This cause was originally commenced under the act of February, 1854 (Session Acts, 126), and tried before the justices and slaveholders, according to the provisions of that act. The plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of grand.larceny, and an appeal was prosecuted by him to the circuit court, under the provisions of the eleventh section of said act of 1854.
A preliminary question is raised as to the jurisdiction of this court, and whether a writ of error-lies at the suit of a slave to this court, in cases of this character.
. As indicating this view, it is said it was the object of the act of 1854 to provide a more summary, cheaper, and more expeditious remedy for the trial of minor offenses charged against slaves, and yet to secure to the slave all just protection against the errors of the inferior court, established for that purpose. Hence the right of appeal to the circuit court, and a trial there according to the usual forms in such trials in the circuit court. If, however, there lies a writ of error in this court in such cases, in addition to the right of appeal to the circuit court, it is said the whole object and design of the act is defeated, and an act designed to. secure a speedy trial will be thereby converted into an instrument of delay, injustice and oppression to all parties interested; and, indeed, that by such construction the smallest offenses will become, in the mode, and forms, and delays of trial, much more difficult, tedious and expensive, than offenses involving the life of the slave.
To this it is answered, that the general language of the new code, extending the writ of error to all criminal eases, and the subsequent act of 1858, making writs of error, in all crimmal cases, writs of right under certain-restrictions, embrace as well this class of cases as any other.- And this would seem to be conclusive, unless it shall be found that, from their peculiar character and situation, this inferior class of our populátion are excepted out of our general legislation, and only included therein when specially named, or are specially excepted by the obvious intent of the act of 1854, the act in question.
.This subject is discussed by Mr. Cobb, in his Treatise on the Law of Slavery. After showing the origin and sources of.
■ He proceeds to remark, that “ no such state of slavery, however, exists in these states,” and to note the modifications growing out of ■ civilization and express legislation. He then examines the arguments of different courts on the long-mooted question, whether, in the absence of statute laws, the homicide of a slave is punishable as murder, under the general law prescribing the penalty of murder.
“ By some courts,” he says, “ it has been held, that so soon as the progress of civilization and Christian enlightenment elevated the slave from the position of a mere chattel, and recognized him for any purpose as a person, just at that moment the homicide of him, a human being in the peace of the state, with malice aforethought, was murder. So long as he remained purely and unqualifiedly property, an injury upon him was a trespass upon the master’s rights. When the law, by providing for his proper nourishment and clothing, by enacting penalties against the cruel treatment of his master, by providing for his punishment for crimes, and other similar provisions, recognizes his existence as a person, he is as a child just born, brought for the first time within the pale of the law’s protecting power. His existence as a person being recognized by the law, that existence is protected by the law; and of this class of cases are the following: The State v. Tackett, 1 Hawks’ R., 217; McGrew v. Cato’s Ex’r, Minor R., 8; Middleton v. Holmes, 3 Porter, 424; The State v. Jones, Walker’s Miss. R., 83; Kelly & Little v. The State, 3 S. & M., 518; Fields v. The State, 1 Yerger, 156; Commonwealth v. Booth, 1 Virginia Cases, 394; Dolly Chappie’s case, 1 ib., 184; Commonwealth v. Turner, 5
“ It has been objected to this conclusion,” he says, “ that if the general provision of the law against murder should be held to include slaves, why should not all other penal enactments, by the same course of reasoning, be held to include similar offenses, when committed on slaves, without their being specially named? The reply made is twofold:
“ 1. The law, by recognizing the existence of the slave, as a person, thereby confers no rights or privileges except such as are necessary to protect that existence. All other rights must be granted specially. Hence the penalties for rape would not and should not, by such implications, be made to extend to carnal forcible knowledge of a slave; the offense not affecting the existence of the slave, and that existence being the extent of the right which the implication of the law grants.
“ 2. Implications of law will always be rebutted by the general policy of the law; and it is clearly against the policy of the law to extend over this class of the community that character of protection which many of the penal statutes are intended to provide for the citizen.”
At section 91 he says: “ To all this reasoning and these conclusions other courts have withheld their assent; and while they acknowledge that the feelings of humanity and the dictates of conscience, enlightened by Christianity, would lead them to these conclusions, yet they have been unable, in the law itself, to feel themselves justified in so declaring it. In their view, the slave remains in a state of pure slavery until relieved by legislative enactment, and the provisions of these enactments are the extent of their rights and protection; that by the rules for the construction of statutes, which are adapted to regulate the conduct of citizens, slaves are not included in their provisions, unless specifically named; that, though murder is defined to be the killing of a human being, &c., yet rape is defined to be the carnal, forcible knowledge of a female; and if the killing of a slave be murder, the carnal, forcible knowledge of a female slave is a rape; and, further, that the fact that every slaveholding state has, by penal enactment, provided punishment for such
The author then says (sect. 92): “ The view we have taken of the law of nature leads us to a different conclusion from either of these, viz., that by that law, and without statutory enactment, the homicide of, or maiming, a negro slave, is prohibited, and unlawful, but that it requires statutory enactment to provide punishment for such offenses.”
(Sect. 94.) The protection of the person of the slave depending so completely upon statute law, it becomes a question of importance what words in a statute would extend to this class of individuals. Generally, it would seem that an act of the legislature would operate upon every person within the -limits of the state, both natural and artificial. Yet when the provisions of the statute evidently refer to natural• persons, the court will not extend them to artificial.
' Nor will statutes ever be so construed as to lead to absurd or ridiculous conclusions. Experience has proved, what theory would have demonstrated, that masters and slaves cannot be governed by the same laws. So different in position, in rights, in duties, they cannot be the subjects of a common system of laws. ■
- Hence/the conclusion that statutoiy enactments never extend to, or include, the slave, neither to protect nor to render him responsible, unless specifically named, or included- by necessary implication. See Wash v. The State, 14 S. & M., 120; and The State v. Whyte and Sadler, 2 N. & McC., 175; 4 Dev., 340; 1 Scam., 178; 2 Dev., 263; 5 Rand, 678; Cobb’s Law of Slavery, §§ 94, 303, 318, 320, 321; State v. Mary Hage, 1 Bailey R., 275; Grady v. The State, 11 Georgia, 253.
In this state the legislature has adopted a code with express reference to the trial of slaves, defining the offenses, from murder to the lowest offenses; affixing penalties; establishing a special tribunal for their trial, wholly differing in its character from the mode applied to persons who are citizens; regulating the competency of witnesses — how summoned — the mode of compelling their attendance; and providing for the keeping and preservation of its records and papers, and for fees and costs; and finally, for appeal to the circuit court.
It can hardly be supposed, therefore, that in the great number, variety and minute particularity of the provisions, establishing a system, having reference to this class alone, it could have escaped the scrutiny of the legislature, if they had so intended to make provision for writs of ei’ror also; and the fact, that in an act so carefully .considered, and making such important changes, no provision for writs of error to this court is made, is strongly persuasive that none was intended.
Without determining the general question discussed by the
Statutes will never be construed so as to lead to conclusions so absurd. Smith’s Commentaries, §§ 511, 518 ; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 400; 7 Mass,, 523; Cobb’s Law of Slavery, § 94.
The same principles are applicable to the case of The State v. Patrick, submitted to us with the case under consideration.
The writs of error in these cases are therefore dismissed, for want of jurisdiction.