FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 27, 2012
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KENNETH E. PEPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 08-1131 & 11-1237
(D.C. No. 1:04-CV-01382-ZLW-KLM)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (D. Colo.)
OF AGRICULTURE; THOMAS
VILSACK, Secretary, in his official
capacity; FOREST SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
THOMAS J. TIDWELL, as Chief, in
his official capacity, *
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before O’BRIEN and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Thomas Vilsack is substituted for
Mike Johanns and Thomas J. Tidwell is substituted for Dale Bosworth as
appellees in this appeal.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these consolidated appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Kenneth E. Peper, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals from the district courts’
orders dismissing his claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a,
and entering judgment on his claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Peper owns a patented mining claim, the May Queen Lode, which is an
inholding 2 located within the Roosevelt National Forest in Colorado. In
November 2001, he sought an easement from the Forest Service, an agency of the
United States Department of Agriculture, pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 251.54, to
access his land via an existing road. In particular, Mr. Peper sought motorized
access so that he could build and access a cabin on the land.
The Forest Service advised Mr. Peper to submit a modified special use
application after forming a home- or landowners’ association. In April 2003,
Mr. Peper provided the Forest Service notice of the formation of the Middle
Boulder Creek Road Association. The Forest Service thereafter notified
Mr. Peper that, due to backlogs and staffing issues, he could expect to receive
special use authorization in two to four years.
1
We liberally construe Mr. Peper’s pro se filings. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
2
“Inholdings constitute property completely surrounded by property owned
by the United States.” United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1515 n.1 (10th Cir.
1994) (Jenks I).
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On July 7, 2004, Mr. Peper filed a verified complaint under the QTA
against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, the Forest Service, and its
Chief. He asserted three easement rights for which he sought to quiet title: (1) a
common law easement by necessity; (2) a public road easement under R.S. 2477; 3
and (3) a statutory easement under the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a). 4 Defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). In addition, in
September 2004, the Forest Service indicated to the court that it would require
3
Before being repealed in 1976, R.S. 2477 permitted rights of way to
construct highways on public lands not reserved for public use. Lyon v. Gila
River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 932
(repealed 1976)); see also S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
425 F.3d 735, 740-41 (10th Cir. 2005). “The law repealing R.S. 2477 expressly
preserved any valid, existing right-of-way.” Lyon, 626 F.3d at 1076; see also
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 741.
4
Section 3210(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and subject to
such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Agriculture may
prescribe, the Secretary shall provide such access to nonfederally
owned land within the boundaries of the National Forest System as
the Secretary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable
use and enjoyment thereof: Provided, That such owner comply with
rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress to or from the
National Forest System.
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two to three more years, until September 2006 or 2007, to complete the
administrative process.
Adopting in part the magistrate judge’s recommendations, the district court
granted in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court decided that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) over the claim based on
R.S. 2477, because merely being a member of the public did not give Mr. Peper
title to public roads allowing him to bring a quiet title suit under R.S. 2477.
Although recognizing jurisdiction under the QTA over an easement-by-necessity
claim, the court decided it was preempted by the ANILCA and the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784. Thus, the court
dismissed the easement-by-necessity claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Lastly, the court recognized that the
application for a special use authorization under the ANILCA was still pending
with the Forest Service. But because the Forest Service estimated an
unreasonably long time to complete the administrative process, the court ordered
it to expedite and complete the administrative process on or before December 1,
2006. Upon the government’s motion, the district court later extended the
deadline to May 15, 2007.
On May 14, 2007, the Forest Service granted the Middle Boulder Creek
Road Association special use authorization under the FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1761,
by offering a forest road easement and a private road easement, subject to various
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conditions, including (1) construction of an armored ford, a bridge, and a road
before motorized use would be allowed and (2) imposition of an annual fee.
Upon notifying the court that administrative processing of Mr. Peper’s application
for a special use authorization was complete and two easements had been issued,
defendants requested dismissal of Mr. Peper’s remaining ANILCA claim.
Mr. Peper responded and filed an amended complaint challenging the
administrative decision under the APA, asserting a new QTA claim for the right
to an easement by prescription under state law, and again asserting QTA rights
based on easements by necessity, under R.S. 2477, and under the ANILCA. The
district court struck the amended complaint as untimely. Also, the court granted
defendants’ request to dismiss the remaining ANILCA claim. The court,
however, gave Mr. Peper permission to file an amended complaint setting forth
only a claim to review the agency decision under the APA.
Mr. Peper filed a second amended complaint, alleging claims under both
the QTA and the APA. Under the QTA, he asserted rights to an easement under
four theories: (1) by necessity; (2) by prescription under state law; (3) under
R.S. 2477; and (4) under the ANILCA. With respect to the APA, he asserted that
(1) defendants violated 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1) 5 by failing to consider his
5
Section 251.114(f)(1) provides that “the authorizing officer, prior to issuing
any access authorization, must . . . ensure that [t]he landowner has demonstrated a
lack of any existing rights or routes of access available by deed or under State or
(continued...)
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pre-existing interest in access to the property before granting a special use permit
under the ANILCA; and (2) because the special use permit contained
unreasonable and arbitrary and capricious rules, regulations, limitations, and
restrictions on the use of his property, the Forest Service in effect denied him an
easement in violation of the ANILCA.
After Mr. Peper filed the second amended complaint, the district court
entered final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on the QTA claims it had
previously dismissed. Mr. Peper filed his first notice of appeal, No. 08-1131.
After the parties completed briefing on the second amended complaint, the
magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the QTA claims, because the
easement-by-necessity, R.S. 2477, and ANILCA claims had been dismissed
previously and the easement-by-prescription claim had been asserted without
leave of the district court. The magistrate judge recommended remand to the
Forest Service for further proceedings on the APA claims, because the Forest
Service had not complied with § 251.114(f)(1)’s requirement that it consider
during its administrative review whether Mr. Peper had “existing rights or routes
of access available by deed or under State or common law.” Further, the
5
(...continued)
common law.”
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magistrate judge recommended that, on remand, the Forest Service again consider
the terms and conditions of any special use authorization or easement.
After both parties filed objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations, the district court entered final judgment in favor of defendants.
In doing so, the court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the
QTA claims be dismissed with prejudice. The court, however, rejected the
magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning the APA claims, determining that
“it is clear that to the extent that review of pre-existing rights and routes of access
is necessary under [§ 251.114(f)(1)], that review occurred since [Mr. Peper] filed
the present lawsuit specifically to address his claims of pre-existing access.”
Suppl. R., Vol. 1 at 346; see also id. at 347 (“Since the [Forest Service] has been
a Defendant in this case from the beginning, all events that took place in this case
must be considered part of the administrative record. Thus, discussion of the
existence of pre-existing access occurred within this case during the
administrative review of [Mr. Peper’s] application. Whatever the level of review
necessary under subsection (f), this Court concludes that the [Forest Service],
through the lengthy litigation that has occurred in this case, has met its burden
under subsection (f)(1).” (footnote omitted)).
The court then proceeded to review the conditions imposed on the
easements offered by the Forest Service and concluded they were not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In reaching this conclusion, the court found
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that Mr. Peper “obtained exactly what he applied for: vehicular access to his
property.” Id. at 351. The court was convinced that the Forest Service
satisfactorily balanced Mr. Peper’s statutory right of access to the land with the
regulatory requirements. Furthermore, the court decided that Mr. Peper did not
prove that the terms of the easements were unreasonable.
Discussing a few of the arguments made by Mr. Peper, the court found that
(1) the termination provisions are an acceptable component of the FLPMA
easements; (2) the specifications for the new bridge are reasonable and consistent
with bridge standards required for Forest Service lands, and Mr. Peper declined to
provide input on the bridge design during the administrative proceedings; (3) the
Forest Service properly issued the easements to the Middle Boulder Creek Road
Association, rather than to Mr. Peper; (4) because Mr. Peper indicated he did not
seek special snow removal, the Forest Service had no obligation to perform
environmental analysis for winter access or to provide winter access in the
easements; and (5) the Forest Service was authorized to impose an annual fee for
the easements, and the fee charged was reasonable. Mr. Peper appealed,
No. 11-1237. This court consolidated the two appeals.
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DISCUSSION
I. Quiet Title Act Claims
Mr. Peper argues that the district court erred in dismissing his QTA claims
as preempted by the ANILCA. 6 We review the district court’s dismissals under
Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) de novo. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090,
1097-98 (10th Cir. 2009); Trackwell v. U.S. Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir.
2007).
The district court correctly determined that an easement by necessity was
preempted by the ANILCA. See United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1353-54
(10th Cir. 1997) (Jenks II). We agree with that determination for the reasons
stated by the court in its order of September 5, 2006, adopting the magistrate
judge’s recommendation dated March 25, 2005. See R., Vol. I at Docs. 19 & 28.
Mr. Peper continues to assert an easement-by-prescription claim. He first
asserted the claim in an amended complaint he filed after the Forest Service’s
permit process was over. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying him leave to assert this untimely claim. See Pater v. City of
6
Because Mr. Peper did not challenge the district court’s determination of
his QTA claim under R.S. 2477 until his reply brief, we deem any claim to an
easement under R.S. 2477 to be waived. Even if he had continued to assert a
claim under R.S. 2477 throughout the appeal, we would affirm the district court’s
decision rejecting an easement under R.S. 2477 for the reasons stated by that
court in its order of September 5, 2006, adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation of March 25, 2005. See R., Vol. I at Docs. 19 & 28.
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Casper, 646 F.3d 1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2011). Untimeliness alone is sufficient to
deny amendment, especially since Mr. Peper has no explanation for his delay in
asserting the new claim. Id. Furthermore, allowing amendment would have
prejudiced defendants, since extensive and final agency review had been
completed. See id.
II. Administrative Procedure Act Claims
Mr. Peper argues that the Forest Service failed to comply with proper
procedures when reaching its decision to grant the two easements with conditions,
and that the decision is arbitrary and capricious. We will “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions [that are] arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Utahns for Better
Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). “The APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard is a
deferential one; administrative determinations may be set aside only for
substantial procedural or substantive reasons, and the court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.” Id. Our review of the district court’s decision
is de novo, and we do not give it any deference. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 620 F.3d 1227, 1233
(10th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Peper disputes the legality of the Forest Service’s issuance of
easements under the ANILCA without first deciding if he owned rights of access
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under state or common law. He contends the Forest Service’s failure to consider
his State and common law access rights violated 36 C.F.R. § 251.114(f)(1). In
addition, he maintains that because he had pre-existing access to Forest Service
land, § 251.114(f)(1) provides that he did not need a statutory right-of-way under
the ANILCA. He further contends that failure to follow § 251.114(f)(1) violated
the APA, either as a failure to comply with procedures or as an arbitrary and
capricious decision imposing unreasonable conditions for access.
Mr. Peper correctly asserts, and we have held, that § 251.114(f)(1) requires
a determination of his patent, State, or common law rights of access. See Jenks
II, 129 F.3d at 1351; see also Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1221
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Forest Service violates its regulations if it fails to
make determination if prior easement existed); Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United
States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Skranak and determining
that “the existence of a preexisting easement, as claimed by the [appellants], is
relevant to the Forest Service’s issuance of a statutory easement under FLPMA”).
See generally Utahns for Better Transp., 305 F.3d at 1165 (“Agencies are under
an obligation to follow their own regulations, procedures, and precedents, or
provide a rational explanation for their departure.”).
Although the Forest Service decision did not specifically address State or
common law easements, the administrative record contains the district court
filings up to the time of the Forest Service’s decision. As the district court
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recognized, the Forest Service, as a defendant, was well aware of Mr. Peper’s
timely easement claims. Thus, we agree with the district court that the Forest
Service met the requirements of § 251.114(f)(1) to consider his claims to an
easement.
Mr. Peper also argues that the FLPMA supports the validity of his
common-law-easement claims and protects his pre-existing rights. Relying on
43 U.S.C. § 1769, he contends his right-of-way was not terminated. In granting
easements with conditions, the Forest Service noted that it had compiled with the
FLPMA. We cannot disagree. Under the FLPMA, the Forest Service has the
right to impose reasonable terms and conditions for access. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 3210(a). “With the passage of FLPMA, Congress believed inholders ‘had the
right of access to their [inholdings] subject to reasonable regulation . . . under []
FLPMA.’” Jenks I, 22 F.3d at 1516 (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. No.
413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 310 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070,
5254, which reviewed access rights of inholders under FLPMA and explained
need for ANILCA); see also id. (“ANILCA guarantees to inholders a threshold
‘right of access to their lands subject to reasonable regulation [under FLPMA] by
. . . the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of national forest [lands].’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1258-59 (9th Cir.
1993)). Although Mr. Peper has the right to access his property, he must comply
with reasonable conditions imposed by the Forest Service easements.
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His easements do not free him from any government regulation. See
Jenks II, 129 F.3d at 1354. Indeed, the Forest Service may impose conditions
regardless of any common law easement Mr. Peper may have. See Fitzgerald
Living Trust, 460 F.3d at 1263. But whether he has a common law easement is
relevant to whether the conditions imposed are reasonable. See id. at 1263-64.
And unreasonable conditions not related to, or disproportionate to, the public’s
benefit may be arbitrary and capricious. See Jenks II, 129 F.3d at 1354.
Mr. Peper objects to the conditions imposed by the easements as
unreasonable. His arguments, even though he is pro se, are inadequate.
He first argues that he “stands by his specific objections [made in the
district court] to the conditions imposed by the easements.” Aplt. Br. at 10.
Mr. Peper’s attempt to adopt by reference materials he filed in the district court
rather than to set forth his dispute with the district court’s reasoning is not
acceptable appellate argument. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc.,
160 F.3d 613, 623-24 (10th Cir. 1998).
He also argues “that any reasonable person who is informed of the history
of this road and the simple basis of the pending application would conclude that
this is government ‘over-kill’ at its finest.” Aplt. Br. at 10. This “perfunctory”
allegation of error “fail[s] to frame and develop [this] issue sufficient to invoke
appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
We will not craft arguments for Mr. Peper. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
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1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, we consider the issue to be waived. See
Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025,
1031 (10th Cir. 2007). 7
Mr. Peper’s further discussion of the reasonableness of the conditions in his
reply brief does not cure the waiver. Developing the issue in the reply brief
deprives defendants of an opportunity to address the issue. See Starkey ex rel.
A.B. v. Boulder Cnty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
7
Mr. Peper also suggests, without more, that the district court gave only a
cursory review to the easement conditions. We conclude that this, too, is an
insufficient development of the issue. In addition, he contends that the Forest
Service improperly treated his application as if he were requesting a new road.
He, however, cites no authority to support his contention. Thus, we consider it to
be inadequately developed.
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