UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Demetrius R. CRUDUP, Private
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 08-0392
Crim. App. No. 20050112
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 29, 2008
Decided December 4, 2008
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN
and RYAN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate
dissenting opinion, in which BAKER, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain William J. Stephens (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Jonathan Potter and Major Teresa L. Raymond (on brief);
Colonel Christopher O’Brien, Lieutenant Colonel Steven C.
Henricks, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, and Captain Nathan
J. Bankson.
For Appellee: Captain James L. Ndiaye (argued); Colonel Denise
R. Lind and Captain Philip M. Staten (on brief); Colonel John W.
Miller II, Major Tami L. Dillahunt, and Major Elizabeth G.
Marotta.
Military Judge: Donna M. Wright
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review to decide whether the United States Army
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) erred in holding that the
improper admission of an out-of-court, testimonial statement was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
I. Background
A. Facts
The CCA described the facts of the case as follows:
On 28 August 2004, Military Police (MP) Officer
Sergeant (SGT) Vasquez was called to investigate
allegations by one of appellant’s neighbors, Mrs. F,
of a domestic disturbance near appellant’s government
quarters on Fort Carson, Colorado. Mrs. F testified
she heard “a lot of yelling and screaming” and saw
[PC, Appellant’s wife] backing away in a defensive
posture from appellant.
Upon arriving at the scene, SGT Vasquez saw
appellant sitting outside. When SGT Vasquez got out
of the MP vehicle, appellant approached SGT Vasquez,
and said he had an altercation with his wife and he
was the person for whom SGT Vasquez was looking.
Sergeant Vasquez, with appellant’s consent, entered
appellant’s quarters. Inside, appellant completed a
data sheet and SGT Vasquez’s MP partner soon arrived.
When SGT Vasquez asked where appellant’s wife was,
appellant said she was at a neighbor’s house down the
street.
Approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after
arrival at the scene, SGT Vasquez proceeded to the
neighbor’s house four doors down where he found
appellant’s wife with a bruised and swollen face. She
appeared to have been crying, was clearly upset, and
told SGT Vasquez appellant pushed her to the ground
while she was holding their infant son, punched and
kicked her, and also kicked their son in the face.
2
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
Furthermore, [Specialist (SPC)] F (appellant’s
neighbor and Mrs. F’s husband) testified that he
looked out his window and saw appellant standing over
[PC], who was defensively curled up in a ball. He
then saw appellant kick [PC] and could see the
couple’s infant son in her arms. Another neighbor,
SGT L, also testified that she saw appellant push [PC]
to the ground while she held the infant, and then
observed appellant kick her and drag her by the hair
across the lawn. Sergeant L also saw appellant hit
the infant during the altercation. Later that day
Mrs. F saw [PC] with bruises on her back, and marks on
her arms and face. [PC] also showed Mrs. F marks on
the infant’s face. Later in the week, SPC F saw [PC],
who still had bruised and puffy eyes.
Appellant later signed a sworn statement
admitting to grabbing and pushing his wife onto the
floor of their quarters. He also admitted that after
she punched him in the head, he went after her --
pushing her into the grass and kicking her. Appellant
stated his wife was not holding their infant son when
he pushed her onto the grass.
The defense, in addition to entering [PC’s]
previous state convictions for offenses related to
fraud, adopted Ms. R, a government witness, as its
own. Ms. R, a friend of both appellant and [PC],
testified she saw [PC] trip and fall while holding the
couple’s infant son and walking backwards away from
appellant. Although she saw appellant attempt to kick
[PC], she did not actually see him kick either [PC] or
the infant. Ms. R testified she took the infant from
[PC] after the fall because she was afraid that
appellant and [PC] might get into an altercation. She
then went into the house to get her brother. She
admitted that she did not know whether appellant hit
[PC] while she was gone.
United States v. Crudup, 65 M.J. 907, 908-09 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2008).
3
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
B. Trial
At trial, PC did not testify. Instead, over the objection
of the defense, the military judge permitted SGT Vasquez to
testify that PC told him that Appellant had pushed her to the
ground while holding the baby, punched and kicked her, and
kicked the baby in the face.
The military judge convicted Appellant, consistent with his
pleas, of resisting apprehension and making a false official
statement, and contrary to his pleas, of signing a false
official record, and three specifications of assault consummated
by a battery. Articles 95, 107, and 128, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 895, 907, 928 (2000). The
military judge sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge and
confinement for three years. The convening authority approved
the sentence as adjudged.
C. The Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
The CCA held that the introduction of the out-of-court
statements PC made to SGT Vasquez about the batteries violated
Appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Crudup, 65
M.J. at 910. Nevertheless, the CCA concluded that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed. Id. The CCA’s
entire analysis of the harmlessness issue is as follows:
We must now determine whether this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The record of trial in
this case contains overwhelming evidence supporting
4
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
appellant’s convictions of assault. Upon arriving at
the scene in response to a complaint of domestic
violence, appellant admitted he had an altercation
with his wife and he “was the one [they were] looking
for.” Moreover, the extent of [PC’s] and her son’s
injuries and the testimony of two of appellant’s
unbiased neighbors, SGT L and SPC F, describing the
assaults in great detail, contradict Ms. R’s account
that [PC] simply tripped and fell. We are convinced,
therefore, that the military judge’s error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
II. Discussion
Before this Court, Appellant alleges that the introduction
of PC’s out-of-court statement was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to Specification 4 of Charge I.
That specification alleged that Appellant unlawfully “shoved
[JC], a child under the age of 16 years, to the ground with his
hands by unlawfully shoving [PC] to the ground while she was
holding [JC] in her arms.”
The denial of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-
examine a witness may be tested for harmlessness. See Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); United States v.
Othuru, 65 M.J. 375, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2007). We will not set aside
Appellant’s conviction if we “may confidently say, on the whole
record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681.
The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the
damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully
realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that
5
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case
depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible
to reviewing courts. These factors include the
importance of the witness’ testimony in the
prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
Id. at 684. Whether a constitutional error in admitting
evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is a question of
law that we review de novo. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 295 (1991); Othuru, 65 M.J. at 378.
In Othuru, we applied the five Van Arsdall factors in
determining whether a constitutional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Othuru, 65 M.J. at 378-80. We noted that the
CCA appeared to have relied solely on the overall strength of
the government’s case in finding the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and cautioned that “[i]t is a better practice
to review and balance all of the Van Arsdall criteria,” rather
than rely on only one of them. Id. at 378 n.3. The CCA in this
case cited to Othuru as authority for reviewing the
constitutional error for harmlessness. Crudup, 65 M.J. at 909.
But the CCA discussed only one of the Van Arsdall factors -- the
overall strength of the Government’s case -- without mentioning
whether it had even considered the other four factors. Id. at
910.
6
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
Applying the Van Arsdall factors to the facts of this case,
we hold that the admission of PC’s out-of-court statement was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(1) The importance of the witness’s testimony: PC’s
testimony was important in the sense that she was a victim and
was the only witness to the entire incident. But it was
“‘unimportant in relation to everything else the [military
judge] considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the
record.’” Othuru, 65 M.J. at 377 (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500
U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991)).
(2) Whether the testimony was cumulative: It was.
(a) SPC F testified that he saw Appellant yelling at
his wife, who was on the ground, holding her son. In a previous
written statement he had stated that PC was not holding him.
(b) SGT L testified that she saw Appellant pushing
PC, who had the baby in her arms. Appellant hit PC and the baby
causing PC to fall to the ground with the baby in her arms.
(c) Ms. R testified that she observed part of the
incident and thought the baby was in PC’s arms when she fell to
the ground, but was not sure whether she fell or was pushed.
(d) In his written statement to the MPs, Appellant
admitted that he pushed PC into the grass and kicked her while
7
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
she was on the ground. He denied that PC was holding the baby
in her arms at the time.
(3) Evidence corroborating or contradicting the statement:
SGT L saw Appellant strike PC causing her to fall to the ground.
Appellant admitted pushing her into the grass and kicking her
while she was on the ground. SGT L, SPC F, and Ms. R agreed
that the baby was in PC’s arms when she went to the ground,
although SPC F had previously stated that PC was not holding the
baby when he saw her on the ground.
(4) The extent of cross-examination permitted: As PC did
not testify at trial, and there was neither an Article 32, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000), investigation nor a deposition,
Appellant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine her.
However, the defense was permitted to impeach PC’s credibility
with a prior conviction for fraud. See Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 806 (permitting impeachment of a hearsay
declarant’s statement that is entered into evidence).
(5) Overall strength of the Government’s case: The case
was quite strong, including eyewitness testimony, corroborating
physical injuries, and Appellant’s partial confession.
Based on our review of the Van Arsdall factors, we are
convinced that the admission of PC’s out-of-court statement into
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It did not
“‘contribute’” to the verdict as it was unimportant in relation
8
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
to the other evidence of record. Othuru, 65 M.J. at 377
(quoting Yates, 500 U.S. at 403).
III. Decision
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
9
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
EFFRON, Chief Judge, with whom BAKER, Judge, joins
(dissenting):
Appellant was convicted of a variety of offenses arising
out of an incident involving his wife and his infant son. The
offenses included assaulting his wife, assaulting his son,
resisting apprehension, making a false official statement, and
signing a false official record.
At trial, a military law enforcement officer who responded
to the scene of an altercation between Appellant and his wife on
August 28, 2004, testified about the information he had obtained
from Appellant’s wife. According to the officer, Appellant’s
wife said that Appellant had pushed her to the ground while she
was holding their infant son. Appellant, in a written statement
provided on the day of the incident, acknowledged that he pushed
and kicked his wife, but denied that his wife was holding their
son during the incident. Four neighbors, all of whom only
witnessed fragments of the altercation, testified about portions
of the incident.
Appellant and his wife were the only persons present for
the entire incident. At trial, the prosecution introduced
Appellant’s sworn statement into evidence, along with the
testimony of the military law enforcement officer recounting the
statement attributed to Appellant’s wife.
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
On appeal, the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the military judge erred in permitting the prosecution
to offer the military law enforcement officer’s version of the
statement attributed to Appellant’s wife. The court concluded
that the statement attributed to the wife, as recounted in court
by the military law enforcement officer, was testimonial.
United States v. Crudup, 65 M.J. 907, 910 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2008). As such, the court held that the erroneous admission of
this statement deprived Appellant of the right of confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 907, 909-
10.
The sole issue before our Court is whether the improper
admission of the testimonial statement attributed to Appellant’s
wife was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States
v. Othuru, 65 M.J. 375, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (observing that the
“Government bears the burden of establishing that [the]
constitutional error has no causal effect upon the findings”).
I agree with the majority that the proper standard for the
harmless error analysis is set forth in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). For the reasons set forth below, I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s application of those
factors in this case.
The first factor under Van Arsdall involves the importance
of the witness’s testimony. The statement attributed to
2
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
Appellant’s wife differed from the statements of the other
witnesses in two vital respects. First, she was the only
person, other than Appellant, to observe the incident in its
entirety. Second, as an alleged victim in a charge growing out
of the same incident, her testimony would likely have carried
greater weight with the panel than the testimony of bystanders.
The second factor asks whether the testimony was
cumulative. Although other witnesses testified as to portions
of the incident, thus replicating the descriptive content of the
wife’s statement to the military law enforcement officer, the
statement attributed to Appellant’s wife was qualitatively
unique. Only she could offer a description based on witnessing
the entire incident, and only she could offer the perspective of
being both the mother of the other alleged victim and an alleged
victim herself.
The third factor considers other evidence corroborating or
contradicting the inadmissible statement. Only Appellant and
his wife witnessed the incident from start to finish; none of
the other witnesses observed the entire altercation. Mrs. F
looked away when she called the military police. Specialist
(SPC) F could not see what was happening as he ran downstairs to
intervene. Sergeant (SGT) L was asleep when the altercation
began. Ms. R turned her back to the scene as she carried off
Appellant’s son to safety. The altercation also occurred in the
3
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
early morning hours when it was still relatively dark outside,
and the closest bystander-witness was no closer than ten feet
from the couple when Appellant’s wife fell to the ground.
The testimony presented in the court-martial contains a
variety of contradictory statements about the incident. Ms. R
stated that Appellant’s wife was not pushed, but instead fell
while walking backwards away from Appellant. Although SPC F and
SGT L testified they saw Appellant’s infant son in Appellant’s
wife’s arms during the altercation, SPC F provided a different
version of the events in his initial statement to military law
enforcement officials. Given the conflicting evidence regarding
whether the infant was in his mother’s arms as she fell to the
ground, the importance of the statements attributed to
Appellant’s wife cannot be discounted.
The fourth factor involves the extent of cross-examination
permitted at trial. Because Appellant’s wife did not testify,
there was no cross-examination.
The fifth factor concerns the overall strength of the
Government’s case. I agree with the majority that the
prosecution presented significant evidence at trial, even
without the statement of Appellant’s wife. The evidence
presented about the incident, however, consisted of partial
observations and sometimes conflicting witness statements. The
testimony of Ms. R, the only testifying witness who directly
4
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
intervened in the incident as it occurred, contradicted the
other witnesses on the critical question of whether Appellant
caused his wife’s fall. Appellant did not make any confession,
complete or partial, to injuring his son. On the contrary,
Appellant denied that his son was in the wife’s arms during the
incident. The Government did not introduce any medical evidence
that the child suffered injuries as a result of the incident,
nor did the Government introduce any photographic evidence of
physical injuries. In that regard, the Government relied solely
on lay witness testimony that the child had red marks and
bruising on his face that had not been observed prior to the
incident.
Even though a reasonable factfinder could have returned a
verdict of guilty based on the evidence presented in this case,
see United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987)
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)), that is
not the standard at issue in this appeal. Here, the Government
bears the burden of demonstrating that the erroneous admission
of the wife’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In light of the Van Arsdall factors, the Government has failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that “there is no reasonable
possibility that the presence of the . . . testimonial
statements contributed to the contested findings of guilty.”
Othuru, 65 M.J. at 377. I would find that the constitutional
5
United States v. Crudup, No. 08-0392/AR
error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacate the
sentence, and remand for a new trial.
6