In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
A MIR H OSSEINI and H OSSEIN O BAEI,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 CR 254—Milton I. Shadur, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 8, 2011—D ECIDED M AY 7, 2012
Before SYKES, T INDER and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. Amir Hosseini and Hossein Obaei
operated three automobile dealerships in Chicago, and
from 1995 to 2005, sold many luxury cars to Chicago-
area drug dealers. Indeed, more than half their sales
during this period were to drug traffickers, who preferred
to deal with Hosseini and Obaei because they were
willing to accept large cash payments in small bills with
no questions asked. They also falsified sales contracts
2 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
and liens, ignored federal tax-reporting requirements,
and arranged their bank deposits to avoid triggering
federal bank-reporting requirements. Based on this
activity and more, Hosseini and Obaei were charged in
a massive 100-count indictment alleging RICO con-
spiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, illegal transaction
structuring, bank fraud, and aiding and abetting a drug
conspiracy. After a five-week trial, a jury convicted on
97 counts (three were dismissed before trial), and the
district court imposed long prison terms.
Hosseini and Obaei appealed, raising a host of chal-
lenges to the district court’s management of the trial
and the sufficiency of the government’s evidence on
some of the counts of conviction. Regarding the money-
laundering counts in particular, they raised a legal ques-
tion left open by the Supreme Court’s splintered deci-
sion in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008): In a
traditional money-laundering case—where the indict-
ment alleges that the defendant engaged in specified
financial transactions for the purpose of concealing the
proceeds of criminal activity or avoiding a state or federal
reporting requirement (as opposed to promoting the
underlying crime)—must the government prove that
the laundered “proceeds” are the net profits or simply
the gross receipts of the underlying crime?
That question remains unresolved in this circuit. See
United States v. Aslan, 644 F.3d 526, 550 (7th Cir. 2011). But
the defendants raised it for the first time on appeal, so
we review only for plain error, and the unsettled state
of the law means that the claimed error is not plain.
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 3
Moreover, there is no reason for us to ultimately decide
the matter here; after the defendants’ trial, Congress
amended the money-laundering statute, using the
broader “gross receipts” definition of “proceeds.” See 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9). Finally, because the evidence is suffi-
cient to support the jury’s verdict and the other claims
of error are meritless, we affirm.
I. Background
Hosseini and Obaei each owned a used-car dealership
in Chicago, and together they owned a third. The evi-
dence at trial established that they jointly operated all
three dealerships. They frequently transferred large
sums of money among the three dealerships. They
bought inventory together, moved vehicles around the
three car lots, referred customers to each other, and
pooled their employee services, financial services, and
employee benefits.
They also regularly sold expensive cars to Chicago-
area drug dealers, who usually paid in cash, often
in small bills—tens, twenties, and fifties rubber-
banded together and carried in paper or plastic
bags or shoe boxes. On the occasions when they gave
their drug dealer customers in-house financing, Hosseini
and Obaei did not require a credit application, proof of
legitimate income, or other normal financial paperwork.
They doctored sales contracts by changing purchase
prices and Social Security numbers, and often used the
names of straw purchasers. They routinely failed to
4 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
file the forms required by the IRS when a customer
pays $10,000 or more in cash. They placed false liens
on vehicles, which (among other things) allowed the
dealerships to claim ownership and recover the vehicles
if they were seized by law enforcement, and also
enabled the drug dealers to trade in the vehicles for
new cars.
Although Hosseini and Obaei frequently received
large payments in cash, they arranged their bank
deposits to avoid depositing more than $10,000 in cash
in any single transaction, which would have triggered
an obligation on the bank’s part to report the cash trans-
action to the federal government. Prosecutors presented
evidence that on at least 51 days, Hosseini and Obaei
made deposits totaling more than $10,000 but divided
the total among separate transactions to make sure that
no single deposit exceeded the $10,000 threshold. For
example, on a single day, Hosseini made six deposits of
between $9,180 and $9,815 at the same bank. On
another occasion he deposited $9,750 and $9,810 at the
same bank in two transactions that occurred only five
minutes apart. Likewise, on another day Obaei deposited
a total of $14,500 in two separate transactions, 15 minutes
apart, at the same bank.
This course of conduct stretched from 1995 to 2005
and involved millions of dollars in laundered drug
money. In a 100-count indictment, the government
charged Hosseini with RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962;
six money-laundering counts, 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 51 counts
of structuring transactions to avoid reporting require-
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 5
ments, 31 U.S.C. § 5324; and four counts of mail fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 1341. Obaei was charged with RICO con-
spiracy; aiding and abetting a drug-trafficking
conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846; seven money-laundering
counts; 30 counts of structuring; three counts of bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and four counts of mail fraud.
Two of the money-laundering counts and one struc-
turing count were dismissed before trial, and the jury
convicted the defendants on the remaining 97 counts.
Hosseini was sentenced to 240 months in prison; Obaei
received a 180-month sentence. The district court also
ordered all three dealerships forfeited. The defendants
timely appealed.1
II. Discussion
On appeal Hosseini and Obaei raise a multitude
of issues, the most prominent of which concerns the
meaning of “proceeds” in the money-laundering statute.
They also challenge the district court’s denial of their
severance motion, the court’s handling of voir dire, two
evidentiary rulings made during the trial, and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence on a number of counts.
1
The government cross-appealed from the denial of its
request to impose a $10 million forfeiture on Hosseini and
Obaei, but later voluntarily dismissed that appeal.
6 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
A. The Definition of “Proceeds” in the Money-Laun-
dering Statute
Hosseini and Obaei first argue that to convict them
of money-laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), the govern-
ment was required to prove that they engaged in
the specified financial transactions for the purpose of
laundering the “proceeds” of some underlying crime,
and that in this context, “proceeds” means net profit of
the underlying crime, not gross receipts. Their argument
is styled as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. They contend that the government did not
prove that the auto sales in question involved the net
profit of the underlying drug trafficking. They point
to evidence that some of the drug dealers used the
vehicles they purchased from Hosseini and Obaei in
furtherance of their drug-trafficking activities. This evi-
dence, they contend, suggests that the car payments
were “business expenses,” not the net profits of the drug
trade.
This argument about the meaning of “proceeds” in
the money-laundering statute is new on appeal. To pre-
serve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a
defendant must move for a judgment of acquittal in
the trial court. United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906
(7th Cir. 2010). Both defendants did so here; they
moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure at the close of the
government’s case, and they renewed their motions at
the close of evidence and again after the verdict. But
they never raised the “proceeds” issue; instead, their
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 7
Rule 29 motions identified other grounds for acquittal.
See F ED. R. C RIM. P. 29 (stating that motions for judgment
as a matter of law “must specify the judgment sought
and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judg-
ment”). For example, they argued that selling cars to
drug dealers was not evidence of a RICO enterprise or
a RICO or money-laundering conspiracy. Obaei also
argued that the evidence was insufficient to find him
guilty of aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy.
A defendant’s choice to raise specific arguments and
omit others in a Rule 29 motion has consequences on
appeal. We have held that when a defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence by motion for judgment
of acquittal and makes specific arguments in support
of that motion, any arguments omitted are thereby for-
feited. See United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 324 (7th
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 637
(7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen . . . a [Rule 29] motion raises
specific arguments, any claims not presented in the
motion are waived.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Young v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005)). We might
alternatively construe the “proceeds” argument as a
claim of instructional error. But neither defendant
raised the definition of “proceeds” as a ground of objec-
tion to the jury instructions.
Accordingly, our review is only for plain error. Aslan,
644 F.3d at 540. “[T]o reverse for plain error, we must
find (1) error (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the
defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. (citing United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). If the defendant
8 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
carries his burden on these points, the decision “whether
to correct the error is discretionary; we will do so only
if it seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the
proceedings.” United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265,
268 (7th Cir. 2011).
The federal money-laundering statute provides in
relevant part:
(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved
in a financial transaction represents the proceeds
of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or at-
tempts to conduct such a financial transaction which
in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity—
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying
on of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting
a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in
whole or in part—
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting require-
ment under State or Federal law,
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000
or twice the value of the property involved in the
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 9
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment
for not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). The statute describes several different
types of money laundering. Subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the
“promotion” version of the offense, requires the gov-
ernment to prove that the financial transaction in
question was intended to promote the underlying
unlawful activity. Subsections (a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii), the
“concealment” and “avoidance” versions of the offense,
require the government to prove that the financial trans-
action was “designed in whole or in part” to “conceal or
disguise” the underlying crime or to “avoid a transac-
tion reporting requirement.”
All three variations of the money-laundering offense
require the government to prove that the defendant
“kn[ew] that the property involved in a financial trans-
action represent[ed] the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity.” Id. § 1956(a)(1). At the time of this
trial, the statute did not define the term “proceeds.”
However, in United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 475
(7th Cir. 2002), we held that “proceeds” means net
profits, “at least when the crime entails voluntary,
business-like operations.” The defendants in Scialabba
owned illegal video-poker machines that they displayed
in bars. They were charged with running an unlawful
gambling operation and also with money laundering
under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the “promotion” version of the
offense. The latter charge, which substantially increased
the defendants’ prison terms, was based solely on their
having “handed some of the money in the [machines’]
coin boxes over to the [bars’] owners.” Id. at 476.
10 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
Under this theory every time the defendants spent
money in support of their video-poker operation, they
also “promoted” the underlying crime and therefore
faced money-laundering charges. We worried that this
created a “merger” problem—in which the money-laun-
dering offense merged with the predicate crime—at
least when the “promotion” variation of the offense is
charged. In a “promotion” money-laundering prosecu-
tion, the government is not required to prove that a
defendant “hid[] or invest[ed] profits in order to evade
detection, the normal understanding of money launder-
ing.” Id. To avoid this merger potential, and based on
the rule of lenity, we held that “proceeds” denotes net
rather than gross income, at least for prosecutions under
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the “promotion” subsection of the
money-laundering statute. Id. at 478.
We reaffirmed Scialabba in Santos v. United States, 461
F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Santos to resolve a circuit split on the “pro-
ceeds” question, but no opinion commanded a majority
of the Court. Four justices held that “proceeds” always
means net profits. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507,
509 (2008) (plurality opinion). Four held that “proceeds”
always means gross revenues. Id. at 531 (Alito, J., dis-
senting). Justice Stevens wrote separately, suggesting
that the meaning of the term could vary depending on
the type of conduct at issue and the penalties involved.
Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Under the circumstances in Santos, he agreed with the
plurality that “proceeds” meant net profits. Id. at 528.
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 11
We have addressed the split opinions in Santos in
three cases. See Aslan, 644 F.3d at 541-50; United States
v. Lee, 558 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hodge,
558 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2009). Two of these, how-
ever—like Santos itself—involved prosecutions for “pro-
motion” money laundering. See Lee, 558 F.3d at 640;
Hodge, 558 F.3d at 633-34. In Aslan we addressed the
“proceeds” question in the context of a prosecution
for “concealment” money laundering. 644 F.3d at 541-50.
We noted that the merger problem dissipates when
the government alleges that the defendant specifically
entered into a transaction to conceal the source or nature
of ill-gotten gains. Id. at 545-46. We suggested in Aslan
that proof of net profits in a concealment prosecution is
not necessary to prevent the money-laundering offense
from merging into the underlying crime. Id.
We did not ultimately resolve the question, however,
because in Aslan, as here, we were reviewing only for
plain error. It was enough to note that “[t]he fractured
Supreme Court opinion [in Santos] addressed only promo-
tional and not concealment money laundering[,]” and
even in that context, a majority of the Court could not
decide whether proof of net profits is always required.
Id. at 550. More importantly, because none of our post-
Santos cases had addressed the meaning of “proceeds” in
a “concealment” money-laundering prosecution, we
held that “[t]he law remains unsettled and the error
is therefore not plain.” Id. at 547-48. We also noted
that Congress had since amended the money-laundering
statute in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
12 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
in Santos, adopting the broader “gross receipts” definition
of the term “proceeds.” 2 Id. at 549.
Our decision in Aslan controls here. Hosseini and
Obaei were convicted of concealment money launder-
ing—and also the transaction-avoidance form of the
offense—but they failed to preserve the “proceeds” issue
in the district court. At the time of their trial, it was
unclear whether proof of “proceeds” in a concealment
or avoidance money-laundering prosecution required
proof that the defendant laundered net profits of the
underlying criminal activity. Accordingly, as in Aslan,
the claimed error—if there was one—was not plain.
B. Misjoinder/Severance
Hosseini asked the district court for severance of the
drug-conspiracy count, which was lodged against Obaei
alone. The district court denied the request, holding
that joinder was proper under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. We review claims of misjoin-
der de novo based on the allegations on the face of
the indictment, not the proofs at trial.3 United States v.
2
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (“[T]he term ‘proceeds’ means any
property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or
indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including
the gross receipts of such activity.”).
3
Relief from prejudicial joinder is governed by Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hosseini focused his
(continued...)
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 13
Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 2009). Joinder
rules are applied broadly in order to promote efficiency;
joint trials are more convenient for witnesses, foster
speedier trials, and allow a single jury to hear the “total
story.” United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 556-57 (7th
Cir. 1995).
Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs joinder of multiple defendants in a single indict-
ment:
The indictment or information may charge 2 or
more defendants if they are alleged to have partici-
pated in the same act or transaction, or in the
same series of acts or transactions, constituting an
offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged
in one or more counts together or separately. All
defendants need not be charged in each count.
F ED. R. C RIM. P. 8(b). If the offenses arise out of “the
same series of acts or transactions,” joinder is appropri-
ate. Even if misjoinder has occurred, however, we
will grant a new trial only if the misjoinder “had sub-
stantial or injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict.” Stillo, 57 F.3d at 557 (quotation marks
omitted).
Hosseini emphasizes that only Obaei was charged in
the drug-conspiracy count, but that’s not enough to
3
(...continued)
argument on the Rule 8 joinder standard, making only passing
reference to Rule 14.
14 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
establish misjoinder. Rule 8(b) specifically provides
that “[a]ll defendants need not be charged in each
count.” The relevant question is whether the acts or
transactions underlying the drug-conspiracy count are
part of the same “series of acts or transactions” as the
other counts in the indictment.
That standard is easily met here. The allegations under-
lying the drug-trafficking conspiracy were part and
parcel of the course of conduct alleged in the RICO
and money-laundering counts. The government’s theory
on the drug-conspiracy count was that Obaei aided
and abetted an international drug-distribution con-
spiracy primarily by placing false liens on vehicles that
were actually paid in full in cash by the drug dealers.
The indictment alleged that one purpose of the false
liens was to provide the appearance of legitimacy in the
event that law-enforcement officers seized the vehicles,
as well as an arguable basis to recover the vehicles:
It was further part of the conspiracy that
defendant OBAEI fraudulently maintained liens on
the majority of the approximately 20 vehicles sold
to Carlos Velazquez-Salgado and members of his
narcotics trafficking organization in order to assist
[him] in retrieving those vehicles from federal or
local law enforcement in the event those vehicles
were seized. Defendant OBAEI maintained these
liens even though the vehicles had been paid for in
full with cash and [the dealership] did not hold
a legitimate security interest in the vehicles.
....
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 15
. . . After the vehicle was seized, defendant OBAEI
attempted to make arrangements to retrieve the
vehicle for Co-conspirator F, a member of Carlos
Velazquez-Salgado’s drug trafficking organization.
The false-lien allegations thus substantially overlap
with the factual basis for the RICO and money-laundering
conspiracy charges. The indictment alleged that once
the vehicles were seized, Hosseini and Obaei, as part of
the RICO conspiracy, attempted to retrieve the vehicles:
It was part of the scheme that defendants
HOSSEINI and OBAEI fraudulently placed liens on
automobiles sold to narcotics traffickers and gang
members involved in drug trafficking . . . and paid for
in full at the time of purchase, which liens falsely
indicated that the affiliated entities held security
interests in (or innocent ownership claim to) automo-
biles sold by the [dealerships] to these drug dealers
and/or gang members.
It was further part of the scheme that, if one of
the automobiles sold by the [dealerships], upon
which a fraudulent lien was placed, was seized by
the Chicago Police Department or a federal law en-
forcement agency following narcotics transactions
or other criminal activity subjecting the automobile
to forfeiture, defendants HOSSEINI and OBAEI . . .
would then falsely claim a security or ownership
interest in the seized automobile to prevent for-
feiture of the motor vehicle.
The drug-conspiracy allegations thus arose out of the
same series of acts or transactions as the other counts in
16 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
the indictment. Hosseini relies on United States v.
Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985), as support for
his misjoinder argument, but this reliance is misplaced.
In Velasquez the government charged five defendants
with trafficking in cocaine. One of the defendants was
also charged with heroin distribution in a completely
unrelated scheme. We held that joinder was improper.
Id. at 1353. Here, in contrast, the conduct forming the
factual basis for the drug-conspiracy charge against
Obaei is part of the same series of acts and transactions
as the RICO-conspiracy and money-laundering charges
against both defendants. The severance motion was
properly denied.
C. Voir Dire
Hosseini and Obaei also challenge the district court’s
refusal to individually question prospective jurors
about possible racial, ethnic, or religious prejudices. Our
review is for abuse of discretion. Hollins v. City of Milwau-
kee, 574 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). Jury selection is
“particularly within the province of the trial judge,” and
“[n]o hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth
or breadth of voir dire.” Skilling v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 2896, 2917 (2010).
The defendants asked the judge to question potential
jurors about bias against Iranian-Americans. The judge
agreed and posed the following question to the entire
venire:
One of the jury instructions that’s given in every
criminal case, and that will of course be given
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 17
in this run reads this way in part[:] “Do not allow
sympathy, prejudice, fear or public opinion to influ-
ence you. You should not be influenced by any per-
son’s race, color, religion, national ancestry or
sex”—both defendants here are Iranian-American
citizens, will any of you have any difficulty in fol-
lowing that instruction as to the ethnicity, national
origin of these defendants rather than deciding
this case solely on the basis of the evidence that’s
presented to you? Anybody have any problem
with that[?]
One juror raised her hand and told the court in a sidebar
that she thought Muslims were “a huge threat” and was
“scared of them.” Questioned further, the juror said
that she had not shared this view with other jurors.
She was dismissed for cause.
The dismissed juror’s replacement quickly informed
the court that he “might have the same problem as
that other young lady had.” Another sidebar was
called, and the prospective juror told the court that he
had “a problem with people that weren’t born in this
country.” He was excused as well. Soon thereafter, the
defendants asked the judge to individually ques-
tion every member of the venire on the issue of
the defendants’ national origin and religion. The judge
refused:
I am not going to do it. I was very careful to pose
a question in the kind of generic way that I think is
appropriate. And the one thing that we don’t want to
have[] is something that by questioning creates a
18 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
suggestion. And we count on jurors to be candid
and open with us. It’s been demonstrated by the
fact that that woman who had bias, an obvious bias,
was troubled and was forthright about that. So
I don’t see any reason to believe that because other
people listened to the question that I posed as you
heard very carefully, didn’t respond, calls then for . . .
individualized voir dire. Because what that basically
does is to heighten the problem instead of easing
a problem.
The judge also said that individualized voir dire could
“have much more adverse fallout than favorable fall-
out.” The judge concluded that putting the question
of bias to the jurors as a group was sufficient to
identify any jurors for whom follow-up individualized
questioning might be necessary.
Where racial or ethnic bias may be an issue in a case
and the defendant requests voir dire on the subject, it is
an abuse of discretion to refuse the request. Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973); United States v.
Booker, 480 F.2d 1310, 1311 (7th Cir. 1973). Here, however,
the district court did not refuse to question the potential
jurors about possible bias. Rather, the judge put the
question generally to the jury venire and continued with
individual inquiry only when specifically warranted.
This was an entirely reasonable contextual judgment
by an experienced trial judge, and we see no basis to
upset it. The district court has broad discretion over
the form and conduct of voir dire, which includes
deciding whether to question potential jurors about
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 19
relevant matter individually or as a group. United States
v. Perez-Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2006); United
States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1991). Individual
voir dire of all prospective jurors may be called for in
limited circumstances—for example, where extensive
pretrial publicity increases the likelihood that jurors
have formed preconceived notions about a case, see, e.g.,
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2919; United States v. Dellinger, 472
F.2d 340, 374 (7th Cir. 1972), or where pervasive inap-
propriate discussions occur during the course of jury
selection, see, e.g., United States v. Blitch, 622 F.3d 658, 665-
67 (7th Cir. 2010). But ordinarily, questioning jurors as
a group is sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment,
even when the defendant belongs to a racial, ethnic, or
religious minority and juror bias on one or more of
these grounds might be a concern. Guy, 924 F.2d at 708;
United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1979).
Dixon is representative. There, the defendant, a
black man who spoke with a marked dialect, sought
individualized voir dire about the racial prejudices of
the jurors, but the trial court refused, opting instead to
address a series of questions about racial bias to the
venire and then conduct follow-up individual ques-
tioning with any juror who answered in the affirmative.
We held that the Sixth Amendment does not demand
any “particular pattern of inquiry” and observed that
“an appellate court must rely considerably on the judg-
ment of the trial judge in deciding on the nature and
extent of the inquiry reasonably required.” Dixon, 596
F.2d at 182. Here too, we defer to the judgment of the
trial judge. His reasoning was sound.
20 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
D. Trial Evidence
Hosseini challenges two of the district court’s eviden-
tiary decisions. First, he argues that the district court
erroneously precluded him from submitting evidence
to show that he sometimes complied with federal
transaction-reporting requirements by filing IRS Form
8300. This evidence, he contends, would have shown
that his failure to file on the occasions charged in the
indictment was unintentional. Second, he argues that he
was wrongly precluded from calling his accountant to
testify. He claims that his accountant advised him
that banks aggregate multiple daily deposits to deter-
mine their obligation to report them to the IRS. This ad-
vice, he argues, would have provided a plausible inno-
cent explanation for his pattern of multiple daily deposits.
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2010).
The district court excluded both categories of evidence
after weighing the probative value of the evidence
against the possibility of prejudice, confusion, cumula-
tion, or delay, as specified in Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. “We give special deference to
the district court’s assessment of the balance between
probative value and prejudice because that court is in
the best position to make such assessments.” United
States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 985 (7th Cir. 2006). We will
find error only “if no reasonable person could agree
with the ruling.” Gorman, 613 F.3d at 720 (quotation
marks omitted). And even if the district court erred,
we will reverse only if the error influenced the jury’s
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 21
ultimate decision. United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774,
778 (7th Cir. 2011).
1. IRS Form 8300
Some of the charges against Hosseini were based on his
repeated failure to file the required IRS Form 8300
when the dealerships received more than $10,000 in
cash from a single customer. Form 8300 requires several
pieces of information, including the buyer’s name,
address, Social Security number, and type of identifica-
tion used when consummating the transaction. The
government argued that Hosseini repeatedly and inten-
tionally failed to file the forms to conceal the true
nature and source of the purchase money involved in
the transactions with drug dealers.
But Hosseini filed Form 8300 in some transactions, and
he sought to introduce evidence of 315 of these forms
as proof that he did not intentionally violate the
reporting requirement on the occasions charged by the
government. The government moved to exclude this
evidence, and the district court granted the motion,
concluding that its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues, mis-
leading the jury, and creating myriad collateral
inquiries into the authenticity of the forms and the facts
of the underlying transactions.
Assuming the forms were marginally relevant to
Hosseini’s “innocent mistake” theory of defense, this
evidence remains subject to Rule 403, and we see no
22 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
reason to second-guess the district court’s judgment on
this point. The judge was validly concerned about the
possibility of confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
and especially wasting time on mini-trials about the
provenance of the forms. The district court did not
abuse its broad discretion in excluding this evidence.
2. Accountant’s Testimony
The structuring charges were based on the defendants’
frequent practice of making bank deposits of more than
$10,000 in a single day but in amounts just below the
$10,000 threshold that triggers the bank’s federal re-
porting requirement. Hosseini claimed that his accoun-
tant told him that banks aggregate daily deposits from
a single source to determine whether they need to file
the IRS report. That advice, taken at face value, tended to
support Hosseini’s claim that the pattern of same-day
deposits had an innocent explanation.
The government moved to exclude the accountant’s
testimony. The judge granted the motion, giving three
reasons for his decision. First, the judge held that
the accountant’s testimony was cumulative because
Hosseini introduced similar testimony from an em-
ployee at one of the banks with which he did business.
Second, the accountant himself made several of the ques-
tionable deposits on Hosseini’s behalf, making him a
potential coconspirator and thus creating distracting
side issues about the accountant’s own culpability.
Third, the court held that Hosseini’s reliance on the ac-
countant’s advice (if indeed he did rely on it) was unjusti-
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 23
fied because the accountant was not an expert in banking-
industry practices.
Hosseini attacks the first and third reasons on appeal.
He insists that the accountant’s testimony was not cumu-
lative because the bank employee would testify only
to conversations with Hosseini about deposits in one
specific bank, while the accountant could have testified
about banking practices more broadly. He also main-
tains that whether he justifiably relied on the
accountant’s advice was a matter for cross-examination
and had no bearing on the admissibility of the testimony.
Perhaps Hosseini is right that the reliance issue was
not a reason to exclude the evidence but, rather, could
have been explored on cross-examination. Still, the other
reasons for excluding the accountant’s testimony were
sound. There was considerable overlap between his
testimony and that of the bank employee. And the
judge’s concern about getting sidetracked by the testi-
mony of a potential coconspirator is entitled to defer-
ence. The accountant would have been cross-examined
about his own conduct and what he knew about
the defendants’ activities. This would have unduly com-
plicated an already complex five-week trial.
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, Hosseini and Obaei contend that the evidence
was insufficient on certain counts of conviction. Both
defendants challenge their RICO-conspiracy convic-
tions, claiming that at best the evidence established
24 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
only parallel conduct, not a criminal enterprise. In addi-
tion, Hosseini challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
on three of his money-laundering convictions. Finally,
Obaei argues that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy.
On all these claims, the defendants face an extremely
difficult burden. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and reverse only if no reason-
able jury could have found the defendants guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Shamah, 624
F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2010).
1. RICO
The defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient
to prove the existence of a racketeering “enterprise,” a
required element of any RICO charge. The RICO statute
defines “enterprise” as including “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court reads this definition quite
broadly. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944-45
(2009). In Boyle the Court held that an “association-in-fact
enterprise” has just three elements: “a purpose,” “relation-
ships among those associated with the enterprise,” and
“longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue
the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 946; see also Jay E.
Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382,
389 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he alleged enterprise in this
case had purpose and relationships and it certainly had
‘longevity,’ and if Boyle is taken at face value[,] nothing
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 25
more is required to make a conspiracy a RICO enter-
prise.”).
The defendants seize on the following language from
a footnote in Boyle:
It is easy to envision situations in which proof that
individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity would not establish the existence of an enter-
prise. For example, suppose that several individuals,
independently and without coordination, engaged in a
pattern of crimes listed as RICO predicates—for
example, bribery or extortion. Proof of these pat-
terns would not be enough to show that the individu-
als were members of an enterprise.
556 U.S. at 947 n.4 (emphasis added). But here, the defen-
dants’ course of conduct, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the verdict, was neither independent nor lacking
in coordination. Together the defendants operated
three auto dealerships, sharing bank accounts, health
insurance, and employees. They transferred money
back and forth with some frequency, referred customers
to each other’s lots, and sold vehicles to known drug
dealers in exactly the same manner.
This evidence was easily sufficient to permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that the alleged RICO enter-
prise had a purpose (profiting through unreported cash
auto sales to drug dealers), relationships (Hosseini and
Obaei’s own close personal relationship, as well as the
dealerships’ interlocking relationship), and longevity
(the scheme lasted at least a decade). Under Boyle the
26 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
evidence was easily sufficient to establish a RICO enter-
prise.4
2. Substantive Money-Laundering Offenses
Hosseini challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
on three of the substantive money-laundering counts.
Count 4 centered on the sale of a car to an undercover
officer posing as a drug dealer. The government alleged
that Hosseini entered into this transaction with the
same intent as the transactions with actual drug dealers:
to conceal the proceeds of drug trafficking. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(3)(B). Hosseini argues that the government
failed to prove his intent to conceal. He claims that al-
though he told the officer that he would not file a
Form 8300 in connection with this transaction, he in
fact did so. Furthermore, while the officer mentioned
“dope money” during the transaction, he never specif-
ically said that the purchase money was drug money.
Compared to the other money-laundering counts, the
evidence on Count 4 was not particularly plentiful. Still,
there was enough for the jury to infer that Hosseini en-
gaged in this particular transaction with the same intent
as all the others: to conceal the fact that the purchase
money was drug money. First, the undercover officer
4
The defendants argue in passing that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the existence of a RICO or money-launder-
ing conspiracy. This argument is underdeveloped and there-
fore waived. See United States v. Adams, 625 F.3d 371, 378 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 27
told Hosseini that his name was “John Russell” but
told Hosseini to use the name “Russell John” to avoid
paperwork in his real name; Hosseini complied. Second,
Hosseini omitted a Social Security number and driver’s
license number from the sales contract and did not
indicate that payment—$16,000—was in cash. Finally, that
the officer used the phrase “dope money” during the
encounter is telling; no one would expect a drug dealer
to specifically say that the purchase money was drug
money. Finally, while it’s true that Hosseini filed a Form
8300 for this transaction, he did not include a Social
Security number as required. Based on this evidence,
and particularly in light of the extended course of
money laundering by the defendants, a rational jury
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hosseini acted with intent to conceal laundered funds.
See United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 894 (7th
Cir. 1993).
Counts 10 and 11 were based on two auto sales Obaei
entered into on the same day; Hosseini was involved
in these transactions only after the fact. As to these
two sales, the government presented the following evi-
dence: (1) Obaei collected the cash proceeds of the
sales and placed them in a bag; (2) later that day
Obaei gave the bag to Hosseini (this was captured on
videotape); and (3) when one of Obaei’s employees
asked to borrow money later that day, Obaei responded
that he gave all his cash to Hosseini.
If this evidence stood alone, it might be hard to
conclude that it was enough to infer Hosseini’s knowl-
edge and intent. But it does not stand alone. When the
28 Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880
evidence on Counts 10 and 11 is considered against
the backdrop of the entire pattern of conduct—millions
of dollars in cash auto sales to drug dealers over the
course of a decade—the jury could reasonably infer
that Hosseini knowingly and intentionally participated
in these sales with intent to conceal laundered funds.
We note in the alternative that the jury was instructed
on the Pinkerton theory of liability, and this provides an
alternative basis to uphold Hosseini’s convictions on
these counts. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1947). Under Pinkerton “a defendant may be found
guilty of a substantive offense committed by a co-con-
spirator if the offense was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy at the time the defendant was a member
of the conspiracy.” United States v. Pisman, 443 F.3d 912,
913 (7th Cir. 2006). This is true “even if the defendant
neither participated in nor had knowledge of the substantive
offense.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the jury found
both defendants guilty of conspiracy to launder the
proceeds of drug trafficking. When Obaei entered into
the two transactions charged in Counts 10 and 11, he
committed a foreseeable act in furtherance of that con-
spiracy. Under Pinkerton Hosseini is liable for the crime
even if he was unaware of the specifics of the trans-
actions, however unlikely that may be.
3. Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy
Finally, Obaei challenges his conviction for aiding and
abetting the underlying drug-trafficking conspiracy. To
convict on this charge, the government needed to prove
Nos. 08-1879 & 08-1880 29
that Obaei knew of the conspiracy, intended to further
its success, and committed at least one act of affirmative
assistance. United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 570 (7th
Cir. 1998). Obaei argues that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish that he knew of the drug-trafficking
conspiracy; rather, he claims that this conviction was
based on an impermissible piling up of inferences. On
this record, Obaei’s argument strikes us as completely
implausible.
Obaei emphasizes that he never bought, sold, possessed,
or stored drugs for the customers of his auto dealerships.
That he did not himself possess or sell drugs does not
undermine the conspiracy conviction. The evidence on
this count established that one of Obaei’s customers was
a high-ranking drug dealer who purchased 20 vehicles
during a six-month period paying in cash in a total
amount exceeding $1 million. Obaei placed false liens
on these vehicles because he knew they might be seized
by law enforcement. As the putative lien holder, he
provided the purchaser with a letter giving permission
for the vehicles to cross the border into Mexico in an
attempt to provide the cover of legitimacy for the
border crossing. And Obaei agreed to—and indeed
later attempted to—retrieve the vehicles seized by law
enforcement. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, the evidence was easily sufficient to
convict Obaei of aiding and abetting a drug-distribution
conspiracy.
A FFIRMED.
5-7-12