UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4988
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSE LUIS WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:10-cr-00997-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Luis Wilson pled guilty to assault on another
inmate and was sentenced to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment to
run consecutively to his undischarged term of imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Wilson’s
sentence was reasonable. Wilson was advised of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so. The
Government declined to file a brief. We affirm.
Counsel does not direct our attention to any specific
potential errors in Wilson’s sentence. We review Wilson’s
sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). In conducting
this review, we must first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to
properly calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) (2006) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence. Id. at 51. “When imposing a sentence within the
Guidelines . . . the [district court’s] explanation need not be
elaborate or lengthy because [G]uidelines sentences themselves
are in many ways tailored to the individual and reflect
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approximately two decades of close attention to federal
sentencing policy.” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267,
271 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is
within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a presumption
on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a
presumption is rebutted only if the defendant demonstrates “that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court adopted the advisory
Guidelines range in the presentence report without objection
from either party. The court then heard argument from counsel
and allocution from Wilson as to the appropriate sentence.
Counsel did not request a specific sentence but suggested that,
despite the Guidelines’ recommendation of a consecutive
sentence, the sentence be run concurrently with the sentence
Wilson was already serving. After considering the § 3553(a)
factors and the advisory Guidelines, the court concluded that a
consecutive sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range
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adequately addressed the sentencing factors. Neither counsel
nor Wilson offers any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal
that the within-Guidelines sentence was substantively
reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Wilson.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Wilson, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Wilson requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Wilson. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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