10-3839-cr
United States v. Garcia
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
2 the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New
3 York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand twelve.
4
5 PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
7 Circuit Judges,
8 EDWARD R. KORMAN,
9 District Judge.*
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12
13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee,
15
16 v. No. 10-3839-cr
17 TOMMY GARCIA, aka Gordo,
18 Defendant-Appellant.
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21
22 FOR APPELLANT: JONATHAN J. EINHORN, Esq., New Haven, CT.
23
24 FOR APPELLEE: ROBERT M. SPECTOR, Assistant United States
25 Attorney (Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United
26 States Attorney, on the brief), for David B. Fein,
*
Judge Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
1 United States Attorney for the District of
2 Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
3
4 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alvin
5 W. Thompson, Chief Judge).
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
7 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
8 Defendant-Appellant Tommy Garcia appeals from a judgment of conviction
9 entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson,
10 C.J.) following his plea of guilty to one count of conspiring to possess and distribute
11 cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The
12 District Court sentenced Garcia principally to a 70-month term of imprisonment, to be
13 followed by a five-year term of supervised release. On appeal, Garcia contends that the
14 District Court erroneously determined that he was responsible for a quantity of crack
15 cocaine that was neither known to him nor reasonably foreseeable by him. We assume
16 the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference
17 only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
18 “The law is well established that if, as a tactical matter, a party raises no objection
19 to a purported error, such inaction constitutes a true ‘waiver’ which will negate even plain
20 error review.” United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation and
21 quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); United
22 States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009). Garcia intentionally waived his
23 right to challenge the factual bases of his sentence, including the drug quantity for which
24 he was held accountable at sentencing.
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1 At his sentencing hearing, for example, Garcia confirmed that during a safety
2 valve proffer, he admitted to being responsible for distributing six kilograms of cocaine
3 base. He explicitly declined a hearing on that issue. In his sentencing memorandum,
4 moreover, Garcia stated that he had no objection to the facts contained in the presentence
5 report, which noted that he was responsible for six kilograms of cocaine base. Similarly,
6 in arguing for a downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines, he admitted that
7 “it was foreseeable to him that the quantities alleged by the government were involved.”
8 Garcia received several tangible benefits from his tactical decision to admit both
9 drug quantity and type. First, he qualified for safety valve relief from the mandatory
10 minimum ten-year sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Second, he received a two-level
11 decrease in his Sentencing Guidelines range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Third, he received
12 an additional three-level reduction under the Guidelines for full acceptance of
13 responsibility. Ultimately, the District Court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence of 70
14 months, below the applicable Guidelines range of 87-108 months.
15 Even if we were to conclude that Garcia had not waived his right to challenge the
16 factual bases for his sentence, his argument based on United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d
17 239 (2d Cir. 1996), would have no merit. Unlike in Chalarca, where the defendant “was
18 not aware that the purpose of his trip . . . was to purchase cocaine,” id. at 244, Garcia
19 directly participated in the drug transactions as a drug courier and knew that he was
20 delivering drugs. Indeed, at sentencing, it was agreed that Garcia “was paid in terms of
21 the amount of drugs that were sold. So that approximately 1 kilogram cocaine base was
22 sold every 10 days to two weeks, and for that he was paid somewhere between $600 and
3
1 $800.” Sentencing Tr., Aug. 17, 2010, at 5-6. “[T]he quantity of drugs attributed to a
2 defendant need not be foreseeable to him when he personally participates, in a direct way,
3 in a jointly undertaken drug transaction.” Chalarca, 95 F.3d at 243.
4 We have considered Garcia’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
5 merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
6 FOR THE COURT:
7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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