FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 14, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 11-2223
(D.C. Nos. 1:06-CV-00009-JAP-WDS
v. and 1:01-CR-01335-JAP-1)
(D. of N.M.)
LAMAR ANTWAUN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
Lamar Antwaun Williams, a federal prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we construe Williams’s filings
liberally because he is proceeding pro se. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991). The district court dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion
on the grounds that the issue had already been adjudicated fully on the merits.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
We find no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district court’s dismissal was
incorrect. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We also note the
Rule 60(b) motion was not timely.
Accordingly, we DENY the application for a COA and DISMISS the
appeal. We DENY the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. Background
A New Mexico jury found Williams guilty of possession with intent to
distribute over 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment. This court
affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1268
(10th Cir. 2004), and his petition for certiorari was denied on October 4, 2004,
see Williams v. United States, 543 U.S. 852 (2004). His 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
was due by October 4, 2005 pursuant to the one-year time limitation period of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Williams filed his § 2255 petition on January 4, 2006, more than three
months late. Finding no basis for equitable tolling, the district court denied his
petition as untimely and on appeal, we denied his request for a COA and
dismissed his appeal. United States v. Williams, 219 F. App’x 778, 779 (10th Cir.
2007). Years later, in December of 2011, Williams filed a motion for
reconsideration of his § 2255 motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion and he then appealed.
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II. Analysis
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)
for an abuse of discretion. Dronsejko v. Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 664 (10th Cir.
2011).
A Rule 60(b) motion challenging the application of the statute of
limitations to a § 2255 motion is not a successive habeas petition because it does
not contest the merits of a conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524
(2005). A petitioner does not make a habeas claim when “he merely asserts that a
previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error–for example,
a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or
statute-of-limitations bar.” Id. at 532 n.4; see id. at 533, 538.
But Rule 60(b) “relief is extraordinary and may only be granted in
exceptional circumstances.” Beugler v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
490 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). The district
court dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion on the grounds that the issue of timeliness
had already been fully adjudicated. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and
the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist
could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or
that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at
484.
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First of all, even if it had merit, Williams’s Rule 60(b) motion was
untimely. To obtain relief, a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). A motion under Rule 60(b) must be
made “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order.” Id. In this
case, this court’s judgment dismissing petitioner’s petition for habeas relief was
entered in 2007, years prior to the Rule 60(b) motion before the district court.
Williams tries to revive his claim for equitable tolling on the grounds he is
actually innocent of the crime. But his claim is unsupported. To establish a
credible claim of actual innocence, a petitioner must support his claim with “new
reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at
trial,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995), and show “that it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.” Id. at 327. Williams provides no evidence establishing a credible
claim of actual innocence, and the additional affidavits proffered by Williams in
his application for a COA do not constitute “newly discovered evidence” that
would be sufficient to establish his innocence and justify equitable tolling.
Furthermore, he made no such claim at the time of his first appeal of the district
court’s untimeliness ruling.
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.
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* * *
The application for a COA, the motion to supplement the opening brief, and
the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are denied and this appeal is
dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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