[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 1, 2012
No. 11-11369
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:94-cr-04057-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JYRONE JEREMIAH JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(May 1, 2012)
Before EDMONDSON, KRAVITCH and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
*
Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
In United States v. Lacey, we said that a defendant “is entitled to ‘a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking’”
probation. 648 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)). We neither ignore nor retreat
from one word of Lacey. We will assume that Lacey’s teaching extends to
revocation of supervised release. Upon the record, Lacey’s requirement was
satisfied.
Johnson was before the court because of a single incident of extreme
domestic violence. The record reflects that a hearing was held to determine the
facts of the incident. Testimony revealed that Johnson battered the victim over the
course of several hours on a Friday night. Johnson stood on her hair so that she
could not lift her head while he punched her, and he kicked her several times.
When she coughed up blood, Johnson dragged her to a sink so she could clean
herself up. The following Monday, she had a huge bruise on her left arm and
bruises on her chest and neck, her mouth was puffy, and there was a footprint of a
tennis shoe on her chest. On Wednesday, probation officers found bruises all over
both of her arms, including eight bruises on her right arm and a huge bruise on her
left arm, bruising on her collarbone between her breasts, and a bruise on her right
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thigh. She also told them that her collarbone might be broken.
Johnson denied the alleged facts in spite of the evidence that the victim, who
had sought permission to leave the halfway house and live with him, was battered
so badly that she sought permission and did return to the halfway house.
At the hearing, the sole question was whether the single incident of battery
justified termination of supervised release. Johnson was present and represented
by counsel. He neither objected nor did he or his counsel indicate by words or
even body language that any language of the court’s crystal clear holding was less
than fully understood. The court stated after all evidence was concluded, “The
Court has heard testimony yesterday and today and I am satisfied that [the]
violation has been established beyond any doubt in this Court’s mind.” It further
explained, “the Court has carefully considered the statements of all the parties and
the information contained in the violation report. I’ve also had the opportunity to
hear the evidence in this case and observe the witnesses on the stand, including
your own testimony. The court finds that you have violated the terms and
conditions of your supervised release.” Given the simple issue before the district
court, the evidence and the reasons for revoking supervised release were clear.
Nothing more was required by the United States Constitution. We will not
remand for the trial judge to restate what we (and we suggest all parties concerned)
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know and understand from the court’s holding. Supervised release was revoked
because of the single incident of domestic violence.
AFFIRMED.
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