(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
No. 04–6964. Argued April 18, 2005—Decided June 13, 2005
Petitioner Johnson, a black man, was convicted in a California state
court of assaulting and murdering a white child. During jury selec-
tion, a number of prospective jurors were removed for cause until 43
eligible jurors remained, three of whom were black. The prosecutor
used 3 of his 12 peremptory challenges to remove the prospective
black jurors, resulting in an all-white jury. Defense counsel objected
to those strikes on the ground that they were unconstitutionally
based on race. The trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain
his strikes, but instead simply found that petitioner had failed to es-
tablish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under the gov-
erning state precedent, People v. Wheeler, which required a showing
of a strong likelihood that the exercise of peremptory challenges was
based on group bias. The judge explained that, although the case
was close, his review of the record convinced him that the prosecu-
tor’s strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, but the State Supreme
Court reinstated it, stressing that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79,
permits state courts to establish the standards used to evaluate the
sufficiency of prima facie cases of purposeful discrimination in jury
selection. Reviewing Batson, Wheeler, and their progeny, the court
concluded that Wheeler’s “strong likelihood” standard is entirely con-
sistent with Batson. Under Batson, the court held, a state court may
require the objector to present not merely enough evidence to permit
an inference that discrimination has occurred, but sufficiently strong
evidence to establish that the challenges, if not explained, were more
likely than not based on race. Applying that standard, the court ac-
knowledged that the exclusion of all three black prospective jurors
looked suspicious, but deferred to the trial judge’s ruling.
2 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
Held: California’s “more likely than not” standard is an inappropriate
yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in jury selection. This narrow but impor-
tant issue concerns the scope of the first of three steps Batson enu-
merated: (1) Once the defendant has made out a prima facie case and
(2) the State has satisfied its burden to offer permissible race-neutral
justifications for the strikes, e.g., 476 U. S., at 94, then (3) the trial
court must decide whether the defendant has proved purposeful ra-
cial discrimination, Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765. Batson does not
permit California to require at step one that the objector show that it
is more likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias. The Batson
Court held that a prima facie case can be made out by offering a wide
variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives
“rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 94.
The Court explained that to establish a prima facie case, the defen-
dant must show that his membership in a cognizable racial group,
the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges to remove mem-
bers of that group, the indisputable fact that such challenges permit
those inclined to discriminate to do so, and any other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor excluded venire
members on account of race. Id., at 96. The Court assumed that the
trial judge would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances, in-
cluding the prosecutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it was
more likely than not that the peremptory challenge was improperly
motivated. The Court did not intend the first step to be so onerous
that a defendant would have to persuade the judge—on the basis of
all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know
with certainty—that the challenge was more likely than not the
product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies
Batson’s first step requirements by producing evidence sufficient to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred. The facts of this case illustrate that California’s standard
is at odds with the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson. The
permissible inferences of discrimination, which caused the trial judge
to comment that the case was close and the California Supreme
Court to acknowledge that it was suspicious that all three black pro-
spective jurors were removed, were sufficient to establish a prima fa-
cie case. Pp. 10–11.
Reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and
BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–6964
_________________
JAY SHAWN JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.
CALIFORNIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 13, 2005]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of California and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have provided
conflicting answers to the following question: “Whether to
establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U. S. 79 (1986), the objector must show that it is more likely
than not that the other party’s peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias?” Pet.
for Cert. i. Because both of those courts regularly review
the validity of convictions obtained in California criminal
trials, respondent, the State of California, agreed to peti-
tioner’s request that we grant certiorari and resolve the
conflict. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the question
presented must be answered in the negative, and accord-
ingly reverse the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
I
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was con-
victed in a California trial court of second-degree murder
and assault on a white 19-month-old child, resulting in
death. During jury selection, a number of prospective
jurors were removed for cause until 43 eligible jurors
2 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
remained, 3 of whom were black. The prosecutor used 3 of
his 12 peremptory challenges to remove the black prospec-
tive jurors. The resulting jury, including alternates, was
all white.
After the prosecutor exercised the second of his three
peremptory challenges against the prospective black
jurors, defense counsel objected on the ground that the
challenge was unconstitutionally based on race under both
the California and United States Constitutions. People v.
Johnson, 30 Cal. 4th 1302, 1307, 71 P. 3d 270, 272–273
(2003).1 Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor “had
no apparent reason to challenge this prospective juror
‘other than [her] racial identity.’ ” Ibid. (alteration in
original). The trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to
explain the rationale for his strikes. Instead, the judge
simply found that petitioner had failed to establish a
prima facie case under the governing state precedent,
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978),
reasoning “ ‘that there’s not been shown a strong likelihood
that the exercise of the peremptory challenges were based
upon a group rather than an individual basis,’ ” 30 Cal.
4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at 272 (emphasis added). The judge
did, however, warn the prosecutor that “ ‘we are very
close.’ ” People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729
(2001).
Defense counsel made an additional motion the next day
when the prosecutor struck the final remaining prospec-
tive black juror. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307, 71 P. 3d, at 272.
Counsel argued that the prosecutor’s decision to challenge
all of the prospective black jurors constituted a “system-
atic attempt to exclude African-Americans from the jury
panel.” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 729. The trial judge still did
not seek an explanation from the prosecutor. Instead, he
——————
1 Petitioner’s state objection was made under People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978).
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Opinion of the Court
explained that his own examination of the record had
convinced him that the prosecutor’s strikes could be justi-
fied by race-neutral reasons. Specifically, the judge opined
that the black venire members had offered equivocal or
confused answers in their written questionnaires. 30 Cal.
4th, at 1307–1308, 71 P. 3d, at 272–273. Despite the fact
that “ ‘the Court would not grant the challenges for cause,
there were answers . . . at least on the questionnaires
themselves [such] that the Court felt that there was suffi-
cient basis’ ” for the strikes. Id., at 1308, 71 P. 3d, at 273
(brackets added). Therefore, even considering that all of
the prospective black jurors had been stricken from the
pool, the judge determined that petitioner had failed to
establish a prima facie case.
The California Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.
People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (2001). Over the
dissent of one judge, the majority ruled that the trial judge
had erred by requiring petitioner to establish a “strong
likelihood” that the peremptory strikes had been imper-
missibly based on race. Instead, the trial judge should
have only required petitioner to proffer enough evidence to
support an “inference” of discrimination.2 The Court of
Appeal’s holding relied on decisions of this Court, prior
California case law, and the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Wade v. Terhune,
202 F. 3d 1190 (2000). Applying the proper “reasonable
inference” standard, the majority concluded that peti-
tioner had produced sufficient evidence to support a prima
facie case.
Respondent appealed, and the California Supreme
Court reinstated petitioner’s conviction over the dissent of
——————
2 In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion
that a showing of a “ ‘strong likelihood’ ” is equivalent to a “ ‘reasonable
inference.’ ” To conclude so would “be as novel a proposition as the idea
that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ has always meant a ‘preponderance
of the evidence.’ ” 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 733.
4 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
two justices. The court stressed that Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U. S. 79 (1986), left to state courts the task of estab-
lishing the standards used to evaluate the sufficiency of
defendants’ prima facie cases. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1314, 71
P. 3d, at 277. The court then reviewed Batson, Wheeler,
and those decisions’ progeny, and concluded that
“Wheeler’s terms ‘strong likelihood’ and ‘reasonable infer-
ence’ state the same standard”—one that is entirely con-
sistent with Batson. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1313, 71 P. 3d, at 277.
A prima facie case under Batson establishes a “ ‘legally
mandatory, rebuttable presumption,’ ” it does not merely
constitute “enough evidence to permit the inference” that
discrimination has occurred. 30 Cal. 4th, at 1315, 71
P. 3d, at 278. Batson, the court held, “permits a court to
require the objector to present, not merely ‘some evidence’
permitting the inference, but ‘strong evidence’ that makes
discriminatory intent more likely than not if the challenges
are not explained.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1316, 71 P. 3d, at 278.
The court opined that while this burden is “not onerous,” it
remains “substantial.” Ibid., 71 P. 3d, at 279.
Applying that standard, the court acknowledged that
the case involved the “highly relevant” circumstance that
a black defendant was “charged with killing ‘his White
girlfriend’s child,’ ” and that “it certainly looks suspicious
that all three African-American prospective jurors were
removed from the jury.” Id., at 1326, 71 P. 3d, at 286. Yet
petitioner’s Batson showing, the court held, consisted
“primarily of the statistical disparity of peremptory chal-
lenges between African-Americans and others.” 30 Cal.
4th, at 1327, 71 P. 3d, at 287. Although those statistics
were indeed “troubling and, as the trial court stated, the
question was close,” id., at 1328, 71 P. 3d, at 287, the court
decided to defer to the trial judge’s “carefully considered
ruling.” Ibid.3 We granted certiorari, but dismissed the
——————
3 In dissent, Justice Kennard argued that “[r]equiring a defendant to
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
Opinion of the Court
case for want of jurisdiction because the judgment was not
yet final. Johnson v. California, 541 U. S. 428 (2004) (per
curiam). After the California Court of Appeal decided the
remaining issues, we again granted certiorari. 543 U. S.
___ (2005).
II
The issue in this case is narrow but important. It con-
cerns the scope of the first of three steps this Court enu-
merated in Batson, which together guide trial courts’
constitutional review of peremptory strikes. Those three
Batson steps should by now be familiar. First, the defen-
dant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 93–94 (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239–242 (1976)).4
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie
case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately
the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral
justifications for the strikes. 476 U. S., at 94; see also
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972). Third,
“[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Purkett v.
——————
persuade the trial court of the prosecutor’s discriminatory purpose at
the first Wheeler-Batson stage short-circuits the process, and provides
inadequate protection for the defendant’s right to a fair trial . . . .” 30
Cal. 4th, at 1333, 71 P. 3d, at 291. The proper standard for measuring
a prima facie case under Batson is whether the defendant has identified
actions by the prosecutor that, “if unexplained, permit a reasonable
inference of an improper purpose or motive.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1339, 71
P. 3d, at 294. Trial judges, Justice Kennard argued, should not specu-
late when it is not “apparent that the [neutral] explanation was the
true reason for the challenge.” Id., at 1340, 71 P. 3d, at 295.
4 An “inference” is generally understood to be a “conclusion reached
by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from
them.” Black’s Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999).
6 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam).
The question before us is whether Batson permits Cali-
fornia to require at step one that “the objector must show
that it is more likely than not the other party’s peremp-
tory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermis-
sible group bias.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1318, 71 P. 3d, at 280.
Although we recognize that States do have flexibility in
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Bat-
son, we conclude that California’s “more likely than not”
standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to meas-
ure the sufficiency of a prima facie case.
We begin with Batson itself, which on its own terms
provides no support for California’s rule. There, we held
that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out
by offering a wide variety of evidence,5 so long as the sum
of the proffered facts gives “rise to an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose.” 476 U. S., at 94. We explained that
“a defendant may establish a prima facie case of pur-
poseful discrimination in selection of the petit jury
solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. To
establish such a case, the defendant first must show
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and
that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to remove from the venire members of the de-
fendant’s race. Second, the defendant is entitled to
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute,
——————
5 In Batson, we spoke of the methods by which prima facie cases could
be proved in permissive terms. A defendant may satisfy his prima facie
burden, we said, “by relying solely on the facts concerning [the selection
of the venire] in his case.” 476 U. S., at 95 (emphasis in original). We
declined to require proof of a pattern or practice because “ ‘[a] single
invidiously discriminatory governmental act’ is not ‘immunized by the
absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable
decisions.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266, n. 14 (1977)).
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7
Opinion of the Court
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of
a mind to discriminate.’ Finally, the defendant must
show that these facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit
jury on account of their race.” Id., at 96 (citations
omitted) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, 562
(1953)).
Indeed, Batson held that because the petitioner had
timely objected to the prosecutor’s decision to strike “all
black persons on the venire,” the trial court was in error
when it “flatly rejected the objection without requiring the
prosecutor to give an explanation for his action.” 476
U. S., at 100. We did not hold that the petitioner had
proved discrimination. Rather, we remanded the case for
further proceedings because the trial court failed to de-
mand an explanation from the prosecutor—i.e., to proceed
to Batson’s second step—despite the fact that the peti-
tioner’s evidence supported an inference of discrimination.
Ibid.
Thus, in describing the burden-shifting framework, we
assumed in Batson that the trial judge would have the
benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the prose-
cutor’s explanation, before deciding whether it was more
likely than not that the challenge was improperly moti-
vated. We did not intend the first step to be so onerous
that a defendant would have to persuade the judge—on
the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for
the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge
was more likely than not the product of purposeful dis-
crimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the require-
ments of Batson’s first step by producing evidence suffi-
cient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred.
8 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
Respondent, however, focuses on Batson’s ultimate
sentence: “If the trial court decides that the facts estab-
lish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prose-
cutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for
his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s convic-
tion be reversed.” Ibid. For this to be true, respondent
contends, a Batson claim must prove the ultimate facts by
a preponderance of the evidence in the prima facie case;
otherwise, the argument goes, a prosecutor’s failure to
respond to a prima facie case would inexplicably entitle a
defendant to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of
nothing more than an inference that discrimination may
have occurred. Brief for Respondent 13–18.
Respondent’s argument is misguided. Batson, of course,
explicitly stated that the defendant ultimately carries the
“burden of persuasion” to “ ‘prove the existence of purpose-
ful discrimination.’ ” 476 U. S., at 93 (quoting Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 550 (1967)). This burden of per-
suasion “rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of
the strike.” Purkett, 514 U. S., at 768. Thus, even if the
State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical
justification for its strike, the case does not end—it merely
proceeds to step three. Ibid.6 The first two Batson steps
govern the production of evidence that allows the trial
court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant’s
constitutional claim. “It is not until the third step that the
persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant—the
——————
6 In the unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to
respond to a trial judge’s inquiry regarding his justification for making
a strike, the evidence before the judge would consist not only of the
original facts from which the prima facie case was established, but also
the prosecutor’s refusal to justify his strike in light of the court’s
request. Such a refusal would provide additional support for the
inference of discrimination raised by a defendant’s prima facie case. Cf.
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273
U. S. 103, 111 (1927).
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9
Opinion of the Court
step in which the trial court determines whether the
opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving
purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, supra, at 768.7
Batson’s purposes further support our conclusion. The
constitutional interests Batson sought to vindicate are not
limited to the rights possessed by the defendant on trial,
see 476 U. S., at 87, nor to those citizens who desire to
participate “in the administration of the law, as jurors,”
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1880). Un-
doubtedly, the overriding interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation from our civic institutions suffers whenever an
individual is excluded from making a significant contribu-
tion to governance on account of his race. Yet the “harm
from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch
the entire community. Selection procedures that purpose-
fully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Bat-
son, 476 U. S., at 87; see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S.
128, 130 (1940) (“For racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted
——————
7 This explanation comports with our interpretation of the burden-
shifting framework in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567,
577 (1978) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U. S. 792 (1973), framework “is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the
critical question of discrimination”); see also St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 509–510, and n. 3 (1993) (holding that determina-
tions at steps one and two of the McDonnell Douglas framework “can
involve no credibility assessment” because “the burden-of-production
determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage,”
and that the burden-shifting framework triggered by a defendant’s
prima face case is essentially just “a means of ‘arranging the presenta-
tion of evidence’ ” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U. S. 977, 986 (1988)).
10 JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
under it but it is at war with our basic concepts of a de-
mocratic society and a representative government” (foot-
note omitted)).
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual
answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination
may have infected the jury selection process. See 476
U. S., at 97–98, and n. 20. The inherent uncertainty
present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels
against engaging in needless and imperfect speculation
when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple
question. See Paulino v. Castro, 371 F. 3d 1083, 1090
(CA9 2004) (“[I]t does not matter that the prosecutor
might have had good reasons . . . [w]hat matters is the real
reason they were stricken” (emphasis deleted)); Holloway
v. Horn, 355 F. 3d 707, 725 (CA3 2004) (speculation “does
not aid our inquiry into the reasons the prosecutor actu-
ally harbored” for a peremptory strike). The three-step
process thus simultaneously serves the public purposes
Batson is designed to vindicate and encourages “prompt
rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without
substantial disruption of the jury selection process.”
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 358–359 (1991)
(opinion of KENNEDY, J.).
The disagreements among the state-court judges who
reviewed the record in this case illustrate the imprecision
of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible
claims of discrimination. In this case the inference of
discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the
trial judge “that ‘we are very close,’ ” and on review, the
California Supreme acknowledged that “it certainly looks
suspicious that all three African-American prospective
jurors were removed from the jury.” 30 Cal. 4th, at 1307,
1326, 71 P. 3d, at 273, 286. Those inferences that dis-
crimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish
a prima facie case under Batson.
The facts of this case well illustrate that California’s
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11
Opinion of the Court
“more likely than not” standard is at odds with the prima
facie inquiry mandated by Batson. The judgment of the
California Supreme Court is therefore reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
BREYER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–6964
_________________
JAY SHAWN JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.
CALIFORNIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 13, 2005]
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion while maintaining here the
views I set forth in my concurring opinion in Miller-El v.
Dretke, post, p.___.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–6964
_________________
JAY SHAWN JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.
CALIFORNIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
[June 13, 2005]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court says that States “have flexibility in formulat-
ing appropriate procedures to comply with Batson [v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)],” ante, at 6, but it then tells
California how to comply with “the prima facie inquiry
mandated by Batson,” ante, at 11. In Batson itself, this
Court disclaimed any intent to instruct state courts on
how to implement its holding. 476 U. S., at 99 (“We de-
cline, however, to formulate particular procedures to be
followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecu-
tor’s challenges”); id., at 99–100, n. 24. According to Bat-
son, the Equal Protection Clause requires that prosecutors
select juries based on factors other than race—not that
litigants bear particular burdens of proof or persuasion.
Because Batson’s burden-shifting approach is “a prophy-
lactic framework” that polices racially discriminatory jury
selection rather than “an independent constitutional
command,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555
(1987), States have “wide discretion, subject to the mini-
mum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to ex-
periment with solutions to difficult problems of policy,”
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 273 (2000); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U. S. 428, 438–439 (2000). California’s
procedure falls comfortably within its broad discretion to
craft its own rules of criminal procedure, and I therefore
respectfully dissent.