UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TOMMY EDWARD YOUNG, SR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 11-4380
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TOMMY EDWARD YOUNG, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00223-1; 2:09-cr-00223-2)
Argued: March 20, 2012 Decided: April 30, 2012
Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Matthew A. Victor, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia; Jane Moran, Williamson, West
Virginia, for Appellants. Susan M. Robinson, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Tommy Edward Young, Sr. and Tommy
Edward Young, Jr. (the “Youngs”) of conspiracy to transport and
sell stolen property and vehicles, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
371, as well as substantive counts arising out of specific
thefts. The district court sentenced Young, Sr. to 132 months
imprisonment and Young, Jr. to 58 months imprisonment. In this
consolidated appeal, the Youngs contend, among other things,
that the district court erred in denying their motion to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to two searches of their
property. For the reasons below, we affirm. 1
During the course of an investigation into the Youngs
regarding stolen property, the Clay County Sheriff’s Office
performed two searches of the Youngs’ property. Upon receiving
a tip from the Youngs’ neighbor, the Sheriff’s Office performed
the first search on March 10, 2006. After aerial surveillance
confirmed the presence of a mini-excavator, the Sheriff’s Office
recovered the excavator near the Youngs’ property line.
However, no one could confirm whether the excavator was actually
located on the Youngs’ property. 2
1
The Youngs raise six other issues, none of which has
merit.
2
The Youngs do not challenge the constitutionality of the
aerial surveillance.
3
The second search occurred two weeks later when the
Sheriff’s Office responded to a tip regarding potential stolen
property located approximately one-quarter mile from the Youngs’
residence. When driving along a road that was used by people in
addition to the Youngs to investigate the tip, an officer drove
past the Youngs' property and observed four other equipment
trailers sitting along the side of the road. Based upon this
observation and the fact that two trailers had recently been
reported stolen, the Sheriff’s Office obtained a search warrant.
When officers later executed the warrant, they seized several
items, including four trailers, at least one of which they
conclusively identified as having been stolen.
As they did before the district court, the Youngs
claim that the two searches violated their Fourth Amendment
rights. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures when they have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Although the Fourth Amendment
recognizes that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home and its curtilage, the “special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, is not extended to the open
fields.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176
(1984)(internal citations and citation marks omitted).
Therefore, “an individual has no legitimate expectation that
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open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by
government officers.” Id. at 181.
After considering the requisite factors, the district
court found that the first search occurred in open fields and
not within the curtilage of the Youngs’ home. As to the second
search, the court found that the officers executed a valid
search warrant. In the alternative, the court concluded that
the open fields doctrine also justified the second search.
Therefore, the court held that the searches did not violate the
Youngs’ Fourth Amendment rights and, consequently, denied the
Youngs’ motions to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the
searches.
Courts consider four factors when deciding whether a
search occurred within the curtilage or open fields: (1) the
proximity of the area to the home, (2) the presence of an
enclosure connecting the property to the home, (3) how the
property is used, and (4) steps taken to prevent observation of
the area by passers-by. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553
F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 301 (1987)).
Applying these four factors, we find that the mini-
excavator recovered in the first search was located in open
fields. The Sheriff’s Office found it at least 500 feet from
the Youngs’ residence; indeed, the Youngs could not even
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identify if the mini-excavator was actually located on their
property. Additionally, the Youngs took no steps to prevent
observation of the area.
As to the second search, we find that the affidavit
supporting the search warrant contained sufficient,
individualized information to support a finding of probable
cause. Furthermore, the second search was also justified by the
open fields doctrine because the land on which the recovered
equipment trailers were found was not within the Youngs’
curtilage. The land was not immediately next to the Youngs’
residence, there was no enclosure connecting the land to the
residence, and the Youngs had taken no steps to prevent
observation of the land or the trailers sitting on it.
Therefore, we find no reversible error in the district court's
disposition of this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
the two motions to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and
sentences imposed by the district court.
AFFIRMED
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