UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4066
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SILAS JUNIOR MOBLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-4606
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARVIN SUNTATE MOBLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00189-RJC-2; 3:09-cr-00189-
RJC-DCK-3)
Submitted: April 23, 2012 Decided: May 14, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina; Andrew B.
Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellants. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney,
Richard L. Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Silas Junior Mobley (“Silas”) and Marvin Suntate
Mobley (“Marvin”) were convicted after a jury trial of one count
each of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent
to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) and
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and one count each of attempted
possession with the intent to distribute at least 500 grams of
cocaine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2006), 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. The
district court sentenced both Silas and Marvin to terms of life
imprisonment on the conspiracy counts and concurrent terms of
120 months’ imprisonment on the attempt counts, and they now
appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
Marvin argues that the motion to withdraw filed by his
trial counsel was erroneously denied. Because the magistrate
judge, rather than the district court, issued the ruling denying
the motion to withdraw, Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governs. Rule 59(a) requires that a party
object to a magistrate judge’s determination on “any matter that
does not dispose of a charge or defense” within fourteen days
after being served with a copy of the written order or after the
oral order is stated on the record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a).
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“Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s
right to review.” Id.
In this case, the magistrate judge entered the ruling
denying the motion to withdraw filed by Marvin’s counsel. The
record does not indicate that Marvin ever objected to the
magistrate judge’s ruling before the district court.
Accordingly, Marvin has waived appellate review of this issue.
Id.; United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93-94 (4th Cir.
1984) (“We do not believe . . . that the [Federal Magistrates]
Act can be interpreted to permit a party . . . to ignore his
right to file objections with the district court without
imperiling his right to raise the objections in the circuit
court of appeals.”).
Next, both Silas and Marvin contend that the district
court’s instructions to the jury regarding its finding on drug
quantity contravened this court’s decision in United States v.
Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311-15 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Silas
and Marvin did not object to the district court’s drug quantity
instructions at the time they were given, we review this claim
for plain error only. United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233,
249 (4th Cir. 2007). After a review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not
commit error—plain or otherwise—under Collins because the
court’s instructions directed the jury to determine the drug
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quantity reasonably foreseeable to Silas and Marvin
individually, as opposed to the conspiracy as a whole.
Marvin also challenges the district court’s imposition
of the statutory minimum sentence of life imprisonment on the
conspiracy count, arguing that the court erred in concluding
that his 1997 South Carolina state conviction qualified as a
predicate felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A).
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the
term “felony drug offense” used in § 841(b)(1)(A). United
States v. Burgess, 478 F.3d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 2007).
A “felony drug offense” is “punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year under any law of the United States or of
a State . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to
narcotic drugs.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(44) (West Supp. 2011).
Marvin asserts that his 1997 conviction does not qualify as a
felony drug offense because he was sentenced for the conviction
under South Carolina’s Youthful Offender Act (“YOA”), S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-19-50 (2005), to five years in the custody of the
state’s youthful offender division, suspended, and a three-year
term of probation.
We conclude that the district court properly
determined that the 1997 conviction was a predicate felony drug
offense under § 841(b)(1)(A). The conviction was for possession
of cocaine base, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(A)
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(2002), and was punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.
The fact that Marvin was given a sentence under the YOA for that
conviction simply has no legal significance. See United
States v. Williams, 508 F.3d 724, 726-30 (4th Cir. 2007)
(upholding a youthful offender offense as an armed career
criminal predicate).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We construe Silas’ pro se letter as a motion seeking leave to
file a pro se supplemental brief and deny the motion. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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