UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Chad M. MCCRACKEN, Sergeant
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 08-0440
Crim. App. No. 200600484
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 2, 2008
Decided July 10, 2009
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
EFFRON, C.J., and RYAN, J., joined. BAKER, J., filed a
separate opinion concurring in the result. STUCKY, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Gregory W. Manz, USN (argued).
For Appellee: Colonel Louis J. Puleo, USN (argued);
Captain Geoffrey S. Shows, USMC (on brief).
Military Judge: Paul J. Ware
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon consideration of the granted issues1 and the
briefs and arguments of the parties, we conclude as a
matter of law that under the circumstances of this case,
open and notorious indecent acts under Article 134, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000),
was neither expressly nor inherently a lesser included
offense of the charged offense of rape under Article 120,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000).
In this case the parties agreed that indecent acts was
a lesser included offense of rape and the military judge
subsequently instructed the members that “[i]n order to
find the accused guilty of this lesser offense, you must be
convinced . . . [t]hat on or about 28 April 2004 . . . the
accused committed a certain wrongful act with Corporal [KM]
1
We granted review of the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING A
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE BASED ON A THEORY OF
CRIMINALITY NOT PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
AT TRIAL.
II.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REASSESSING
APPELLANT’S SENTENCE INSTEAD OF REMANDING
THE CASE FOR A SENTENCE REHEARING.
67 M.J. 36 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
2
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
. . . by fondling her breasts and vagina . . . .” However,
the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on
the ground that McCracken’s conduct was open and notorious,
which was not the factual basis upon which members were
instructed. United States v. McCracken, No. NMCCA
200600484, 2008 CCA LEXIS 39, at *19, 2008 WL 274920, at *7
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2008) (unpublished). We have
stated that “[a]n appellate court may not affirm an
included offense on ‘a theory not presented to the’ trier
of fact.” United States v. Riley, 50 M.J. 410, 415
(C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445
U.S. 222, 236 (1980)). Further, in our recent opinion in
United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 389 (C.A.A.F. 2009),
we held that a Court of Criminal Appeals may not affirm an
Article 134, UCMJ, offense based solely on the charging of
an enumerated offense at trial.2
2
Miller addressed the narrow issue as to whether the
holding in United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 143
(C.M.A. 1994), “that an accused is on notice of an Article
134, UCMJ, lesser included offense because every enumerated
offense under the UCMJ is per se prejudicial to good order
and discipline or service discrediting” had continuing
validity and found it did not. Miller, 67 M.J. at 388-89.
Miller did not address other potential issues related to
Article 134, UCMJ, lesser included offense, such as whether
a lesser included offense that includes elements not
included in the greater offense may be affirmed in other
circumstances, i.e., where the lesser included offense is
listed in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States or
where the lesser included offense is not objected to at
3
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
As our disposition of the first granted issue
dramatically changes the penalty landscape in this case, it
requires that we authorize a sentence rehearing on the
remaining offense and we need not address the second
granted issue. See Riley, 58 M.J. at 312; United States v.
Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307-08 (C.M.A. 1986). Accordingly, it
is, by the Court, this tenth day of July, 2009,
ORDERED:
That the decision of the United States Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed as to the
finding of guilty of indecent acts and the sentence. The
remaining findings are affirmed. The findings of guilty of
Charge II and its specification are set aside and Charge II
and its specification are dismissed. The sentence is set
aside. A rehearing on sentence is authorized.
trial and is instructed upon by the military judge. Those
issues are reserved for another day.
4
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
BAKER, Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result. However, I would decide this case
based on the instructions given to the members by the military
judge, rather than by breaking what is arguably new and
unexplained ground in the law involving lesser included
offenses.
In this case, the parties agreed that indecent acts was a
lesser included offense of rape. The military judge then
instructed the members that “[i]n order to find the accused
guilty of this lesser offense [indecent acts with another], you
must be convinced . . . [t]hat on or about 28 April . . . , the
accused committed a certain wrongful act with Corporal [KM] . .
. by fondling her breasts and vagina . . . .” However, the
United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed this lesser offense on the ground that Appellant’s
conduct was open and notorious. Therefore, even assuming
without deciding that indecent acts is a lesser included offense
of rape in this case, we cannot know whether the members would
have found the act in question indecent because it was “open and
notorious” based on all the facts and circumstances had they not
found Appellant guilty of indecent assault.1 I therefore believe
1
Had the members rejected the greater offenses of rape and
indecent assault, they would necessarily have been left with
private consensual sexual contact between unmarried persons in
the absence of the evidence offered by the defense. Such
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
the nature of the definition of indecent acts provided in the
instruction in this case precluded the lower court from
affirming the lesser included offense.
In United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385 (C.A.A.F. 2009), we
considered and restated the current state of the law with
respect to lesser included offenses before concluding that
“Article 134, UCMJ, is not an offense necessarily included in
Article 95, UCMJ.” Id. at 389 (overruling United States v.
Foster, 40 M.J. 140 (C.M.A. 1994), and its progeny to the extent
those cases “support the proposition that clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134, [Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 (2002)], are per se included in every enumerated
offense”). However, the granted issue in McCracken raises a
number of issues involving lesser included offenses in the
military justice system that are arguably left unresolved after
Miller, including:
private consensual conduct has never been punishable in the
military as an indecent act. United States v. Stocks, 35 M.J.
366, 367 (C.M.A. 1992) (sexual foreplay in private setting is
not criminally “indecent”); United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J.
146, 150 (C.M.A. 1986) (“private sexual intercourse between
unmarried persons is not punishable”), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997)
(summary disposition); United States v. Snyder, 1 C.M.A. 423,
427, 4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (1952) (fornication in the absence of
aggravating circumstances is not an offense under military law
because “Congress has not intended by Article 134 . . . to
regulate the wholly private moral conduct of an individual”).
2
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
(1) Whether or not the offenses expressly listed by the
President as violations of Article 134, UCMJ, such as
indecent acts, that are identified in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States as a lesser included offense
to a particular enumerated offense can satisfy the
requirements of Article 79, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879 (2000)
(as a “necessarily included” lesser offense);
(2) Whether the elements test articulated in Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989), precludes the President
from delineating certain Article 134, UCMJ, offenses as
lesser included offenses of enumerated offenses absent a
statutory change to the enumerated offense;
(3) Whether the due process principles advanced in Schmuck can,
as a matter of law, be satisfied through mechanisms of fair
notice other than the elements test; and
(4) What appellate effect, if any, does an agreement by the
parties at trial that an offense is a lesser included
offense have on the greater offense being considered on
appeal.
It may well be that the majority opinion currently resolves
each of these outstanding issues through implication. But, in
my view, these issues warrant more than a summary disposition.
Moreover, in fairness to the parties, and given the importance
of the lesser included offense structure to the administration
3
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
of military justice, these issues should not be resolved by
implication, but should receive briefing, argument, and
appropriate analytic consideration.
4
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
STUCKY, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I respectfully disagree with the implication contained in
the majority opinion that the lower court could have affirmed a
conviction for indecent acts with another if it were “inherently
a lesser included offense of the charged offense of rape.”
United States v. McCracken, __ M.J. __, (2) (C.A.A.F. 2009).
More than fifteen years ago, this Court abandoned the “inherent
relationship” and “fairly embraced” tests for lesser included
offenses in favor of the statutory elements test. See United
States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370, 376 (C.M.A. 1993) (citing Schmuck
v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989)).
One offense is not a lesser included offense of another
“unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the
elements of the charged offense.” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716.
“Since offenses are statutorily defined, that comparison is
appropriately conducted by reference to the statutory elements
of the offenses in question.” Id. One element of the offense
of indecent acts with another under Article 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000), is that the
conduct be prejudicial to good order and discipline or service
discrediting, while the offense of rape, Article 120, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 920 (2000), contains no such element. Therefore,
indecent acts with another is simply not a lesser included
offense of rape.
United States v. McCracken, No. 08-0440/MC
With regard to the remedy, rather than order a sentence
rehearing, I would remand to the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals for sentence reassessment.
2