UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Matthew J. MCCLAIN, Specialist
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 12-0099
Crim. App. No. 20090446
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 12, 2012
Decided April 10, 2012
PER CURIAM
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Matthew T. Grady (argued); Colonel
Patricia A. Ham, Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. Jamison, and
Major Richard E. Gorini (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Frank E. Kostik Jr. (argued); Major Amber
J. Roach and Major LaJohnne A. White (on brief).
Military Judge: Andrew Glass
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. McClain, No. 12-0099/AR
PER CURIAM:
Specialist Matthew J. McClain pleaded not guilty at a
general court-martial to one specification of possessing child
pornography and one specification of distributing child
pornography, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). A military
judge found McClain guilty of both specifications and sentenced
him to reduction to E-1, confinement for fourteen months, and a
bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved
thirteen months of the adjudged confinement and otherwise
approved the sentence adjudged. The United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) dismissed the distribution specification
but affirmed the possession finding and the sentence. United
States v. McClain, No. ARMY 20090446, slip op. at 5 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2011).
Background
During a child pornography investigation in Hawaii, the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) identified an
Internet Protocol (IP) address belonging to McClain that
contained what the agent believed to be video files of child
pornography in a Limewire share folder. The agent could not
download or view any of the four files from McClain’s computer
that formed the basis of the possession specification, but based
on the characteristics of the files (i.e., title, size, type,
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United States v. McClain, No. 12-0099/AR
and “SHA1” value1) he downloaded what he believed were identical
files from other Limewire users. McClain admitted in a pretrial
statement to knowingly downloading child pornography while
assigned in Hawaii. After being shown the file names of the
four videos charged in the possession specification, McClain
stated that he could not recall the file names but admitted that
he had downloaded those video files. Explaining why he
downloaded the child pornography, McClain stated that he was
“curious,” but when he viewed the videos he was disgusted and
never downloaded any other child pornography.
We granted review of this case to determine if the evidence
is legally sufficient to affirm the possession of child
pornography conviction.2 We hold that the evidence is legally
sufficient and affirm the decision of the CCA.
Discussion
This court reviews issues of legal sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. United States v. Winckelmann, 70 M.J. 403,
1
The agent testified during the pretrial motions hearing that a
“SHA1” value is a 32-digit alphanumeric code that acts as a
digital signature of the file and that it is more accurate than
DNA; it was developed originally to permit security of
electronic financial transactions.
2
We granted review of the following issue:
Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to
support Appellant’s conviction of possessing child
pornography.
United States v. McClain, 2011 CAAF LEXIS 1087 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(order granting review).
3
United States v. McClain, No. 12-0099/AR
406 (C.A.A.F. 2011). “Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewed
in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of [possession
of child pornography] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In applying
this test, we must “‘draw every reasonable inference from the
evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Bright, 66 M.J. 359, 365 (C.A.A.F. 2008)).
McClain does not contest that the four videos introduced
into evidence contain child pornography. He argues, however,
that the evidence is legally insufficient as there is no
evidence that the videos on his computer were the four charged
videos of child pornography, nor was there evidence he exercised
actual dominion over and control of those videos.
The statement made by McClain on July 16, 2008, and
admitted as Prosecution Exhibit 3 was sufficiently corroborated
by the other evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for the
military judge to admit the statement.3 McClain did not object
at trial to the statement’s admission nor is he now asserting on
3
Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 304(g); see also United
States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 160 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (“The
standard for corroboration is very low. Corroborating evidence
must raise only an inference of truth as to the essential facts
admitted. This inference may be drawn from a quantum of
corroborating evidence that this Court has described as very
slight.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
4
United States v. McClain, No. 12-0099/AR
appeal that the military judge erred by admitting the statement.4
That statement provides direct evidence that McClain
intentionally sought pornography on the Internet using a
Limewire software program that he installed on his computer,
knowingly downloaded what he thought were videos containing
child pornography, and then viewed those videos. An agent from
the Army Criminal Investigation Command testified that when he
showed McClain the names of the videos that were found saved in
a shared folder on McClain’s computer, McClain admitted that he
had downloaded those files to his computer. The NCIS agent also
testified that the characteristics of the files he found in the
shared folder on McClain’s computer were identical with the
characteristics of the videos admitted into evidence including
the fact that they had the same title, they were the same size
files, they were the same type of file (i.e., videos), and they
shared the same SHA1 value.5 We hold that based on this
evidence, including every reasonable inference that can be drawn
from the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, a rational trier of fact could find the essential
4
M.R.E. 304(d)(2)(A).
5
Because the agent was testifying as a lay rather than expert
witness, the military judge did not permit the NCIS agent to
testify on the merits as to the significance of the SHA1 value
or what a SHA1 value is; however, the military judge did
properly admit the agent’s testimony of the SHA1 value as
evidence of a shared characteristic.
5
United States v. McClain, No. 12-0099/AR
elements of the charged offense of possession of child
pornography beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
6