UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Benjamin H. HARTMAN,
Sonar Technician (Submarines) Second Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 10-0291
Crim. App. No. 200900389
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 7, 2011
Decided March 15, 2011
EFFRON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BAKER, ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Kirk Sripinyo, USMC (argued).
For Appellee: Major Elizabeth A. Harvey, USMC (argued); Brian
K. Keller, Esq., and Colonel Louis J. Puleo, USMC (on brief).
Military Judge: William F. Martin
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
Chief Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of a military judge
sitting alone, convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of
one count of sodomy in violation of Article 125, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006). The sentence
adjudged by the court-martial and approved by the convening
authority included a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for one
month, and reduction to pay grade E-1. The United States Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States
v. Hartman, No. NMCCA 200900389, 2009 CCA LEXIS 462, at *7, 2009
WL 5126122, at *3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 29, 2009). Our
Court set aside the decision and remanded the case to the Court
of Criminal Appeals. United States v. Hartman, 69 M.J. 170
(C.A.A.F. 2010). Upon further review, the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. United States v. Hartman, No. NMCCA
200900389, slip op. at 3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 22, 2010).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE
125, UCMJ, FOR CONSENSUAL SODOMY IN THE
PRESENCE OF A THIRD PERSON VIOLATES THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeals.
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United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
I
In United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), we
addressed the constitutionality of prosecutions under Article
125, UCMJ (proscribing sodomy) in light of the decision by the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578
(2003) (striking down a state statute “making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct” as violating the constitutional “right to liberty under
the Due Process Clause”). See also Marcum, 60 M.J. at 203-05
(discussing the scope of Lawrence and the limitations set forth
therein).
In Marcum, we considered the general applicability of
constitutional safeguards in military proceedings, as well as
the well-established principle that “these constitutional rights
may apply differently to members of the armed forces than they
do to civilians.” 60 M.J. at 205. As we subsequently noted in
United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004),
Marcum “identified a tripartite framework for addressing
Lawrence challenges within the military context . . . .” Under
the tripartite framework, we ask:
First, was the conduct . . . of a nature to
bring it within the liberty identified by
the Supreme Court [in Lawrence]? Second,
did the conduct encompass any behavior or
factors identified by the Supreme Court as
outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third,
are there additional factors relevant solely
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United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
in the military environment that affect the
nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty
interest?
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 206-07 (citation omitted). In the present
case, the parties agree that Marcum provides the appropriate
framework for distinguishing between conduct constitutionally
protected under Lawrence and conduct that may be prosecuted
criminally under Article 125.
II
When a charge against a servicemember may implicate both
criminal and constitutionally protected conduct, the distinction
between what is permitted and what is prohibited constitutes a
matter of “critical significance.” United States v. O’Connor,
58 M.J. 450, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2003). With respect to the requisite
inquiry into the providence of a guilty plea, see United States
v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247, 253 (C.M.A. 1969), and Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 910, the colloquy between the military judge
and an accused must contain an appropriate discussion and
acknowledgment on the part of the accused of the critical
distinction between permissible and prohibited behavior.
Compare O’Connor, 58 M.J. at 453 (setting aside the plea in the
absence of such an inquiry), with United States v. Mason, 60
M.J. 15, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (noting that the plea colloquy
demonstrated that the accused understood and acknowledged the
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United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
circumstances establishing the criminal nature of the conduct at
issue).
III
During the plea inquiry in the present case, the military
judge described the offense of sodomy solely in terms of the
definition of the offense set forth in the Manual for Courts-
Martial (MCM), which describes various forms of sexual conduct
between two people. See MCM pt. IV, para. 51.c. (2008 ed.).
Consistent with Care, the military judge asked Appellant to
explain in his own words why he believed he was guilty of the
offense. Appellant responded by describing the nature of the
sexual conduct between himself and the other party to the sexual
act. The inquiry did not reflect consideration of the Marcum
framework.
At the conclusion of the military judge’s colloquy with
Appellant, he asked counsel if either desired any further
inquiry. The trial counsel then engaged in a discussion with
the military judge about Lawrence and Marcum. Trial counsel
asked the military judge to pose questions to the accused about
the location of the act of sodomy, the presence of any other
person in the room, and the military relationship between
Appellant and the other person involved in the sexual act. In
response to the questions from the military judge, Appellant
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United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
stated that the incident took place at the Transient Visitors
Quarters on a U.S. Navy facility; that the other participant in
the sexual activity was a member of the Navy assigned to the
same ship as Appellant; and that a third shipmate “was present
and asleep in the room” at the time of the charged act of
sodomy. The military judge did not explain to Appellant the
significance of the questions, nor did the military judge ask
Appellant whether he understood the relationship of the
questions and answers to the distinction drawn in Lawrence and
Marcum between constitutionally protected behavior and criminal
conduct.
IV
The fundamental requirement of plea inquiry under Care and
R.C.M. 910 involves a dialogue in which the military judge poses
questions about the nature of the offense and the accused
provides answers that describe his personal understanding of the
criminality of his or her conduct. A discussion between the
trial counsel and the military judge about legal theory and
practice, at which the accused is a mere bystander, provides no
substitute for the requisite interchange between the military
judge and the accused. In the absence of a dialogue employing
lay terminology to establish an understanding by the accused as
to the relationship between the supplemental questions and the
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United States v. Hartman, No. 10-2091/NA
issue of criminality, we cannot view Appellant’s plea as
provident. See O’Connor, 58 M.J. at 454.
V
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the findings and sentence
are set aside. The record is returned to the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy, and a rehearing is authorized.
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