[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 25, 2012
No. 11-13061
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-22951-KMM
JOAN LYONS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MIAMI DADE COUNTY FIRE RESCUE DEPARTMENT,
MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
Governmental Entities,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 25, 2012)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joan Lyons appeals the summary judgment in favor of Miami-Dade County
and against her complaint of unlawful retaliation and discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with
Disabilities Act, id. § 12101 et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. §
760.10. Lyons argues that she was prejudiced by the denial of her motions to
amend the scheduling order and to defer consideration of the motion of the County
for summary judgment. Lyons also argues that the County retaliated against her
for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
Internal Affairs office and that the County violated the Disabilities Act by
requesting that she submit to a medical examination. We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Lyons’s
motions to amend the scheduling order and to defer consideration of the motion for
summary judgment. Lyons sought additional time purportedly to conduct
discovery, but Lyons had been dilatory in preparing for trial. Lyons’s counsel of
eight months withdrew based on Lyons’s refusal to “fulfill . . . obligations” or to
communicate with him. After counsel withdrew and before Lyons filed her
motions, Lyons failed to comply with an order to notify the district court whether
she would proceed pro se or retain new counsel; she twice failed to appear for a
deposition; and she neglected to hire new counsel until after the deadline for
2
discovery and pre-trial pleadings had expired and after the County had moved for
summary judgment. Lyons failed to establish that there was “good cause” to
amend the scheduling order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), or that her circumstances
warranted that the district court defer consideration of the motion for summary
judgment, see Wright v. Revere Copper and Brass Inc., 836 F.2d 505, 507 n.4
(11th Cir. 1988).
Even if we assume, as the district court did, that Lyons proved a prima facie
case of retaliation, Lyons failed to prove that the legitimate reason proffered for her
termination was pretextual. See Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160,
1181–82 (11th Cir. 2010); Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255
(11th Cir. 2007). The County presented evidence that Lyons was terminated for
insubordination after she refused to comply with an order to provide medical
information in an evaluation to determine her fitness to resume work. Lyons
argues that the “reason[] proffered . . . for [her] termination . . . [is] rife with errors
and inconsistencies,” but the County introduced the testimony of Dr. Dasalia Soto
that she could not evaluate Lyons’s fitness for duty because Lyons had refused to
execute a release to grant access to her medical history. Lyons conceded in her
response to the motion for summary judgment that she had refused to execute the
release. Lyons failed to present evidence that would create a genuine issue of
3
material fact about whether the reason for her termination was discriminatory or
unworthy of credence. See Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1278
(11th Cir. 2008).
Lyons also failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Disabilities Act. Under the Act, a covered employer may not require a medical
examination or make medical inquiries regarding an employee’s disability “unless
such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The County had reason to
question Lyons’s fitness to work as a fire code inspector. In 2005, Lyons was
injured on the job and suffered a herniated disk and dislocated vertebrae, after
which she required periodic reassignments to light duty and obtained a medical
leave of absence between December 1, 2006, and July 13, 2007, for “urgent
medical care.” The order to undergo a fitness evaluation was indisputably related
to a legitimate concern of the County about whether Lyons could perform her job-
related duties.
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the County.
4