In Re VistaCare Group, LLC

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______

No. 11-2695
______

IN RE: VISTACARE GROUP, LLC, et al.,

Debtors

WILLIAM G. SCHWAB, Trustee,

Appellant
______

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-02522)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
______

Argued January 24, 2012
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and GREENAWAY,
JR., Circuit Judges.

(Filed: May 4, 2012)
Frank J. Lavery (Argued)
Sunshine J. Thomas
Lavery, Faherty, Young & Patterson
225 Market Street, Suite 304
P.O. Box 1245
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Counsel for Appellant

Barry W. Sawtelle (Argued)
Kozloff Stoudt
2640 Westview Drive
P.O. Box 6286
Wyomissing, PA 19610
Counsel for Appellee

John H. Doran
Doran & Doran
69 Public Square
700 Northeastern Bank Building
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701

Barry A. Solodky
Blakinger, Byler & Thomas
28 Penn Square
Lancaster, PA 17603
Counsel for Debtor

2
Martin P. Sheehan (Argued)
Sheehan & Nugent
41 Fifteenth Street
Wheeling, WV 26003
Counsel for Amicus Appellant,
National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees
______

OPINION OF THE COURT
______

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

William Schwab appeals from an order of the District
Court affirming an order of the Bankruptcy Court granting
CGL, LLC’s motion for leave to sue Schwab in the Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas for actions
taken in his capacity as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of
VistaCare Group, LLC. The primary question on appeal is
whether the Barton doctrine, which requires a party seeking
to sue a court-appointed receiver, to first obtain leave of the
appointing court, applies to bankruptcy trustees in light of
changes in the bankruptcy laws. For the reasons set forth
below, we hold that (1) the Barton doctrine continues to apply
to bankruptcy trustees and (2) the Bankruptcy Court’s
decision to grant leave in this case was proper. Therefore, we
will affirm.

I.

William Schwab (“the Trustee”) was appointed as the
Chapter 7 trustee of the bankruptcy estate of VistaCare

3
Group, LLC (“VistaCare”). VistaCare’s bankruptcy estate
included Parkside Manor Retirement Community
(“Parkside”), a 12.2 acre parcel of land located in Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania. The parcel consisted of forty-five lots,
forty-four of which were subdivided and zoned for mobile
homes. The forty-fifth lot (“Lot 45”) contained a four-story
retirement and assisted living facility. All of the lots shared
common infrastructure, including roads, sewer lines, storm
lines, and water lines. The lots were subject to a subdivision
plan, which contained various restrictions, including
“Restriction No. 1,” which provided: “Fee title to the Lot
shown on this plan will not be transferred to the parties
having residences constructed upon the said Lots, but title
will remain in the developer, his heirs and assigns.” The
subdivision plan was approved by East Cocalico Township
(“the Township”) and recorded in the Office of the Recorder
of Deeds of Lancaster County.

On July 25, 2008, the Trustee filed a motion in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, seeking authorization to sell Parkside, either as
one parcel, or as two separate parcels, with one parcel
consisting of Lot 45 and the other containing the remaining
forty-four lots. The Trustee’s motion acknowledged the
existence of Restriction No. 1 and stated that a sale of
Parkside as two separate parcels “would be contingent upon
approval by East Cocalico Township of the modification of
Restriction No. 1 to allow the personal care home and the
mobile home park to be separated.” The Bankruptcy Court
granted the motion on August 21, 2008. On September 27,
2008, after a public auction, CGL, LLC (“CGL”) entered into

4
an agreement for the purchase of Lot 45. On November 14,
2008, the Township Solicitor confirmed that Restriction No. 1
did not prevent the sale of Lot 45, and in an order dated
March 10, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court stated, “[t]his sale
shall . . . be free and clear of Restriction #1 of the Subdivision
Plan.” The sale of Lot 45 closed on May 8, 2009.

During this time, the Trustee had determined that it
was necessary to liquidate the remaining forty-four lots on
Parkside. While making preparations to sell the lots, the
Trustee discovered that some residents in the mobile home
park had permanently affixed their mobile homes to the land.
The Trustee then instituted adversary actions against these
residents. To resolve the adversary actions, the Trustee and
the residents agreed that the lots could be sold to the
residents, despite Restriction No. 1’s prohibition on sales to
individuals “having residences constructed” on the land.
Most of the lots were subsequently sold to the individual
residents. For each sale, the Trustee filed a Report of Sale
with the Bankruptcy Court. On December 14, 2009, the
Trustee and the Township entered into an agreement
abrogating Restriction No. 1 as to the forty-four individual
lots. CGL was not a party to that agreement.

On July 30, 2010, CGL filed in the Bankruptcy Court a
motion for leave to file suit against the Trustee in the
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas.
CGL alleged that the sales of the individual lots were
unlawful and that such sales damaged its property interests in
Lot 45. CGL further alleged that the December 14 agreement
between the Trustee and the Township abrogating Restriction
No. 1 deprived CGL of its property rights without notice and

5
without due process of law. On August 12, 2010, the Trustee
filed a response, in which he asserted that under Barton v.
Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), CGL could not proceed in
state court without the permission of the Bankruptcy Court.
The Trustee urged the Bankruptcy Court to refuse to give
permission in this case, arguing that CGL’s proposed state
law claims were “frivolous.” The Trustee also asserted
various “affirmative defenses.”

On October 21, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court held a
hearing on CGL’s motion, in which Grant Wise, the sole
owner of CGL, and the Trustee, testified. During the hearing,
the Bankruptcy Court expressed doubt as to whether CGL
needed its permission to file suit against the Trustee in state
court, opining that Barton was “antiquated and probably not
controlling in the Third Circuit.” Nevertheless, the
Bankruptcy Court went on to determine whether it should
grant leave in this case. After hearing arguments, the
Bankruptcy Court concluded that although it could not predict
whether CGL would be successful on its state law claims,
such claims were not “on [their] surface, frivolous.” The
Bankruptcy Court added that state court was the appropriate
forum to resolve the dispute given that state courts “probably
ha[d] an expertise in th[e] area.” On October 22, 2010, the
Bankruptcy Court issued an order formally granting CGL’s
motion for leave.

The Trustee appealed to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. On May 26, 2011, the
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. In re
Vistacare Grp., LLC, No. 10-2522, 2011 WL 2111997, at *5
(M.D. Pa. May 26, 2011). The District Court declined to

6
address the Trustee’s claim that the Bankruptcy Court
erroneously found that Barton did not apply, reasoning that
although the Bankruptcy Court questioned Barton’s
continued validity, the Bankruptcy Court did, in fact, examine
whether it should approve CGL’s motion for leave. Id. at *3.
The District Court then concluded that the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision to grant leave was proper. Id. at *3-4. The
Trustee filed a timely notice of appeal. 1

II.

The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b). The District Court had jurisdiction over the
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a),
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.
On appeal, “we ‘stand in the shoes’ of the District Court and
review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.” In re Global Indus.
Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(citations omitted). We review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal
determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear
error. Id. We review a bankruptcy court’s decision to grant a
motion for leave to sue a trustee under the deferential abuse
of discretion standard. In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th

1
On June 24, 2011, while this appeal was pending,
CGL filed suit against the Trustee in the Lancaster County
Court of Common Pleas. On July 20, 2011, the case was
removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and is currently pending in that court. CGL,
LLC v. Schwab, Civ. No. 11-4593.

7
Cir. 1998); In re Beck Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir.
1984).

III.

A.

The first question presented by this case is whether a
party must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it
brings an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee
for acts done in the trustee’s official capacity. We now join
our sister circuits in holding that, under the doctrine
established in Barton v. Barbour, leave of the bankruptcy
court is required before instituting such an action. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Goldberg, 573 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the Barton doctrine is applicable to bankruptcy
trustees); In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 970 (9th
Cir. 2005) (same); Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 143 (1st
Cir. 2004) (same); In re Linton, 136 F.3d at 545-46 (same); In
re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996)
(same); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th
Cir. 1993) (same); Anderson v. United States, 520 F.2d 1027,
1029 (5th Cir. 1975) (same). 2

Established by the Supreme Court over a century ago,
the Barton doctrine provides that “before suit is brought
against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which he was

2
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have not spoken on
the issue, at least not in published precedential opinions.

8
appointed must be obtained.” 104 U.S. at 128 (citing Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. 203 (1872)). The Barton Court explained that
a court approval requirement was necessary to ensure a
consistent and equitable administration of the receivership
property. Id. at 128-29. Because a judgment against the
receiver in his capacity as receiver would be satisfied out of
the receivership property, the effect of a suit brought without
leave to recover such a judgment would be “to take the
property of the trust from [the receiver’s] hands and apply it
to the payment of the plaintiff’s claim, without regard to the
rights of other creditors or the orders of the court which [was]
administering the trust property.” Id. In other words, the
party bringing suit would be able to “obtain [an] advantage
over the other claimants” as to the distribution of “the assets
in the receiver’s hands.” Id. at 128. The Court further
observed that if the judgment “were recovered outside the
territorial jurisdiction” of the court administering the trust
assets (i.e., the appointing court), that court would be
“impotent” to prevent enforcement of the judgment. Id.
Thus, requiring a party with claims against the receiver to
obtain permission from the appointing court before filing suit
in another jurisdiction would prevent the “usurpation of the
powers and duties which belonged exclusively to [the
appointing] court” and protect “the duty of that court to
distribute the trust assets to creditors equitably and according
to their respective priorities.” Id. at 136.

As the Court explained ten years later in McNulta v.
Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 330 (1891), the Barton doctrine was
not dependent on any federal statute, but instead was based on
principles of common law. Accordingly, after Barton, courts

9
in “[a]n unbroken line of cases,” In re Linton, 136 F.3d at 545
(citations omitted), imposed as a matter of federal common
law, a requirement that a party seeking to sue an equity
receiver must first obtain the permission of the appointing
court. See, e.g., Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473, 478-80
(1893); Merryweather v. United States, 12 F.2d 407, 408 (9th
Cir. 1926); Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969, 970-71
(2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.). Absent such permission, no
other court would have jurisdiction to hear the suit. Porter,
149 U.S. at 479 (“It is for [the appointing] court, in its
discretion, to decide whether it will determine for itself all
claims of or against the receiver, or will allow them to be
litigated elsewhere.”); Barton, 104 U.S. at 136-37. Although
Barton involved an equity receiver, subsequent courts
extended the Barton doctrine to bankruptcy trustees,
reasoning that much like a receiver, a trustee was appointed
by the court to oversee the debtor’s estate, and therefore was
“an officer of the court” whose “possession [was] protected
because it [was] the court’s.” Vass, 59 F.2d at 970 (citations
omitted). Although we have never explicitly held that
Barton’s leave-of-court requirement applies to bankruptcy
trustees, in In re National Molding Co., 230 F.2d 69, 70-71
(3d Cir. 1956), we examined whether a bankruptcy referee
erred in denying a party’s motion for leave to sue a trustee in
a “plenary action” in New Jersey state court. Thus, implicit
in our decision was that a party seeking to sue a trustee for
acts taken in his official capacity must obtain permission from
the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceeding. See id.

In this case, although the Bankruptcy Court did not
definitively hold that the Barton doctrine did not apply to

10
bankruptcy trustees, during the hearing on CGL’s motion for
leave, the Bankruptcy Court stated that the doctrine was
“antiquated and probably not controlling in the Third
Circuit.” The Bankruptcy Court opined that although courts
may have applied the Barton doctrine to bankruptcy trustees
under the bankruptcy system in place before 1978, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, commonly known as the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1527 (“the Bankruptcy
Code” or “the Code”), fundamentally overhauled the
bankruptcy laws, and in the process, raised doubts about the
continued applicability of Barton. During the hearing, the
Bankruptcy Judge echoed the concerns he had previously
raised in In re Lambert, 438 B.R. 523 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2010). In that case, the court concluded that the Bankruptcy
Code had superseded the common law Barton doctrine. Id. at
526. We disagree; as we explain below, the Barton doctrine
has continuing validity.

Although Congress has never expressly codified the
Barton doctrine, implicit in a provision of the Judicial Code,
28 U.S.C. § 959(a), is a general rule that a party seeking to
sue a receiver or trustee must first obtain permission from the
appointing court. Section 959(a) provides:

“Trustees, receivers or managers of any
property, including debtors in possession, may
be sued, without leave of the court appointing
them, with respect to any of their acts or
transactions in carrying on business connected
with such property. Such actions shall be
subject to the general equity power of such
court so far as the same may be necessary to the

11
 ends of justice, but this shall not deprive a
litigant of his right to trial by jury.”

28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (emphasis added). 3

This provision, originally enacted in 1887, just six
years after Barton, seems to have been in direct response to
the concerns raised in Justice Miller’s dissent in Barton.
Criticizing the scope of the Court’s holding, Justice Miller
noted that the role of a receiver had expanded well beyond
winding up the affairs of a defunct corporation and
liquidating its assets, to in some situations, essentially

3
The original provision applied only to “receivers”
and “managers” of property. Act of Congress of Mar. 3,
1911, ch. 231, §§ 65, 66, 36 Stat. 1104 (repealed 1948). In
1948, Congress amended the statute and extended it to
“trustees” and “debtors in possession.” 62 Stat. 926 (June 25,
1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 959(a)).

12
running the company. 4 Barton, 104 U.S. at 137-38 (Miller,
J., dissenting). Justice Miller opined that it would be
fundamentally unfair to require a party to obtain court
permission to pursue claims against the receiver arising out of
the receiver’s operation of the business. Id. at 138. Such a
system would render the everyday operations of the
corporation “exempt[] from the operation of common law”
and deprive potential litigants of the right “to have their
complaints tried by [a] jury or by the ordinary courts of
justice.” Id. Rather, a party’s only remedy against the
corporation would be in “the hands of . . . the court which
appointed [the receiver].” Id. In contrast, Justice Miller
agreed with the majority that “[w]hen a receiver [was]
appointed to wind up a defunct corporation . . . [and] his sole

4
Justice Miller was particularly worried about the
potential effect of the majority’s holding on suits against
railroad corporations. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 137-
38 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting). He noted that it had
become common for a railroad to place its daily operations in
the hands of a receiver. Id. The receiver would then “take[]
the property out of the hands of its owner, operate[] the road
in his own way, with an occasional suggestion from the court,
which he recognize[d] as a sort of partner in the business.”
Id. at 138. Although the receiver would pay some of the
corporation’s debts, he would also enter into new contracts,
incur new obligations, and frequently add to the corporation’s
debts. Id. For all intents and purposes, the receiver was
“performing the functions of a common carrier of goods and
passengers.” Id.

13
duty [was] to convert the property into a fund for the payment
of debts, . . . a very strong reason exist[ed] why the court
which appointed him should alone control him in the
performance of his duty.” Id.

When Congress enacts legislation, it is presumed to act
with knowledge of the “existing law and judicial concepts.”
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 112 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). As Judge Learned Hand recognized, it is
readily apparent that Congress shared Justice Miller’s
concerns and, in enacting § 959(a), intended to create an
exception to the Barton rule for situations where the receiver
was “continu[ing]” the debtor’s business, rather than simply
administering the estate. See Vass, 59 F.2d at 971 (explaining
that the provision “was apparently passed to meet the doctrine
of Barton v. Barbour”). Our sister circuits have consistently
recognized § 959(a) as a limited exception to Barton. See,
e.g., In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971; Muratore,
375 F.3d at 143; In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d at
1240-41. We agree. Congress’s creation of what appears to
be a statutory exception to a common law rule strongly
suggests its acknowledgement and acceptance of the general
rule. Mindful that “Congress ‘does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes,’” Bilksi v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3250 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001)), we believe that had Congress intended to abrogate
Barton in its entirety, it would have done so explicitly.
Especially when viewed in light of Justice Miller’s dissent in
Barton, it is abundantly clear that Congress intended to
narrow the scope of the Barton doctrine by creating an

14
exception for situations in which the policy rationales
underlying the Court’s creation of the doctrine were not
applicable. Under § 959(a), where a trustee or receiver is
actually operating the business, and the acts complained of
involved the trustee’s “conducting the debtor’s business in the
ordinary sense of the words or [his] pursuing that business as
an operating enterprise,” an aggrieved party need not seek
permission from the appointing court before filing suit in
another forum. In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971-
72 (citation omitted). In contrast, where a trustee “acting in
his official capacity conducts no business connected with the
property other than to perform administrative tasks
necessarily incident to the consolidation, preservation, and
liquidation of assets in the debtor’s estate,” § 959(a) does not
apply, and leave of court is still required before filing suit
against the trustee. In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d at
276 (citations omitted). 5

Significantly, although the Bankruptcy Code
overhauled the bankruptcy system and replaced many of the
bankruptcy statutes, § 959(a) was left intact. Although 28
U.S.C. § 959 is technically part of the Judicial Code, we note
that the other subsection in § 959, subsection (b), was

5
It is important to note that 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) does
not apply here. VistaCare was not in the business of buying
and selling real estate. Thus, in selling the lots on the
Parkside property, the Trustee was not carrying on
VistaCare’s business, but rather performing his duty as trustee
to liquidate the assets of the estate.

15
amended when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code. 6
Thus, Congress was clearly aware of § 959 when it adopted
the Code, and its decision to leave subsection (a) intact is
telling. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen
Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write ‘on a
clean slate.’” Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, courts should be “reluctant
to accept arguments that would interpret the Code . . . to
effect a major change in pre-Code practice,” absent at least
some suggestion in the legislative history that such a change
was intended. Id. (citations omitted). Here, we can find no
indication that Congress intended to abrogate the Barton
doctrine. Rather, its decision to leave § 959(a), the exception

6
Section 959(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides:

Except as provided in section 1166 of
title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed
in any cause pending in any court of the United
States, including a debtor in possession, shall
manage and operate the property in his
possession as such trustee, receiver or manager
according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which such property is situated,
in the same manner that the owner or possessor
thereof would be bound to do if in possession
thereof.

In 1978, Congress substituted “Except as provided in
section 1166 of title 11, a trustee” for “A trustee.” Act of
Congress of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-958.

16
to Barton, intact strongly suggests that Barton’s general rule
remains valid.

Moreover, the policies underlying the Barton doctrine
continue to apply with full force to bankruptcy proceedings.
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy estate
is created, which consists of, with certain exceptions, all of
the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in property, wherever
located and by whomever held. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The
district court in which a bankruptcy case is commenced has
exclusive jurisdiction over all of the property of the estate, 28
U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1), and the bankruptcy court within such
district may hear and determine all cases under the
Bankruptcy Code and all “core proceedings” arising under the
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Because a judgment against the
trustee, whether ultimately satisfied out of the assets of the
estate or out of the trustee’s pockets, may affect the
administration of the estate, “[t]he requirement of uniform
application of bankruptcy law dictates that all legal
proceedings that affect the administration of the bankruptcy
estate” be either brought in the bankruptcy court or with the
permission of the bankruptcy court. In re Crown Vantage,
Inc., 421 F.3d at 971. “If debtors, creditors, defendants in
adversary proceedings, and other parties to a bankruptcy
proceeding could sue the trustee in state court for damages
arising out of the conduct of the proceeding, [the state] court
would have the practical power to turn bankruptcy losers into

17
bankruptcy winners, and vice versa.” In re Linton, 136 F.3d
at 546. 7

Although the Bankruptcy Court did not address the
impact of § 959(a), it opined that several other changes
implemented by the Code have raised questions about the
continued applicability of the Barton doctrine. First, the
Bankruptcy Court noted that under the Code, trustees are no
longer appointed by the bankruptcy court, but instead are
7
Citing McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327 (1891),
and Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), the Trustee
argues that a suit against a trustee based on acts taken in his
official capacity will always be a suit against the estate,
satisfied out of the assets of the estate. We disagree with the
Trustee’s interpretation of McNulta and Brown insofar as he
argues that those cases established a categorical rule that
judgments against a trustee will always be satisfied out of the
assets of the estate. In Brown, the Supreme Court
acknowledged its previous statement in McNulta that actions
against a receiver “are official and not personal, and
judgments against him as receiver are payable only from the
funds in his hands,” but classified that statement as dicta.
Brown, 391 U.S. at 477 n.7 (quoting McNulta, 141 U.S. at
332). The Brown Court explained that it would be wrong to
infer from McNulta that “an action against the receiver
personally . . . would never lie under any circumstances.” Id.
Therefore, like the Bankruptcy Court, we express no opinion
as to whether a judgment against the Trustee in this case will
ultimately be satisfied out of the assets of the estate or out of
the Trustee’s pockets.

18
appointed by a United States Trustee. Second, the
Bankruptcy Court observed that 11 U.S.C. § 362 provides for
the automatic stay of all suits and lien enforcement efforts
against the debtor or the debtor’s estate, thus making it more
difficult for a third party to drain the assets of the estate.
Finally, although the Bankruptcy Judge did not raise this
concern here, in his decision in In re Lambert, he noted that
11 U.S.C. § 323(b) provides that a trustee “has capacity to sue
and be sued,” but says nothing about a leave-of-court
requirement. 438 B.R. at 525-26. We will discuss these
points in turn.

We first address the contention that changes in the way
in which trustees are appointed undermined the basis for the
Barton doctrine. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544 (1898) (superseded 1978) (“the Bankruptcy
Act”), and the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(superseded 1978), the predecessors to the Code, trustees
were appointed by the courts. However, when the Code was
adopted in 1978, a pilot program was initiated, under which
the power to appoint bankruptcy trustees was vested in the
United States Department of Justice. 2 Norton Bankr. L. &
Prac. 3d § 26:1 (3d ed. 2012). The program was “designed to
remove the . . . awkward relationship between bankruptcy
judges and private trustees, whom they appoint[ed], which
ha[d] generated great disrespect for the bankruptcy system.”
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 113 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6074. In 1986, Congress added 28
U.S.C. § 581, which established the United States Trustee
System on a national basis. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat.

19
3088, 3091 (1986). 8 Under the current system, the U.S.
Attorney General is charged with the appointment of United
States Trustees, who, among other things, “establish,
maintain, and supervise [] panel[s] of private trustees that are
eligible and available to serve as trustees in cases under
chapter 7.” 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(1). Upon the commencement
of a Chapter 7 case, the U.S. Trustee selects an individual
from the panel to serve as the trustee in that case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1). 9

CGL argues that because the Barton doctrine
specifically requires leave of the appointing court, and there
is no appointing court under the modern bankruptcy system,
Barton is no longer valid. We disagree. A bankruptcy trustee
is the “statutory successor to the equity receiver” and “[j]ust
like an equity receiver, a trustee in bankruptcy is working in
effect” for the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceeding,
“administering property that has come under the court’s
control by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code.” In re Linton, 136

8
The only exceptions are Alabama and North
Carolina, which are not part of the United States Trustee
System, and in the judicial districts in those states, bankruptcy
courts retain the power of appointment and direct supervision.
2 Norton. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d § 26:1 (3d ed. 2012).
9
Under 11 U.S.C. § 701, a member of the panel of
private trustees is initially appointed to serve on an interim
basis. Eligible creditors subsequently have an opportunity to
elect a trustee, and if no trustee is elected, the interim trustee
serves as trustee in the case. 11 U.S.C. § 702.

20
F.3d at 545. In changing the way in which trustees are
appointed, Congress did not alter the fundamental role of the
bankruptcy trustee as a fiduciary, overseen by the bankruptcy
court. Although U.S. Trustees now “aid[] bankruptcy judges
in monitoring certain aspects of bankruptcy proceedings,”
United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 225 (3d
Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), the bankruptcy court is the
entity primarily responsible for authorizing acts by the
trustee. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (providing that sale
or other disposition of property by the trustee is subject to
review by the bankruptcy court); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004(c)
(requiring trustee to file with the bankruptcy court a motion to
sell property free and clear of all liens). Additionally,
bankruptcy courts retain the ability to remove a trustee (other
than the U.S. Trustee) for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 324(a). We
therefore disagree with the Bankruptcy Court’s statement that
a trustee is “really just another advocate that appear[s]
before” it. The trustee remains, for all intents and purposes,
an officer of the bankruptcy court. Thus, the fact that
bankruptcy trustees are no longer appointed by the court does
not persuade us that the Barton doctrine has been superseded
by statute.

The Bankruptcy Court further opined that the Barton
doctrine is no longer necessary in light of 11 U.S.C. § 362,
which provides for the automatic stay of any attempt to
collect against property of the estate. We disagree. First, as
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained
in In re Linton, there are several rationales for the Barton
doctrine unrelated to the concern that a suit against the trustee
could directly threaten the assets of the estate. 136 F.3d at

21
545-46. If a trustee is burdened by having to defend against
suits in other courts, the trustee’s actions on behalf of the
bankruptcy court, the estate, and the estate’s creditors will
likely be impeded. Id. at 545. Moreover, without a court
approval requirement, trusteeship would become a “more
irksome duty,” thereby discouraging qualified people from
serving as trustees. Id. (noting that trustees would likely have
to pay higher malpractice premiums). Finally, requiring
prospective plaintiffs to set forth to the bankruptcy court the
basis of their claims against the trustee would allow the
bankruptcy court to monitor the work of the trustee more
effectively, and ensure that the trustee is satisfying his
obligations. Id.

Second, assuming a suit against a bankruptcy trustee in
another forum would jeopardize the assets of the estate,
Congress’s adoption of § 362 still does not convince us that it
intended to abrogate Barton. 10 The power of a court to stay
collection efforts against the debtor has always been an
integral part of bankruptcy law. See 1A Collier on
Bankruptcy § 11, at 130 (1898 ed.) (“The power to stay suits
concerning the person or property of the bankrupt is essential
to the orderly administration of a bankruptcy law.”). Mindful
of the Supreme Court’s admonition that we should not read a
10
We emphasize that we are assuming, for the purpose
of addressing the Bankruptcy Court’s point, that the assets of
the estate will be affected. As we noted in Footnote 7, supra,
we express no opinion as to whether a judgment against the
Trustee in this case will be satisfied out of the assets of the
estate.

22
Bankruptcy Code provision to “effect a major change in pre-
Code practice” absent clear congressional intent, Dewsnup,
502 U.S. at 419, we will briefly review the history of the
automatic stay in bankruptcy.

Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided
that a lawsuit pending when a bankruptcy petition was filed
would be stayed if the suit was based on a claim that would
be subject to discharge. § 11, 30 Stat. at 549. However, the
Act’s stay provision was not “self-executing” and therefore
some affirmative action by the court was required to invoke
the stay. Frank Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy,
11 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 175, 184-85 (1978) (citations omitted).
In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act, which provided
for automatic stays under Chapters X and XII. §§ 148, 428,
52 Stat. at 888, 918. There was confusion, however,
regarding the scope of the Chandler Act’s provisions,
including whether they applied to other chapters of the
Bankruptcy Act. Mark Shaiken & Cindi Woolery, Automatic
Stay Litigation in Bankruptcy 3 (1996). Therefore, when the
former Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were adopted,
a separate automatic stay provision was included for each
chapter. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 10-601(a) (1977) (superseded
1978) (“A petition filed under [Chapter X] shall operate as a
stay of the commencement or the continuation of any court or
other proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement of
any judgment against it, or of any act or the commencement
or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce any lien
against its property . . . .”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 11-44(a) (1977)
(superseded 1978) (same for Chapter XI); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
12-43(a) (1977) (superseded 1978) (same for Chapter XII);

23
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 13-401(a) (1977) (superseded 1978) (same
for Chapter XIII).

In 1978, as part of the new Bankruptcy Code,
Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides that upon
the filing of a voluntary or involuntary case, all suits and lien
enforcement efforts against the debtor or the debtor’s estate
shall be automatically enjoined, subject to certain exceptions
for repeat bankruptcy filers. The legislative history
accompanying § 362 explains that its primary purpose was to
give the debtor a “breathing spell” from creditors, to allow the
debtor to begin the process of discharging his debts, and
where applicable, to develop a repayment or reorganization
plan. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 174, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6135. Section 362 was also intended to
protect creditors by preventing one creditor from obtaining
payment of its claims to the detriment of others. Id. The
legislative history noted that the existing automatic stay
provisions were “inadequate, both from the standpoint of the
debtor . . . and of the creditor.” Id. Therefore, § 362
“expand[ed] coverage in some areas, reduce[d] it in others,
and clarifie[d] many uncertain aspects of the [old]
provisions.” Id. Given that the applicability of the Barton
doctrine under the pre-Code system has not been questioned,
despite the existence of automatic stay provisions under the
Bankruptcy Act and the former Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, we decline to interpret the changes implemented

24
by § 362 as eliminating the long-standing common law
Barton doctrine. 11

Finally, we address CGL’s argument that because 11
U.S.C. § 323(b) provides that a trustee has the “capacity to
sue and be sued,” but mentions no leave-of-court
requirement, no such requirement exists. In In re Lambert,
the bankruptcy court stated, “[s]hould Congress have wanted
to subject lawsuits against the trustee to preliminary court
approval, it clearly could have used language that [it] inserted
in multiple other provisions directing the need for court
authorization.” 438 B.R. at 525-26 (citations omitted); see
also In re Reich, 54 B.R. 995, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985)
(concluding that because court approval is not mentioned as a
prerequisite, “[t]he implication is that none is required”).
This is an overly simplistic analysis. “As the Supreme Court
has often noted, ‘statutory construction is a holistic
11
We also note that the availability of one mechanism
to protect against depletion of the assets of the bankruptcy
estate does not necessarily foreclose others. Bankruptcy
courts have broad powers (in addition to 11 U.S.C. § 362) to
protect the property of the estate. For example, under 11
U.S.C. § 105(a), a bankruptcy court may issue injunctive
relief “where parties are pursuing actions pending in other
courts that threaten the integrity of a bankrupt’s estate.” In re
DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1242 (6th Cir. 1993)
(internal marks and citations omitted). Here, the Bankruptcy
Court left open the possibility that it could enjoin CGL’s
proposed state court case “should property of the estate be
threatened.”

25
endeavor,’ and this is especially true of the Bankruptcy
Code.” In re Cybergenics Corp., 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
We must “not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy.” In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986))
(additional citations omitted). Here, this requires us to look at
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6009, which provides:
“[w]ith or without court approval, the trustee . . . may
prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending
action or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence
and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate
before any tribunal.” This rule establishes only that a trustee
may, with or without court approval, act as a representative of
the estate in litigation; it does not address the circumstances
under which a third party may bring suit against the trustee.
See id. “When the interpretation of federal statutes fails to
yield specific answers to procedural issues, federal courts
have implicit authority to supply the answers.” In re Linton,
136 F.3d at 545. Thus, although § 323(b) recognizes that a
trustee has the capacity to be sued, the procedures which must
be followed before commencing any suit against the trustee
not otherwise authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) have been left
to case law. See In re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 884 n.9
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that § 323(b) “merely
indicates the proper party to sue for purposes of standing”).
We therefore reject CGL’s argument that the text of § 323(b)
indicates a congressional intent to abrogate the Barton
doctrine.

26
 In sum, we hold that the Barton doctrine remains valid,
and therefore, subject to the exception in § 959(a), a party
must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it brings
an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee for
acts done in the trustee’s official capacity.

B.

Although the Bankruptcy Court expressed skepticism
as to whether Barton applied, it nevertheless held a hearing
on CGL’s motion for leave, 12 and ultimately granted the
motion. The Bankruptcy Court therefore complied with
Barton and we will consider whether its decision to grant
CGL’s motion for leave constituted an abuse of discretion. In
re Linton, 136 F.3d at 546; In re Beck Indus., 725 F.2d at 889.
Under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we will
reverse “only where the . . . court’s decision is arbitrary,
fanciful, or clearly unreasonable—in short, where no
reasonable person would adopt the . . . court’s view.” United
States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
marks and citation omitted).

A party seeking leave of court to sue a trustee “must
make a prima facie case against the trustee, showing that its
claim is not without foundation.” In re Nat’l Molding Co.,
230 F.2d at 71 (citations omitted). Although, as CGL

12
Our holding should not be read as requiring a
bankruptcy court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion for
leave in every case. Whether to hold a hearing is within the
sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.

27
observed at oral argument, the “not without foundation”
standard is similar to the standard courts employ when
evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), we emphasize that the former involves a
greater degree of flexibility. Compare Barefoot Architect,
Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)), with In re
Nat’l Molding Co., 230 F.2d at 71. Reviewing courts should
accord significant deference to the determinations of the
bankruptcy court, which, given its familiarity with the
underlying facts and the parties, is uniquely situated to
determine whether a claim against the trustee has merit. The
bankruptcy court is also uniquely situated to determine the
potential effect of a judgment against the trustee on the
debtor’s estate. As the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel noted in In re Kashani, the decision whether to grant
leave may involve a “balancing of the interests of all parties
involved” and consideration of whether another tribunal may
have expertise regarding the issues in the proposed suit. 190
B.R. at 886, 887 (citation omitted). We will not second-guess
the bankruptcy court’s judgment unless it is clear from the
record that the proposed suit is wholly lacking in factual or
legal support. See Anderson, 520 F.2d at 1029 (explaining
that permission to sue a trustee “ordinarily should be granted
unless it is clear that the claim is without foundation”).

In this case, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that CGL had met its burden of

28
establishing that its claims against the Trustee were “not
without foundation.” CGL’s motion for leave alleged that
(1) “[t]he sales of individual lots in violation of Restriction
No. 1 [were] unlawful and . . . caused damage to CGL’s
property interests in Lot 45” and (2) the agreement between
the Trustee and the Township was “an attempt to deprive
CGL of its property rights without notice and without due
process of law.” Although CGL’s motion did not specify a
particular state law cause of action, as the Bankruptcy Court
observed, the proposed state court action would be a property
dispute involving the status of Restriction No. 1, and whether
the owner of a lot in the subdivision could enforce the
restriction against another owner.

CGL’s motion set forth the following factual
allegations: (1) the Parkside subdivision plan included a
recorded restriction prohibiting the sale of lots to “parties
having residences constructed” on the lots; (2) in purchasing
Lot 45, CGL relied on assurances from the Township
Solicitor that Restriction No. 1 did not prevent the sale of Lot
45, and the Bankruptcy Court’s March 10, 2009 order
confirming that the sale was “free and clear of Restriction
#1”; (3) after the sale of Lot 45, the Trustee filed motions
with the Bankruptcy Court seeking authorization to sell the
individual lots in the mobile home park, but none of those
motions advised the court of Restriction No. 1’s applicability
to the individual lots; (4) the Trustee then sold most of the
lots in the mobile home park to individual residents who had
affixed their mobile homes to the land; and (5) on
December 14, 2009, the Trustee and the Township entered
into an agreement which purported to abrogate Restriction

29
No. 1 as to the forty-four individual lots, and CGL was not a
party to that agreement. During the hearing on CGL’s
motion, Grant Wise, the owner of CGL, testified that he was
under the assumption when he purchased Lot 45 that
Restriction No. 1 remained in place with respect to the forty-
four individual lots, and explained that single ownership was
crucial to his decision to purchase.

As the District Court noted, CGL had presented
“evidence of a restriction on the deeds to the individual lots
that had been recorded,” and there was “a legitimate
disagreement about the status of those restrictions.” In re
Vistacare Grp., LLC, 2011 WL 2111997, at *4. The
Bankruptcy Court determined that a state court would
“probably ha[ve] expertise in [the] area,” and therefore state
court was the appropriate forum in which to resolve the
dispute. This was not an abuse of discretion. Under
Pennsylvania law, a restriction in a subdivision plan creates
an enforceable restrictive covenant, even if the restriction is
not specifically set forth in the deeds conveying the lots
created by the subdivision. Ballard v. Heppe, 589 A.2d 266,
268-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Doylestown Twp. v. Teeling,
635 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). A land owner in
a subdivision may institute an action against the developer or
another owner in the subdivision to enforce restrictive
covenants that appeared in the recorded subdivision plan.
Berg v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., 822 A.2d 810, 819-20 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003) (discussing Perrige v. Horning, 654 A.2d
1183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). For example, in Perrige v.
Horning, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an owner
in a subdivision could bring suit to enforce a restrictive

30
covenant in a previously approved subdivision plan, and to
enjoin an attempt by another owner and the municipality to
alter that plan in a way that violated the existing restrictions.
654 A.2d at 1186-87; see also Gey v. Beck, 568 A.2d 672,
673, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (issuing injunction to protect
lot owners who were granted “protective covenants” to
preserve the residential nature of a development); Teeling,
635 A.2d at 661 (finding that conditions attached to a
subdivision plan could be enforced in equity by an owner of
other lots in the subdivision).

Here, CGL purchased Lot 45, a parcel within the
Parkside subdivision. The subdivision was subject to a
restrictive covenant barring the sale of lots to individuals with
residences constructed on the lots. Nevertheless, the Trustee
sold many of the forty-four individual lots to such
individuals, and together with the Township, attempted to
remove the restrictive covenant to allow for the sales.
Although we express no opinion regarding CGL’s likelihood
of success on its claims once it gets to state court, the
Bankruptcy Court did not err in concluding that the claims
were “not without foundation.” See In re Nat’l Molding Co.,
230 F.2d at 71. Admittedly, “[r]estrictive covenants must be
construed in light of their language, their subject matter, the
intent or purpose of the parties, and the conditions
surrounding their execution.” Perrige, 654 A.2d at 1188
(citation omitted). However, in determining whether a
proposed suit related to the enforcement of a restrictive
covenant is “not without foundation,” a bankruptcy court
need not make factual findings regarding the parties’ intent.
See In re Nat’l Molding Co., 230 F.2d at 71; Perrige, 654

31
A.2d at 1188. It is within the discretion of the bankruptcy
court to determine that such questions are most appropriately
answered by a state tribunal.

On appeal, the Trustee maintains that the Bankruptcy
Court erred in failing to consider his arguments that he was
entitled to immunity for the challenged actions, or
alternatively, that the proposed suit was barred under
preclusion principles. 13 We disagree. A bankruptcy court is
not required to consider immunities and defenses raised by a
trustee when evaluating a motion for leave. A bankruptcy
court cannot be expected to conduct a trial on the merits of a
party’s proposed state law claim against a trustee simply to
decide whether to grant leave to pursue such a claim in state
court. The bankruptcy court need only satisfy itself that the
claim is “not without foundation.” In re Nat’l Molding Co.,
230 F.2d at 71. The trustee, of course, will retain the right to
raise immunities and defenses in state court.

13
At oral argument, CGL asserted that the immunity
issue was never raised before the Bankruptcy Court and thus
we should consider it waived. Although CGL is correct that
the issue was not addressed during the October 21, 2010
hearing before the Bankruptcy Court, the Trustee did raise
immunity as a defense in his response to CGL’s motion for
leave. This was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate
review.

32
 IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of
the District Court affirming the order of the Bankruptcy Court
granting CGL’s motion for leave. We hold that: (1) the
Barton doctrine continues to apply to bankruptcy trustees;
and (2) the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that CGL’s proposed claims were “not without
foundation.”

33