Alaska v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER

No. 128, Orig. Argued January 10, 2005—Decided June 6, 2005
States are generally entitled “under both the equal footing doctrine and
the Submerged Lands Act to submerged lands beneath tidal and
inland navigable waters, and under the Submerged Lands Act alone
to submerged lands extending three miles seaward of [their] coast-
line.” United States v. Alaska, 521 U. S. 1, 6, 9 (Alaska (Arctic
Coast)). The Federal Government can overcome the presumption of
title and defeat a future State’s claim, however, by setting submerged
lands aside before statehood in a way that shows an intent to retain
title. Id., at 33–34. Here, Alaska and the United States dispute title
to two areas of submerged lands. The first consists of pockets and
enclaves of submerged lands underlying waters in the Alexander Ar-
chipelago that are more than three nautical miles from the coast of
the mainland or any individual island. Alaska can claim these pock-
ets and enclaves only if the archipelago waters themselves qualify as
inland waters. The second area consists of submerged lands beneath
the inland waters of Glacier Bay, a well-marked indentation into the
southeastern Alaskan coast. To claim them, the United States must
rebut Alaska’s presumption of title. The Special Master recom-
mended that summary judgment be granted to the United States
with respect to both areas, concluding that the Alexander Archipel-
ago waters do not qualify as inland waters either under a historic
inland waters theory or under a juridical bay theory, and concluding
that the United States had rebutted the presumption that title to the
disputed submerged lands beneath Glacier Bay passed to Alaska at
statehood. Alaska filed exceptions to these conclusions.
Held: Alaska’s exceptions are overruled. Pp. 4–35.
(a) The Alexander Archipelago’s waters are not historic inland wa-
ters. To make a historic waters claim, a State must show that the
United States exercises authority over the area, has done so continu-
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Syllabus

ously, and has done so with the acquiescence of foreign nations. This
“exercise of sovereignty must have been, historically, an assertion of
power to exclude all foreign vessels and navigation,” United States v.
Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 197, including vessels engaged in “innocent
passage,” i.e., passage that does not prejudice the coastal State’s
peace, good order, or security. Based on his examination of five dif-
ferent periods from 1821 to the present, the Special Master found
that Russia and the United States historically have not asserted the
requisite authority over the waters of the Alexander Archipelago.
The evidence that Alaska points to—including incidents during Rus-
sian and early United States sovereignty, and the United States’ liti-
gating position during a 1903 arbitration proceeding—is insufficient
to demonstrate the continuous assertion of exclusive authority, with
acquiescence of foreign nations, necessary to support a historic inland
waters claim. Pp. 4–15.
(b) Nor do the Alexander Archipelago’s waters qualify as inland
waters under the juridical bay theory Alaska advances in the alter-
native. The claimed juridical bays would exist only if, at minimum,
four of the archipelago’s islands were deemed to form a constructive
peninsula extending from the mainland and dividing the archipel-
ago’s waters in two. Yet even assuming, arguendo, that each of the
islands should be assimilated one to another, Alaska’s hypothetical
bays still would not meet the criteria for juridical bays set forth in
Article 7(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone (hereinafter Convention). In particular, the resulting bodies
of water north and south of Alaska’s constructive peninsula do not
qualify as well-marked indentations under the Convention, for they
do not possess physical features that would allow a mariner looking
at navigational charts that do not depict bay closing lines nonetheless
to perceive the bays’ limits in order to avoid illegal encroachment into
inland waters. Pp. 15–20.
(c) The United States has rebutted Alaska’s presumed title to the
submerged lands underlying the waters of Glacier Bay National
Monument (now Glacier Bay National Park). The United States can
defeat a future State’s presumed title to submerged lands by, inter
alia, setting the lands aside as part of a federal reservation “such as
a wildlife refuge.” Idaho v. United States, 533 U. S. 262, 273. To de-
termine whether Congress has used that power, this Court first asks
whether the United States clearly intended to include the submerged
lands within the reservation. If the answer is yes, the Court then
asks whether the United States expressed its intent to retain federal
title to the lands within the reservation.
The Special Master’s conclusion that the monument, at the time of
Alaska’s statehood, included the submerged lands underlying Glacier
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Syllabus

Bay has strong support in the precedents and whole record of the
case, and Alaska does not take exception to it. As for the second
question, the Alaska Statehood Act’s (ASA) provisions suffice to over-
come Alaska’s ownership presumption arising from the equal footing
doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) and to reserve Glacier
Bay’s submerged lands to the United States.
Under the ASA, Alaska acquired title to any property previously
belonging to the Territory of Alaska and the United States retained
title to its property located with Alaska’s borders, subject to excep-
tions set forth in ASA §6. The first clause of §6(e) directs a transfer
to Alaska of any United States property used “for the sole purpose of
conservation and protection of [Alaska’s] fisheries and wildlife” under
three specified federal laws. The proviso following that clause made
clear that the initial clause’s directive did not apply to “lands with-
drawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for [wildlife]
protection.” In Alaska (Arctic Coast), this Court held that the proviso
expressed congressional intent to retain title to a reservation such as
the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, and that intent was sufficient to
defeat Alaska’s presumed title under both the equal footing doctrine
and the SLA. Alaska cannot avoid that result here.
Alaska’s narrow reading—that the proviso applies only to federal
property covered by §6(e)’s initial clause, which does not include Gla-
cier Bay—is neither necessary nor preferred. A proviso may refer
only to things covered by a preceding clause, but it can also state a
general, independent rule. The Court agrees with the United States
that the proviso is best read, in light of the interpretation given to it
in Alaska (Arctic Coast), as expressing an independent and general
rule uncoupled from the initial clause. Under the initial clause the
United States obligated itself to transfer to Alaska equipment and
other property used for general fish and wildlife management re-
sponsibilities Alaska was to undertake upon acquiring statehood.
Under the proviso the United States expressed its intent, notwith-
standing this property transfer, to retain ownership over all federal
refuges and reservations set aside for the protection of wildlife, re-
gardless of the specific statutory authority enabling the set-aside.
This expression of intent encompassed Glacier Bay National Monu-
ment, which was set aside “for the protection of wildlife” within the
meaning of §6(e). The text thus defeated the presumption that the
new State of Alaska would acquire title to the submerged lands un-
derlying the monument’s waters, including the inland waters of Gla-
cier Bay. Pp. 20–35.
Exceptions overruled.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with re-
4 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

spect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, the opinion of the Court with respect to
Part V, in which STEVENS, O’CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER,
JJ., joined, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part VI, in
which STEVENS, O’CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined,
and in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined ex-
cept as to those portions related to Part V. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J.,
and THOMAS, J., joined.
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Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 128 Orig.
_________________

STATE OF ALASKA, PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT
[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Alaska has invoked our original jurisdiction
to resolve its dispute with the United States over title to
certain submerged lands underlying waters located in
southeast Alaska. Alaska initiated the action by filing a
complaint with leave of the Court. 530 U. S. 1228 (2000).
We appointed Professor Gregory E. Maggs to act as Spe-
cial Master in this matter. 531 U. S. 941 (2000). The
Special Master gave thorough consideration to the written
and oral submissions of the parties. In a detailed report
he now recommends the grant of summary judgment to
the United States with respect to all the submerged lands
in dispute. Report of Special Master 1 (hereinafter Report
or Special Master’s Report). We set the case for oral ar-
gument on Alaska’s exceptions to the Special Master’s
Report. 543 U. S. ___ (2004). For the reasons we discuss,
Alaska’s exceptions are overruled.
I
We begin by reviewing the general principles elaborated
in the resolution of similar submerged lands disputes in
our earlier cases.
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Opinion of the Court

States enjoy a presumption of title to submerged lands
beneath inland navigable waters within their boundaries
and beneath territorial waters within three nautical miles
of their coasts. This presumption flows from two sources.
Under the established rule known as the equal footing
doctrine, new States enter the Union “on an ‘equal footing’
with the original 13 Colonies and succeed to the United
States’ title to the beds of navigable waters within their
boundaries.” United States v. Alaska, 521 U. S. 1, 5 (1997)
(Alaska (Arctic Coast)). Under the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA), 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §1301 et seq., which applies
to Alaska through an express provision of the Alaska
Statehood Act (ASA), §6(m), 72 Stat. 343, the presumption
of state title to “lands beneath navigable waters within the
boundaries of the respective States” is “confirmed” and
“established.” 43 U. S. C. §1311(a); see also Alaska (Arctic
Coast), 521 U. S., at 5–6. The SLA also “establishes
States’ title to submerged lands beneath a 3-mile belt of
the territorial sea, which would otherwise be held by the
United States.” Id., at 6. “As a general matter, then,
Alaska is entitled under both the equal footing doctrine
and the Submerged Lands Act to submerged lands be-
neath tidal and inland navigable waters, and under the
Submerged Lands Act alone to submerged lands extending
three miles seaward of its coastline.” Ibid.
The Federal Government can overcome the presumption
and defeat a future State’s title to submerged lands by
setting them aside before statehood in a way that shows
an intent to retain title. Id., at 33–34. The requisite
intent must, however, be “ ‘definitely declared or otherwise
made very plain.’ ” Id., at 34 (quoting United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55 (1926)).
With these principles in mind, we discuss the two areas
of submerged land at issue here.
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Opinion of the Court

II
The first area of submerged land in dispute, claimed by
Alaska under alternative theories in counts I and II of its
amended complaint to quiet title (hereinafter Amended
Complaint), consists of pockets and enclaves of submerged
lands underlying waters in between and fringing the
southeastern Alaska islands known as the Alexander
Archipelago. These disputed submerged lands, shown in
red and dark blue on the map in Appendix A, infra, share
a common feature: All points within the pockets and en-
claves are more than three nautical miles from the coast of
the mainland or of any individual island of the Alexander
Archipelago.
For these pockets and enclaves, the dispositive question
is whether the Alexander Archipelago’s waters qualify as
inland waters. If they do, Alaska’s coastline would begin
at the outer bounds of these inland waters as marked by
the black line drawn on the map in Appendix A, infra. See
43 U. S. C. §1301(c) (“The term ‘coast line’ means the line
of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which
is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters”); see also United
States v. Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 187–188, and n. 5 (1975)
(Alaska (Cook Inlet)). Under the equal footing doctrine
and the SLA, a presumption of state title would then arise
as to all the submerged lands underlying both the inland
waters landward of this coastline, and also the territorial
sea within three nautical miles of it. Because the United
States concedes it could not rebut the presumption of state
title as to this aspect of the case, Alaska would have title
to all the pockets and enclaves of submerged lands in
dispute.
If the Alexander Archipelago’s waters do not qualify as
inland, then they instead qualify as territorial sea. In that
case Alaska would have no claim of title to the disputed
pockets and enclaves, as these lands are beyond three
4 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

nautical miles from the coast of the mainland or any indi-
vidual island.
The second area of submerged land in dispute, claimed
by Alaska in count IV of its Amended Complaint, consists
of the submerged land beneath Glacier Bay, a well-marked
indentation into the coast of the southeast Alaskan
mainland. See Appendixes C, D, infra (maps of Glacier
Bay). There is no question that Glacier Bay’s waters are
inland. For the submerged lands underlying these waters,
the controlling question is whether the United States can
rebut Alaska’s presumption of title.
After receiving the parties’ written submissions and
conducting a hearing, the Special Master recommended
that this Court grant summary judgment to the United
States with respect to Alaska’s claims of title to both areas
of submerged land in dispute. Report 1. As to the pockets
and enclaves, the Special Master concluded that the wa-
ters of the Alexander Archipelago do not qualify as inland
waters either under the historic inland waters theory
advanced in count I of Alaska’s Amended Complaint or
under the juridical bay theory advanced in count II. Id.,
at 137–138, 226. As to the submerged lands underlying
Glacier Bay and claimed by Alaska in count IV, the Spe-
cial Master concluded that the United States has rebutted
the presumption that title passed to Alaska at statehood.
Id., at 276. Alaska filed exceptions to each of these three
conclusions. We address them in turn.
III
In count I of its Amended Complaint, Alaska alleges
that the waters of the Alexander Archipelago are historic
inland waters. As this Court has recognized, “where a
State within the United States wishes to claim submerged
lands based on an area’s status as historic inland waters,
the State must demonstrate that the United States: (1)
exercises authority over the area; (2) has done so continu-
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Opinion of the Court

ously; and (3) has done so with the acquiescence of foreign
nations.” Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U. S., at 11. “For this
showing,” we have elaborated, “the exercise of sovereignty
must have been, historically, an assertion of power to
exclude all foreign vessels and navigation.” Alaska (Cook
Inlet), supra, at 197.
Nations may exclude from inland waters even vessels
engaged in so-called “innocent passage”—passage that “is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal State,” Arts. 14(1), 14(4) of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U. S. T. 1607, 1610 T. I. A. S. No. 5639 (herein-
after Convention). See United States v. Louisiana, 470
U. S. 93, 113 (1985) (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 11, 22 (1969).
To claim a body of water as historic inland water, it is
therefore important to establish that the right to exclude
innocent passage has somehow been asserted, even if
never actually exercised. See Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case, 470 U. S., at 113, and n. 13. The Court
also has considered the “vital interests of the United
States” in designating waters as historic inland waters.
Id., at 103.
The Special Master recommended that the Court grant
summary judgment to the United States on this count.
The Special Master first made a thorough examination of
historical documents, from 1821 to the present, bearing on
the status of the Alexander Archipelago’s waters. The
Special Master sorted these documents into five distinct
periods: (1) Russian sovereignty (1821–1867), Report 23–
38; (2) early American sovereignty (1867–1903), id., at 38–
55; (3) the 1903 U. S.-Britain Boundary Arbitration, id., at
56–63; (4) later American sovereignty (1903–1959), id., at
63–89; and (5) the poststatehood era (1959–present), id.,
at 89–107. Based on his examination of the record evi-
dence from all of these periods, the Special Master con-
6 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

cluded that “Russia and the United States historically did
not assert authority to exclude vessels from making inno-
cent passage through the waters of the Alexander Archi-
pelago.” Id., at 109. In the Special Master’s view, Alaska
had at best “uncovered and presented only ‘questionable
evidence’ that the United States exercised the kind of
authority over the waters of the Archipelago that would be
necessary to prove a historic waters claim.” Id., at 129.
Though Alaska’s failure to demonstrate that the waters
of the Alexander Archipelago had historically been treated
as inland waters would by itself justify granting summary
judgment to the United States on count I, the Special
Master also addressed other relevant factors, such as the
acquiescence of other nations and the vital interests of the
United States. In the Special Master’s view these factors
only strengthened the case for granting summary judg-
ment to the United States.
Excepting to the Special Master’s recommendation on
count I, Alaska contends the Special Master gave too little
weight to historical events that tend to support Alaska’s
position. By the same token Alaska argues the Special
Master gave too much weight to historical events that
tend to undermine its position. Alaska also asserts that
foreign nations have acquiesced in the treatment of the
waters of the Alexander Archipelago as inland waters, and
that the interests of the United States support such
treatment. We find Alaska’s arguments unconvincing.
Rather than canvassing the entire historical record
discussed by the Special Master in his thorough, com-
mendable report, we turn our attention to the events
Alaska presents as its best evidence that the Alexander
Archipelago’s waters qualify as historic inland waters.
A
First in time among the events to which Alaska points
are incidents from the period of Russian sovereignty.
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Opinion of the Court

These incidents are pertinent to the inquiry because, as
we have held, when Russia ceded the territory of Alaska to
the United States in 1867, “the United States thereby
acquired whatever dominion Russia had possessed.”
Alaska (Cook Inlet), 422 U. S., at 192, n. 13.
In 1824, the United States and Russia entered into a
treaty that, inter alia, granted United States vessels the
right, over the next 10 years, to “frequent, without any
hindrance whatever, the interior seas, gulphs, harbours,
and creeks [of the Alexander Archipelago], for the purpose
of fishing and trading with the natives of the country.”
See Convention Between the United States of America and
Russia, Art. 4, 8 Stat. 304 (1825) (hereinafter 1824 Treaty
or Treaty). In Alaska’s view this Treaty demonstrates
that “the Russian claim extended to the entire Archipel-
ago” and thus that Russia treated the archipelago waters
as inland waters. Exceptions to Report of Special Master
and Brief in Support for Plaintiff 29 (hereinafter Excep-
tions and Brief for Plaintiff Alaska). The principal prob-
lem with Alaska’s assertion is that the 1824 Treaty by its
terms did not address navigation for the purpose of inno-
cent passage, but rather addressed only navigation “for
the purpose of fishing and trading with the natives.” Even
on the questionable assumption that the Treaty’s refer-
ence to “interior seas” included all the waters of the Alex-
ander Archipelago and not just waters within three nauti-
cal miles of the coast of the mainland or any particular
island, but see Report 27–28 (refuting this assumption),
the Treaty simply does not provide evidence that Russia
asserted a right to exclude innocent passage. Yet evidence
of the assertion of this right—not some lesser right—must
be provided to support an historic inland waters claim.
See Alaska (Cook Inlet), supra, at 197.
Upon the expiration of the 10-year right granted to
United States vessels by virtue of the 1824 Treaty, Russia
stationed a brig, the Chichagoff, at the southern border of
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Opinion of the Court

Russian America. Alaska implies that Russia’s purpose in
stationing the brig there was to exclude any foreign ves-
sels from entering the Alexander Archipelago’s waters.
See Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff Alaska 30–31. Were
we to accept this interpretation of the Chichagoff incident,
we would acknowledge it as some evidence that Russia
treated the Alexander Archipelago’s waters as inland
waters.
As the Special Master noted, however, a report prepared
for the 1903 Alaskan Boundary Tribunal (a tribunal we
will discuss further) described the Chichagoff incident as
follows:
“Governor Wrangell sent the brig Chichagoff, under
command of Lieutenant Zarembo, to Tongas, near the
southern boundary line at 54° 40', for the purpose of
intercepting foreign vessels entering the inland wa-
ters of the colony, to the masters of which he was to
deliver written notice of the expiration of the treaty
provisions, being furnished with six copies for Ameri-
can and three for British vessels.” 1 Proceedings of
the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, S. Doc. No. 162, 58th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 70 (1904) (footnote omitted)
(hereinafter ABT proceedings).
Like the Special Master, we see nothing in this passage to
indicate that Russia, through its actions with respect to
the Chichagoff, asserted a right to exclude from the Alex-
ander Archipelago waters foreign vessels engaged only in
innocent passage. By giving written notice of the expira-
tion of the 1824 Treaty rights, the Chichagoff reminded
American mariners that they were no longer free to trade
with the natives, or to approach within cannon shot of the
Russian lands “without any hindrance whatever.” 1824
Treaty, Art. 4, 8 Stat. 304. Russia did not assert thereby
the more sweeping right to exclude even vessels engaged
only in innocent passage.
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Opinion of the Court

Alaska also points to evidence that in 1836 Russian
forces apprehended and boarded the American vessel
Loriot while it was within the Alexander Archipelago
waters, and then ordered it “ ‘to leave the waters of His
Imperial Majesty.’ ” Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff
Alaska 30; see also Letter from John Forsyth to G. M.
Dallas (May 4, 1837), reprinted in Report of Secretary of
State Thomas F. Bayard upon the Seal Fisheries in the
Bering Sea, S. Exec. Doc. No. 106, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.,
232–233 (1889). Even this incident does not constitute
evidence that Russia viewed the archipelago waters as
inland waters, however, because the Loriot was not en-
gaged in innocent passage. The Loriot’s mission, as freely
admitted in a contemporary letter written by a State
Department official to a member of the United States
legation in St. Petersburg, was to visit “the northwest
coast of America, for the purpose of procuring provisions,
and also Indians to hunt for sea otter on the said coast.”
Id., at 232. By excluding the Loriot, which evidently had
tried to exceed the limits of mere “innocent passage,”
Russia did not, and could not, assert a right to exclude
vessels engaged solely in innocent passage.
In sum, none of the incidents Alaska cites from the
period of Russian sovereignty support the proposition that
Russia treated the waters of the Alexander Archipelago as
inland waters prior to ceding Alaska to the United States
in 1867.
B
For the period of early U. S. sovereignty between 1867
and 1903, Alaska cites not a single incident demonstrating
that the United States acted in a manner consistent with
an understanding that the Alexander Archipelago waters
were inland. Alaska thus leaves itself with at most 56
years to demonstrate continuous prestatehood treatment
of the Alexander Archipelago as inland waters. This alone
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Opinion of the Court

constitutes a substantial weakness in Alaska’s position.
As to the years between 1867 and 1903, Alaska does
attempt to explain away a significant event which under-
cuts its claim, but this attempt is unsuccessful. In 1886,
Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard wrote a letter to
Secretary of Treasury Daniel Manning concerning the
limits of the territorial waters of the United States on both
the northeastern and the northwestern coasts. See 1 J.
Moore, Digest of International Law 718–721 (1906). The
State Department’s position with respect to waters sur-
rounding fringing islands on both coasts was that the
sovereigns of those islands could only claim a territorial
sea of three miles from the coast of each island. Secretary
Bayard explained that, in asserting the 3-mile belt of
territorial sea, the United States denied neither “the free
right of vessels of other nations to pass, on peaceful er-
rands, through this zone” nor the right “of relief, when
suffering from want of necessities, from the shore.” Id., at
720–721.
According to Secretary Bayard, the State Department’s
position was a well-considered one, rooted in principles of
reciprocity and consistent practice:
“These rights we insist on being conceded to our fish-
ermen in the northeast, where the mainland is under
the British sceptre. We can not refuse them to others
on our northwest coast, where the sceptre is held by
the United States. We asserted them . . . against
Russia, thus denying to her jurisdiction beyond three
miles on her own marginal seas. We can not claim
greater jurisdiction against other nations, of seas
washing territories which we derived from Russia un-
der the Alaska purchase.” Id., at 721 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
The Special Master singled out this letter as “unambigu-
ously support[ing] the United States’ position that the
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Opinion of the Court

United States and Russia historically did not assert the
right to exclude foreign vessels from the waters of the
Archipelago.” Report 109. Emphasizing the statements in
the letter that the United States could not “ ‘claim greater
jurisdiction’ ” than three miles of marginal seas and that
foreign vessels had the right to make “ ‘free transit,’ ” the
Special Master concluded that “[o]fficials who held this
belief could not, and evidently did not, claim that the
United States could exclude innocent passage through the
waters.” Id., at 110.
Alaska argues that Secretary Bayard’s letter is of mini-
mal relevance because “it was internal correspondence
that primarily addressed a dispute on the East coast” and
thus “did not announce to any foreign nation that the
United States had abandoned a claim to the Archipelago.”
Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff Alaska 31–32. Alaska’s
arguments are unpersuasive. That Secretary Bayard’s
letter referred to the east coast in no way diminishes the
unequivocal nature of its statements with respect to the
Alaskan coast. It may be true that no foreign nation ever
became aware of Secretary Bayard’s letter (though the
subsequent publication of the letter in the United States’
Digest of International Law gives us reason to believe the
contrary). Regardless, Secretary Bayard’s letter still
provides strong evidence that the United States, as of
1886, did not claim a right to exclude all foreign vessels
from the Alexander Archipelago waters and had no inten-
tion of doing so. We do not need to parse the letter to see
whether it “announce[d] to any foreign nation that the
United States had abandoned a claim to the Archipelago,”
for Alaska can muster no proof that the United States as
of 1886 had made any such claim in the first place.
C
A stronger piece of evidence Alaska identifies to support
its historic inland waters claim is a litigating position
12 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

taken by the United States during an arbitration proceed-
ing in 1903. This proceeding was before the Alaska
Boundary Tribunal, a body convened to resolve a dispute
between the United States and Britain regarding the land
boundary between southeastern Alaska and Canada.
Report 56–63, 116–119.
In a written submission to the tribunal, the United
States described its view of the “political coast” of Alaska
as enclosing all of the Alexander Archipelago waters, as
shown on the map in Appendix A, infra. 4 ABT Proceed-
ings, pt. 1, pp. 31–32 (1903). According to the United
States’ submissions, “[t]he boundary of Alaska,—that is,
the exterior boundary from which the marine league [of
the territorial sea] is measured,—runs along the outer
edge of the Alaskan or Alexander Archipelago, embracing
a group composed of hundreds of islands.” 5 id., pt. 1, at
15–16. At oral argument before the tribunal, moreover,
counsel for the United States made explicit that the rec-
ognition of such a “political coast” would render all waters
landward of it “just as much interior waters as the interior
waters of Loch Lomond.” 7 id., at 611 (1904).
Before the Special Master in the instant case, the
United States sought to discount as mere hypothetical
statements the submissions it had made at the tribunal a
full century prior. The Special Master rejected this view
and instead agreed with Alaska that in its submissions to
the tribunal the United States “was expressing a consid-
ered analysis of the [Alexander Archipelago] area, not
merely speaking hypothetically for the purpose of showing
a flaw in Britain’s argument.” Report 61. Ultimately,
however, the Special Master still concluded that the
United States’ submissions to the tribunal were “not an
adequate assertion of authority over the waters of the
Alexander Archipelago.” Id., at 118. The Special Master
noted that the issue before the 1903 tribunal was not
“[t]he status of the waters of the Alexander Archipelago,”
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 13

Opinion of the Court

ibid., but rather the land boundary between southeast
Alaska and Canada; that the United States’ declarations
regarding the status of the Alexander Archipelago took up
“only a few paragraphs in a seven volume record”; and
that “[f]or these reasons, it would be unrealistic to con-
clude that counsel’s assertions at the tribunal should have
made foreign nations (other than Britain) aware that the
United States was asserting a right to exclude them.”
Ibid.
Alaska responds that the Special Master was incorrect
to conclude that the United States’ submissions in 1903
could not have made foreign nations other than Britain
aware of its claim. Alaska argues that Norway became
aware of the United States’ submissions and then relied
on them in its dispute with the United Kingdom in the
well-known Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I. C. J. 116
(Judgment of Dec. 18). As the Special Master explained,
however, “[t]he ability of one foreign nation to discover the
United States’ argument when litigating a related issue
. . . does not mean that foreign nations should have known
of the United States’ position.” Report 118, n. 34. This
reasoning carries particular force in light of the precedent
a contrary conclusion would create. If this Court were to
recognize historic inland waters claims based on argu-
ments made by counsel during litigation about nonmari-
time boundaries, “the United States would itself become
vulnerable to similarly weak claims by other nations that
would restrict the freedom of the seas.” Reply Brief for
United States in Response to Exceptions of the State of
Alaska 15–16 (hereinafter Reply Brief for United States).
We are reluctant to create a precedent that would have
this effect.
D
The litigating position taken by the United States at the
ABT Proceedings at best would provide weak support for
14 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

inland status of the Alexander Archipelago waters even
were we to accept it as signaling a significant change from
the view expressed in Secretary Bayard’s letter of 1886;
for there is little evidence that the United States later
acted in a manner consistent with this litigating position.
Alaska says that the United States asserted control over
the waters by enacting and enforcing fishery regulations
in the Alexander Archipelago during the first half of the
20th century. Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff Alaska
25–29. In particular, Alaska cites the 1906 Alien Fishing
Act, 34 Stat. 263, which prohibited foreign, but not domes-
tic, commercial fishing “in any of the waters of Alaska.”
As its sole evidence that the Act was enforced even in the
pockets and enclaves at issue, Alaska cites the seizure by
the United States Coast Guard in 1924 of the Canadian
vessel Marguerite, whose captain was fined $100 for fish-
ing in contravention of the Act.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Marguerite was seized in
one of the disputed pockets or enclaves, a point which the
Special Master found unclear, Report 67–68, this one
incident hardly suffices to demonstrate a continuous
policy. Indeed, contrary authority exists. In 1934 the
Departments of State and Commerce exchanged letters
expressing their shared understanding that the United
States lacked the power to enforce the Act more than three
miles from the shore of any island or the mainland. Id., at
70–71 (quoting Letter from Daniel C. Roper, Secretary of
Commerce, to Secretary of State 1 (Sept. 5, 1934) (“ ‘Cana-
dian fishermen may operate [in the Alexander Archipelago
waters] so long as they remain outside the three mile
limit’ ”); Letter from William Phillips, Under Secretary of
State, to Secretary of Commerce 1 (Sept. 13, 1934) (ex-
pressing appreciation for the assurance “ ‘that the Fishery
laws and regulations will be enforced by the Bureau of
Fisheries in conformity with the view that Canadian
fishermen may operate [in the Alexander Archipelago
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 15

Opinion of the Court

waters] so long as they remain outside the three-mile
limit’ ”)). This understanding was inconsistent with a view
of the Alexander Archipelago waters as inland. Report
70–71, 110–111.
Even were the seizure of the Marguerite taken as evi-
dence of a right asserted by the United States in 1924, the
official correspondence cited by the Special Master estab-
lishes that by 1934 the United States had reverted to the
position taken in Secretary Bayard’s 1886 letter. As the
United States observes, furthermore, the fact that Britain
protested the seizure of the Marguerite indicates that any
claim of right implied from that seizure was not one in
which foreign nations acquiesced. Reply Brief for United
States 17, n. 10.
Alaska also refers to various poststatehood events
which, in its view, confirm the status of the Alexander
Archipelago waters as inland waters. We find insufficient
prestatehood evidence to establish inland waters status in
the first place, and so we find it unnecessary to discuss
these further events.
At best, Alaska’s submissions before this Court establish
that the United States made one official statement—in the
1903 Alaska Boundary Arbitration—describing the Alex-
ander Archipelago waters as inland, and that the United
States seized one foreign vessel—the Marguerite—in a
manner arguably consistent with the status of those wa-
ters as inland. These incidents are insufficient to demon-
strate the continuous assertion of exclusive authority,
with acquiescence of foreign nations, necessary to support
an historic inland waters claim. Alaska’s exception to the
Special Master’s recommendation on count I of the
Amended Complaint is overruled.
IV
In count II of its Amended Complaint, Alaska presents
an alternative theory to justify treating the Alexander
16 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Archipelago’s waters as inland. Alaska’s alternative
theory is that the waters of the Alexander Archipelago in
truth consist of two vast, but as yet unnoticed, juridical
bays. Waters within a juridical bay would be deemed
inland waters. Art. 5(1) of the Convention, 15 U. S. T., at
1609. Thus, if accepted, Alaska’s theory would render all
the Alexander Archipelago’s waters inland waters to the
extent they lie within the limits of the bays Alaska identi-
fies. For this reason, and because the United States would
not be able to rebut the presumption of title that would
arise from inland waters status, Alaska’s alternative
theory would require the Court to accept Alaska’s claim of
title to the pockets and enclaves in dispute.
The parties agree that Alaska’s claimed juridical bays
would exist only if four of the Alexander Archipelago’s
islands—Kuiu Island, Kupreanof Island, Mitkof Island,
and Dry Island—were deemed to be connected to each
other and to the mainland. We have recognized that such
“assimilat[ion]” of islands fringing the mainland is possi-
ble, albeit only in “exceptional case[s]” in which “an island
or group of islands . . . ‘are so integrally related to the
mainland that they are realistically parts of the “coast.” ’ ”
United States v. Maine, 469 U. S. 504, 517 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Louisiana, 394 U. S., at 66). If the as-
similation Alaska urges were accepted, the four islands
Alaska has identified would form a constructive peninsula
extending from the mainland and dividing the Alexander
Archipelago’s waters in two. To bolster its case, Alaska
labels the waters north and south of this hypothetical
peninsula the “North Bay” and the “South Bay.” See
Appendix B, infra (map showing Alaska’s hypothetical
peninsula and the resulting bays).
Were we to accept Alaska’s hypothetical peninsula, we
would then be required to determine whether North Bay
and South Bay in fact qualify as juridical bays under the
Convention, which we have customarily consulted for
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 17

Opinion of the Court

purposes of “determining the line marking the seaward
limit of inland waters of the States.” United States v.
Maine, supra, at 513. Article 7(2) of the Convention sets
forth the following geographic criteria for deciding
whether a body of water qualifies as a bay:
“For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-
marked indentation whose penetration is in such pro-
portion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-
locked waters and constitute more than a mere curva-
ture of the coast. An indentation shall not, however,
be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or
larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is
a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.”
15 U. S. T., at 1609.
This definition can be understood to comprise a number of
elements. To apply the definition to a given body of water,
one must first determine whether the body of water satis-
fies the descriptive test of being a “well-marked indenta-
tion.” One must then determine, among other things,
whether the indentation’s area satisfies the mathematical
“semi-circle” test set forth in the second sentence of Article
7(2).
After due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the
Special Master recommended that the Court reject
Alaska’s alternative theory. The Special Master first
conducted a detailed assessment of the propriety of assimi-
lating the four islands in question in order to form the
constructive peninsula so critical to Alaska’s theory.
Report 147–197. Applying the principles set forth in
United States v. Maine, supra, at 514–520, and United
States v. Louisiana, supra, at 60–66, the Special Master
concluded that assimilation would be unwarranted save
for two inconsequential channels that “do not suffice to
create the juridical bays alleged by Alaska.” Report 197.
In the alternative, the Special Master concluded that, even
18 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

were Alaska’s hypothetical peninsula accepted, neither
“North Bay” nor “South Bay” could satisfy the descriptive
test that a proposed bay constitute a “ ‘well-marked inden-
tation.’ ” Id., at 222.
Excepting to the Special Master’s recommendations,
Alaska makes a detailed argument that this Court’s
precedents regarding assimilation of islands support
recognition of the constructive peninsula Alaska has iden-
tified. Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff Alaska 39–45.
Alaska further contends that, once this peninsula is rec-
ognized, the resulting bodies of water satisfy all the crite-
ria set forth in the Convention. Id., at 45–49.
We overrule Alaska’s exception. For the sake of brevity
we assume, arguendo, that each of the islands in Alaska’s
hypothetical peninsula should be assimilated one to an-
other (though we are aware of, and Alaska itself cites, no
precedent foreign or domestic in which such a massive
amount of successive assimilation has been accepted for
the purpose of identifying a juridical bay). Even with the
benefit of this daunting doubt Alaska could not prevail, for
its hypothetical bays do not satisfy the Convention’s de-
scriptive requirement of being well-marked indentations.
To qualify as a well-marked indentation, a body of water
must possess physical features that would allow a mariner
looking at navigational charts that do not depict bay clos-
ing lines nonetheless to perceive the bay’s limits, and
hence to avoid illegal encroachment into inland waters.
See G. Westerman, The Juridical Bay 82–85 (1987).
Alaska’s hypothetical bays do not possess these features.
We have been referred to no authority which indicates
that a mariner looking at an unadorned map of the south-
east Alaskan coast has ever discerned the limits of
Alaska’s hypothetical bays. So subtle are these limits that
even Alaska itself did not discover them until after it had
filed its first complaint in this action. Compare Complaint
to Quiet Title (Nov. 24, 1999) with Amended Complaint
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 19

Opinion of the Court

(Dec. 14, 2000). The test is what mariners see, not what
litigators invent. Alaska’s hypothetical bays would not be
discernible to the eye of the mariner.
A comparison to United States v. Maine, 469 U. S., at
514–520, makes clear the force of our conclusion. In that
case the Court considered whether Long Island Sound and
Block Island Sound together qualify as a juridical bay. In
determining that they do, the Court held that Long Island
itself should be assimilated to the mainland. Id., at 517–
520. The Court then determined that the resulting inden-
tation formed by Long Island Sound and Block Island
Sound satisfied the requirements of Article 7(2) of the
Convention, including the descriptive requirement of
being a “well-marked indentation.” Id., at 515, 519.
There is a critical difference between this body of water
and the bodies of water Alaska has christened as North
Bay and South Bay. Even before this Court held that
Long Island Sound and Block Island Sound qualified
together as a juridical bay, mariners and geographers had
recognized Long Island Sound and Block Island Sound as
adjacent, cohesive bodies of water—indeed, as “sound[s],”
which itself is a term used to describe a wide and deep
bay, or a strait connecting other bodies of water. See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2176 (1981)
(defining “sound” as “a long and rather broad inlet of the
ocean generally with its larger part extending roughly
parallel to the coast”; “a long passage of water connecting
two larger bodies but too wide and extensive to be termed
a strait”). Nothing of the sort can be said of Alaska’s
claimed bays. It is not just that no mariner and no geog-
rapher (and not even Alaska’s litigators) before this action
recognized Alaska’s claimed bays as bays or sounds. It
appears that no one before this action recognized Alaska’s
claimed bays as constituting cohesive bodies of water at
all.
Even accepting the constructive peninsula Alaska has
20 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

crafted out of four separate islands within the Alexander
Archipelago, Alaska’s claimed bays still fail to qualify as
“well-marked indentations” for purposes of the Conven-
tion. For this reason, we reject the alternative theory
Alaska urges in count II of its Amended Complaint.
Alaska’s exception to the Special Master’s recommenda-
tion on this count is overruled.
V
In count IV of its Amended Complaint, Alaska claims
title to the submerged lands underlying the waters of
Glacier Bay National Monument (now known as Glacier
Bay National Park), located at the northern end of the
Alexander Archipelago. Concluding that the United
States had rebutted Alaska’s presumed title to these
lands, the Special Master recommended granting sum-
mary judgment to the United States. As with the other
aspects of this case, the Special Master was correct in his
interpretation and application of the controlling prece-
dents and principles, and we overrule Alaska’s exception
to his recommendation.
A
The centerpiece of Glacier Bay National Park is Glacier
Bay itself. By contrast to the bays Alaska claims in count
II, Glacier Bay is a textbook example of a juridical bay. Its
waters mark a dramatic indentation within the coastline
of the Alaskan mainland. While the width of Glacier Bay’s
mouth measures 5 miles at most, the bay’s waters stretch
more than 60 miles into the mainland. See Appendix C,
infra (map of Glacier Bay).
Glacier Bay National Park is one of the Nation’s largest
national parks, embracing over 3.2 million acres, an area
larger than the State of Connecticut. Rennicke, North to
Wild Alaska, National Geographic Traveler 48, 55
(July/Aug. 1994). John Muir, who first saw the bay and its
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 21

Opinion of the Court

surroundings in 1879, described it as a “ ‘solitude of ice
and snow and newborn rocks.’ ” Id., at 56. One way to
comprehend the solitude is to note that in the area of
Glacier Bay there are still not more than 10 miles of estab-
lished hiking trails. See id., at 50. As the world’s largest
marine sanctuary, it is, in one sense, a water park.
A ship in the waters of the Pacific in the Gulf of Alaska
reaches Glacier Bay by heading shoreward to the east
through Cross Sound and to Bartlett Cove, there turning
to proceed through the bay in a generally northwest direc-
tion. See Appendix D, infra. The entrance to the bay near
Bartlett Cove is about 100 miles northwest of Juneau and
still 600 miles southeast of Anchorage.
The bay owes its name to Captain Beardslee of the
United States Navy, who, upon first entering the bay in
1880, was so impressed by the ice formations surrounding
it that he called it Glacier Bay. 5 New Encyclopaedia
Britannica 290 (15th ed. 2003). A glacier is a large forma-
tion of perennial ice. The definition used by the Special
Master was a “ ‘mixture of ice and rock that moves down-
hill over a bed of solid rock or sediment under the influ-
ence of gravity.’ ” Report 246. Some of the glaciers in the
region are tidewater glaciers, so called because they end at
the water’s edge. Even large ships must take precautions
near these glaciers, for ice can break off (a process called
calving); and when a large segment plunges to the sea, it
becomes an iceberg. Ibid.
The weight of a glacier can cause it to move, either
advancing to crush the life before it or receding to allow
life forms to begin anew. At Glacier Bay some of the
glaciers are advancing, some are receding, and others
seem to be stable. See id., at 246–247.
At least in Glacier Bay, the extreme slowness suggested
by the term “glacial” is inapt, for the ice once present
where the bay now extends receded with (in a geological
context) astounding speed. When Captain George Van-
22 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

couver visited in 1794, the bay was but 5 miles inward
from Bartlett Cove, while today it penetrates inland for
over 60 miles. This retreat of the ice is “considered the
fastest glacial withdrawal in recorded history. ‘Unzip-
ping,’ the geologists call it. The landscape dancing in
geologic time.” Rennicke, supra, at 56. The advance and
retreat of the glaciers are of great interest to scientists,
and in the areas of glacial recession the submerged floor of
the bay is contoured or sculptured in ways that can be
studied to learn more of glacial movement and geologic
formations. See Report 246–248.
The immense scene is one of remarkable beauty, and the
waters, which accommodate large vessels, can be calm
enough so that kayaks can be used to explore the bay and
its surroundings. Where glaciers have retreated either in
the bay or on shore, the retreat reveals how a new life
cycle begins. Plant succession is of absorbing interest. “It
can be almost like a chant: lichens and algae, moss and
dryas, fireweed, willows, alder, and spruce.” Rennicke,
supra, at 56.
The bay and the surrounding shore and forest areas of
the park sustain a chain of fish, bird, and animal life.
Over 200 avian species have been noted, most of these in
or near the marine environment. Glacier Bay: A Guide to
Glacier Bay National Park and Preserve, Alaska 78
(1983). There are mussels and crabs on the shore, and in
the bay’s waters there are numerous fish, including her-
ring and salmon. The light in the long days of summer,
and the oxygen-rich waters, accelerate phytoplankton
populations, and this is part of the food chain working up
to the herring and salmon, then porpoises, seals, and sea
lions. The bay also has whales, including the humpback
whale. K. Jettmar, Alaska’s Glacier Bay: A Traveler’s
Guide 53 (1997).
In the 1930’s, when naturalists and other observers
were supporting the movement to expand Glacier Bay
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Opinion of the Court

National Monument beyond its initial boundaries, the
brown bear became the flagship species for the cause.
Declaration of Theodore R. Catton 51, Exhibits to Reply of
United States in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Count IV of Amended Complaint, Tab No. 3
(Exh. U. S. IV–3). One of the largest of omnivores, the
brown bear’s food in estuarine areas includes “vegetation,
invertebrates (clams, mussels, worms, barnacles, amphi-
pods), carcasses of fish and marine mammals washed onto
the beach, and winter-killed ungulates . . . .” Declaration
of Victor Barnes 3 (Exh. U. S. IV–6). Brown bears find
salmon in streams, and (with distressing frequency) they
can swim to the small islands to raid the nesting places of
birds and water fowl. Id., at 9. When bears swim in the
bay, they are particularly vulnerable to hunters. When he
was considering the proposal to extend the boundaries of
the Glacier Bay National Monument, President Franklin
Roosevelt was angered by accounts of bears being shot
from pleasure yachts. Id., at 16.
Reference to the complex ecosystem of Glacier Bay and
the surrounding land is important for understanding the
purposes that led the United States to create Glacier Bay
National Monument. These purposes, in turn, inform the
inquiry whether title to the submerged land underlying
the waters of Glacier Bay National Monument passed to
Alaska at statehood. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U. S.
262, 274 (2001) (describing the inquiry as encompassing
the question whether “the purpose of the reservation
would have been compromised if the submerged lands had
passed to the State”); Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U. S., at
42–43 (noting that “defeating state title . . . was necessary
to achieve the United States’ objective [of] securing a
supply of oil and gas that would necessarily exist beneath
uplands and submerged lands”).
24 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

B
Owing to Glacier Bay’s status as a juridical bay, its
waters qualify as inland navigable waters. All the re-
maining waters within the boundaries of Glacier Bay
National Monument as it existed at statehood, moreover,
lie less than three nautical miles from the coastline.
Under both the equal footing doctrine and the SLA, there-
fore, a strong presumption arises that title to the lands
underlying all the waters in dispute in count IV of
Alaska’s Amended Complaint passed to Alaska at state-
hood. See supra, at 2–3, 4–5; see also Alaska (Arctic
Coast), supra, at 33–36. The controlling question here is
whether the United States can rebut this presumption.
It is now settled that the United States can defeat a
future State’s presumed title to submerged lands not only
by conveyance to third parties but also by setting sub-
merged lands aside as part of a federal reservation “such
as a wildlife refuge.” Idaho v. United States, supra, at
273; Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U. S., at 33–34. To ascer-
tain whether Congress has made use of that power, we
conduct a two-step inquiry. We first inquire whether the
United States clearly intended to include submerged lands
within the reservation. If the answer is yes, we next
inquire whether the United States expressed its intent to
retain federal title to submerged lands within the reserva-
tion. Id., at 36; Idaho v. United States, supra, at 273. “We
will not infer an intent to defeat a future State’s title to
inland submerged lands ‘unless the intention was defi-
nitely declared or otherwise made very plain.’ ” Alaska
(Arctic Coast), supra, at 34 (quoting Holt State Bank, 270
U. S., at 55).
After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments,
the Special Master recommended granting summary
judgment to the United States on Alaska’s claim of title to
the submerged lands underlying Glacier Bay. Report 227–
276. His recommendation rested on two conclusions that
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Opinion of the Court

track the two-part test developed in our precedents. First,
he concluded that in creating Glacier Bay National
Monument the United States had reserved the submerged
lands underlying Glacier Bay and the remaining waters
within the monument’s boundaries. Id., at 264. Second,
he concluded that §6(e) of the ASA, 72 Stat. 340–341, note
preceding 48 U. S. C. §21, p. 320, expressed Congressional
intent to retain those submerged lands in federal owner-
ship. Report 276.
Alaska takes exception only to the Special Master’s
second conclusion. We nonetheless explain the Special
Master’s first conclusion (and our own), for it is a
necessary part of the reasoning for the second step of the
analysis.
C
We need not detain ourselves long with the first part of
the test regarding title to submerged lands. In 1925,
President Calvin Coolidge invoked the Antiquities Act of
1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225, 16 U. S. C. §431 et seq., to
create Glacier Bay National Monument. Proclamation No.
1733, 43 Stat. 1988 (1925 Proclamation). In 1939, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a proclamation expand-
ing the monument to include all of Glacier Bay’s waters
and to extend the monument’s western boundary three
nautical miles out to sea. Proclamation No. 2330, 3 CFR
28 (Supp. 1939) (1939 Proclamation). See Appendix C,
infra (depicting both the initial boundaries established by
the 1925 Proclamation and the expanded boundaries
established by the 1939 Proclamation). In 1955, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a proclamation slightly
altering the monument’s boundaries, but leaving the bay’s
waters within them. Proclamation No. 3089, 3 CFR 24
(Supp. 1955) (1955 Proclamation). In 1980, Congress
designated the monument as part of Glacier Bay National
Park and Preserve and expanded the resulting reserva-
tion’s boundaries. 16 U. S. C. §410hh–1(1); see Appendix
26 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

D, infra (map of Glacier Bay National Park). For present
purposes, however, the important point is that by the time
Alaska achieved statehood in 1959, the Glacier Bay Na-
tional Monument had already existed for 34 years as a
federal reservation.
After considering the evidence submitted by both par-
ties, the Special Master concluded that “the Glacier Bay
National Monument, as it existed at the time of statehood,
clearly included the submerged lands within its bounda-
ries.” Report 263–264. According to the Special Master,
the descriptions of the monument in the 1925, 1939, and
1955 Proclamations themselves showed that the monu-
ment embraced submerged lands. Id., at 232–242. The
Special Master also considered it significant that exclusion
of the submerged lands would have undermined at least
three of the purposes that led the United States to create
Glacier Bay National Monument. Exclusion of the sub-
merged lands would impair scientific study of the majestic
tidewater glaciers surrounding the bay. Id., at 245–251.
It would also impair efforts both to study and to preserve
the remnants of “ ‘interglacial forests,’ ” which can be found
both above and below the tideline. Id., at 251–253. Fi-
nally, exclusion of the submerged lands would compromise
the goal of safeguarding the flora and fauna that thrive in
Glacier Bay’s complex and interdependent ecosystem. Id.,
at 253–263.
The Special Master, in our view, had ample support for
his conclusions that all of these were purposes for creation
of the monument, and each would be compromised were it
to be determined that submerged lands were not included
in the monument. His ultimate determination, that Gla-
cier Bay National Monument included the submerged
lands within its boundaries, has strong support in the
precedents and in the whole record of the case. Alaska
has not filed a formal exception to this determination, and
the four-sentence footnote in Alaska’s brief which ex-
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Opinion of the Court

presses disagreement with it, Exceptions and Brief for
Plaintiff Alaska 10–11, n. 4, does not in our view suffice to
impeach its validity.
D
Having established the proposition that the Glacier Bay
National Monument, at the time of Alaska’s statehood,
included the submerged lands underlying Glacier Bay, we
turn to the remaining question: whether the United States
“ ‘definitely declared or otherwise made very plain’ ” its
intent to defeat Alaska’s title to these submerged lands.
Alaska (Arctic Coast), 521 U. S., at 34 (quoting Holt State
Bank, 270 U. S., at 55).
1
The requisite expression of intent might conceivably
reside in the very proclamations that invoked the Antiqui-
ties Act of 1906 to create and then expand Glacier Bay
National Monument. It is clear, after all, that the Antiq-
uities Act empowers the President to reserve submerged
lands. United States v. California, 436 U. S. 32, 36 (1978).
An essential purpose of monuments created pursuant to
the Antiquities Act, furthermore, is “to conserve the scen-
ery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same
in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 16
U. S. C. §1. From these two premises it would require
little additional effort to reach a holding that the Antiqui-
ties Act itself delegated to the President sufficient power
not only to reserve submerged lands but also to defeat a
future State’s title to them. Given the reasons motivating
the creation of Glacier Bay National Monument and the
overall complexity of the Glacier Bay ecosystem, it would
be unsurprising to find that the relevant proclamations
manifested intent to retain federal title.
28 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

One amicus has advanced this argument at length, and
the United States foreshadows it in a footnote. See Brief
for National Parks Conservation Association as Amicus
Curiae 6–7, 13–16; Reply Brief for United States 32, n. 20.
If true, this argument would provide a powerful alterna-
tive basis for agreeing with the Special Master’s recom-
mendation to grant summary judgment to the United
States with respect to Alaska’s claim of title to the sub-
merged lands underlying Glacier Bay.
We need pursue this alternative basis no further, how-
ever. In our view the provisions of the ASA themselves
suffice to overcome the state ownership presumption
arising from the equal footing doctrine and the SLA and to
reserve the submerged lands in Glacier Bay to the United
States.
2
The Special Master agreed with the United States that
Congress expressed an intent to retain title to all of Gla-
cier Bay National Monument, including the submerged
lands within it, in §6(e) of the ASA. Report 276. To un-
derstand §6(e), we begin by considering its context within
the ASA, its text, and the construction we have given to it
in an earlier case.
Section 5 of the ASA sets forth a guiding principle re-
garding title to property within Alaska’s boundaries:
“The State of Alaska and its political subdivisions, re-
spectively, shall have and retain title to all property,
real and personal, title to which is in the Territory of
Alaska or any of the subdivisions. Except as provided
in section 6 hereof, the United States shall retain title
to all property, real and personal, to which it has title,
including public lands.” 72 Stat. 340.
Based on this provision, the new State of Alaska acquired
title to any property previously belonging to the Territory
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 29

Opinion of the Court

of Alaska. The United States, in turn, retained title to its
property located within Alaska’s borders, “including public
lands,” subject to certain exceptions set forth in §6 of the
ASA.
One of those exceptions is contained in §6(e), which
provides in pertinent part:
“All real and personal property of the United States
situated in the Territory of Alaska which is specifi-
cally used for the sole purpose of conservation and
protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska, un-
der the provisions of the Alaska game law of July 1,
1943 (57 Stat. 301; 48 U. S. C., secs. 192–211), as
amended, and under the provisions of the Alaska
commercial fisheries laws of June 26, 1906 (34 Stat.
478; 48 U. S. C., secs. 230–239 and 241–242), and
June 6, 1924 (43 Stat. 465; 48 U. S. C., secs. 221–228),
as supplemented and amended, shall be transferred
and conveyed to the State of Alaska by the appropri-
ate Federal agency: . . . Provided, That such transfer
shall not include lands withdrawn or otherwise set
apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of
wildlife nor facilities utilized in connection therewith,
or in connection with general research activities relat-
ing to fisheries or wildlife.” Id., at 340–341.
The first quoted part of §6(e), the initial clause, directs a
transfer to Alaska of any federal property located in
Alaska and used “for the sole purpose of conservation and
protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska” under
three particular federal game and wildlife laws. The next
quoted part, the proviso, makes clear that the transfer
directive in the initial clause has no application to “lands
withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reserva-
tions for the protection of wildlife.”
In Alaska (Arctic Coast), we held that the proviso of
§6(e) expressed congressional intent to retain title to a
30 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

reservation such as the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR), and that the statute’s declaration of intent was
sufficient to defeat Alaska’s presumed title under both the
equal footing doctrine and the SLA. “In §6(e) of the ASA,
Congress clearly contemplated continued federal owner-
ship of certain submerged lands—both inland submerged
lands and submerged lands beneath the territorial sea—so
long as those submerged lands were among those ‘with-
drawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or reservations for
the protection of wildlife.’ ” 521 U. S., at 56–57 (quoting
§6(e)). If the proviso of §6(e) applies to Glacier Bay Na-
tional Monument, as we held it applied to ANWR in
Alaska (Arctic Coast), then it follows that title to the sub-
merged lands underlying Glacier Bay did not pass to
Alaska at statehood.
To avoid this reasoning, Alaska first argues that the
proviso is limited in scope to federal property already
covered by the initial clause; because Glacier Bay is not
covered by the initial clause, the State contends, it is not
covered by the proviso either. Alaska next argues that
even assuming the scope of the proviso is broader than the
initial clause, Glacier Bay was not “set apart” “for
the protection of wildlife.” We reject both of Alaska’s
arguments.
a
Regarding the relationship between the initial clause
and the proviso, Alaska contends the proviso applies only
to wildlife refuges or reservations set aside under the
three particular federal game and wildlife statutes named
in the initial clause. Glacier Bay National Monument was
not set aside under any of these particular statutes, of
course; so Alaska says that omission from the initial
clause dictates omission from the proviso. The United
States counters that the initial clause is confined to spe-
cific property but that the proviso is a statement of intent
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 31

Opinion of the Court

to retain federal title which extends to all reservations
thus described without regard to the specific statutory
authority under which the reservations were set aside.
As the Special Master noted, generalizations about the
relationship between a proviso and a preceding clause
prove to be of little help in resolving the parties’ disagree-
ment about the scope of §6(e)’s proviso. Report 268.
Though it may be customary to use a proviso to refer only
to things covered by a preceding clause, it is also possible
to use a proviso to state a general, independent rule. “[A]
proviso is not always limited in its effect to the part of the
enactment with which it is immediately associated; it may
apply generally to all cases within the meaning of the
language used.” McDonald v. United States, 279 U. S. 12,
21 (1929); see also 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction §47:08, p. 238 (2000).
We conclude that Alaska’s narrow reading of the proviso
is neither necessary nor preferred. Section 6(e) begins
with specificity. It covers “all real and personal property”
“specifically used for the sole purpose of conservation and
protection of the fisheries and wildlife of Alaska” as identi-
fied under three particular federal game and wildlife laws.
Those provisions, in turn, make clear that the initial
clause’s transfer requirement applies to facilities such as
certain fish hatcheries, and likely would include specific
types of equipment or even vehicles.
Having thus transferred the identified “property,” the
section proceeds to state a more general reservation, using
the word “lands.” “Provided, [t]hat such transfer shall not
include lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges
or reservations for the protection of wildlife nor facili-
ties . . . .” The lands here in question were in fact “with-
drawn or otherwise set apart,” that is to say by the proc-
lamations which created the monument. Though it may
not be the usual style, it does not strike us as illogical for
the draftsperson of a statute to write it so that it transfers
32 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

some specific real and personal property and then pro-
ceeds to reserve lands in a much larger classification.
Alaska’s insistence that the proviso must be limited to
what is contained at the outset is foreclosed as well by the
decision in Alaska (Arctic Coast). In the proceedings
leading up to that decision, Alaska had argued that §6(e)’s
proviso did nothing more than to except lands from the
transfer effected in §6(e)’s initial clause. In Alaska’s view,
even lands covered by the proviso could still be transferred
by virtue of the SLA made applicable to Alaska via §6(m)
of the ASA. See Reply Brief for State of Alaska in United
States v. Alaska, O. T. 1996, No. 84, Orig., pp. 44–45. The
Court rejected Alaska’s view:
“If [the Arctic National Wildlife Range is covered by
§6(e)’s proviso], then the United States retained title
to submerged lands as well as uplands within the
Range. This is so despite §6(m) of the Statehood Act,
which applied the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 to
Alaska. The Submerged Lands Act operated to con-
firm Alaska’s title to equal footing lands and to trans-
fer title to submerged lands beneath the territorial
sea to Alaska at statehood, unless the United States
clearly withheld submerged lands within either cate-
gory prior to statehood. In §6(e) of the Statehood Act,
Congress clearly contemplated continued federal own-
ership of certain submerged lands—both inland sub-
merged lands and submerged lands beneath the terri-
torial sea—so long as those submerged lands were
among those ‘withdrawn or otherwise set apart as
refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife.’ ”
521 U. S., at 56–57 (emphasis in original).
Thus we have held that §6(e)’s proviso operates not just
negatively and parasitically, only to except refuges or
reservations “set apart” for “the protection of wildlife”
from the transfer effected by §6(e)’s main clause, but also
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 33

Opinion of the Court

affirmatively and independently, as an expression of
Congress’ intent to retain federal ownership over all lands
within such reservations.
This affirmative and independent expression of intent
logically applies with just as much force to reservations
that fall within §6(e)’s initial clause as to those that do
not. It would have made little sense for Congress to dif-
ferentiate between those two sets of reservations in mak-
ing the broad statement of intent we have construed
§6(e)’s proviso to set forth. It would have made even less
sense to differentiate in such a way as to exclude reserva-
tions set aside pursuant to the Antiquities Act, like Gla-
cier Bay National Monument. The differentiation sug-
gested by Alaska’s reading, moreover, cannot be discerned
from the text of §6(e)’s proviso, which covers all reserva-
tions set aside “for the protection of wildlife,” regardless of
the specific authority under which those reservations were
set aside.
Alaska is correct to note that our decision in Alaska
(Arctic Coast) did not directly address the relationship
between the initial clause and the proviso in §6(e). As
Alaska observes, it appears that we assumed the ANWR
would fall within §6(e)’s initial clause were it not for the
proviso. Id., at 60–61. For the reasons we have explained,
however, the broad construction we gave to the proviso in
Alaska (Arctic Coast) of necessity carries consequences for
the relationship between it and the initial clause.
b
Anticipating the possibility that its narrow interpreta-
tion of the proviso might be rejected, Alaska raises one
last argument. The proviso does not reach Glacier Bay
even under a broad view of the proviso’s scope, Alaska
contends, because Glacier Bay was not set apart “for the
protection of wildlife” within the meaning of §6(e).
This argument can be rejected without extended discus-
34 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

sion. As the Special Master noted and as we have recog-
nized, Congress has made clear that one of the fundamen-
tal purposes of wildlife reservations set apart pursuant to
the Antiquities Act is “to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.” 16 U. S. C. §1. Because
Glacier Bay National Monument serves as habitat for
many forms of wildlife, it was set aside in part for its
preservation. Any doubt as to this conclusion is dispelled
by reference to the Presidential proclamations setting
aside the monument, for the proclamations identify the
study of flora and fauna as one of the express purposes of
the reservation. 1925 Proclamation, 43 Stat. 1988; 1939
Proclamation, 3 CFR 28 (Supp. 1939). As the Special
Master observed, the study of flora and fauna necessarily
requires their preservation. Report 274.
In sum we agree with the United States that the proviso
is best read, in light of our prior interpretation of it in
Alaska (Arctic Coast), as expressing an independent and
general rule uncoupled from the initial clause. Under the
initial clause the United States obligated itself to transfer
to Alaska equipment and other property used for general
fish and wildlife management responsibilities Alaska was
to undertake upon acquiring statehood. Under the proviso
the United States expressed its intent, notwithstanding
this property transfer, to retain ownership over all federal
refuges and reservations set aside for the protection of
wildlife, regardless of the specific statutory authority
enabling the set-aside. This expression of intent encom-
passed Glacier Bay National Monument, which was set
aside “for the protection of wildlife” within the meaning of
§6(e). The text thus defeated the presumption that the
new State of Alaska would acquire title to the submerged
lands underlying the monument’s waters, including the
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 35

Opinion of the Court

inland waters of Glacier Bay.
Alaska’s exception to the Special Master’s recommen-
dation on count IV of Alaska’s Amended Complaint is
overruled.
VI
For the foregoing reasons, we overrule each of Alaska’s
exceptions to the Special Master’s recommendations.
Alaska shall take title neither to the submerged lands
underlying the pockets and enclaves of water at issue in
counts I and II of its Amended Complaint nor to the sub-
merged lands underlying the waters of Glacier Bay at
issue in count IV. As to Count III of Alaska’s Amended
Complaint, the parties and the Special Master are in
agreement that this Court should confirm the United
States’ proposed disclaimer of title. The proposed dis-
claimer is hereby accepted.
The parties are directed to prepare and submit to the
Special Master an appropriate proposed decree for the
Court’s consideration. The Court retains jurisdiction to
entertain such proceedings, enter such orders, and issue
such writs as may become necessary or advisable to effect
and supplement the forthcoming decree and the respective
rights of the parties.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 128 Orig.
_________________

STATE OF ALASKA, PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT
[June 6, 2005]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join all of the Court’s opinion, except for Part V and
the related portions of Part VI. I do not agree with the
conclusion that the United States expressly retained title
to submerged lands within Glacier Bay National Monu-
ment (Monument) at the time of Alaskan statehood.
The Court holds that the United States has rebutted the
“strong presumption” that submerged lands passed to
Alaska when it became a State. Ante, at 24, 34. That
presumption inheres in the equal-footing doctrine, but is
given particular strength and specificity in this case by
§6(m) of the Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 343, which
incorporated the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, including
the confirmation that a State owns all “lands beneath
navigable waters within [its] boundaries” unless (as rele-
vant here) they were “expressly retained by or ceded to the
United States when the State entered the Union,” 43
U. S. C. §§1311(a), 1313(a) (emphasis added). The Court
acknowledges that state title to submerged lands cannot
be defeated “ ‘ “unless the intention was definitely declared
or otherwise made very plain.” ’ ” Ante, at 24 (quoting
United States v. Alaska, 521 U. S. 1, 34 (1997) (Alaska
(Arctic Coast)) (in turn quoting United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 55 (1926))). Though the Court makes a
2 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

dictal feint toward the Antiquities Act of 1906, ante, at 27–
28, its holding relies on only a single proviso to §6(e) of the
Alaska Statehood Act, ante, at 28–34.
That proviso seems to me anything but a “ ‘very plain’ ”
or “clear” retention of the Monument’s submerged lands.
Alaska (Arctic Coast), supra, at 34, 57. Indeed, the Court’s
own evaluation of the parties’ textual arguments is can-
didly lukewarm toward the United States’ position.
Alaska’s doomed construction of the proviso is deemed to
be “neither necessary nor preferred,” ante, at 31—not
exactly a death knell when Alaska’s opponent is subject to
the clear-statement requirement. The Court applauds the
United States’ construction—the victorious, allegedly
“clear” one—just for being “not . . . illogical,” and admits
that that construction means the statute was not written
in “the usual style.” Ibid.
The statutory text fully justifies this lack of exuberance.
Section 5 of the Alaska Statehood Act established a gen-
eral rule that “the United States shall retain title to all
property . . . to which it has title . . . .” 72 Stat. 340. Sec-
tion 6(m), by incorporating the Submerged Lands Act,
generally excepted submerged lands from that rule. Id., at
343. Another exception to the rule of U. S. retention was
§6(e), which consisted of two relevant parts: the main
clause, which required the “transfe[r] and conve[yance] to
the State of Alaska” of “[a]ll real and personal property of
the United States . . . specifically used for the sole purpose
of conservation and protection of the fisheries and wildlife
of Alaska, under [certain statutory provisions],” id., at
340; and the proviso, which said “[t]hat such transfer shall
not include lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as
refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife,” id.,
at 341. The short of the matter is that if the proviso cre-
ated only an exception from the preceding main clause, it
did not reserve Glacier Bay (which was not covered by the
main clause) for the United States; whereas if it was an
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

independent and free-standing reservation, it did.
The Court unconvincingly attempts to sever the proviso
from its statutory text and context. It is true enough that
by accumulation of sloppy usage a proviso need not, sim-
ply by reason of its introductory words (“provided that”),
always be taken as a limitation only upon the preceding
clause. Ante, at 31. But the Court fatally fails to cope
with the actual text of this particular proviso. It claims,
ibid., that §6(e) moves from a specific main clause (“all
real and personal property” under three statutes) to a
general proviso (“lands withdrawn . . . as refuges”). But
“lands” is not inherently more general than “real . . . prop-
erty” and there is no reason whatever why the qualified
former (“lands withdrawn . . . as refuges”) cannot be a
subset of the qualified latter (“real . . . property” under
three statutes). Moreover, the Court disregards obvious
clues to the relationship between these two parts of §6(e).
It makes no attempt to identify the antecedent for the
proviso’s reference to “such transfer” (emphasis added).
As it happens, the main clause of §6(e) contains the only
mention of a “transfe[r]” in the Statehood Act that pre-
cedes the proviso,1 making it the only logical antecedent.
Thus, the word “such” indicates the natural, structural tie
between §6(e)’s main clause and its proviso, making it
quite clear that the proviso does not reserve to the United
States all “lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as
refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife,” but
rather only the lands of that description covered by the
preceding main clause. Moreover, the proviso is phrased
as a carve-out (“such transfer shall not include lands”)
rather than a free-standing rule (e.g., “no transfer shall
include lands” or “lands shall not be transferred”). In
——————
1 The only other mention of a “transfe[r]” in §6 appeared in subsection

(k), which “confirmed and transferred” all grants previously made to
the Territory of Alaska. 72 Stat. 343.
4 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

sum, the text amply supports Alaska’s claim that the
proviso operates as an exception to the main clause, and
not the Court’s conclusion that it is “an independent and
general rule uncoupled from [that] clause,” ante, at 34.
The Court also contends that its 1997 decision in Alaska
(Arctic Coast) “foreclose[s]” Alaska’s argument that the
proviso operates as an exception to the main clause of
§6(e). Ante, at 32. That conclusion follows from neither
the holding of Alaska (Arctic Coast) nor any reasonable
extension of its underlying rationale. As the Court ac-
knowledges, ante, at 33, “Alaska (Arctic Coast) did not
directly address the relationship between the initial clause
and the proviso in §6(e).” It quoted them as if they were a
single, unitary rule, 521 U. S., at 55, and, as the United
States concedes, the Court “assum[ed] with no briefing,”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 34, that the refuge at issue fell within the
scope of the main clause of §6(e). Given that assumption,
the case does not stand for the proposition that the proviso
is a free-standing provision; a proviso limited to the main
clause would have the same effect. Or to put the point
differently: Alaska (Arctic Coast) holds that what the
proviso takes out of §6(e) it also takes out of §6(m). In the
present case, however, it is undisputed that Glacier Bay is
not within §6(e), and so is not removed from §6(e) by the
proviso. Nothing in Alaska (Arctic Coast) suggests that
the proviso alone operated “affirmatively and independ-
ently,” ante, at 33, to trump §6(m). The Court is thus
knocking down a straw man when it says that, if the
proviso can trump §6(m), it would make “little sense” to
cabin it with the main clause of §6(e), ibid. It was not the
proviso that trumped §6(m), but the proviso’s removal of
land from the exception of §6(e). There is no such removal
here.
The only part of the Court’s opinion on Glacier Bay that
displays genuine enthusiasm is its Ursine Rhapsody,
which implies that federal ownership of submerged lands
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

is critical to ensuring that brown bears will not be shot
from the decks of pleasure yachts during their “distress-
ing[ly] frequen[t]” swims to islands where they feast on
seabirds and seabird eggs.2 Ante, at 23. Surely this is
irrelevant to interpretation of the Alaska Statehood Act,
unless there is some principle of construction that texts
say what the Supreme Court thinks they ought to have
said. But besides being irrelevant, it is not even true.
Many (though perhaps not all) means of fulfilling the
Monument’s purposes could be achieved without federal
ownership of the submerged lands within the Monument.
If title to submerged lands passed to Alaska, the Federal
Government would still retain significant authority to
regulate activities in the waters of Glacier Bay by virtue of
its dominant navigational servitude, other aspects of the
Commerce Clause, and even the treaty power.3 See, e.g.,
43 U. S. C. §1314(a) (under the Submerged Lands Act, the
United States retains “powers of regulation and control of
. . . navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of
——————
2 It is presumptively true that the seabirds consider these visits dis-

tressingly frequent, and demonstrably true that the brown bears do
not. It is unclear why this Court should take sides in the controversy.
3 The United States presented evidence that, even before the Monu-

ment was established, some scientists had studied the bottom of Glacier
Bay and its relationship with the glaciers by taking soundings of the
water’s depth. Memorandum in Support of Motion of the United States
for Partial Summary Judgment on Count IV of the Amended Complaint
13. Similar but more sophisticated studies, involving acoustic mapping
and sonar imaging of gouges in the floor of the bay, are conducted
today. Declaration of Tomie Patrick Lee 93–94, Exhibits to Reply of
United States in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Count IV of Amended Complaint, Tab No. 8 (Exh. U. S. IV–8). Alaska’s
ownership of submerged lands should not hinder such studies, gener-
ally conducted from vessels on the water’s surface. But the United
States also noted that other, newer means of scientific study—such as
withdrawing core samples from submerged lands and installing listen-
ing devices on the surface of submerged lands—would require Alaska’s
cooperation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
6 ALASKA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

commerce [and] navigation”); United States v. Morrison,
529 U. S. 598, 609 (2000) (Congress may “regulate the use
of the channels of interstate commerce” and “protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Alaska, 503 U. S. 569, 577–583
(1992) (the Secretary of the Army may consider effects
upon recreation, fish and wildlife, natural resources, and
other public interests when refusing to permit structures
or discharges in navigable waters that have “no effect on
navigation”); United States v. California, 436 U. S. 32, 41,
and n. 18 (1978) (noting that the United States retained
“its navigational servitude” even when California took the
“proprietary and administrative interests” in submerged
lands surrounding islands in a national monument); Doug-
las v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S. 265, 284–287
(1977) (finding state regulation of commercial fishing
partially pre-empted by federal statute); Letter from W. C.
Henderson, Acting Chief, Bureau of Biological Survey,
Dept. of Agriculture, to Stephen T. Mather, Director,
National Park Service (Nov. 4, 1926), Alaska Exh. AK–405
(noting that a colony of eider ducks in and near the
Monument was “protected at all times by the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act and Regulations thereunder”). It is thus
unsurprising that States own submerged lands in other
federal water parks, such as the California Coastal Na-
tional Monument and the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in
Minnesota. See California, supra, at 37; Brief for Na-
tional Parks Conservation Association as Amicus Curiae
30.
I would probably find for Alaska on the Glacier Bay
issue even if the United States did not have to overcome
the obstacle of “very plain” retention. With the addition of
that well established requirement, the case is not even
close. Because neither text, nor context, nor precedent
compels the conclusion that the Alaska Statehood Act
 Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

expressly retained the Monument’s submerged lands for
the United States, I cannot agree with the Court’s conclu-
sion that the United States deserves summary judgment
on count IV of Alaska’s amended complaint.