UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4971
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC PETE CRADDOCK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00236-D-2)
Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 9, 2012
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Pete Craddock pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and distribution of crack
cocaine and stipulated in his plea agreement that he was
responsible, for sentencing purposes, for 16.8 to 22.4 grams of
crack. The district court varied above the sentencing
Guidelines range of 46-57 months and imposed a sentence of
sixty-six months. * Craddock appeals his sentence, contending
that the upward variance resulted in a substantively
unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.;
see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). A
“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applies to any
sentence, whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside
the Guidelines range.” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668
F.3d 95, 100-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation
*
At sentencing, both Craddock and the government took the
position that, under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), the statutory minimum
sentence of sixty months did not apply. The district court
tentatively adopted that position, and in its sealed statement
of reasons confirmed that the five-year mandatory minimum was
inapplicable.
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marks omitted). In reviewing any variance, the appellate court
must give due deference to the sentencing court’s decision.
United States v. Diosdado Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.)
(citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 56), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946
(2011). Here, the court varied upward by nine months.
Craddock concedes that his sentence is procedurally
reasonable, but argues that it is substantively unreasonable
because the mandatory minimum sentence, which was greater than
the Guidelines range, provided adequate deterrence and
incapacitation. The district court gave an individualized
assessment of Craddock’s situation in light of the § 3553(a)
factors, and decided that the likelihood of his recidivism was
high and the need to protect the public was not met sufficiently
by the Guidelines sentence. The district court’s determination
warrants our deference. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d
669, 679-80 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 187 (2011). We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
and that the variance was not substantively unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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