(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DODD v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–5286. Argued March 22, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28
U. S. C. §2255, claiming that his conviction for knowingly and inten-
tionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of
21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846, should be set aside because it was con-
trary to Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813, 815, which held
that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each
of the specific violations that together constitute the continuing
criminal enterprise. The District Court held that, because Richard-
son had been decided more than one year before Dodd filed his mo-
tion, the motion was untimely under §2255, ¶6(3), which provides
that §2255’s 1-year limitation period begins to run on “the date on
which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” On
appeal, Dodd argued that ¶6(3)’s limitation period began to run on
April 19, 2002, the date the Eleventh Circuit recognized Richardson’s
retroactive application to cases on collateral review. The Eleventh
Circuit held that the period began to run on June 1, 1999, the date
that this Court initially decided Richardson.
Held:
1. The 1-year limitation period under ¶6(3) begins to run on the
date on which this Court “initially recognized” the right asserted in
an applicant’s motion, not the date on which that right was made ret-
roactive. The text of ¶6(3) unequivocally identifies one, and only one,
date from which the limitation period is measured: “the date on
which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court.” This Court presumes that a legislature says what it means
and means what it says in a statute. Dodd’s reliance on ¶6(3)’s sec-
2 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ond clause to identify the operative date is misplaced. That clause
merely limits the subsection’s applicability to cases in which appli-
cants assert rights “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Thus,
¶6(3)’s date—“the date on which the right asserted was initially rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court”—does not apply at all unless the con-
ditions in the second clause are satisfied. This result may make it
difficult for applicants filing second or successive §2255 motions to
obtain relief, since this Court rarely announces a new rule of consti-
tutional law and makes it retroactive within a year, but the Court is
not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted. Pp. 3–7.
2. Because Dodd’s §2255 motion was filed more than a year after
this Court decided Richardson, his motion was untimely. Pp. 7–8.
365 F. 3d 1273, affirmed.
O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STE-
VENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and
BREYER, JJ., joined as to Part II, except for n. 4. GINSBURG, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–5286
_________________
MICHAEL DONALD DODD, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U. S. C. §2255 establishes a “1-year period of
limitation” within which a federal prisoner may file a
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under
that section. That period runs from “the latest” of a num-
ber of events, which are enumerated in subparagraphs (1)
through (4) of ¶6 of that section. This case involves sub-
paragraph (3), which provides that the limitation period
begins to run on “the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral re-
view.” We must decide whether the date from which the
limitation period begins to run under ¶6(3) is the date on
which this Court “initially recognized” the right asserted
in an applicant’s §2255 motion, or whether, instead, it is
the date on which the right is “made retroactiv[e].”
I
Petitioner Michael Donald Dodd was indicted on June
25, 1993, for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U. S. C.
2 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
§§841 and 846, conspiring to possess with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana in violation of §841(a)(1), conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of
§841(a)(1), and 16 counts of using and possessing a pass-
port obtained by false statement in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§1546(a). He was convicted of all counts except the co-
caine charge, and was sentenced to 360 months’ impris-
onment followed by five years of supervised release. The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on May
7, 1997. 111 F. 3d 867 (per curiam). Because Dodd did
not file a petition for certiorari, his conviction became final
on August 6, 1997. See Clay v. United States, 537 U. S.
522, 525 (2003).
On April 4, 2001, more than three years after his convic-
tion became final, Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28
U. S. C. §2255 seeking to set aside his conviction for know-
ingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise, based on our decision in Richardson v. United
States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999). Richardson held that a jury
must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each
of the specific violations that together constitute the con-
tinuing criminal enterprise. Id., at 815. Dodd argued,
among other things, that he was entitled to relief because
his jury had not been instructed that they had to agree
unanimously on each predicate violation. App. 9. The
District Court dismissed Dodd’s §2255 motion as time
barred. Id., at 11–15. Because Richardson had been
decided more than one year before Dodd filed his motion,
the court held that the motion was untimely; it also re-
jected Dodd’s request for equitable tolling. App. 13–15.
Dodd appealed, arguing that the limitation period in
§2255, ¶6(3), did not begin to run until April 19, 2002,
when the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in
Ross v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677, that the right recog-
nized in Richardson applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
Opinion of the Court
limitation period began to run on “the date the Supreme
Court initially recognizes the right”—the date Richardson
was decided—and accordingly affirmed the dismissal of
Dodd’s motion as time barred. 365 F. 3d 1273, 1283
(2004).
We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. __ (2004), to resolve a
conflict in the Courts of Appeals over when the limitation
period in ¶6(3) begins to run. Compare, e.g., 365 F. 3d, at
1283 (case below) (period runs from date of Supreme Court
decision initially recognizing right asserted); and United
States v. Lopez, 248 F. 3d 427, 432–433 (CA5 2001) (same),
with Pryor v. United States, 278 F. 3d 612, 616 (CA6 2002)
(period does not begin to run until right has been held
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); and
United States v. Valdez, 195 F. 3d 544, 547–548 (CA9
1999) (same).
II
Section 2255, ¶6, provides:
“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion
under this section. The limitation period shall run
from the latest of—
“(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes final;
“(2) the date on which the impediment to making a
motion created by governmental action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is re-
moved, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;
“(3) the date on which the right asserted was ini-
tially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
“(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered
4 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
through the exercise of due diligence.”
In most cases, the operative date from which the limita-
tion period is measured will be the one identified in ¶6(1):
“the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final.” Ibid.; see also Clay, supra, at 524. But later filings
are permitted where subparagraphs (2)–(4) apply. This
case involves ¶6(3), which gives §2255 applicants one year
from “the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroac-
tively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Dodd
contends that under subparagraph (3), the limitation
period runs from the date on which the right asserted was
made retroactively applicable. The United States, on the
other hand, argues that it runs from the date on which
this Court initially recognized the right asserted.
We believe that the text of ¶6(3) settles this dispute. It
unequivocally identifies one, and only one, date from
which the 1-year limitation period is measured: “the date
on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court.” We “must presume that [the] legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,
503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992). What Congress has said in
¶6(3) is clear: an applicant has one year from the date on
which the right he asserts was initially recognized by this
Court.
Dodd urges us to adopt a different interpretation. He
contends that the second clause in ¶6(3) affects the appli-
cable date under that provision. He reads ¶6(3) as con-
taining “three distinct prerequisites” that “must be satis-
fied before the limitation period begins.” Brief for
Petitioner 8. Those three prerequisites are: (1) the right
asserted by the applicant “was initially recognized” by this
Court; (2) this Court “newly recognized” the right; and (3)
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
Opinion of the Court
a court must have “made” the right “retroactively applica-
ble to cases on collateral review.” Id., at 13–14 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit did not hold the right recognized
in Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999),
retroactively applicable until April 19, 2002, when it
decided Ross, 289 F. 3d 677, Dodd contends that he had
until April 19, 2003—one year from the date when all
three prerequisites were satisfied—to file his §2255
motion.
Dodd’s interpretation does not square with the only
natural reading of the text. Paragraph 6(3) identifies one
date and one date only as the date from which the 1-year
limitation period runs: “the date on which the right as-
serted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.”
Dodd’s reliance on the second clause to identify the opera-
tive date is misplaced. That clause—“if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”—
imposes a condition on the applicability of this subsection.
See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1124
(1993) (the definition of “if ” is “in the event that” or “on
condition that”). It therefore limits ¶6(3)’s application to
cases in which applicants are seeking to assert rights
“newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retro-
actively applicable to cases on collateral review.” §2255,
¶6(3). That means that ¶6(3)’s date—“the date on which
the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court”—does not apply at all if the conditions in the sec-
ond clause—the right “has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review”—have not been satisfied. As long as
the conditions in the second clause are satisfied so that
¶6(3) applies in the first place, that clause has no impact
whatsoever on the date from which the 1-year limitation
period in ¶6(3) begins to run. Thus, if this Court decides a
6 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
case recognizing a new right, a federal prisoner seeking to
assert that right will have one year from this Court’s
decision within which to file his §2255 motion. He may
take advantage of the date in the first clause of ¶6(3) only
if the conditions in the second clause are met.
We recognize that the statute of limitations in ¶6(3)
makes it difficult for applicants filing second or successive
§2255 motions to obtain relief. The limitation period in
¶6(3) applies to “all motions” under §2255, initial motions
as well as second or successive ones. Section 2255, ¶8(2),
narrowly restricts an applicant’s ability to file a second or
successive motion. An applicant may file a second or
successive motion only in limited circumstances, such as
where he seeks to take advantage of “a new rule of consti-
tutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
§2255, ¶8(2). Dodd points out that this Court rarely de-
cides that a new rule is retroactively applicable within one
year of initially recognizing that right. Thus, because of
the interplay between ¶¶8(2) and 6(3), an applicant who
files a second or successive motion seeking to take advan-
tage of a new rule of constitutional law will be time barred
except in the rare case in which this Court announces a
new rule of constitutional law and makes it retroactive
within one year.
Although we recognize the potential for harsh results in
some cases, we are not free to rewrite the statute that
Congress has enacted. “[W]hen the statute’s language is
plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to en-
force it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Tyler
v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 663, n. 5 (2001) (“[E]ven if we
disagreed with the legislative decision to establish strin-
gent procedural requirements for retroactive application of
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7
Opinion of the Court
new rules, we do not have license to question the decision
on policy grounds”). The disposition required by the text
here, though strict, is not absurd. It is for Congress, not
this Court, to amend the statute if it believes that the
interplay of ¶¶8(2) and 6(3) of §2255 unduly restricts
federal prisoners’ ability to file second or successive
motions.
JUSTICE STEVENS would hold, contrary to the plain text,
that the limitation period in ¶6(3) begins to run when the
right asserted is made retroactive, see post, at 9–10 (dis-
senting opinion), because he assumes that “the most natu-
ral reading of the statutory text would make it possible for
the limitations period to expire before the cause of action
accrues,” post, at 1. JUSTICE STEVENS analogizes this case
to Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, ex rel. Wilson, post, p. __, see post, at 1
(dissenting opinion), but Graham County is distinguish-
able. The text of the statute at issue in Graham County is
ambiguous, justifying the Court’s partial reliance on “the
‘standard rule that the limitations period commences
when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action.’ ” See Graham County, post, at 5–8, and n. 2.
Here, there is no such ambiguity; ¶6(3) clearly specifies
the date on which the limitation period begins to run.
III
Dodd’s §2255 motion sought to benefit from our holding
in Richardson, supra, which was decided on June 1, 1999.
Thus, he had one year from that date within which to file
his motion. Because he did not file his motion until April
4, 2001, the motion was untimely. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
STEVENS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–5286
_________________
MICHAEL DONALD DODD, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUS-
TICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join as to Part II,
dissenting.
Because the same anomalous factor is present in both
this case and in Graham County Soil & Water Conserva-
tion Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, post, p. ___, and
is decisive in my analysis of both cases, it is appropriate to
explain my views in a single opinion. In each case the
most natural reading of the statutory text would make it
possible for the limitations period to expire before the
cause of action accrues. Whether the source of this possi-
ble result is merely the use of careless wording or an
incorrect assumption by Congress concerning the timing of
two relevant events, I am convinced that Congress did not
intend to authorize such a perverse result in either case.
Thus, while I agree with much of the reasoning in the
Court’s cogent opinion in Graham County, I write sepa-
rately because I would agree with the Court of Appeals’
reading of the text of 31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1) were it not for
this anomaly. In this case, however, because that same
factor provides an even stronger reason for rejecting the
interpretation of 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3), that the Court
endorses, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
2 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
I
In Graham County, respondent and the Government
argue (and the Court of Appeals held) that the 6-year
limitations period applicable to a “civil action under sec-
tion 3730,” 31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1), applies to the retalia-
tion action authorized by §3730(h). That argument is
supported by a literal reading of the statutory text; for
§3730(h) plainly qualifies as “a civil action under section
3730.” Moreover, that reading derives strong support
from the interest in having a uniform federal statute of
limitations govern the litigation of federal causes of action.
Cf. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 377–
383 (2004). Nevertheless, I agree with the Court that
another reading of the text is far more plausible, and with
its conclusion that when choosing between two construc-
tions of a statute of limitations, whenever possible we
should prefer the construction that starts the time limit
running when the cause of action accrues.1
——————
1 Contrary to the Court’s comment in Graham County, post, at 9, n. 2,
I do not suggest that a statute providing that the limitations period
begins to run before the cause of action accrues is necessarily ambigu-
ous. Rather, as JUSTICE THOMAS’ scholarly footnote demonstrates,
Graham County, post, at 9–11, n. 3, it is so unlikely that a legislature
would actually intend such an anomalous design that I would presume
that the anomaly was the product of a drafting error absent evidence in
either the legislative history or elsewhere in the text that Congress
specifically intended such a result. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
v. Nigh, 543 U. S. ___, ____ (2004) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op., at
1–2).
The literal text of §3731(b)(1), which uses an event that is not an
element of the retaliation cause of action to start the limitations period
running, produces two anomalies: (1) the statute may never begin to
run and (2) it may expire before the cause of action accrues. The Court
argues that the first anomaly makes the statute ambiguous and that
the second justifies resort to a default rule to resolve the ambiguity. In
my judgment, the latter anomaly would provide a sufficient justifica-
tion for resort to the default rule whether or not some other feature of
the statute would support an argument that the text was “ambiguous.”
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
STEVENS, J., dissenting
In Graham County that choice is compelled by the in-
teraction between two relevant events: the “violation of
§3729” and the retaliatory act against the whistle-blower.
Section 3731(b)(1) provides that a “civil action under
section 3730” must be brought within six years of a “viola-
tion of section 3729.” If this section were read to encom-
pass retaliation claims under §3730(h), as held by the
Court of Appeals, the statute of limitations would be
triggered by the “violation of §3729”; that is, the limita-
tions period would begin to run before the cause of action
for retaliation accrues, and could potentially expire before
an actionable retaliation claim even exists. See Graham
County, post, at 11; United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham
County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 367 F. 3d 245,
260–261 (CA4 2004) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Thus, the
potentially prolonged time period between the two rele-
vant events—the violation of §3729 (triggering the limita-
tions period) and the retaliation against the whistle-
blower (giving rise to an actionable claim)—could leave the
well-intentioned whistle-blower without any recourse
under §3730(h), the very statute designed to provide such
protection.
The Court rightly avoids that harsh and counterintui-
tive result by adopting a construction of the statute that
would generally start the running of the limitations period
from the date the cause of action accrues, i.e., when the act
or acts of retaliation occur. As JUSTICE THOMAS explains,
that is not only the prevailing rule applied throughout the
country to analogous state-law claims, Graham County,
post, at 9–11, n. 2; it is also the background norm against
which Congress legislates, Graham County, post, at 8–9.
Because Congress surely did not intend to create a cause
of action for retaliation with one hand, and impose with
the other a premature trigger date for the limitations
period with the potential to bar retaliation claims alto-
gether, I concur in the judgment in Graham County.
4 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
II
The same potential for premature expiration of a statute
of limitations is the primary reason why I cannot join the
Court’s anomalous construction of the statute in this case.
The statute we are called upon to interpret provides a 1-
year period of limitation for a habeas petition that has as
its basis a new rule of criminal law or criminal procedure
that has retroactive application. Title 28 U. S. C. §2255,
¶6(3), provides that “the limitation period shall run from
. . . the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroac-
tively applicable to cases on collateral review.” There are
two possible interpretations of when the period should
start to run: from the date that this Court recognizes the
new right, or from the date that both conditions2 in ¶6(3)
are met.
If, as I believe Congress thought to be the case, this
Court made a decision concerning a new rule’s retroactive
application at the same time it recognized the new right,
the statutory scheme would make perfect sense: Petition-
ers, whether filing an initial habeas petition or a second or
successive petition, would have one year from this Court’s
decision to file a petition for a writ taking advantage of
that decision. Within a relatively short amount of time,
those claims would be adjudicated, and the statute’s goals
of finality would be duly served. In practice, however, this
Court does not ordinarily make retroactivity judgments at
the time a new right is recognized.3 See, e.g., Ring v.
——————
2 Section 2255, ¶6(3), technically has three requirements: that a right
be “initially recognized,” that it be “newly recognized,” and that it be
“made retroactively applicable.” In practice, however, the first two
requirements are one and the same. Hence, in this opinion I will refer
only to the requirements (1) that a right be newly recognized and (2)
that it be made retroactively applicable.
3 The retroactivity issue is not normally argued in the same case that
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002) (applying Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), to determinations of death
penalty eligibility); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348
(2004) (concluding Ring was not retroactive). Thus, as in
Graham County, the statute implicates two relevant
events: this Court’s recognition of a new right (which,
according to the majority, triggers the limitation period)
and the declaration that the right can be applied retroac-
tively (which allows a petitioner to proceed with the
claim). Because a significant amount of time may elapse
during the interval between the triggering event and the
point at which a petitioner may actually be able to file an
action seeking relief under the statute, there is a real risk
that the 1-year limitation period will expire before the
cause of action accrues. In my judgment, the probable
explanation for statutory text that creates this risk is
Congress’ apparent assumption that our recognition of the
new right and our decision to apply it retroactively would
be made at the same time. Otherwise it seems nonsensi-
cal to assume that Congress deliberately enacted a statute
that recognizes a cause of action, but wrote the limitation
period in a way that precludes an individual from ever
taking advantage of the cause of action.
We are thus faced with the same decision as in Graham
County: Do we interpret the statute in such a way as to
allow prisoners such as Dodd to take advantage of the full
year Congress provided for such claims, or do we interpret
the statute in such a way that the limitation period will
begin to run before a prisoner may take advantage of
¶6(3)? As an initial matter, the text here certainly per-
mits both readings, just as it did in Graham County.
——————
announces a new rule because the prisoner is only interested in the
outcome of his own case. Moreover, in order to minimize the impact of
the new rule at issue, he actually has an incentive to minimize its
consequences.
6 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Paragraph 6(3) requires that two prerequisites must be
met before a habeas petitioner can take advantage of that
date as the starting point for the statute of limitations.
Both requirements are in the past tense, and both must be
satisfied before ¶6(3) is applicable. Furthermore, just as
the clause “if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court” describes the date indicated in the phrase
“the date on which the right asserted was initially recog-
nized,” it is possible to read the subordinate clause “if that
right has been. . .made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review” as amplifying the description of the date
in the provision’s main clause, rather than adding an
additional qualifier. Consequently, while the majority’s
reading of ¶6(3)—requiring that the statute of limitations
begin to run when this Court recognizes a new rule—may
be the more natural reading of the text, that advocated
by petitioner—starting the statute of limitations when
the new rule is held to be retroactive—is by no means
implausible.4
——————
4 I should note an additional point of disagreement with the majority
(and with petitioner). In reaching its result, the Court relies on an
assumption made by both parties and not challenged in this Court:
namely, that the decision to make a new rule retroactive for purposes of
this section can be made by any lower court. While I recognize that
every Circuit to have addressed the issue has made the same assump-
tion, I am satisfied that the Government’s initial interpretation of this
provision is the correct one. See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae in Tyler v. Cain, O. T. 2000, No. 00–5961, p. 16, n. 7. Under
that interpretation, the requirement that “the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review” is met only if the Supreme Court has made
the right retroactive.
Courts that have reached the contrary conclusion have principally
relied on the fact that 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) contains an explicit
requirement that a new rule be “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme
Court.” (Emphasis added.) See Ashley v. United States, 266 F. 3d 671,
674 (CA7 2001). Thus, the argument goes, the absence of “by the
Supreme Court” after “made retroactive” must have some meaning.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Moreover, the potential for claims to be prematurely
barred by the statute of limitations is even greater than in
Graham County. There, the possibility that the 6-year
statute of limitations period could run before the cause of
action accrued, while plausible, was not particularly
likely, since in most cases the retaliatory conduct that
would form the basis of the cause of action under 31
U. S. C. §3730(h) would probably occur within six years of
the violation of §3729.5 In this case, owing to the substan-
——————
However, in that clause there is only one verb that the prepositional
phrase “by the Supreme Court” can modify, whereas in the relevant
clause of §2255, ¶6(3), there are two: newly recognized and made
retroactive. The more natural reading of ¶6(3) is that the prepositional
phrase “by the Supreme Court” modifies both verbs of the subordinate
clause. This reading comports with Congress’ general direction that
this Court, and not the lower courts, should provide the final answer to
questions of interpretation arising under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See, e.g., 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1) (requiring that a state-court decision be contrary to “clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States” (emphasis added)). Additionally, it avoids difficult
questions of which court can make a retroactivity determination, sets a
uniform date by which lower courts can make determinations as to
whether a petition is timely, and means that only those cases made
retroactive by this Court can form the basis for a petition that can gain
the benefit of tolling under §2255, ¶6(3). Finally, it is the only interpre-
tation that gives full effect to §2255, ¶8(2), which allows prisoners who
have already completed one round of federal habeas review to seek
additional relief on the basis of such a new rule.
Ultimately, this reading has no direct bearing on the question pre-
sented in this case. While my view that this Court must make the
retroactivity determination informs my belief that Congress had a
mistaken understanding of how ¶6(3) would operate in practice, I
would conclude that the 1-year limitation period begins to run when
both requirements of ¶6(3) are met regardless of which court makes the
retroactivity decision.
JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER do not join
this footnote.
5 As the majority in Graham County noted, however, in almost every
case the statute of limitations would begin to run before the cause of
action actually accrued. See post, at 11.
8 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
tially shorter 1-year statute of limitation period, both
requirements of 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3), will often not be
met before the statute of limitation period has expired if it
is triggered by the decision of the Supreme Court an-
nouncing a new rule.
That result is certainly true for Dodd himself. Richard-
son v. United States, 526 U. S. 813, was decided on June 1,
1999. Under the majority’s interpretation, the statute of
limitations thus expired on June 1, 2000, one year after we
recognized the new rule. The Eleventh Circuit, however,
did not decide whether Richardson was retroactive until
April 19, 2002.6 See Ross v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677
(CA11 2002). Thus, Dodd would not, under the majority’s
interpretation, have been able to raise his claim at all,
since the statute of limitations expired before he could
have taken advantage of ¶6(3)’s 1-year grace period.7
——————
6 This assumes that the Eleventh Circuit is the relevant “court” to
decide the retroactivity question, an issue the majority fails to address.
Even if a district court, as opposed to the Court of Appeals, could make
that determination for purposes of ¶6(3), the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida has not decided the issue in a published
opinion.
7 This would be true for prisoners in every Circuit except the Sixth
Circuit, in which a prisoner would have had six months to file his
petition. See Murr v. United States, 200 F. 3d 895 (Jan. 7, 2000). In
the five other Circuits besides the Eleventh to have decided the issue,
all held Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999), to be retro-
active more than one year after Richardson was decided; in all of those
Circuits, prisoners’ claims under Richardson would be time barred
before they were able to file under ¶6(3). See Santana-Madera v.
United States, 260 F. 3d 133 (CA2 Aug. 3, 2001); United States v. Lopez,
248 F. 3d 427 (CA5 Apr. 16, 2001); Lanier v. United States, 220 F. 3d
833 (CA7 June 12, 2000); United States v. Montalvo, 331 F. 3d 1052
(CA9 June 9, 2003); United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F. 3d 1242
(CA10 Dec. 3, 2002); Ross v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677 (CA11 Apr.
19, 2002). The Eighth Circuit appears to have assumed the retroactive
application of Richardson, but that too was decided more than a year
after Richardson itself. See United States v. Scott, 218 F. 3d 835 (July
7, 2000). Of course, if any of the other four Circuits that have not yet
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Even for those prisoners who are incarcerated in a juris-
diction in which the new rule is quickly held to be retroac-
tive, at least part of the 1-year period in which to file a
claim taking advantage of the retroactive rule will run
before the petition raising the claim can be filed.8
Thus, the admonition in Graham County that “Congress
generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the
cause of action accrues,” post, at 11, applies with special
force in this case. Paragraph 6(3) both recognizes a basis
for habeas relief by allowing an otherwise barred claim to
go forward if certain conditions are met, and also sets
forth a 1-year statute of limitation for such claims. It
would make no sense for Congress, in the same provision,
both to recognize a potential basis for habeas relief and
also to make it highly probable that the statute of limita-
tion would bar relief before the claim can be brought.
Again, this is not simply a remote possibility: it is true for
Dodd himself, and in 6 of the 7 Circuits to have addressed
whether Richardson is retroactive. See n. 7, supra. It is
this absurd result that convinces me that Congress could
not have intended that ¶6(3) should be read in this manner.
Even if the text is as clear as the majority claims (a proposi-
tion I reject), we should still interpret the text in a manner
that would avoid such an absurd result. See, e.g., Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 429 (1998); Church of Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892).
To avoid this result, I would interpret ¶6(3) to begin to
——————
decided the issue were to conclude Richardson was retroactive, the
statue of limitations would have long since expired, and prisoners
would be similarly barred from taking advantage of any such decision.
8 In Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656 (2001), it appeared that a majority of
the Court recognized that the Court could make a new rule retroactive
“through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the
new rule.” Id., at 668 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring). In such a case, a
prisoner could file a petition under ¶6(3) immediately. Since there was
much disagreement over when that would be the case, however, that
potential exception holds small comfort in this case.
10 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
run only when the Supreme Court has initially recognized
the new right and when that right has been held to be
retroactive. Under this interpretation, the statute of
limitation would not begin to run until the prisoner was
actually able to file a petition under ¶6(3), which is the
only interpretation Congress could have intended. Al-
though in enacting AEDPA Congress was clearly con-
cerned with finality, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167,
179 (2001), ¶6(3) is an explicit exception to that general
preference. Congress surely intended to allow habeas
petitioners to take advantage of the new rights that this
Court deems retroactive. Otherwise, there would have
been no reason to include that section in the statute. That
is why, “[a]bsent other indication, a statue of limitations
begins to run at the time the plaintiff has the right to
apply to the court for relief.” Graham County, post, at 8–9
(quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001)
(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).9
——————
9 The approach that the Court takes in Graham County and the ap-
proach I would take here has support in our prior case law. In Fleisch-
mann Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Forsberg, 270 U. S. 349 (1926),
the Court was faced with the interpretation of the Materialmen’s Act of
1894, as amended, which allowed a private creditor to bring suit against a
party contracting with the United States, provided that the United States
did not itself bring suit “within six months from the completion and final
settlement” of the contract. 33 Stat. 812. Such a creditor had one year
from the completion of the contract and final settlement to bring a suit,
giving him a 6-month window within which to file his claims. If any other
creditors wanted to bring suit, they had to join the action of the original
creditor, but under the statute had only one year from “the completion of
the work” in which to do so. Ibid. As the Court in Fleischmann recog-
nized, if taken literally this last section would have meant that in a case
in which the “final settlement” of the contract occurred more than six
months after work was completed on the contract—as “frequently” hap-
pened—only the initial creditor to file suit would have been able to meet
the requirement of the statute of limitations; any subsequent creditor
would have been barred under the second statute of limitation that did
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 11
STEVENS, J., dissenting
In addition to creating the perverse result that the
statute of limitations will run before a prisoner can file an
initial habeas petition, the Court’s myopic reading of ¶6(3)
effectively nullifies 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A), which al-
lows prisoners to file second or successive applications
based on a retroactive rule.10 As the majority recognizes
in what amounts to a dramatic understatement, its inter-
pretation of ¶6(3) “makes it difficult for applicants filing
second or successive §2255 motions to obtain relief.” Ante,
at 6. Because of the way ¶¶6(3) and 8(2) interact, a pris-
oner can only file a second or successive petition based on
a newly recognized rule that has been made retroactive if
this Court has held the rule to be retroactive within one
year of recognizing it. Unfortunately for such prisoners,
however, this Court has never done so since Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), was decided.11 Because of the
——————
not reference the final settlement as a start date, but rather only the
completion of work. 270 U. S., at 361. Rather than permit these “unjust
or absurd consequences,” id., at 360, the Court interpreted “within one
year from the completion of the work” to mean “within one year after the
performance and final settlement of the contract.” Id., at 362.
Fleischmann thus presents the identical situation as in Graham
County and Dodd: Because of the unforeseen possibility that two
relevant events might occur far apart in time, the most natural reading
of the statute would cause the statute of limitations to expire before the
suit may be brought. As we did in Fleischmann and in Graham County,
we should construe the statute of limitations in Dodd to avoid this
unnatural result.
10 Our cases make clear that when interpreting a particular section of a
statute, we look to the entire statutory scheme rather than simply exam-
ining the text at issue. See Koons, 543 U. S., at ___ (2004) (slip op., at 8).
“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one
of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compati-
ble with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) (citation omitted
and emphasis added).
11 Again, it is possible that a combination of our decisions has effec-
12 DODD v. UNITED STATES
STEVENS, J., dissenting
need for percolation, and the time it takes for cases to
come to this Court from the courts below, it seems unlikely
(to say the least) that we would ever do so. Therefore, the
majority’s interpretation of ¶6(3) effectively nullifies ¶8(2).
It is, of course, a basic canon of statutory construction that
we will not interpret a congressional statute in such a
manner as to effectively nullify an entire section. See, e.g.,
Duncan, 533 U. S., at 174 (“[A] statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant” (citations omitted)). It is a strange principle
that requires strict adherence to the text of one provision
while allowing another to have virtually no real world
application. It would seem far wiser to give both sections
the meaning that Congress obviously intended.
Accordingly, while I concur in the judgment in Graham
County, I respectfully dissent in Dodd.
——————
tively done this, see n. 8, supra, but we have never actually recognized
an instance in which that has occurred.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–5286
_________________
MICHAEL DONALD DODD, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 20, 2005]
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,
dissenting.
Essentially for reasons stated by JUSTICE STEVENS, I
conclude that 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3), is most sensibly
read to start the time clock on the date a right is “made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” I
therefore join, in principal part, Part II of JUSTICE
STEVENS’ dissenting opinion.*
The Court’s interpretation—that the limitation period
begins on “the date on which the right asserted was ini-
tially recognized by [this] Court,” 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3)—
presents “a real risk that the 1-year limitation period will
expire before [a §2255 petitioner’s] cause of action ac-
crues,” ante, at 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). By contrast,
as JUSTICE BREYER explains in his dissenting opinion in
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United
——————
* Petitioner and respondent assume, for the purpose at hand, that a
controlling decision whether a right operates retroactively may be made
by a court of appeals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–7, 20, 24, 41; Brief for
Petitioner 13–14, and n. 2, 25, and n. 5, 26–28; Brief for United States
17–18, and n. 5, 23. We have no cause in this case to question that
assumption. I therefore do not subscribe to JUSTICE STEVENS’ state-
ments that only this Court has the prerogative to make the retroactiv-
ity determination. See ante, at 6–7, n. 4. I would await full adversarial
presentation before expressing an opinion on that issue.
2 DODD v. UNITED STATES
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
States ex rel. Wilson, post, at 5–6, a determination that the
False Claims Act’s six-year statute of limitations, see 31
U. S. C. §3731(b)(1), governs civil suits for retaliation
under the Act, see §3730(h), ordinarily would work no
claim deprivation. See ante, at 7–8 (STEVENS, J., dissent-
ing) (In Graham County, “the possibility that the 6-year
statute of limitations period could run before the cause of
action accrued, while plausible, was not particularly likely,
since in most cases the retaliatory conduct that would
form the basis of the cause of action under 31 U. S. C.
§3730(h) would probably occur within six years of the
violation of §3729. [In cases like Dodd, on the other hand,]
owing to the substantially shorter 1-year statute of limita-
tion period, both requirements of 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3),
will often not be met before the statute of limitation period
has expired if it is triggered by the decision of the Su-
preme Court announcing a new rule.” (footnote omitted)).
Nearly 20 years have passed since Congress amended 31
U. S. C. §3731(b)(1) to provide that “[a] civil action under
section 3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years
after the date on which the violation of section 3729 is
committed.” See Graham County, post, at 2. Yet peti-
tioner Graham County District has been unable to cite a
single instance in which a suit has been time barred be-
cause the alleged retaliation proscribed by §3730(h) fell
outside the period triggered by submission of a false claim
in violation of §3729. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 04–169,
pp. 4–6; Brief for Respondent in No. 04–169, pp. 4, 15–16;
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 04–169,
pp. 27–28; see also Graham County, post, at 5 (BREYER, J.,
dissenting). As Dodd’s case illustrates, however, on the
Court’s reading, it is “highly probable” that the 28 U. S. C.
§2255, ¶6(3), limitation “would bar relief before the claim
can be brought.” Ante, at 9 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, I would not, as JUSTICE STEVENS does,
bracket the instant case with Graham County.
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3
GINSBURG, J., dissenting
True, the limitation period in Graham County, like the
§2255, ¶6(3), limitation, is triggered by an event that may
precede the accrual date of a claim. But the resemblance
ends there. The generous six-year span in 31 U. S. C.
§3731(b)(1), in practical effect, will give the plaintiff lee-
way to commence suit she likely will not have under the
typically shorter state limitation. See Graham County,
post, at 5 (BREYER, J., dissenting). The opposite effect
would attend 28 U. S. C. §2255, ¶6(3). The one-year limi-
tation specified there, if triggered by the date on which
this Court “initially recognized” the right asserted, bars
Dodd and will bar most “new rule” petitioners from pre-
senting their claims. It exalts form over reality to equate
the two statutes and cases for time-bar purposes.