilty plea did not have
a factual basis. Rea-Beltran offers no escape hatch for
Bahena-Navarro’s failure to knowingly waive his trial
rights.
Perhaps acknowledging that he did not knowingly
waive his trial rights, Bahena-Navarro next argues that
the district court arbitrarily rejected his guilty plea
without fully inquiring into the underlying confusion.
In a similar vein, Bahena-Navarro suggests that the
district court coerced him into proceeding to trial. The
record belies both assertions. In fact, the district court
repeated certain questions and gave deeper explana-
tions when Bahena-Navarro initially expressed confu-
sion. For example, the district court in response to Bahena-
Navarro’s expressed confusion said, “[L]et’s end this
confusion. . . . What are you confused about, sir?” (Tr. at
230.) The district court also permitted a short recess
for Bahena-Navarro to confer with an interpreter and
defense counsel. Most importantly, Bahena-Navarro
twice said “Let’s go to trial,” after which the district court
still asked Bahena-Navarro three more times whether
he understood the rights he was forgoing. (Id. at 235.)
Far from coercing Bahena-Navarro into proceeding to
trial, the plea colloquy transcript suggests that the
district court diligently and patiently questioned Bahena-
Navarro about his willingness to waive his trial rights.
Finally, Bahena-Navarro argues that the district court
erred by not fully explaining its rationale for rejecting
the proposed guilty plea. See Rea-Beltran, 457 F.3d at 701
10 No. 11-1348
(“To facilitate meaningful appellate review and ‘foster
the sound exercise of judicial discretion,’ we require
that courts state on the record a sound reason for
rejecting a plea.”) (quoting United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d
447, 453 (7th Cir. 1998)). This argument is without
merit as the district court explained its rationale
in portions of the plea colloquy and within its opinion
denying Bahena-Navarro’s motion for a new trial.
During the plea colloquy, for example, the district court
attempted to call the jury after Bahena-Navarro initially
declined to waive his right against self-incrimination.
(Tr. at 234.) Likewise, the district court’s opinion denying
Bahena-Navarro’s motion for a new trial explained that
Bahena-Navarro “did not understand the consequences
of his guilty plea.” Specifically, Bahena-Navarro “ap-
peared to believe that he would still be able to argue
his innocence before a jury or before another judge at
some point in the future.” The record clearly indicates
that the district court plainly explained its reasoning
in denying Bahena-Navarro’s guilty plea.
III. C ONCLUSION
Because we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting Bahena-Navarro’s guilty plea,
we A FFIRM Bahena-Navarro’s conviction.
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