UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
James E. BARE Jr., Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 06-0911
Crim. App. No. 35863
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 28, 2007
Decided May 4, 2007
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major John N. Page III (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Mark R. Strickland (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Jefferson E. McBride (argued); Colonel
Gerald R. Bruce and Major Matthew S. Ward (on brief).
Military Judge: Lance B. Sigmon
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Bare Jr., No. 06-0911/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was tried by general court-martial composed of
officer and enlisted members. He was convicted, contrary to his
pleas, of sodomy with a child under twelve and indecent
liberties with a child, in violation of Articles 125 and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 925, 934
(2000). Appellant pleaded guilty by exceptions to one
specification of indecent acts with a child in violation of
Article 134, UCMJ, but was found guilty as charged. The
adjudged and approved sentence included a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for forty years and reduction to grade
E-1. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. United States v. Bare, 63 M.J. 707 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2006).
We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF UNITED STATES V. BERRY, 61 M.J.
91 (C.A.A.F. 2005) AND UNITED STATES V. MCDONALD, 59
M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F. 2004), EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED SEXUAL
ACTS BETWEEN APPELLANT, WHEN HE WAS AN ADOLESCENT, AND
HIS SISTER WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AND MATERIALLY
PREJUDICED APPELLANT.
Finding no error in the admission of the uncharged
misconduct in this case, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
At the time of trial, Appellant was a thirty-four-year-old
staff sergeant (E-5) with thirteen years of active service. The
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charges against him stemmed from acts committed against his
daughter, RB, over the course of several years. Appellant was
charged with one specification of sodomy with a child under
twelve on divers occasions, and one specification of sodomy with
a child between twelve and sixteen years. The members acquitted
Appellant of the latter specification. The indecent acts
specification alleged that Appellant molested RB “by rubbing his
penis against her body, by having her place her hands upon and
fondle his genitalia, and by placing his hands upon and fondling
her breasts, buttocks, and genitalia.” Appellant pleaded guilty
by exceptions to this specification, excepting the words “divers
occasions,” “by rubbing his penis against her body,” and
“buttocks and genitalia” (i.e., admitting only that he had
touched her breasts while she touched his penis). An indecent
liberties specification alleged that Appellant had RB wear
women’s lingerie and watched her urinate with intent to gratify
his sexual desires.
Although RB was the only victim included in the charged
offenses, two other victims of uncharged misconduct, KB and TA,
also testified on the merits. TA, Appellant’s stepdaughter,
testified that Appellant had touched her breasts, legs, and back
when she was about eleven years old. KB, Appellant’s sister,
testified that Appellant had molested her on a number of
occasions from when she was about eight until she was about
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eleven years old. Appellant was about eight years older than
KB, making him between sixteen and nineteen years old when the
alleged acts occurred. At trial, Appellant did not contest the
admissibility of TA’s testimony, but argued that KB’s testimony
should have been excluded under Military Rules of Evidence
(M.R.E.) 414 and 403.
DISCUSSION
M.R.E. 414(a) provides that “[i]n a court-martial in which
the accused is charged with an offense of child molestation,
evidence of the accused’s commission of one or more offenses of
child molestation is admissible and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”
Before admitting evidence of other sexual acts under M.R.E.
414, the military judge must make three threshold findings: (1)
that the accused is charged with an act of child molestation as
defined by M.R.E. 414(a); (2) that the proffered evidence is
evidence of his commission of another offense of child
molestation as defined by the Rule; and (3) the evidence is
relevant under M.R.E. 401 and M.R.E. 402. United States v.
Wright, 53 M.J. 476, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (requiring threshold
findings before admitting evidence under M.R.E. 413); United
States v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 138 n.4 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“As
Rules 413 and 414 are essentially the same in substance, the
analysis for proper admission of evidence under either should be
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the same.”). The military judge must also conduct a M.R.E. 403
balancing analysis, to which the following nonexhaustive list of
factors is relevant: “[s]trength of proof of prior act --
conviction versus gossip; probative weight of evidence;
potential for less prejudicial evidence; distraction of
factfinder; and time needed for proof of prior conduct. . . .
temporal proximity; frequency of the acts; presence or lack of
intervening circumstances; and relationship between the
parties.” Wright, 53 M.J. at 482 (citations omitted).
Appellant does not contest that the evidence satisfies the
three threshold requirements for admitting M.R.E. 414 evidence,
but argues that the military judge erred in conducting the
required M.R.E. 403 analysis. Appellant analogizes the facts of
his case to those in United States v. Berry. 61 M.J. 91
(C.A.A.F. 2005). In Berry, the appellant was charged with
committing forcible sodomy with an adult man in his home. Id.
at 92. The government moved to admit evidence pursuant to
M.R.E. 413 showing that when Berry was thirteen years old, he
had talked a six-year-old boy into committing oral sodomy with
him. Id. at 93. The military judge admitted this evidence,
accepting the government’s argument that it was relevant and
probative under M.R.E. 413 to prove Berry’s “propensity to
sexually assault those who are in a position of vulnerability.”
Id. at 93, 94.
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We reversed, concluding that the military judge was
entitled to less deference on his ruling than was ordinarily due
under the abuse of discretion standard because he failed to
conduct a thorough M.R.E. 403 balancing test. Id. at 96. We
noted that the military judge omitted discussion of four of the
factors identified in Wright. Id. The omissions concerned the
factors tending to weigh against admission, including the
unfairly prejudicial effect of evidence that identified Berry as
a “child molester” in a case in which he was not charged with
child molestation, and the limited probative value of uncharged
misconduct that allegedly occurred when Berry was clearly a
minor. Id. at 96-98. In particular, the Court noted that
“[d]uring the eight years between the two incidents Berry grew
from a child of thirteen to an adult of twenty-one. . . .
[T]here is no evidence suggesting that Berry’s mens rea at
twenty-one was the same as it was when he was a child of
thirteen.” Id. at 96-97. Consequently, we concluded that the
military judge erred in admitting the evidence. Id. at 97.
In applying M.R.E. 403 to evidence otherwise admissible
under M.R.E. 414 we apply an approach balancing numerous
factors. No one factor is controlling, although in a given case
it could be. Further, as noted in Berry:
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when projecting on a child the mens rea of an adult or
extrapolating an adult mens rea from the acts of a
child, military judges must take care to meaningfully
analyze the different phases of the accused’s
development rather than treat those phases as
unaffected by time, experience, and maturity.
61 M.J. at 97.
Appellant argues that, as in Berry, the military judge failed to
give adequate consideration to his young age at the time the
uncharged misconduct with KB occurred. As a result, he argues
that the military judge’s ruling is entitled to less deference
before this Court and should be found to be erroneous.
Applying this framework to Appellant’s case, like the lower
court, we are persuaded the facts are distinguishable from those
in Berry in several significant respects. First, unlike in
Berry, the military judge conducted a meaningful M.R.E. 403
balancing analysis which considered factors weighing both
against and in favor of admission of the evidence. Also, unlike
Berry, Appellant was charged with an offense of child
molestation, rather than a sexual assault on an adult.
Appellant was also older than Berry at the time the uncharged
misconduct occurred. Significantly, the conduct occurred while
Appellant was an adult as well as an adolescent. KB testified
that the molestation continued until the time Appellant moved
out of the family home to get married and join the Air Force.
By contrast, “[t]here was no evidence introduced to show that
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Berry engaged in similar acts between the time he was thirteen
and the time of the [charged] incident with SGT T eight years
later.” Berry, 61 M.J. at 96-97. Finally, the alleged
incidents with KB were not a one-time event, but occurred
regularly for a period of about two or three years. All of
these factors make KB’s testimony both more probative and less
unfairly prejudicial than the testimony admitted in Berry. As
such, the military judge did not abuse his discretion in
admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct pursuant to M.R.E.
414.
Having concluded that the evidence of acts with KB was
properly before the members under M.R.E. 414, we need not
address Appellant’s remaining contention that it was error to
admit the same acts to prove common plan or intent under M.R.E.
404(b). M.R.E. 414 was “intended to provide for more liberal
admissibility of character evidence in criminal cases of child
molestation where the accused has committed a prior act of
sexual assault or child molestation.” Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules of
Evidence app. 22 at A22-37 (2005 ed.). Consequently, even if
the military judge erred in determining that the evidence was
relevant to one of the narrower purposes permitted by M.R.E.
404(b), any such error was harmless.
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DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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