United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
(Serial No. 09/313,532)
IN RE ROGER YOUMAN AND MARNEY MORRIS
__________________________
2011-1136
__________________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
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Decided: May 8, 2012
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LAURENCE S. ROGERS, Ropes & Gray, LLP, of New
York, New York, argued for appellants. With him on the
brief was PRISTINE JOHANNESSEN.
SCOTT C. WEIDENFELLER, Associate Solicitor, Office of
the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on
the brief were RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, and JANET A.
GONGOLA, Associate Solicitor.
__________________________
Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge PROST.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE.
IN RE YOUMAN 2
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Roger Youman and Marney Morris (collectively, “ap-
plicants”) appeal from a decision of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (“Board”). The Board affirmed
the examiner’s rejection of claims 24-27, 29-43, and 45-55
in the applicants’ reissue patent application under 35
U.S.C. § 251. Ex parte Youman, No. 2010-007029, 2010
WL 3503790 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 7, 2010) (“Board Decision”).
Because the Board did not properly apply the recapture
rule’s three-step analysis, we vacate and remand.
BACKGROUND
The invention at issue is directed to an electronic pro-
gram schedule system for a television that allows the user
to access and navigate television program information
efficiently. As a part of this system, a user can access a
“By Title” display that lists programs alphabetically by
title. A user can either scroll through this list or search it
by entering the first few letters of a program title using
the remote. As filed, U.S. Patent Application 08/346,603
contained a single claim for the invention. Claim 1
(“original claim 1”) of the application read as follows:
An electronic television programming guide
for use in connection with a television receiver for
displaying a plurality of television programs from
a plurality of program sources on a plurality of
user-selectable television channels comprising:
user control means for issuing control com-
mands, including channel-control commands;
data processing means for receiving said con-
trol commands and for generating video control
commands;
3 IN RE YOUMAN
a video display generator adapted to receive
video control commands from said data processing
means for generating and displaying a plurality of
television program titles on said television re-
ceiver, said plurality of television programs dis-
played alphabetically by title; and
selection means for allowing said user to select
a title for display on said television receiver by se-
lecting the first n characters of said title, where n
is greater than or equal to one; said data process-
ing means being responsive to said selection
means and adapted to select said plurality of tele-
vision program titles for display on said television
receiver in response to said n characters.
J.A. 909 (emphasis added). During prosecution, with all
the other limitations in the prior art, the examiner re-
jected original claim 1 based on the “selection means”
limitation as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of
three prior art references: U.S. Patent No. 5,241,671
(“Reed patent”), U.S. Patent No. 5,253,066 (“Vogel pat-
ent”), and U.S. Patent No. 5,353,121 (“Young patent”).
The Young patent teaches a television programming
guide that can display television program titles on the
screen by using a user control. The Vogel patent teaches
a television programming guide that includes selecting
means such as four triangular arrow buttons and a selec-
tion button for selecting programs from a list, but does
not disclose displaying programs alphabetically by title or
selecting a title by selecting the first few characters of
titles. The Reed patent teaches a multimedia search
system of alphabetically-listed titles, in which a user can
select a title by entering one or more characters of a
selected title. As each character is entered, the Reed
patent teaches that the program will list titles that are
closest to the entry displayed. The Reed system is used
IN RE YOUMAN 4
on a personal computer with access to a keyboard of
alphanumeric keys to enter searchable titles.
The examiner found that it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the television
guide systems in the Young and Vogel patents, which
allow users to select titles by scrolling through programs
that are not in alphabetical order, to include a means of
selecting a title from an alphabetical list by typing the
first n characters of the title into a keyboard, as taught in
Reed. The applicants then amended original claim 1 and
added claims 2-23. In remarks filed with the amendment,
they argued that they overcame the prior art by using the
keys on the television control device to select the charac-
ters, by, for example, cycling through the alphabet, rather
than entering each character using a keyboard, as taught
in Reed. 1 After a supplemental amendment, the exam-
1 Specifically, the applicants explained that:
[A]lthough Reed may accomplish [search-by-title
capability] for a database search system using a
keyboard as the input device, it does not teach or
suggest such a system for an EPG [Electronic
Program Guide] . . . [T]he system disclosed in
Reed operates using a full keyboard. As such, it is
a simple matter to type in the first few letters of
an article title. In contrast, in an EPG environ-
ment, the user control device is typically a hand-
held remote control transmitter with only a very
limited number of keys. Therefore, in terms of
performing searching based on alphanumeric
characters, an EPG presents a problem not pre-
sent in nor solved by systems such as that de-
scribed in Reed. Applicants solve this problem by
using the existing keys on the remote control de-
vice to input characters of a program title. . . . For
example, as disclosed in applicants’ specification,
the up/down arrow keys used for changing chan-
5 IN RE YOUMAN
iner issued a notice of allowability for claims 1-23, con-
cluding that the means of selecting characters by cycling
forward, backward, up and down through a list of alpha-
numeric characters was not obvious in light of the prior
art.
On May 13, 1997, U.S. Patent Number 5,629,733
(“’733 patent”) issued. Claim 1 of the ’733 patent (“issued
claim”) reads as follows:
An electronic television programming guide
for use in connection with a television receiver for
displaying a plurality of television programs from
a plurality of program sources on a plurality of
user-selectable television channels comprising:
user control means for issuing control com-
mands, including channel-control commands;
data processing means for receiving said con-
trol commands and for generating video control
commands;
video display generator means adapted to re-
ceive video control commands from said data
processing means for generating and displaying a
visual display of a plurality of television program
titles on said television receiver, said plurality of
television program titles arranged alphabetically
by title; and
selection means for allowing said user to se-
lect a title for display on said television receiver
by selecting the first n characters of said title,
nels in normal television mode may be used to cy-
cle through the letters A-Z and the numbers 0-9 in
order to choose the individual letters in a program
title.
J.A. 973-74.
IN RE YOUMAN 6
where n is greater than one; said data processing
means being responsive to said selection means
and adapted to select said plurality of television
program titles for display on said television re-
ceiver in response to said n characters;
wherein said video display generator means
displays said n characters and said selection
means comprising means for causing each of said
n characters to cycle forward and backward
through a plurality of alphanumeric characters
and means for assigning one of said alphanumeric
characters to each of said n characters.
’733 patent col.34 l.49 – col.35 l.10 (emphasis added).
On May 13, 1999, within two years of the ’733 patent
issuing, the applicants filed reissue application
09/313,532, adding claims 24-55. In the accompanying
declaration, they stated that “U.S. patent 5,629,733 is
partly inoperative by reason of said patent claiming less
than we had a right to claim in said patent.” J.A. 334.
Following a non-final rejection of claims 24 and 40 under
35 U.S.C. § 251, the applicants amended claim 24 (“reis-
sue claim”) to read as follows:
An electronic television programming guide
for use in connection with a television receiver for
displaying a plurality of television programs from
a plurality of sources on a plurality of user-
selectable television channels comprising:
a wireless remote control, comprising nonal-
phanumeric keys, that generates control com-
mands;
a data processor that receives the control
commands from the wireless remote control; and
a video display generator connected to the
data processor that displays an alphabetically-
7 IN RE YOUMAN
arranged visual display of a plurality of television
program titles on said television receiver,
wherein a user may search for a title to be
displayed by selecting n characters with the wire-
less remote control, where n is greater than one,
wherein each of the n characters may be selected
with the wireless remote control from a plurality
of displayed alphanumeric characters by changing
from a first character to a second character using
the nonalphanumeric keys.
J.A. 502. On December 4, 2007, the examiner issued a
final rejection of claims 24-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 251
because they improperly recaptured subject matter that
was surrendered in the application for the ’733 patent.
The applicants appealed. The Board applied the
three-step recapture rule analysis to affirm the exam-
iner’s rejection of the reissue claims. Under step one, the
Board found that the reissue claim was broader than the
issued claim but narrower than the original claim. The
reissue claim was broader than the issued claim, the
Board found, because the “changing” limitation in the
reissue claim was broader in scope than the “cycling”
limitation in the issued claim. The Board found that the
reissue claim was narrower than the original claim be-
cause the original claim did not contain any limitation
related to how the characters changed, whereas the
reissue claim did. Under step two, the Board determined
that the broadening related to the surrendered subject
matter. Relying on the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 1402.02 (I)(C) (8th ed., rev. 7, July
2008) and North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak
Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Board
held that because the reissue claim broadened patented
claim 1 to an intermediate scope, it constituted an im-
IN RE YOUMAN 8
permissible recapture of surrendered subject matter.
Board Decision, 2010 WL 3503790, at *9. The Board
articulated step 3 as allowing a reissue claim to escape
the recapture rule only through other materially narrow-
ing limitations “if the narrowing limitation is directed to
one or more ‘overlooked aspects’ of the invention.” Id. at
*10. It concluded that the other potentially narrowing
limitations in this case—the “wireless remote,” “nonal-
phanumeric keys,” and “changing” limitations—were not
overlooked during prosecution and thus the reissue claim
could not avoid the recapture rule. Id. at *11.
The applicants timely appealed. This court has juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the applicants are challenging whether the
recapture rule does indeed prevent them from claiming
“changing” as a selecting means in reissue claim 24.
I
Prior to evaluating the Board’s rejection based on the
recapture rule, it is important to understand the statu-
tory source from which the judicial recapture rule stems—
the reissue statute. That statute provides that:
Whenever any patent is, through error without
any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly
inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
specification or drawing, or by reason of the pat-
entee claiming more or less than he had a right to
claim in the patent, the Director shall . . . reissue
the patent for the invention disclosed in the origi-
nal patent . . . . No reissued patent shall be
9 IN RE YOUMAN
granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the
original patent unless applied for within two
years from the grant of the original patent.
35 U.S.C. § 251.
Thus, the statute allows a patentee to broaden claims
in its original patent if the patentee can show “error
without any deceptive intention.” Id. With regard to this
broadening, Congress weighed the competing interest of
providing a patentee with an opportunity to correct errors
of inadequate claim scope with the public interest in
finality and certainty of patent rights, and legislated in
favor of allowing the patentee to correct its errors through
broadening, if necessary. See In re Doyle, 293 F.3d 1355,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Yet, in doing so, Congress provided the
public with two safeguards against this broadening.
First, the reissue statute requires a patentee to file for a
broadening reissue patent within two years of the issu-
ance of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251. As a result, the
public is on notice for two years following the issuance of
a patent that the patent can be broadened to recapture
matter “dedicated to the public” through error; after the
two year period, the public can definitively rely on the
scope of the patent claims. Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1364
(“[T]he public knows, or should know, that an issued
patent can be broadened by reissue during a two-year
period following issuance.”); In re Fotland, 779 F.2d 31, 33
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The purpose of the law that a broaden-
ing reissue must be applied for within two years after
patent grant is to set a limited time after which the public
may rely on the scope of the claims of an issued patent.”).
Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 252 ensures that if the patentee
succeeds in obtaining a broader reissue patent, the public
interest is protected through intervening rights. See In re
IN RE YOUMAN 10
Tanaka, 640 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that
to the extent that the public may rely on what is actually
claimed in the patent, this problem is addressed by the
intervening rights statute, 35 U.S.C. § 252); Doyle, 293
F.3d at 1364.
Second, Congress limited reissue to instances where
the patentee could demonstrate an “error without any
deceptive intention.” 35 U.S.C. § 251. Because the reis-
sue statute is “based on fundamental principles of equity
and fairness,” the “error” requirement is liberally con-
strued. Medtronic, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 465 F.3d 1360,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Mentor Corp.
v. Coloplant, Inc., 998 F.2d 992, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The
most commonly asserted correctable error is the failure of
the patentee’s attorney to appreciate the full scope of the
invention during prosecution of the original patent appli-
cation. Hester, 142 F.3d at 1479-80 (citing cases); In re
Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Yet, “not
every event or circumstance that might be labeled ‘error’
is correctable by reissue.” Hester, 142 F.3d at 1479.
Against the remedial backdrop of the reissue statute,
one such circumstance that does not satisfy the “error”
requirement is embodied by the recapture rule. The
recapture rule bars a patentee from recapturing subject
matter, through reissue, that the patentee intentionally
surrendered during the original prosecution in order to
overcome prior art and obtain a valid patent. In re Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468); Medtronic, 465 F.3d at 1372;
Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc., 258 F.3d 1366, 1370-71
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
11 IN RE YOUMAN
The rationale underlying the rule is that the cancella-
tion or amendment of the original claim in order to over-
come prior art is a deliberate action that necessarily
excludes the inadvertence or mistake contemplated by the
statute’s error requirement. Medtronic, 465 F.3d at 1372-
73; Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468; Mentor, 998 F.2d at 995.
Determining whether the claims of a reissued patent
violate 35 U.S.C. § 251 by implicating the recapture rule
is a question of law that we review de novo. Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358 (quoting N. Am. Container, 415
F.3d at 1349). The underlying factual findings are re-
viewed for substantial evidence. Pannu, 258 F.3d at
1370.
II
To determine whether the applicants’ reissue claims
violate the recapture rule, we apply a three-step recap-
ture rule analysis. Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358; N.
Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1349; Pannu, 258 F.3d at
1371. 2
A
Under the first step, we “determine whether and in
what ‘aspect’ the reissue claims are broader than the
patent claims.” Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358 (quoting
2 For purposes of articulating and applying the
three-step recapture analysis, the term “original claim”
refers to the claim in the original application, prior to
amendment or cancellation; the term “patented claim”
refers to claims allowed over the prior art in the issued
patent; and the term “reissue claim” refers to the claims
subject to the reissue application at issue. See Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358.
IN RE YOUMAN 12
Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468); Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371. The
parties do not contest that with regards to the selecting
means, the Board correctly determined that the “chang-
ing” limitation in claim 24 (“the reissue claim”) is broader
than the “cycling” limitation of patented claim 1 of the
’766 patent (“the patented claim”). Appellants’ Br. 44;
Appellee’s Br. 16-17. This conclusion is confirmed by
dependent reissue claim 25, which limits reissue claim 24
by calling for “changing from a first to second character
comprising cycling through displayed alphanumeric
characters.” J.A. 33.
B
Having agreed with the parties that the reissue claim
is broader than the patented claim, step two requires us
to “determine whether the broader aspects of the reissue
claims relate to surrendered subject matter.” Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Clement, 131 F.3d at
1468-69); N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1350. Both
parties answer this inquiry in the affirmative. Appel-
lants’ Br. 45-46; Appellee’s Br. 17.
Yet, they dispute what constitutes surrendered sub-
ject matter within the context of the recapture rule. The
applicants argue that surrendered subject matter is
limited to subject matter broader than the original claim
1 (i.e., before amendment) and necessarily excludes
subject matter of intermediate scope that is broader than
patented claim 1 and narrower than original claim 1.
Apellants’ Br. 44-46. In doing so, they misinterpret our
case law.
As we have instructed in Clement and its progeny, we
look to changes in the claim language and arguments in
the prosecution history that were made in an effort to
13 IN RE YOUMAN
overcome prior art to determine what subject matter the
patentee surrendered. 131 F.3d at 1469; see Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358; MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 475 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Hester, 142 F.3d at 1480-81. We have consistently held
that when a patentee narrows the original claim in an
effort to overcome a prior art rejection and makes argu-
ments in support, the patentee surrenders the subject
matter broader than the patented claim. See, e.g., Mosta-
fazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1360 (“The recapture rule is trig-
gered only where the reissue claims are broader than the
patented claims because the surrendered subject matter
has been reclaimed in whole or substantial part (i.e., an
added limitation has been eliminated or revised).”); N.
Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1350 (looking to change in
claim scope and arguments during amendment to find
patentee surrendered subject matter broader than the
“generally convex” limitation of the patented claim);
Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371 (relying on change in claim scope
and arguments during amendment to find that patentee
surrendered subject matter broader than the “continuous,
substantially circular arc” limitation of the patented
claim). 3
Thus, as the PTO urges, to determine what the appli-
cants surrendered, we look to the change of scope between
3 A contrary holding would render the analysis in
Pannu and North American Container flawed. Further-
more, the holding in Mostafazadeh—that a modified
limitation that was narrower than the limitation in the
original claim recaptured surrendered subject matter,
violating the recapture rule—would be also wrong. It
would also render our instruction in Clement and its
progeny to look at prosecution history and arguments
accompanying the amendments superfluous.
IN RE YOUMAN 14
the original and patented claim 1 and the accompanying
arguments applicants made during the original prosecu-
tion. The applicants amended the original claim, which
provided for “selecting means,” to require “cycling” to
select characters. This amendment was targeted at
overcoming prior art—specifically, the Reed, Vogel, and
Young patents. In the remarks accompanying this
amendment, the applicants argued that the key distinc-
tion in the amended claim that overcame prior art was
the use of “cycling” to “input 36 different characters (A-Z
and 0-9) using only a few keys on the remote control
device.” J.A. 974-75. We agree with the Board that
through their argument and amendment, the applicants’
surrendered subject matter was any selecting means that
was broader than the cycling limitation of the patented
claim.
C
If the reissue claims are broader relative to the pat-
ented claims in a manner related to the surrendered
subject matter, we must “determine whether the surren-
dered subject matter has crept into the reissue claim.”
Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358 (citing Clement, 131 F.3d
at 1469); see Hester, 142 F.3d at 1482. Unless the claims
are materially narrowed in a way that avoids substantial
or whole recapture of the surrendered subject matter, the
surrendered subject matter has crept into the reissue
claims and they are barred under the recapture rule.
Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1361. The Board failed in
several respects to apply this third step of the recapture
rule; thus, we must vacate and remand.
15 IN RE YOUMAN
1
First, the Board considered any broadening of the
patented claim via a modified limitation, regardless of
how minimal, sufficient to invoke the recapture rule’s bar.
Specifically, the Board determined that the broadening
from cycling to changing “essentially broadens patented
claim 1 to an intermediate scope (i.e., narrower than
original patent claim 1 before amendment, but broader
than issued claim 1).” Board Decision, 2010 WL 3503790,
at *9. The Board then held that “[t]his broadening there-
fore constitutes an impermissible recapture of surren-
dered subject matter.” Id. In doing so, the Board relied
on an isolated statement in North American Container—
that it is irrelevant that claims as a whole are intermedi-
ate in scope, 415 F.3d at 1350—and the MPEP—which
states that “[i]f surrendered subject matter . . . has been
in any way broadened in a reissue application claim, then
a recapture rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 251 is proper,”
MPEP § 1412.02(I)(C). Id. at *9 & n.5. Such reliance is
misplaced. Read in context, the statement in North
American Container does little more than explain that the
recapture rule analysis is conducted on a limitation-by-
limitation basis, so that narrowing limitations completely
unrelated to the relevant limitation will not save a reissue
claim from the recapture rule, even if the additional
narrowing limitations render the reissue claim, on the
whole, of “intermediate scope.” 415 F.3d at 1350. With
regard to the MPEP, this court in Mostafazadeh has
already admonished the Board’s reliance on this section
as inappropriate. 643 F.3d at 1360.
In erring, the Board failed to distinguish between in-
stances where an added limitation has been modified
versus instances where an added limitation is eliminated
in its entirety. As Mostafazadeh teaches, such a distinc-
IN RE YOUMAN 16
tion is critical to applying correctly step three of the
recapture rule. Id. at 1361.
The majority of our precedent (including precedent re-
lied on by the Board) involves instances where the pat-
entee eliminates the added limitation in its entirety; in
such circumstances it is clear that the surrendered sub-
ject matter has been recaptured and the scope of the
reissue claim is even broader than the original. See, e.g.,
N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1350 (patentee eliminated
the “generally convex” restriction on the “inner wall”
limitation, which was added to overcome prior art);
Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371 (in its reissue claim, the pat-
entee eliminated any limitation on the shape of the hap-
tics, which had necessarily been added to overcome prior
art during original prosecution); Clement, 131 F.3d at
1470-71.
In the case at bar, however, the Board has already de-
termined that the added limitation—cycling—has not
been eliminated; rather, it has been broadened to chang-
ing. Board Decision, 2010 WL 3503790, at *9. Such
modification does not instantly implicate the recapture
rule bar, as the Board held; rather, such a broadening
modification must be evaluated to determine if it materi-
ally narrows relative to the original claim such that
surrendered subject matter is not entirely or substantially
recaptured. Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358, 1359, 1361.
The appellee argues that material narrowing should
be determined relative to the patented claim, rather than
the original claim. We disagree. Using the original claim
as a frame of reference for determining whether the
reissue claim materially narrows is consistent both with
case law and the purposes underlying the reissue stat-
17 IN RE YOUMAN
ute. 4 By measuring material narrowing relative to the
original claim, which was deliberately surrendered during
the original prosecution, we are ensuring that the pat-
entee is unable to recapture what it surrendered deliber-
ately, but allowing room for error, as required by the
reissue statute. 35 U.S.C. § 251; In re Richman, 409 F.2d
269, 274-75 (CCPA 1969) (“We . . . find neither decision to
be authority for the proposition that a limitation added to
a claim in obtaining its allowance cannot be broadened,
under [§ 251], by reissue if the limitation turns out to be
more restrictive than the prior art required.”); see Med-
tronic, 465 F.3d at 1375 (finding the surrender of certain
subject matter during amendment not deliberate due to
error—attorney’s failure to understand the scope of the
invention—and thus avoiding recapture rule). As the
court noted in In re Richman, even when narrowing a
4 See Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1358-59 (applying
step three’s “materially narrowing” analysis “relative to
the original claims” where “original claims” are defined as
“the claims before surrender”); Clement, 131 F.3d at 1469
(“If the scope of the reissue claim is the same as or
broader than that of the canceled [i.e, original] claim,
then the patentee is clearly attempting to recapture
surrendered subject matter and the reissue claim is,
therefore, unallowable.”); Ball Corp. v. United States, 729
F.2d 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The recapture rule bars
the patentee from acquiring, through reissue, claims that
are the same or of broader scope than those claims that
were canceled from the original application. On the other
hand, the patentee is free to acquire, through reissue,
claims that are narrower in scope than the canceled
claims. If the reissue claims are narrower than the
canceled claims, yet broader than the original patent
claims, reissue must be sought within 2 years after grant
of the original patent.”); see also Clement, 131 F.3d at
1470 (“Comparing reissue claim with claim 42 before the
May 1988 and June 1987 amendments . . . , we see that
claim 49 is narrower in one area” and broader in others).
IN RE YOUMAN 18
claim to overcome prior art, “[c]ertainly one might err
without deceptive intention in adding a particular limita-
tion where a less specific limitation regarding the same
feature, . . . would have been sufficient to render the
claims patentable over prior art.” 409 F.2d at 274. By
contrast, if we use the patented claims, as the appellee
urges, as a frame of reference and prevent any broadening
relative to the patented claims, we would bar patentees
from doing what they otherwise would be entitled to
under the reissue statute—broadening their claims within
two years when such claims were overly narrowed during
prosecution as a result of attorney error. This would
frustrate the remedial nature of the reissue statute and
contradict case law.
With regards to determining whether a modified limi-
tation is materially narrowing, Mostafazadeh should
provide the Board with guidance for conducting such
analysis. There, the “circular attachment pad” limitation
was added to an original claim to overcome prior art.
Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1356-57. On reissue, the
patentees argued that the patented claims were partially
inoperative because this limitation was unduly limiting,
and filed reissue claims that broadened the limitation to
“attachment pad,” so that, with regard to this limitation,
the reissue claims were of intermediate scope. Id. at
1357. The court rejected the applicants’ contention that
the recapture rule was avoided because they did not
recapture everything they surrendered. Id. at 1361. The
court explained that “the mere argument that the reissue
claims constitute only a partial recapture is insufficient
without a corresponding demonstration of material nar-
rowing.” Id. Where the modified limitation was con-
tained in the prior art relied on by the examiner in the
original prosecution, as the attachment pad was, the
limitation is not materially narrowing. Id. at 1361 & n.4.
19 IN RE YOUMAN
Thus, Mostafazadeh establishes, as a ceiling for de-
termining whether a modified limitation material nar-
rows, any recapture of surrendered subject matter that
was in the prior art of the original prosecution. 5 The logic
of such a ceiling flows from the concept of “error” under
the reissue statute. When a patentee is narrowing its
claim limitations due to prior art that would otherwise
render the claims unpatentable, the patentee can only be
doing so deliberately, without any possibility of error.
Thus, if the patentee modifies the added limitation such
that it is broader than the patented claim yet still materi-
ally narrows relative to the original claim, the recapture
rule does not bar reissue. The Board’s failure to distin-
guish this case from instances where the added limitation
is deleted in its entirety and to conduct the proper analy-
sis for a modified limitation is reason enough to vacate
and remand.
5 Applicants appeared to take a similar position
during oral argument.
IN RE YOUMAN 20
2
If the modified limitation does not materially narrow
(or, in other cases, the limitation is eliminated), the Board
must still determine whether the reissued claims were
materially narrowed in other respects so that the claims
have not been enlarged, and hence avoid the recapture
rule. Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1361 (applying this
analysis where limitation modified but not materially
narrowing); N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1349 (applying
this analysis where added limitation was eliminated);
Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371 (same); Hester, 142 F.3d at 1482
(same); Mentor, 998 F.2d at 996 (same).
While the Board attempted to conduct this analysis, it
incorrectly evaluated whether other limitations added
during reissue materially narrow based on whether those
added limitations were directed to an “overlooked aspect”
of the invention. Board decision, 2010 WL 3503790, at
*10-11. Whereas the recapture rule applies when surren-
dered subject matter is being reclaimed, overlooked
aspects by definition were never claimed and thus never
surrendered. See Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d at 1360.
Rather, as we explained in Mostafazadeh, “overlooked
aspects” is a separate inquiry under reissue that is inde-
pendent of whether or not the recapture rule applies. 6
Without conducting any analysis beyond determining that
the limitations the applicants identified as materially
narrowing were not overlooked aspects, the Board did not
correctly apply step three.
6 Indeed, during oral argument in Mostafazadeh,
the PTO admitted that “overlooked aspects” are unrelated
to the recapture rule. 643 F.3d at 1360.
21 IN RE YOUMAN
Properly applied, the material narrowing must relate
to the surrendered subject matter to prevent the recap-
ture rule from applying. Id. at 1359 (“[T]he narrowing
must relate to the subject matter surrendered during the
original prosecution (i.e., the applicant cannot recapture
the full scope of what was surrendered).”); N. Am. Con-
tainer, 415 F.3d at 1350 (applying recapture rule bar
because the narrowing of claims did not relate to the
surrendered subject matter); Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1371-72
(determining that added limitations relating to the size
and position of the haptics did not materially narrow
relative to surrendered subject matter, which related to
the shape of the haptics). If the narrowing is unrelated to
the surrendered subject matter, it is irrelevant for the
purposes of the analysis even if it renders the reissue
claim as a whole intermediate in scope relative to the
patented and original claims. N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d
at 1350. If the narrowing is related to the surrendered
subject matter, it must render the reissue claim narrower
than it is broader in a manner pertinent to the subject
matter surrendered during prosecution in order to avoid
the recapture rule. See Clement, 131 F.3d at 1471.
CONCLUSION
The Board did not properly conduct step three of the
recapture rule analysis. It failed to determine whether
the applicants avoided the recapture rule bar on reissue
by modifying their “cycling” limitation to “changing” in
the reissue claim. Thus, we vacate the Board’s decision.
On remand, the Board should properly apply the recap-
ture rule analysis, as articulated in this opinion and in
Mostafazadeh, to the claims at issue and make necessary
findings of fact.
VACATED AND REMANDED
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
(Serial No. 09/313,532)
IN RE ROGER YOUMAN AND MARNEY MORRIS
__________________________
2011-1136
__________________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
__________________________
LOURIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that
the scope of a claim in reissue is to be judged for recap-
ture purposes by comparison with the claim as originally
filed. When the originally filed claim has been amended,
especially when the amendment was made in order to
obtain allowance, a later reissue claim should be com-
pared with the issued claim in order to determine
whether it has been broadened and hence constitutes
recapture of surrendered subject matter.
Reissue-recapture law, now encumbered by a variety
of cases and writings, should basically not be complicated.
Its application, though, is more difficult. Simply stated, if
a patent applicant surrenders subject matter during
prosecution, and then attempts to recapture part of what
is surrendered, he should be denied that attempt because
of the recapture rule. On the other hand, if the reissue
IN RE YOUMAN 2
also attempts to significantly narrow the broadened claim
over what has been patented, in other ways than pertain
to the point of broadening, the so-called third prong of the
recapture analysis, then recapture may be avoided be-
cause the claims overall are not broader than what is
claimed in the issued patent.
The majority relies for its conclusion here on In re
Mostafazadeh, which used the term “original” in noting
what a reissue claim should be measured against for the
third prong. 643 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
But it makes no sense to compare a reissue claim to an
original, pre-issued claim in this context. The original
claim is only history as far as later narrowing is con-
cerned. What should count is only whether a reissue
claim is in toto broadened in relation to the issued claim.
In accordance with these principles, the Mostafazadeh
court held that the applicants in that case violated the
recapture rule because the reissue claims were broader
than the issued patent claims regarding the surrendered
subject matter and were not “materially narrowed in a
way that avoid[ed] recapture of the surrendered subject
matter.” Id. at 1361 (citing N. Am. Container, Inc. v.
Plastipack Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2005), Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc., 258 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464,
1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Indeed, the cases relied on by
Mostafazadeh likewise held that the “materially narrow-
ing” inquiry focuses on whether the reissue claims were
narrowed in any material respect compared to the issued
patent claims, not the originally-filed claims. E.g.,
Pannu, 258 F.3d at 1372 (holding that recapture rule
applied when “the reissued claims were not narrowed in
any material respect compared with their broadening”);
N. Am. Container, 415 F.3d at 1349–50 (holding that
recapture rule applied to reissued claims that had been
3 IN RE YOUMAN
“enlarged” and were not “materially narrowed in other
respects”). Thus, the majority’s extension of dicta in
Mostafazadeh is unwarranted.
The point of surrender and recapture is to ensure that
an applicant does not amend a pending claim, surrender
part of it in order to obtain issuance, and then file a
reissue application broadening the issued claim over what
he accepted in the Patent Office. It is broadening over the
issued claim, not the originally filed claim, that should
count. Moreover, concepts such as total or partial modifi-
cation of a claim, and “overlooked aspects” of a claim are
only tools for dealing with the basic concept of surrender,
broadening, and recapture rather than basic rules.
Here, materially narrowing was not at issue because
the limitations added by the patentee during reissue
corresponded to limitations already present in the issued
claims. Board Decision, 2010 WL 3503790 at 19–20. The
originally-filed claim reciting a selection means did not
limit that means to means for causing characters to cycle
forward and backward. That limitation was inserted to
overcome a rejection over the Reed, Young, and Vogel
references. But, once that patent issued with the cycling
limitation, the reissue claim replacing cycling with the
broader changing limitation was a broadening. What
matters is that it was a broadening over the issued claim
reciting cycling, not a broadening over the originally-filed
claim without the cycling limitation. By comparing the
reissue claim to the originally-filed claim, the majority
has drawn the wrong conclusion from Mostafazadeh and
further complicated the law of reissue-recapture.
The Board found that reissue claims 24–27, 29–43,
and 45–55 broadened surrendered subject matter and
were not materially narrowed in other respects to avoid
IN RE YOUMAN 4
recapture. Those conclusions were not lacking in sub-
stantial evidence or contrary to law. I would therefore
affirm the Board’s decision. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent.