UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5045
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SHERWOOD MILAS GAITHER, a/k/a Wood,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:03-cr-00012-RLV-9)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Ann Hester, Assistant Federal Defender, Erin K.
Taylor, Research and Writing Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sherwood Milas Gaither appeals from his twelve-month
sentence with four years of supervised release imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release. Gaither’s counsel has
filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) brief,
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
raising whether Gaither’s sentence was plainly unreasonable.
The Government did not file a brief and Gaither did not file a
pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
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revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The
twelve-month prison term does not exceed the applicable maximum
allowed by statute and is within the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2006). The district
court considered the argument of Gaither’s counsel, the
Guidelines advisory range, the recommendation of the Government,
and relevant § 3553(a) factors, addressing on the record
Gaither’s criminal history and characteristics, and the need for
the sentence to deter Gaither. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A,
introductory cmt. 3(b) (2011). The district court adequately
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explained its rationale for imposing sentence, and the reasons
relied upon are proper bases for the sentence imposed.
Accordingly, we conclude that Gaither’s sentence was
reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s order imposing
the twelve-month prison sentence and four-year term of
supervised release. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Gaither’s revocation of supervised
release and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform
Gaither, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Gaither requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Gaither.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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