Shepherd v. Holder

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 8, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
____________________________ Clerk of Court
KAIRI ABHA SHEPHERD, a/k/a Kara
Shepherd, a/k/a Kairi A. Shepherd,

Petitioner,

v. No. 11-9520
(Petition for Review)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,

Respondent.
______________________________

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
______________________________

Alan L. Smith, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Petitioner.

Jesse M. Bless, Trial Attorney, (David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, with him on the
brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
______________________________

Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
______________________________

MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
______________________________

This case is about the government’s repeated efforts to remove Kairi Abha

Shepherd from the United States on the ground she is a criminal alien. In the initial

removal proceeding, the government did not effectively contest Ms. Shepherd’s claim to
automatic citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1431,

and the Immigration Judge (IJ) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The very next day, the government initiated a new removal proceeding, explaining

to the same IJ that it had made a mistake and now realized that Ms. Shepherd was too old

to qualify under the CCA for citizenship. The IJ eventually decided that his initial ruling

precluded the government from relitigating Ms. Shepherd’s citizenship or alienage status,

and he terminated the proceeding. The government successfully appealed to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA), which held that collateral estoppel did not apply and

remanded to the IJ, who ordered removal.

Ms. Shepherd then petitioned this court for review. Her petition requires us to

decide whether we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits judicial

review of orders to remove criminal aliens. We therefore must ascertain as a

jurisdictional fact whether Ms. Shepherd is a citizen or an alien, using the procedures that

Congress prescribed in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) for that purpose. We find that her alien

status precludes our jurisdiction. Her issue preclusion argument based on the IJ’s first

decision is unavailing because administrative collateral estoppel does not apply to our

§ 1252(b)(5) analysis. Accordingly, we dismiss her petition for review.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Shepherd was an orphaned baby in India when she was brought to this

country for adoption in 1982 by a U.S. citizen. Her adoptive mother died when she was

eight years of age, and she was thereafter cared for by guardians. There is no record of

any effort by Ms. Shepherd or her guardians to petition for her citizenship.

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 In March and May 2004, Ms. Shepherd was convicted in Utah of attempted

forgery and third-degree forgery. After she served her time, the government initiated

removal proceedings against her, alleging she was a criminal alien subject to removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on the convictions.

At an initial hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ), government counsel noted

that Ms. Shepherd’s history suggested she might be able to prove she became a U.S.

citizen through adoption under the CCA’s automatic citizenship provision, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1431. This provision directs that “[a] child born outside of the United States

automatically becomes a citizen of the United States” when three conditions are fulfilled:

“(1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States”; “(2) The child is

under the age of eighteen years”; and “(3) The child is residing in the United States in the

legal and physical custody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for

permanent residence.” Id. § 1431(a); see also id. § 1431(b) (clarifying that an adopted

child may qualify for automatic citizenship).

Citizenship constitutes the “‘denial of an essential jurisdictional fact’ in a

deportation proceeding.” Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)); see also Omolo v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d

404, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Only aliens are removable under the Immigration and

Nationality Act.”). Accordingly, the IJ continued the hearing so that Ms. Shepherd could

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retain counsel and attempt to muster the necessary proof to secure dismissal of the

removal proceeding.1

At the ensuing hearing, Ms. Shepherd offered what everyone involved deemed

sufficient documentation to establish citizenship under § 1431: an immigrant visa

showing she had arrived in the U.S. as a legal permanent resident, and a certified copy of

her subsequent adoption decree. Based on these documents, the IJ dismissed the case

without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, because “the Government is unable to . . . prove

the respondent’s not a citizen of the United States.” Admin. R. at 276. The parties

waived appeal. Id. at 506.

The next day, however, the government initiated a second removal proceeding

based on the same grounds as the first. The government explained that it had overlooked

an important fact at the prior hearing: the automatic citizenship provision of the CCA did

not apply to Ms. Shepherd because she was no longer a child “under the age of eighteen

years” on February 27, 2001, the effective date of the CCA.2 See Gomez-Diaz v.

Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 913, 915-16 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases holding CCA did not

retroactively afford citizenship to children who did not satisfy its conditions on its

effective date). The IJ noted that the government’s initiation of the second removal

1
Although the government bore the burden of proving that Ms. Shepherd was not a
U.S. citizen, Mozdzen v. Holder, 622 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2010); Duvall v. Att’y Gen.,
436 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2006), her foreign birth raised a presumption of alienage that
she had to rebut, Leal Santos v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008); Murphy v. INS,
54 F.3d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1995).
2
Various documents indicated that Ms. Shepherd was born in April 1982.

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proceeding raised issues of administrative preclusion and ordered the parties to brief the

matter.

After another hearing, the IJ held that the second removal proceeding was not

barred by administrative res judicata because the first proceeding had been dismissed

without prejudice. The IJ went on to rule, however, that the government was collaterally

estopped from relitigating the jurisdictional fact of alienage/citizenship that had been

found in Ms. Shepherd’s favor in the first proceeding. Thus, lacking jurisdiction to

proceed against Ms. Shepherd, the IJ terminated the second removal proceeding.

The government appealed to the BIA, which reversed the IJ’s collateral estoppel

ruling. The BIA held that collateral estoppel did not apply because “the record does not

demonstrate that the issue of [Ms. Shepherd’s] citizenship was actually litigated or

clearly adjudicated” in the first proceeding. Admin. R. at 5. The BIA remanded for

further proceedings and the entry of a new decision. On remand, the IJ ordered

Ms. Shepherd removed. She then filed the instant petition for review directly from the

IJ’s removal order, challenging the BIA’s prior rejection of collateral estoppel on the

issue of her citizenship.

II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR REVIEW

This appeal raises a host of jurisdictional issues. We first address whether

Ms. Shepherd has met the requirements of finality and exhaustion in the underlying

administrative proceedings to qualify for review in this court. We next consider whether

the passage of time overcomes the premature filing of her petition to this court. Finally,

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we analyze whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which generally bars appeals of removal

orders by criminal aliens, constitutes a jurisdictional bar to Ms. Shepherd’s petition.

A. Finality and Exhaustion

The unusual route Ms. Shepherd took to reach this court, bypassing (a second)

appeal to the BIA, implicates two basic jurisdictional prerequisites for a petition for

review: the “final order of removal” required by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and the

“exhaust[ion] [of] all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right” required

by § 1252(d)(1).

The finality concern, implicated by her direct resort to the court of appeals

following the IJ’s decision, is not a problem.3 An appeal to the BIA is not necessary to

make a removal order final for purposes of judicial review. Such an order becomes final

either through appeal to and affirmance by the BIA, id. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i), or through

“expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review” by the BIA, id.

§ 1101(a)(B)(ii). Thus, bypassing the BIA and directly seeking judicial review of an IJ’s

removal order does not violate the jurisdictional condition of finality because the period

to seek BIA review has expired.

The exhaustion issue is more complicated. Generally, “[n]eglecting to take an

appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to any issue

that could have been raised, negating the jurisdiction necessary for subsequent judicial

review.” Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal

3
In the next section of this opinion, we address a more specific finality
complication here, arising strictly from the timing of her petition for review.

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quotation marks omitted). We must address whether bypassing an available final appeal

to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust when the issue for which the alien later seeks

judicial review was already resolved by the BIA in an earlier appeal in the same case.

The relevant statutory language includes only one qualification to the exhaustion

requirement: the remedy to be exhausted must be “available to the alien as of right.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (emphasis added). Ms. Shepherd had a right of appeal to the BIA

after the IJ’s removal order, and we know of no statute or regulation limiting this right of

appeal so as to exclude matters, such as the collateral estoppel ruling at issue here, that

had been resolved by the BIA on an interlocutory or interim appeal in the same case.

Although Ms. Shepherd may have had little expectation of success in a second appeal to

the BIA on the collateral estoppel issue, we cannot assume that review through a second

appeal was unavailable to her as a matter of right.

There is, however, another consideration based upon the concept of exhaustion

itself. Exhaustion is generally understood to require one complete presentation of an

issue. See generally Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) (quoting O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). Courts have repeatedly adhered to this general

principle in applying § 1252(d), holding that exhaustion is satisfied once the BIA decides

a matter. Motions to reopen or reconsider that merely reargue issues already decided are

not required. See, e.g., Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2010); Parlak v.

Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2009); Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874,

880-81 (9th Cir. 2003); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 33 n.13 (1st Cir. 1993). In

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short, “[f]ederal jurisdiction is not conditioned upon the petitioner affording the BIA a

second bite at the apple.” Dale, 610 F.3d at 301.

At least two circuits have invoked this principle to hold that a second appeal to the

BIA is not required for exhaustion under circumstances like those presented here. The

Third Circuit explained that such a redundant appeal would not serve the purposes of

exhaustion because

[t]he issues have [already] been fairly presented to, and fully adjudicated by, the
BIA. . . . Judicial economy would not be served by requiring [the alien] to take a
second, essentially frivolous appeal to the BIA raising the same issues that the
Board had already rejected in [the alien’s] own case. Nor would the congressional
purpose of preventing unjustified delay in removal cases, be advanced by
interposing a second and wholly repetitive appeal to the BIA.

Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Fei Mei

Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 185 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (following Popal to hold alien

was not “required to reargue the [asylum] issue before the Board after the IJ’s second

decision [ordering removal], given that the Board already had the opportunity to address

the issue” on government’s interim appeal from IJ’s initial grant of asylum). The Sixth

Circuit similarly held that

petitioners were not required to present their asylum claims to the Board a second
time [following the IJ’s entry of a removal order]. A second administrative appeal
on the asylum issues would have been the functional equivalent of a motion for the
Board to reconsider its first order [reversing the IJ’s initial grant of asylum]. Such
motions, as a general rule, need not be filed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).4

4
Perkovic predates passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), so it addresses
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) rather than § 1252(d)(1), but the latter just “reenacted the key
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 Consistent with the general principle that exhaustion does not require repeated

presentations of issues already finally resolved, as well as the specific case law from the

Third and Sixth Circuits disavowing the need for redundant appeals to the BIA, we hold

that Ms. Shepherd was not required to take a second appeal to the BIA following the IJ’s

removal order issued on remand. The BIA’s determination on the prior appeal that the

government was not collaterally estopped from denying her status as a U.S. citizen

sufficed to exhaust that issue.

In sum, Ms. Shepherd’s petition meets the finality requirement by virtue of

passage of time and meets the exhaustion requirement because a second appeal to the

BIA would essentially be a motion for reconsideration of an issue the BIA already had

decided.

B. Premature Petition for Review and Applicability of Ripening Principle

The IJ issued the order of removal on February 22, 2010. Without an appeal to the

BIA, that order became final for purposes of judicial review on March 25, 2010. See

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). Ms. Shepherd, however, filed her petition for review with

this court on March 9, 2010, before the order of removal became final. This chronology

raises the question of whether premature petition for review from an administrative order,

in particular an IJ’s removal order still subject to appeal to the BIA, can support our

jurisdiction when the order later becomes final through expiration of the time to appeal to

the BIA.

language” of the former, Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 582 (8th Cir. 2005),
i.e., the requirement that the alien “exhaust[] all administrative remedies available to
[him] as of right.”
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 For some time this circuit has held that, under appropriate circumstances, a

premature notice of appeal—filed from an order that finally resolves a matter but which

must await additional judicial action before becoming final for purposes of appeal—

“ripens” into an effective notice of appeal when the necessary action is taken. See

Constien v. United States, 628 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.

2884 (2011); Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2007);

Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

We adopted this rule to avoid creating “a trap for unwary attorneys” and litigants

who, having filed the necessary notice of appeal, only too early, would not realize a

second notice of appeal was required. See Lewis, 850 F.2d at 645. A similar approach is

appropriate for petitioners, such as Ms. Shepherd, who face removal from the only

country they have known. Indeed, the statutory language is more favorable to a ripening

rule in this administrative context than it was in the judicial context addressed in Lewis.

Unlike the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which specifies a filing period that a premature

notice of appeal clearly does not satisfy (“within thirty days after the entry of such

judgment”), the language of § 1252(b)(1) specifies a filing deadline that a premature

petition for review arguably does satisfy (“not later than 30 days after the date of the final

order of removal”). Our holding is narrow: a petition for review filed from an IJ’s

removal order that is not appealed to and reviewed by the BIA ripens to permit judicial

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review when the removal order becomes final upon the expiration of the time for appeal

to the BIA. Ms. Shepherd’s petition, though filed prematurely, is ripe for our review.5

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D) and § 1252(b)(5)

In 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), Congress directed that, “[n]otwithstanding any other

provision of law . . . , including [the habeas and mandamus statutes], and except as

provided in [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)], no court shall have jurisdiction to review any

final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed

a criminal offense covered in . . . [8 U.S.C. §] 1227(a)(2)(A).” But this directive is not as

preclusive as it may appear. First, the exception in § 1252(a)(2)(D) allows review of

“constitutional claims or questions of law” arising in removal proceedings. Second, we

have jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts. We conclude that this second principle

allows us to reach the issue of Ms. Shepherd’s citizenship. By reaching that issue, we

follow the procedures outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5), which gives us plenary authority

to decide claims of citizenship.6

5
We need not and therefore do not decide whether ripening would be appropriate
in cases where the BIA reviews a removal order after the premature petition for review is
filed. Interposing BIA review may undercut the case for ripening, particularly if
something other than a summary affirmance or dismissal ensues, because the BIA’s
substantive decision would then supplant the IJ’s decision as the object of our review.
See Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that IJ’s
order is agency decision on judicial review if BIA affirms without opinion, but if BIA
panel issues full opinion “the BIA opinion completely supercedes the IJ opinion for
purposes of judicial review” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6
Because nationality includes citizenship, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22); see also id.
§ 1101(a)(3) (“alien” and “citizen or national of the United States” are mutually exclusive
categories), the statutory reference to nationality claims is understood to include
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 1. Review under § 1252(a)(2)(D) Exception

The § 1252(a)(2)(D) exception to the § 1252(a)(2)(C) jurisdictional bar does not

apply to our case under Tenth Circuit precedent. The § 1252(a)(2)(D) exception allows

review of “constitutional claims or questions of law” arising in removal proceedings.

Whether the conditions for collateral estoppel have been met is generally considered to

be an issue of law. See Szehinskyj v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2005);

Dailide v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 387 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United States

v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1999).

This court has relied on the relevant legislative history in holding that the phrase

“questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not refer to all legal issues, but only to “issues

regarding statutory construction.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1281-82 (10th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 850

(10th Cir. 2009); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2007); Kechkar v.

Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 2007); Torres De La Cruz, 483 F.3d at

1019 n.5. Collateral estoppel is a product of decisional law, not a statutory directive.

The BIA’s ruling on administrative collateral estoppel in this case did not involve

construction or interpretation of a statute. Thus, under our circuit’s restrictive view of

citizenship claims. See, e.g., Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 388, 393
(5th Cir. 2006); Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).

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§ 1252(a)(2)(D), the petition for review challenging that ruling does not satisfy this

exception to the § 1252(a)(2)(C) jurisdictional bar.7

2. Review through the principle of jurisdictional self-determination

Before § 1252(a)(2)(D) was enacted as part of the REAL ID Act of 2005,

Pub. L. No. 109-13, 118 Stat. 231, this court (and others) recognized that, to determine

our own jurisdiction over a petition for review falling within the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar, we

retain jurisdiction to review the jurisdictional facts upon which the bar is predicated.

Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001).

The [statute)] divests courts of jurisdiction only if an alien ‘is removable by
reason of having committed a criminal offense.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)
(emphasis added). It does not say that courts lack jurisdiction if the … alien is
found deportable for commission of certain criminal offenses [by the IJ/BIA].
Thus, the statutory language clearly requires that we determine whether [the
triggering statutory] conditions exist before dismissing the appeal.

Id. at 1220. We therefore have jurisdiction to “decide whether the petitioner is (i) an

alien (ii) deportable (iii) by reason of a criminal offense listed in the statute.” Id.

This principle of jurisdictional self-determination of the three triggering conditions

of the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar is not restricted, as § 1252(a)(2)(D) is, to “constitutional

claims or questions of law.” Indeed, Tapia Garcia specifically refers to our “review of

jurisdictional facts” relating to the statutory bar. 237 F.3d at 1220 (emphasis added).

7
Some circuits take a broader view of the § 1252(a)(2)(D) exception and include
collateral estoppel within its scope. See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 488-89 (2d Cir.
2008); see also Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 129-31 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing
collateral estoppel ruling in criminal-alien-removal action subject to § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar,
though not explicitly invoking § 1252(a)(2)(D)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1005 (2012);
Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 386 (3d Cir. 2006) (same).
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 Tapia Garcia rests on the well-settled principle that “a federal court always has

jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628

(2002) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the later enactment of the § 1252(a)(2)(D)

constitutional-claim/legal-issue exception to the § 1252(a)(2)(C) jurisdictional bar does

not restrict our authority to determine a jurisdictional fact that in turn determines whether

the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar applies. Put another way, Congress may limit federal court

jurisdiction through provisions such as the § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar, but courts have authority

to determine whether the factual conditions for the bar are present. Because this

determination precedes application of the bar, the potential availability of some other,

statutory exception, such as § 1252(a)(2)(D), which only comes into play once the bar is

found to apply, does not preclude exercising our Tapia Garcia authority to determine a

relevant jurisdictional fact.

Our circuit precedent confirms the point. Following enactment of

§ 1252(a)(2)(D), this court has repeatedly recognized that Tapia Garcia’s principle of

jurisdictional self-determination remains a distinct basis for our review of the factual

bases for application of § 1252(a)(2)(C), independent of § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Torres de

la Cruz, 483 F.3d at 1018-19 (noting § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar is now “subject to two

exceptions,” the existing jurisdictional self-determination principle from Tapia Garcia

and the new statutory exception for constitutional and legal issues in § 1252(a)(2)(D));

Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (same), adhered to in

relevant part on reh’g en banc, 482 F.3d 1202 (2007).

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 Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under the Tapia Garcia principle to review

whether the factual conditions exist for application of the jurisdictional bar in

§ 1252(a)(2)(C). Here, that includes the “jurisdictional fact[]” of “whether the petitioner

is . . . an alien.” Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1220.

3. De novo determination under § 1252(b)(5)

Whether Ms. Shepherd is an alien is therefore a jurisdictional fact. If she is an

alien, we have no jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C). In § 1252(b)(5), Congress

“explicitly place[d] the determination of nationality claims solely in the hands of the

courts of appeals and (if there are questions of fact to resolve) the district courts.”

Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388

F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting § 1252(b)(5) “explicitly places the determination of

nationality claims in the hands of the court”). Specifically, the statute provides:

Treatment of nationality claims

(A) Court determination if no issue of fact

If the petitioner claims to be a national of the United States and the
court of appeals finds from the pleadings and affidavits that no
genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is
presented, the court shall decide the nationality claim.

(B) Transfer if issue of fact

If the petitioner claims to be a national of the United States and the
court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material fact about the
petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall transfer the
proceeding to the district court … for a new hearing on the
nationality claim and a decision on that claim as if an action had
been brought in the district court under section 2201 of Title 28
[i.e., the Declaratory Judgment Act].

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 (C) Limitation on determination

The petitioner may have such nationality claim decided only as
provided in this paragraph.

This provision requires that the federal courts make a plenary determination of the

issue. The reason for this is an historical accommodation of constitutional concerns. “In

carving out nationality claims for this kind of treatment, ‘Congress was aware of past

Supreme Court decisions holding that the Constitution requires that there be some

provision for de novo judicial determination of claims to American citizenship in

deportation proceedings’” Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978)) (brackets omitted); see Agosto,

436 U.S. at 753-54 (noting “Congress intended [§ 1252(b)(5)’s predecessor] to satisfy

any constitutional requirements relating to de novo judicial determination of citizenship

claims”).

Congress directed the courts to decide citizenship claims, not review or reconsider

agency determinations. If the circuit court of appeals finds that the material facts are

undisputed, it “shall decide the nationality claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) (emphasis

added). If material facts are in dispute, the matter is transferred to the district court “for a

new hearing on the nationality claim.” Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (emphasis added); see also id.

§ 1252(b)(4) (specifying standard for judicial review of BIA decision, particularly the

deferential review of fact findings, but clarifying that it applies “[e]xcept as provided

in . . . [§ 1252(b)](5)(B)” (emphasis added)).

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 In short, although alienage is a prerequisite for removal and may certainly be

addressed at the administrative level, Theagene v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 n.4

(9th Cir. 2005), once the issue of citizenship is put before the courts, “the BIA’s decision

is no longer relevant.” Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 2009).

We note a complication in the criminal-alien context arising from the interplay

between § 1252(b)(5) and § 1252(a)(2)(C). This court has stated that § 1252(b)(5) “is not

excepted from the jurisdiction-stripping mandate of § 1252(a)(2)(C). Therefore, [when

the petitioner] is being removed for commission of an aggravated felony, we can review

his claim [of nationality] under § 1252(b)(5) only with respect to constitutional claims or

questions of law [i.e., issues involving statutory interpretation].” Abiodun v. Gonzales,

461 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006); see Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1231-32

(10th Cir. 2006) (following Abiodun). In cases not involving constitutional claims or

issues of statutory interpretation, the bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) would preclude

resort to § 1252(b)(5) for the judicial determination of citizenship.

But the panel decisions in Abiodun and Brue could not (and did not purport to)

overrule the line of cases discussed earlier, from Tapia Garcia and Ballesteros (which

preceded Abiodun) to Torres de la Cruz, recognizing that the principle of jurisdictional

self-determination already affords the court jurisdiction to decide citizenship issues as

one of the conditions for the bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C). This determination necessarily

precedes application of the bar and the limited exception it makes for constitutional and

legal issues through § 1252(a)(2)(D).

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 Thus, under the Tapia Garcia principle, the issue of citizenship falls within our

jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts. To make this determination, Congress

directed use of the procedures specified in § 1252(b)(5)(A) and (B) for de novo judicial

resolution of both legal and factual disputes.8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(C) (“The

petitioner may have such nationality claim decided only as provided in this paragraph.”

(emphasis added)). Of course, if the issue is ultimately decided against petitioner, the

appropriate disposition of the petition for review is dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

under § 1252(a)(2)(C). See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1223; Khalayleh v. INS, 287 F.3d

978, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (following Tapia Garcia).

In sum, we have jurisdiction to determine the jurisdictional fact of whether

Ms. Shepherd is a citizen or an alien, and we must follow the procedures outlined in

§ 1252(b)(5) to do so.

D. Summary of Jurisdictional Analysis

We summarize our jurisdictional analysis as follows. First, our jurisdiction is not

foreclosed by either timeliness or exhaustion concerns. Second, notwithstanding the bar

in § 1252(a)(2)(C), our subject matter jurisdiction—insofar as the threshold issue of

alienage/citizenship is concerned—is secured by the jurisdictional self-determination

principle recognized in Tapia Garcia. We need not and cannot rely on § 1252(a)(2)(D),

8
Other circuits do not subordinate plenary jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(5) to the
limits on judicial review in § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), and for them the jurisdictional
analysis is more straightforward. They need only invoke jurisdiction directly under
§ 1252(b)(5) and then follow the congressionally mandated procedures for determining
citizenship as in any other context. See, e.g., Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 510 n.1
(5th Cir. 2004); Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003); Batista v.
Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2001).
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with its restriction to legal issues of statutory construction and constitutional claims, for

our review. Finally, because the Tapia Garcia principle is an independent exception to

the bar in § 1252(a)(2)(C), operating before the bar can even be applied, we proceed to

determine the jurisdictional fact of alienage/citizenship according to the exclusive

procedures in § 1252(b)(5).

III. THE JURISDICTIONAL FACT OF ALIENAGE/CITIZENSHIP

We now turn to the determination of Ms. Shepherd’s alienage or citizenship to

decide whether we have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C). We apply the § 1252(b)(5)

procedures to determine citizenship.

A. Review under § 1252(b)(5)(A)

The issue of citizenship is for the court of appeals to decide when “the pleadings

and affidavits [show] that no genuine issue of material fact . . . is presented.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(5)(A); see also id. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (directing transfer to district court for

hearing upon court of appeals’ finding that “a genuine issue of material fact about the

petitioner’s nationality is presented”). Nothing in the administrative record suggests a

dispute about the facts material to Ms. Shepherd’s citizenship. Under those facts, she

was too old to qualify when the Child Citizenship Act became effective. Unless

additional evidence can create a dispute in that regard, taking the case out of the reach of

§ 1252(b)(5)(A) and requiring a transfer to the district court for a factual hearing under

§ 1252(b)(5)(B), we have no choice but to hold that Ms. Shepherd is an alien and dismiss

her petition for review.

B. Review under § 1252(b)(5)(B)

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 Ms. Shepherd argues that she be afforded a hearing in the district court under

§ 1252(b)(5)(B) to bolster her citizenship claim. To support such a request, however, she

must show “from the pleadings and affidavits” a genuine issue of material fact warranting

development and disposition at an evidentiary hearing. Whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists for purposes of § 1252(b)(5) is resolved under “the same principles

employed on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.” Duarte-Ceri, 630 F.3d at 91

(following Supreme Court’s holding as to § 1252(b)(5)’s predecessor in Agosto, 436 U.S.

at 754); see Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Traditional

summary judgment rules guide our decision concerning transfer [under

§ 1252(b)(5)(B)].”). A party opposing summary judgment may submit evidence to

establish genuine issues of material fact requiring trial. And proceedings under

§ 1252(b)(5)(B) are expressly excepted from the provision limiting judicial review to the

agency record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). Thus, the reference to “pleadings and

affidavits” in § 1252(b)(5) is properly understood to include additional evidence

presented on judicial review, Batista v. Ashcroft, 270 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2001), and

the lack of a factual dispute evident from the administrative record alone is not

necessarily dispositive.

On the other hand, the petitioner must proffer probative evidence to forestall the

summary disposition of the citizenship issue on the existing record, and Ms. Shepherd

has failed to do that. When pressed on this point at oral argument, her counsel could only

speculate that Ms. Shepherd might be able to uncover evidence in India indicating a later

birth date, thereby enabling her to fall within the window of applicability for the CCA.

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Multiple records specify her birth date as April 1, 1982, see Admin. R. at 515, 786-87,

788, 790. Even more conclusive, her adoption decree (noting her presence in the

courtroom that day) was issued by the Salt Lake County District Court on December 2,

1982, see id. at 513—still more than 18 years prior to the effective date of the CCA. It is

effectively impossible for Ms. Shepherd to produce probative evidence establishing a

birth date late enough (after January 1983) for her to have secured citizenship through

operation of the CCA.

Ms. Shepherd has not suggested any other factual basis for demonstrating her

citizenship. And she cannot plead surprise. She has been on notice of the deficiency of

her claim under the CCA ever since the initiation of the second removal proceeding

before the IJ, and the point only became more crucial with the BIA’s rejection of her

collateral estoppel argument. Analogizing to the standards governing requests for

additional discovery to forestall imminent summary judgment, see generally Garcia v.

U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2008); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v.

Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 987 (10th Cir. 2000), Ms. Shepherd has not advanced or

supported any ground to justify postponement of our disposition of this case.

We must conclude that a transfer to the district court for an evidentiary hearing

under § 1252(b)(5)(B) is not warranted. The existing record provides a fully sufficient

basis for us to rule as a matter of law that Ms. Shepherd is an alien who may properly be

removed from this country for commission of an aggravated felony.

C. Administrative Collateral Estoppel

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 Ms. Shepherd argues that the IJ’s favorable determination of her citizenship issue

in the initial removal proceeding should have collateral estoppel effect, precluding a

finding that she is an alien. Although, as explained earlier, we lack jurisdiction under

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) to review whether the agency should have applied collateral

estoppel in Ms. Shepherd’s second removal proceedings, here we consider whether

collateral estoppel could constrain our own independent determination of citizenship

under Tapia Garcia and § 1252(b)(5). Several reasons convince us that, regardless of

whether administrative preclusion principles should have operated at the agency level,

they have no role to play in our jurisdictional fact decision.

First, whether Ms. Shepherd is an alien determines our own jurisdiction to review

her petition. As such, it “is categorically not a matter of agency judgment.” United

States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 934 (10th Cir. 2008). “Determining federal court

jurisdiction is exclusively the province of the federal courts regardless of what an agency

may say.” Id. (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). We would cede an

essential part of this judicial function to the agency if we allowed an administrative

preclusion principle to remove the jurisdictional fact of citizenship from our purview.

Second, our duty to decide the citizenship issue for ourselves is specifically

bolstered by the congressional directive in § 1252(b)(5) that “places the determination of

[citizenship] claims solely in the hands of the courts of appeals and (if there are questions

of fact to resolve) the district courts.” Hughes, 255 F.3d at 758; see Alwan, 388 F.3d

at 510. This directive requires an independent judicial determination of citizenship,

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which is incompatible with a forced adherence to an initial agency determination through

administrative collateral estoppel.

Finally, general preclusion principles corroborate our conclusion that § 1252(b)(5)

requires us to decide the citizenship issue without the constraint of administrative

collateral estoppel. The congressional directive in § 1252(b)(5) for independent judicial

determination must be given precedence over the operation of administrative preclusion:

“An adjudicative determination of an issue by an administrative tribunal does not

preclude relitigation of that issue in another tribunal if according preclusive effect to

determination of the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that . . . [t]he

tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent

determination of the issue in question.” Restatement (2d) of Judgments § 83(4).

***

The foregoing analysis shows that Ms. Shepherd cannot establish the jurisdictional

fact of citizenship. The undisputed and indisputable record requires a finding of alienage

under § 1252(b)(5)(A). Such a finding precludes our jurisdiction to review

Ms. Shepherd’s petition under § 1252(a)(2)(C).

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that we have jurisdiction to determine whether the facts support our

authority to review Ms. Shepherd’s petition, in particular whether she is an alien. In

accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A), we find that she is an alien. It follows that the

jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) applies and precludes further review. The

petition for review is therefore dismissed.

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