UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4979
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALPHONSO RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Alphonso Rodirguez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (5:09-cr-00332-FL-4)
Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 3, 2012
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, P.C., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alphonso Rodriguez pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to one count charging him and eleven
codefendants with conspiracy to distribute contraband
cigarettes, transport stolen merchandise in interstate commerce,
and sell and dispose of counterfeit tax stamps, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). As part of the plea agreement,
Rodriguez agreed to pay restitution for lost tax revenue, with
the total amount of restitution not exceeding $20,000. The
district court sentenced Rodriguez to eight months in prison and
ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $20,000.
Rodriguez timely appealed. We affirm.
On appeal, Rodriguez raises two claims. First,
Rodriguez argues that the district court violated his equal
protection rights because the court did not consider the fact
that as a result of his sentence, Rodriguez faced adverse
immigration consequences not faced by other coconspirators.
Second, Rodriguez claims that the district court erred in
ordering restitution in the amount of $20,000 after incorrectly
interpreting the plea agreement to preclude a lower award.
We review a sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). This standard of review
involves two steps. Under the first, we examine the sentence
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for significant procedural errors, and under the second, we
review its substantive reasonableness. United States v.
Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010).
Significant procedural errors include improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, choosing a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, and failing to sufficiently explain the
chosen sentence, including any deviation from the Guidelines
range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no significant
procedural errors, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Where, as here, the district court imposes a variant sentence,
we consider the extent of the variance, giving deference to the
district court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors justify
the level of variance. Id.
We conclude that the district court committed neither
procedural nor substantive error. While Rodriguez argues that
his sentence is unreasonable because he may face adverse
immigration consequences as a result of his sentence that his
coconspirators, U.S. citizens, will not, it is well settled that
codefendants and coconspirators may be sentenced differently for
their commission of the same offense. United States v. Pierce,
409 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2005). A criminal sentence violates
the Equal Protection Clause “only if it reflects disparate
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treatment of similarly situated defendants lacking any rational
basis.” Id. at 234. Our review of the record reveals no valid
equal protection challenge to Rodriguez’s sentence. Therefore,
this claim lacks merit.
Rodriguez next asserts that the district court’s
restitution order was unreasonable because the court
misconstrued the plea agreement. Again, we review a sentence
for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 41, 51 (2007). The record belies
Rodriguez’s interpretation of the district court’s construction
of the plea agreement and its reason for the restitution amount.
Accordingly, the court’s restitution order was not unreasonable.
We affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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