UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Keith M. TERRY, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 06-0314
Crim. App. No. 35801
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 24, 2006
Decided January 29, 2007
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN, J., joined.
STUCKY and RYAN, JJ., did not participate.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Levi (argued);
Lieutenant Colonel Mark R. Strickland and Major Sandra K.
Whittington (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Kimani R. Eason (argued); Colonel Gerald
R. Bruce and Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs (on brief).
Military Judge: Barbara G. Brand
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to his pleas, Appellant was convicted by a general
court-martial composed of officer members of disobeying a lawful
no-contact order, and the rape of a female airman stationed at
the base in violation of Articles 92 and 120, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 920 (2000),
respectively. The adjudged and approved sentence included a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for eight years, forfeiture
of all pay and allowances, reduction to grade E-1, and a
reprimand. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed. United States v. Terry, No. ACM 35801, 2005
CCA LEXIS 420, at *9, 2006 WL 13166, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
Dec. 6, 2005).
On Appellant’s petition we granted review of the following
two issues:
I. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION
IN DENYING TWO CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE.
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION
BY GIVING A CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE INSTRUCTION OVER
OBJECTION.
Although we resolve the second issue adverse to Appellant,
for the reasons that follow, we decide the first issue in his
favor.
Appellant was tried by a court-martial consisting of two
officers and three enlisted personnel. Two officer members,
2
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
Major (Maj) H and Captain (Capt) A, indicated during voir dire
that they knew family or friends who had been the victims of
sexual assaults. Appellant challenged both members for cause.
The challenges were denied. We conclude that Maj H properly sat
on Appellant’s court-martial. Although Maj H’s wife had been
the victim of some form of sexual assault by a family member,
the record reflects that Maj H and his wife had not discussed
the incident for over five years. Moreover, his wife had
reconciled with the family member responsible for the sexual
assault, which had occurred ten to twenty years earlier.
In contrast, we conclude the military judge erred in not
granting the challenge for cause against Capt A. Capt A’s
experience with rape was pronounced and distinct. A long time
girlfriend, whom Capt A may have intended to marry, was raped
and became pregnant. The experience caused the girlfriend to
break off her relationship with Capt A. Further, the girlfriend
named the child after Capt A, indicating the nature of the bond
and the continuing feelings between the girlfriend and Capt A.
We believe that most persons in Capt A’s position would have
difficulty sitting on a rape trial, even given the passage of
six years. Further, an objective observer might well have
doubts about the fairness of Appellant’s court-martial panel.
Applying the liberal grant mandate, the military judge erred in
not eliminating such doubts from Appellant’s court-martial at
3
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
the outset. As we stated in United States v. Clay, the liberal
grant mandate exists not just to protect an accused’s right to a
fair trial, but also to protect society’s interest, including
the interests of the Government and the victims of crime, in the
prompt and final adjudication of criminal accusations. __ M.J.
__ (7) (C.A.A.F. 2007). Where military judges consider implied
bias and apply the liberal grant mandate on the record,
deference is warranted. United States v. Downing, 56 M.J. 419,
422 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
As this case illustrates, a prior connection to a crime
similar to the one being tried before the court-martial is not
per se disqualifying to a member’s service. Capt A’s experience
with rape is too distinct to pass the implied bias muster. If
there were additional factors that might have swayed the
military judge’s determination otherwise, these factors were not
placed on the record and subjected to an implied bias analysis.
THE CONSTRUCTIVE FORCE INSTRUCTION
Background
The facts of the rape offense were set forth in the opinion
of the court below:
The appellant was a radiology technician working in
the ultrasound department at the Offutt AFB hospital.
In December 2002, he performed an ultrasound
examination on Airman First Class (A1C) S to check for
swelling in her right ovary. During the examination,
the appellant talked with A1C S and told her he was
taking classes at a local university. He asked if she
4
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
would help him with one of his classes by letting him
take ultrasound photos of the veins in her arms. She
agreed to come into the hospital the next day, a
Saturday, and help him with his study.
When she arrived at 1200 the radiology clinic was
relatively deserted, although it was a reserve
training weekend. The appellant led her to the
ultrasound examination room by a more circuitous route
than they had taken the day before. He began to
examine her arms, but then told A1C S that he was
having trouble seeing her veins. He asked if he could
examine the veins in her legs to see if he could get a
better picture. She agreed, and the appellant left
the room while she removed her pants and donned a
hospital gown. The appellant returned and continued
the examination. When he reached her groin area, he
told her the picture was fuzzy and asked if she would
mind removing her panties. She agreed. The appellant
left the room again and A1C S removed her panties.
When the appellant returned, he asked if he could take
ultrasound pictures of her left ovary, because he
needed pictures of female organs and already had
pictures of her right ovary. A1C S agreed and placed
her feet in the stirrups of the examining table. The
appellant inserted an internal probe and continued the
examination. When A1C S complained of some
discomfort, the appellant apologized and adjusted his
examination technique. Next, the appellant asked A1C
S if she would mind turning over on her stomach. She
complied.
The appellant positioned himself between her legs and
continued to manipulate the internal ultrasound probe.
He then asked her if she had ever had sex with a black
man. She said that she had not. He next asked if she
had ever had a one-night stand. She said, “no.” He
asked if she ever wanted to have a one-night stand,
and she said she wanted to know a person before she
“did anything” with him. Next he asked her what she
would do if he had a condom. A1C S heard a “crinkling
sound” turned her head and saw the skin of the
appellant’s bare thighs. Then she felt the
appellant’s penis penetrate her vagina. At the same
time, he pressed his hands on her back and grabbed her
breast with his right hand. He told her not to
5
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
scream. A1C S crawled away from him and got up. She
put her clothes on and before she left the appellant
told her not to tell anyone what had happened.
Terry, 2005 CCA LEXIS 420, at *2-*4, 2006 WL 13166, at *1.
At trial, the victim testified, among other things, that at
no time did she ever intend on having intimate contact with
Appellant. When asked why she did not leave the room she
stated,
I was just scared, and I felt like if I -- even if I
would have done anything I couldn’t have -- the room
was so small and it’s like I was trapped in-between
the wall and the machine, and he was like in the way
of my -- it’s just so cramped in there, you can’t help
but feeling enclosed.
At the close of the evidence the defense objected when the
military judge indicated that he would provide the members with
an instruction on constructive force. This objection was
overruled, with the military judge concluding that there was
some evidence that raised the issue that Appellant had
threatened or intimidated the victim. The following
instruction, in relevant part, was then provided to the members:
Where intimidation or threats of death or physical
injury make resistance futile, it is said that
constructive force has been applied, thus satisfying
the requirement of force. Hence, when the accused’s
actions and words or conduct, coupled with the
surrounding circumstances, create a reasonable belief
in the victim’s mind that death or physical injury
would be inflicted on her and that resistance would be
futile, the act of sexual intercourse has been
accomplished by force.
6
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
Analysis
Appellant, citing United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368
(C.A.A.F. 2003), contends that an instruction on constructive
force should not have been given because neither his superior
rank, position of authority, or physical size were factors on
the issue of consent or the lack thereof. It is true that these
factors were more at issue in Simpson. However, we need not
rely on the factors that might have been relevant in that case
in resolving the issue in this case. It has long been the law
with respect to the offense of rape that “[w]here intimidation
or threats of death or physical injury make resistance futile,
it is said that ‘constructive force’ has been applied.” United
States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9 (C.M.A. 1991). Further,
constructive force “may consist of expressed or implied threats
of bodily harm.” United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 6 (C.M.A.
1987). Generally, a military judge is granted considerable
discretion in deciding which instructions to give. United
States v. Damatta-Olivera, 37 M.J. 474, 478 (C.M.A. 1993). The
military judge will generally instruct on matters that are “in
issue.” “A matter is ‘in issue’ when some evidence, without
regard to its source or credibility, has been admitted upon
which members might rely if they chose.” Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 920(e) Discussion. The record in this case
contains “some evidence” that Appellant intimidated the victim
7
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
into sexual intercourse without consent and that the victim’s
perception of this intimidation and her attendant fear were
reasonable. Among other things, there was some evidence that
Appellant, acting under the guise of an E-5 medical technician
in order to gain the victim’s trust for the purported test,
lured the victim to an isolated part of the hospital at off-duty
hours, that he told the victim “not to scream,” and that the
victim was “really scared.” Thus, we discern no abuse of
discretion on the part of the military judge.
THE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Background
Appellant contends that the military judge erred in denying
his challenges for cause against two members, Maj H and Capt A.
In response to voir dire questioning by both the military judge
and trial counsel, Maj H indicated that he had a “family member,
friend, [or] acquaintance [who had] been the victim of . . .
rape or sexual assault . . . .” The trial counsel pressed Maj H
on the specifics and the following colloquy ensued:
TC: You had also indicated in the response to one of the
judge’s questions [that you knew] some type of victim
involved in a sex assault that’s an acquaintance, family
member, [or] otherwise, can you explain in a little more
detail who that was and what that was about?
[Maj H]: I don’t know how to answer that. It was a family
member and I’d rather not go into it in open court.
TC: I understand that it’s uncomfortable and difficult . .
. . [but] it’s important for both the government but also
8
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
for [the accused] to understand what kind of life
experience you may have had that you bring to the table.
[Maj H]: Sure. It was my wife . . . .
TC: Did this incident occur while she was your wife or
before . . . ?
[Maj H]: Oh no, it was before, it was her stepfather.
TC: And this was before you ever knew her?
[Maj H]: Oh, yeah.
TC: Do you recall about how long ago it was?
[Maj H]: She was still living at home so she must have
been 16 or . . . maybe 18.
TC: [H]ow long have you been married?
[Maj H]: Ten years.
TC: Has your wife talked to you in any detail about . . .
this incident?
[Maj H]: At one point, yes, but ages ago, but it’s
obviously part of her makeup and her mother’s still married
to her stepfather.
TC: Okay, you say she talked to you about it just one
time?
[Maj H]: It probably would have been more than just one
time . . . it hasn’t come up in five years, but it’s still
part of who she is.
TC: How long has it been since you . . . have discussed
it? Do you think it’s been five years or more?
[Maj H]: Oh, yes.
TC: [Do] you have a sense that this [past abuse] affects
her life? Have there been times more recently when you’ve
seen her act in a certain way and you thought . . . that
[it] has to do with [her past assault]?
9
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
[Maj H]: No, no. In fact, she and her mother both do a
form of Indian dance and her stepfather takes pictures and
they all went to India together . . . she and her mother
and stepfather.
TC: Was there ever a formal allegation made?
[Maj H]: No, she just left home.
TC: Do you know if your wife has ever disclosed this
situation to anyone other than you?
[Maj H]: And her mother, no, probably not.
. . . .
TC: Knowing about the circumstance . . . do you think you
have any . . . preconceptions about the issue of sex
assault or rape or related offenses?
[Maj H]: No, no, I don’t think so . . . .
TC: Do you think there’s anything about having heard your
wife tell you about this situation that would cause you to
not be able to sit fairly and impartially in this case?
[Maj H]: No.
TC: Do you think that you’d be able to listen to all the
evidence, even if it deals with testimony concerning a
sexual assault, and receive and consider all the evidence?
[Maj H]: Yes.
TC: Do you have any doubt at all about whether you’d be
able to hear that evidence and consider it and sit fairly
and impartially?
[Maj H]: No.
TC: Do you think that you can apply any instructions . . .
that the judge may give you concerning rape or sexual
assault?
[Maj H]: Yes.
TC: Any doubt about that?
10
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
[Maj H]: No.
Capt A indicated during initial questioning that he too had
known someone who was a victim of some type of sexual assault.
When asked to return to the courtroom for further questioning,
Capt A indicated that he had known two victims of assault. He
was asked about each:
TC: Can you explain in a little more detail who [you knew
who were victims] and what that involved?
. . . .
[Capt A]: [My] [h]igh school . . . girlfriend for six
years . . . . [A] guy that was supposed to be a friend of
the family raped her, and . . . it was her first time . . .
having intercourse, and she . . . became pregnant. And
then later on another girlfriend [informed me that] before
I met her, she was also raped . . . .
TC: The first person you talked about, how long ago was it
that this incident occurred?
[Capt A]: This occurred in [19]96 I believe.
TC: And you were boyfriend and girlfriend at the time?
[Capt A]: We were on and off for around five, six years .
. . .
. . . .
[The rape happened] near the end of [the relationship].
TC: How did you first come to find out about this
incident?
[Capt A]: [The victim had terminated our relationship] and
she called me up . . . to tell me what had happened and the
reason [she ended the relationship] . . . . [She told me
that due] to the [rape and] pregnancy she felt guilty . . .
11
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
she felt she was unworthy of being with me and didn’t want
to have anything to do with me because of the incident.
. . . .
TC: What was your reaction when she told you about what
happened?
[Capt A]: I was angry. I was angry at the person that did
it obviously. . . . [T]his was her first type of
intercourse, she [had] wanted to wait until she was married
so it kind of ruined something that she had saved for her
wedding day . . . . So it got me angry and upset . . . . I
tried to stay in her life, but she pushed me and my family
away.
TC: At the point that she told you about this . . . . did
you see staying together in a relationship [with her]?
[Capt A]: Yes, I did . . . . [Though] looking back . . .
[I don’t know if I meant it or not] . . . , I had mentioned
to her sister . . . [that] “I’m going to marry your sister
at some point.”
TC: What’s your contact been like since [19]96?
[Capt A]: Probably a year we kept in sort of contact.
When she gave birth to the baby we kept in kind of close
contact. She actually named her son after me, that’s how
close we were . . . .
. . . .
I’ve been married since late [19]97, and out of respect for
my wife I don’t contact any of my old girlfriends.
TC: How do you feel about that situation and that incident
today as you sit here?
[Capt A]: Every incident is different. I view everything
for what it’s worth . . . . I’m impartial.
. . . .
TC: Can you go ahead and tell me again about the other
person that you knew that was raped?
12
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
[Capt A]: I don’t know [about] the incident, I don’t know
what happened, how she got raped, I have no clue. I didn’t
get into details. We dated for maybe a couple of months.
. . . .
[She was] more of an acquaintance, and she had mentioned
that she had been raped . . . .
TC: Previous to your relationship?
[Capt A]: [Yes], well previous.
. . . .
TC: [Is] there anything about either of those experiences
that you think would cause you to not be able to sit fairly
and impartially in this case?
[Capt A]: No, Sir.
. . . .
TC: Do you think you’re going to be able to apply that
impartially to the law as the military judge instructs you
and reach an unbiased finding?
[Capt A]: Yes, Sir.
TC: Do you have any doubt whatsoever about that?
[Capt A]: No, Sir.
Upon the conclusion of voir dire the defense counsel made
four challenges for cause. The military judge granted the
challenges with respect to two other potential members, one who
had “more than just a passing acquaintance” with the victim, and
the other who worried that if he sat on the panel he would have
flashbacks to the assault of his daughter, and stated only that
13
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
he could be impartial “right now” rather than for the duration
of the trial process.
The military judge denied the challenge to Maj H stating
that though he “was [initially] uncomfortable when answering the
questions [about his wife’s experiences with sexual abuse] . . .
. as the questioning went on he was [more] forthright in
answering . . . .” The military judge also stated that Maj H
indicated that he “had no predisposition . . . . [and] that he
could be fair and impartial . . . .”
The military judge also denied the challenge to Capt A
using similar reasoning, concluding that she saw no indication
that Capt A had any feelings about rape “[that could not be] put
aside” so that he could be impartial. Appellant preserved the
issue for appeal by subsequently using his peremptory challenge
against another member, Colonel H. See United States v.
Leonard, 63 M.J. 398, 403 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (trial defense counsel
not required to state that he would use a non-existent
peremptory challenge against another member).
Appellant contends that the liberal grant mandate required
the military judge to grant the challenges for cause for both
Maj H and Capt A. Appellant further argues that Maj H’s and
Capt A’s experiences actually biased them and/or that their
experiences presented an implied bias. Appellant asserts that
14
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
since both should have been removed, their participation in the
court-martial denied him a fair trial.
The Government argues, among other things, that both Maj H
and Capt A affirmed that they could be fair, there were
differences between the Appellant’s case and the events
described by the challenged members during voir dire, and there
was a “significant time lapse” between the court-martial and the
events discussed during voir dire. Further, Capt A “only dated
the rape victims.” Finally, “trial defense counsel declined to
inquire into this area of their backgrounds when given the
opportunity.”
DISCUSSION
The impartiality of members is a core principle of the
military justice system, and “the sine qua non for a fair court-
martial.” United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Its importance is
emphasized by the fact that the mandate for disinterested,
evenhanded members is echoed across the central sources of
military law: the Constitution, federal statutes, regulations
and directives, and case law. Leonard, 63 M.J. at 399
(citations omitted); see also Downing, 56 M.J. at 421 (finding
that “[a]s a matter of due process, an accused has a
constitutional right, as well as a regulatory right, to a fair
15
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
and impartial court-martial panel”) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
A military judge’s determinations on the issue of member
bias, actual or implied, are based on the “totality of the
circumstances particular to [a] case.” United States v. Strand,
59 M.J. 455, 456 (C.A.A.F. 2004). Such determinations are
guided by this Court’s longstanding and often-stated holding
that challenges for cause are to be liberally granted. Clay, __
M.J. at __ (7); United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 134
(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Miles, 58 M.J. 192, 194
(C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v. Youngblood, 47 M.J. 338, 341
(C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. White, 36 M.J. 284, 287
(C.M.A. 1993).
Actual and Implied Bias
The requirement for impartiality necessitates inquiry into
both the actual bias and implied bias of potential members, with
each type of bias distinct and reviewed under a different
standard. Youngblood, 47 M.J. at 341.
“The test for actual bias is whether any bias ‘is such that
it will not yield to the evidence presented and the judge’s
instructions.’” United States v. Napoleon, 46 M.J. 279, 283
(C.A.A.F. 1997) (citation omitted). The existence of actual
bias is a question of fact, and we consequently provide the
military judge with significant latitude in determining whether
16
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
it is present in a prospective member. United States v. Warden,
51 M.J. 78, 81 (C.A.A.F. 1999). That the military judge, rather
than the reviewing court, has been physically present during
voir dire and watched the challenged member’s demeanor makes the
military judge specially situated in making this determination.
Id. (noting that actual bias is viewed “subjectively, ‘through
the eyes of the military judge or the court members’” (quoting
Napoleon, 46 M.J. at 283)).
In analyzing implied bias, however, appellate courts
provide less deference to the military judge. Id. Here, the
military judge’s privileged position at trial is less important
because the test for implied bias is objective, and asks
whether, in the eyes of the public, the challenged member’s
circumstances do injury to the “perception of appearance of
fairness in the military justice system.” Moreno, 63 M.J. at
134 (citations omitted). In considering this question, courts
also consider whether “most people in the same position would be
prejudiced [i.e. biased].” Strand, 59 M.J. at 459 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Consequently, “‘issues of implied
bias are reviewed under a standard less deferential than abuse
of discretion but more deferential than de novo.’” Id. at 458
(quoting Miles, 58 M.J. at 195).
17
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
Was There Actual Bias on the Part of Maj H or Capt A?
In this case, Appellant claims that given Maj H’s and Capt
A’s experiences with the crime of rape, it “was asking too much
of them” to be truly impartial. In her denial of the challenges
against both Maj H and Capt A, the military judge emphasized the
importance of the demeanor of each member in making her
decision. Regarding Maj H, the military judge emphasized that
“having [had] the opportunity to personally observe” Maj H, she
was confident based on his “forthright and honest” answers that
he could be fair and impartial regardless of his wife’s history
with sexual abuse.
The military judge made a similar finding regarding Capt A,
introducing her decision to deny the challenge by stressing that
“each decision [on challenges for cause] is being made on an
individual basis [based on my having] watch[ed] each individual
talk.” “[After] watching [Capt A] answer the questions,” the
military judge believed “he was very sincere, very forthright”
and she did not see “a demeanor” that would impact his ability
to “be fair and impartial.”
That the military judge unambiguously based her findings on
her personal examination of witness demeanor brings the decision
in line with this Court’s precedents. We have held that “mere
declarations of impartiality [on behalf of potential members],
are not sufficient by themselves to insure legal propriety.”
18
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
United States v. Harris, 13 M.J. 288, 292 (C.M.A. 1982).
However, “[w]e . . . recognize that the military judge is in the
best position to judge the sincerity and truthfulness of the
challenged member’s responses on voir dire.” Youngblood, 47
M.J. at 341 (citing United States v. Daulton, 45 M.J. 212, 217
(C.A.A.F. 1996)); see also, Miles, 58 M.J. at 194-95 (holding
that “a challenge for cause for actual bias . . . essentially
[requires a determination] . . . of credibility”).
This Court has frequently addressed the specific concern
for the bias at issue here: the potential for actual bias
stemming from a member’s exposure to a crime similar to the one
to be litigated before them. In our analyses of actual bias
resulting from such contact we have been guided by two
principles. First, the fact that a member was close to someone
who had been a victim of a similar crime is not grounds for per
se disqualification. United States v. Velez, 48 M.J. 220, 223-
24 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Likewise, “[m]ere distaste for certain
offenses is not automatically disqualifying.” United States v.
Schlamer, 52 M.J. 80, 92 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citing United States
v. Bannwarth, 36 M.J. 265, 268 (C.M.A. 1993)).
Second, regardless of a member’s prior exposure to a crime,
it is often possible for a member to rehabilitate himself before
the military judge by honestly claiming that he would not be
biased. Even in light of a member’s extensive exposure to the
19
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
same sort of crime that the member is being asked to adjudge at
court-martial, we have regularly found the absence of actual
bias when the military judge reported that following voir dire
she was satisfied with the honesty of the member and convinced
that the member was neither “inflexible” nor resistant to the
evidence or the military judge’s instructions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 34 M.J. 105, 111 (C.M.A. 1992) (in a
case dealing with a sodomy charge, the military judge
appropriately denied the challenge against a member whose young
son had been the victim of a homosexual assault after
“evaluat[ing] and accept[ing] this prospective member’s . . .
disclaimer on the basis of a careful examination of this
person’s demeanor . . . .”).
Despite this, and the fact that this Court has found
members lack bias in cases in which members have themselves been
victims of crimes, see, e.g., Daulton, 45 M.J. at 217; United
States v. Lavender, 46 M.J. 485, 489 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United
States v. Reichardt, 28 M.J. 113, 116 (C.M.A. 1989); United
States v. Porter, 17 M.J. 377, 379-80 (C.M.A. 1984), we have
found actual bias when members have been victims of similar,
particularly violent or traumatic crimes, or if other unique
circumstances pertained.
For instance, in United States v. Smart, this Court held
that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a challenge for cause
20
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
of a member sitting on an armed robbery case. 21 M.J. 15, 20
(C.M.A. 1985). The member had been subjected to robbery at
knife-point on at least six occasions, and his father had been
robbed at gunpoint, the same crime for which the accused was
charged. Id. at 17. Despite the potential member’s assurances
to the military judge that he could be impartial, the distress
of his repeated robbery and his father’s assault led this Court
to “disagree that this assertion sufficed to permit his
inclusion on the panel.” Id. at 20.
In Miles, this Court found error in a case concerning
wrongful use of cocaine. 58 M.J. at 195. In Miles, the
military judge erred when he denied a challenge of a member
whose nephew had died due to complications associated with his
mother’s prenatal use of cocaine. Id. It was not just the
member’s exposure to this misfortune that was determinative, but
that the trial counsel himself commented that the event had
evidently been traumatic for the member, and that the member had
recently written an article for the base newspaper -- due to be
published four days after the court-martial was to convene --
recounting his nephew’s story and admonishing readers not to use
drugs. Id.
Without similar exacerbating circumstances present in the
stories of either Maj H or Capt A, and in light of the military
judge’s assessment of the members’ demeanor and truthfulness
21
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
during voir dire, we conclude the military judge did not err in
finding an absence of actual bias in both Maj H and Capt A.
“Their answers disclaimed any bias or partiality, and we do not
fault the military judge for finding that the members exhibited
no actual bias.” Youngblood, 47 M.J. at 342.
Possible Implied Bias on the Part of Either Member
There are a number of factors in Maj H’s situation that
tend to ameliorate his exposure to the crime, dispelling the
appearance of implied bias. First, though an exact chronology
is not clear from the record, the crime against Maj H’s wife
took place at least ten, and perhaps as many as twenty years,
prior to the court-martial and, significantly, before Maj H even
knew his wife. It was never reported to law enforcement, nor
was it cause for his wife to receive any counseling. As a
couple they had spoken about the event only a few times, and the
subject had not been broached for at least five years.
Further, Maj H’s mother-in-law remains married to the man
who assaulted his wife, and it appears some measure of intra-
family reconciliation has been made. Maj H reports that his
wife and her stepfather participate in a dancing club together,
and shortly before the court-martial, Maj H’s wife, her mother,
and her stepfather had even traveled abroad together.
Finally, taking the record of Maj H’s voir dire as a whole,
the military judge’s interpretation of Maj H’s initial
22
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
discomfort in speaking about his wife’s abuse was justifiably
described as emanating from his concern for his wife’s
reputation in the community, rather than any distress he
personally suffered due to his wife’s experiences.
Capt A’s situation is different. He reported that he knew
two people who were victims of rape. The first was a woman who
he had “dated for a couple months . . . in college.” Capt A
reported that he was not particularly close with the victim,
calling her “more of an acquaintance.” She had been raped “well
previous” to their relationship, and had provided Capt A with no
details as to what happened. Capt A had “no clue” about the
incident. It appears the impact on Capt A of this rape is
attenuated, and we find no implied bias here.
In contrast, the impact on Capt A of the rape of a
longstanding girlfriend is more significant, and that situation
“offers facts of clarity and consequence on both sides of the
implied bias equation.” Strand, 59 M.J. at 459.
On the one hand, the rape occurred more than seven years
before the court-martial and Capt A had not spoken with the
victim for more than six years. Further, Capt A reported that
his lack of contact with the victim during this time was not
because of uneasiness with what had happened or because of some
particularly powerful lingering emotional attachment. Rather, it
was “out of respect for [his] wife,” that he did not “contact
23
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
any of [his] old girlfriends.” Moreover, Capt A described his
relationship with the victim as “on and off” and at the time of
the rape the relationship was “off.” Indeed, the victim was not
living in the same country as Capt A.
On the other hand, in regards to this rape, Capt A --
unlike his minimal awareness of the rape of his other
girlfriend, or in apparent contrast to Maj H’s sparse knowledge
of his wife’s assault -- was familiar with the details of the
rape. He was aware of exactly when the crime occurred, the
circumstances of who assaulted her, and how the rapist had
managed to gain access to her. Further, Capt A was aware of
specific aggravating circumstances of the attack, such as the
fact that the rape was the victim’s first sexual experience,
that the victim had wished to save herself for marriage, and
that the rape resulted in a pregnancy and a child.
Capt A’s connection to this victim and this crime appear
noteworthy and lasting even after their relationship ended.
When asked how he felt about the incident by the trial counsel,
Capt A expressed that he was incensed, and whether or not their
relationship was ongoing at the time of the incident, he was
angry that his “very close friend” had been hurt. Though it is
not clear whether Capt A still harbored these feelings or was
merely recounting his past emotions to the court, it is likely
that given the strength of his relationship with the victim he
24
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
may well have maintained this resentment. In fact, Capt A had
been close enough to the victim and her family to have been made
a part of her sister’s wedding party. It was at the wedding
that Capt A informed the victim’s sister that he was going to
marry the victim “at some point.” Finally, Capt A reported that
the rape was the reason that the victim broke up with him and
that following the assault the victim was wracked by feelings
that “she was unworthy” and she did not want to be with Capt A
“because of the incident.” Despite this, they kept in close
contact through the birth of the victim’s son; indeed, Capt A
reported that they were so close that the victim named her son
after him. Capt A “tried to stay in her life, but [the victim]
pushed [him and his] family away.”
Though the military judge was correct in basing her finding
of a lack of actual bias on her impressions of Capt A’s demeanor
and statements during voir dire, the record does not reflect the
application of an objective implied bias test. Indeed, there
was no indication that the military judge “intended to address
implied bias at all.” Downing, 56 M.J. at 422.
This Court recognizes that “[t]he military judge may well
have intellectually applied the . . . test. However, the law is
clear in this area . . . . We do not expect record
dissertations but, rather, a clear signal that the military
judge applied the right law.” Id.
25
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
Such an examination would have explicitly brought the
distinct features of Capt A’s situation to bear and would have
compelled the military judge to “squarely address the essential
question [of an implied bias analysis] -- was [she] satisfied
that an objective public observer would find [Capt A’s service
on the panel notwithstanding his acute involvement with the
crime of rape as] consonant with a fair and impartial system of
military justice?” Id.
As previously stated, a prior experience with or connection
to the crime in question is not per se disqualifying, as the
circumstances involving Maj H demonstrate. However, the events
described by Capt A go well beyond the circumstances described
by Maj H. We have no reason to doubt the military judge’s
determination that Capt A was capable of compartmenting his life
history and impartially hearing Appellant’s case. However,
applying the liberal grant mandate and cognizant of case law
finding “implied bias ‘when most people in the same position
would be prejudiced,’” Wiesen, 56 M.J. at 174 (citations
omitted), we hold that the military judge erred in denying the
challenge for cause as to Capt A.
Whatever Capt A’s individual character and emotional
capacity, we believe most people in Capt A’s circumstance would
be hard pressed with such a background to sit impartially in a
rape case. The totality of circumstances in this case include
26
United States v. Terry, No. 06-0314/AF
the circumstances in which Capt A’s relationship with his
longtime girlfriend ended, the suggestion that Capt A would
otherwise have married this girlfriend, and the subsequent
choice of the girlfriend to name the resulting child after Capt
A. In such circumstances, it “was ‘asking too much’ of him and
the system” for Capt A to sit.∗ See Miles, 58 M.J. at 195
(citations omitted); Daulton, 45 M.J. at 218 (citation omitted).
DECISION
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed and the findings and sentence are
set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force. A rehearing may be
authorized.
∗
“Although military or national security exigencies may create
personnel circumstances relevant to the liberal grant analysis,
there is no indication in the record that this was the reason
for the military judge’s denial of Appellant’s challenge for
cause.” Clay, __ M.J. at __ (11, n.2).
27