UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7477
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ELIJAH GAYLON JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:07-cr-00704-HFF-1; 6:10-cv-70268-HFF)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: May 8, 2012
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elijah Gaylon Jones, Appellant Pro Se. William Corley Lucius,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Elijah Gaylon Jones seeks to appeal the district
court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.
2011) motion as untimely. In a civil case in which the United
States or its officer or agency is a party, parties have sixty
days following the entry of the district court’s final judgment
or order in which to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B). However, if a party moves for an extension of time
to appeal within thirty days after expiration of the original
appeal period and demonstrates excusable neglect or good cause,
a district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d
899, 900-01 (4th Cir. 1989).
Jones’ notice of appeal was received in the district
court after the expiration of the sixty-day appeal period but
within the thirty-day excusable neglect period. In his notice
of appeal, Jones requested an extension of time to appeal
because he was in transit when the district court served him
with notice of its judgment and he did not receive the judgment
until he returned to his assigned correctional facility on
September 19, 2011. We conclude this letter should be construed
as a motion pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5)(A). Accordingly, we remand
the case to the district court for the limited purpose of
determining whether Jones has demonstrated excusable neglect or
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good cause warranting an extension of the sixty-day appeal
period. The record, as supplemented, will then be returned to
this court for further consideration.
REMANDED
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