NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 08-4309
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
VERNON DOUGLAS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 2:05-cr-00038-001)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 24, 2012
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Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 26, 2012)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Vernon Douglas appeals his conviction as well as the District Court’s denial of his
post-conviction motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29(a) or for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), based
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on the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial. For the following reasons, we will
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our
disposition. On June 22, 2004, Police Officer Nathan London and a confidential
informant went to Douglas’s home and conducted an undercover drug purchase. The
confidential informant knocked on Douglas’s door, and when Douglas answered, the
confidential informant asked for “four,” and gave Douglas a prerecorded $20 bill.
Douglas went into the house and returned with small objects. After the purchase, the
confidential informant gave Officer London the four pink-tinted packets, which later
testing revealed to be crack cocaine.
The next day, officers executed a search warrant on Douglas’s home. At the time
of the search, Douglas was the only person in the house. Officers arrested Douglas and
searched him, finding $306 cash, including the prerecorded $20 bill used as buy money
the previous day. The officers searched the house. They found a triple beam scale,
commonly used to weigh drugs, in the dining room. Inside a piano bench, they found a
bag with a large amount of cocaine. In the living room, the officers found two pink-
tinted packets containing crack cocaine in a magnetic Hide-A-Key attached to a tool box
near the front door of the house. Officers found three guns, one inside the toolbox,
another inside a vase in the living room, and a third in the bedroom. Officers also found
Douglas’s social security card and driver’s license in the house. Douglas’s daughter
testified at trial that her father was the only person who lived in the house but that eight
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cousins and family friends had keys and access to the house. However, on cross-
examination, she admitted she had not been to her father’s house for six months prior to
his arrest. Further, she was unable to provide last names of the family friends that she
claimed had access to the house and did not have contact information for the family
members who allegedly had access.
Douglas was convicted by the jury of distribution of cocaine base in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a),
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). After the jury trial, the District Court found Douglas
guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(g)(1) in a stipulated nonjury trial.
The District Court sentenced Douglas to life imprisonment for the possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and to concurrent sentences for the
other four counts, ranging from 12 to 240 months. Douglas appealed, raising only issues
related to his sentence, and this Court remanded for the District Court to clarify the basis
of the life sentence, because it had not specified whether the non-guideline sentence was
based on a variance or a departure. United States v. Douglas, 244 F. App’x 411, 413 (3d
Cir. 2007). On remand the District Court resentenced Douglas to a term of imprisonment
of 220 months, three years supervised release, and a special assessment of $500. Douglas
now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
II.
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The Government contends Douglas waived his appeal of his conviction when he
did not raise it in his earlier appeal of his sentence. The question of whether an appellant
has waived an issue presented on appeal is a question of law, over which this Court
exercises plenary review. United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 178 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010).1
In United States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 2001), defendant Pultrone
voluntarily withdrew his initial notice of appeal. The Government filed a cross-appeal,
contending that the District Court had erred when it failed to sentence Pultrone to the
statutory mandatory minimum. Id. at 307. This Court agreed with the Government and
vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded for resentencing. Id. After
resentencing, Pultrone appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against him
and the District Court’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard to its
determination of the amount of cocaine for which he was responsible. Id. at 306-07. He
also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. This Court held that “[e]ach of
these allegations of error could and should have been raised in that direct appeal; because
Pultrone voluntarily withdrew the appeal, he failed to preserve these issues.” Id. at 307.
This Court dismissed Pultrone’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
Pultrone is controlling in this matter. Because Douglas failed to raise the
sufficiency of the jury verdict in his initial appeal, he has waived his right to appeal that
issue. On this basis, we will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
III.
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
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Douglas filed a pro se motion for appointment of new counsel on June 20, 2011
because his appointed counsel did not provide Douglas with a copy of the brief she filed
on his behalf. The motion was denied, but Douglas appealed the decision, which was
construed as a motion to reconsider and is currently before this merits panel.
Douglas contends that his appointed counsel refused to raise his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. This Court does not generally entertain ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, except in the narrow circumstances where
the record is sufficient to permit determination of the issue. United States v. Thornton,
327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003). The record in Douglas’s case has not been developed,
so we would not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review.
Further, Douglas does not have a right to counsel of his choosing. Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Douglas’s motion for reconsideration of his motion for
new counsel will be denied.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
will deny Douglas’s motion to reconsider denial of his motion for appointment of new
counsel.
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