United States v. Christopher Scott

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

CHRISTOPHER TYRONE SCOTT,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:97-cr-00133-H-4)

Submitted: April 27, 2012 Decided: May 8, 2012

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Christopher Tyrone Scott appeals from his thirty-month

sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised

release. Scott asserts that the district court erred by failing

to address his arguments for a within-Guidelines sentence and by

not providing adequate justification for the variance sentence. *

We affirm.

A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised

release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In

making this determination, we first consider whether the

sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry

takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of

fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review

for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making our review, we “follow

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that

[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .

with some necessary modifications to take into account the

*
The Guidelines range was 8-14 months. The statutory
maximum was 36 months.

2
unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.”

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.

We should affirm if the sentence is not unreasonable.

Id. at 439. Only if a sentence is found procedurally or

substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the sentence

is plainly unreasonable.” Id. “[T]he court ultimately has

broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a

term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439.

When imposing sentence, the district court must

provide individualized reasoning. Where the sentencing court

imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines range, it “‘must

consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the

justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree

of the variance.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473

(4th Cir. 2007). We “may consider the extent of the deviation

[from the recommended Guidelines range], but must give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.]

§ 3553(a) [2006] factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the

variance.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The

sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the

appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments

and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal

decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d

325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The Carter rationale applies to

3
revocation hearings; however, “[a] court need not be as detailed

or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be

when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States v.

Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a

district court’s reasoning may be “clear from context” and the

court’s statements throughout the sentencing hearing may be

considered). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “[w]here

a [sentencing] matter is . . . conceptually simple” and “the

record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the

evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the

judge to write more extensively.” Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 359 (2007).

Given the high level of discretion afforded to the

district court, we conclude that the court’s reasoning was

sufficient. It is clear from a review of the record that the

court listened attentively to Scott’s arguments. The court

questioned Scott about his statements and ensured that it fully

understood the facts and contentions in the case. The court

noted that it was considering the maximum sentence, but

eventually imposed a sentence six months shorter after hearing

argument. The court stated that it imposed a sentence above the

Guidelines range based on the fact that Scott absconded from

supervision and the conclusion that his criminal history posed a

danger to society. While the court did not directly address

4
Scott’s argument that his wife was requiring his sobriety as a

condition of their marriage, the court did recommend intense

drug treatment. Moreover, the resolve of Scott’s wife was not a

reasonable ground to impose a shorter sentence given Scott’s

criminal history and repeated violations of supervised release -

she was a third party with no actual or apparent control over

Scott.

Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s sentence. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED