UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4330
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT JAMAAL LILES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:10-cr-00945-TLW-2)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: April 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Liles pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack
and powder cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to
262 months’ imprisonment. Liles noted a timely appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that he has found no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Liles’ guilty plea and whether the sentence imposed was
reasonable. Although informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, Liles has not done so. We affirm.
We have reviewed the transcript of Liles’ guilty plea
hearing and find that the district court fully complied with the
mandates of Rule 11. The court ensured that Liles understood
the charges against him, the potential sentence he faced, and
the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. See United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover,
Liles entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and the plea
was supported by a sufficient factual basis. Id. at 119–20.
We review Liles’ sentence for reasonableness, applying
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
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Id. We assess whether the district court properly calculated
the advisory Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments presented
by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; see United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2010). If there is no procedural
error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is within the Guidelines
range, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (upholding presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. Moreover, Liles has failed to overcome the
presumption of reasonableness we accord his within-Guidelines
sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Liles’ conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Liles, in writing, of the right to
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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Liles requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Liles.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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