Joseph Roberts v. Rodney Cole, II

Case: 11-40520 Document: 00511853397 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/11/2012

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED
May 11, 2012

No. 11-40520 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

JOSEPH CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS,

Plaintiff–Appellant
v.

RODNEY G. COLE, II, Individually and in his Official Capacity; JOHNNY
LYNN VICKERY, JR., Individually and in his Official Capacity;
JEFFERSON COUNTY,

Defendants–Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC 1:08-cv-00406-MAC

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff–Appellant Joseph Christopher Roberts appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Jefferson County and the district court’s
denial of his motion for reconsideration in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. Roberts was
assaulted by two correctional officers at the Jefferson County Correctional
Facility and sued both the officers and the County. Shortly after the events

*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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No. 11-40520

complained of, the officers were fired and pleaded guilty to official oppression
charges. Roberts’s claims against the officers proceeded to trial, but the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. None of Roberts’s
grounds for appeal has merit and so we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the County for the following reasons:
1. Roberts first argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to the County because he produced sufficient
evidence of a widespread custom of using excessive force among the
County’s correctional officers to defeat the County’s motion. Roberts,
however, presents only a video of his own abuse and two other
vague accounts of correctional officers abusing prisoners. Even
taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Roberts, it falls
short of the necessary showing of a “persistent, widespread practice”
on the part of the County. See Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336
F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003). Moreover, Roberts is unable to create
a genuine issue of material fact that Sheriff G. “Mitch” Woods, the
relevant policymaker, had actual or constructive knowledge of any
such abuses, as he has not shown that “the violations were so
persistent and widespread that they were the subject of prolonged
public discussion or of a high degree of publicity.” Bennett v. City of
Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). We affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County
on this issue.
2. Roberts next asserts that the district court should have denied
summary judgment to the County because he demonstrated
deliberate indifference on the part of the County in its training and
supervision of its correctional officers. We disagree. Showing
deliberate indifference requires more than demonstrating simple

2
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No. 11-40520

negligence, and Roberts produces evidence showing, at most, that
the County was negligent. See Conner v. Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 794,
796 (5th Cir. 2000). Isolated incidents of the kind Roberts identifies
cannot form the basis for municipal § 1983 liability, unless they
were the highly predictable consequence of a failure to train. See
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 849–50 (5th Cir.
2009). Roberts does not meet this burden. Consequently, the district
court properly held on summary judgment that the County was not
liable for any § 1983 violation under the theories of failure to train
or supervise.
3. Lastly, Roberts appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e)
motion for reconsideration. Roberts fails to provide any persuasive
argument that the district court erred in denying his motion or that
the district court abused its discretion in declining to consider the
ostensibly novel evidence he sought to introduce. We affirm the
district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.