In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-2225
S ARAH W HITEHEAD ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
L AWRENCE J. B OND, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 3765—Ruben Castillo, Judge.
A RGUED M ARCH 27, 2012—D ECIDED M AY 21, 2012
Before F LAUM, W ILLIAMS, and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sarah Whitehead
brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chicago
police officers Thomas Stack, Michael Stevens, and Law-
rence Bond (and others who are not parties to this ap-
peal) alleging Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest
and excessive force (and other claims not at issue). The
events giving rise to Whitehead’s arrest began when
Officer Bond and his partner Officer Kevin Geyer
2 No. 11-2225
stopped Whitehead’s adult son, Daniel, for a traffic viola-
tion. After the officers found crack cocaine in the car,
Daniel attempted to flee, resulting in a physical alterca-
tion between him and the officers. Whitehead, who lived
close, was told by a neighbor, “you have to get down
to the corner,” “they’re killing your son.” Whitehead
hurried to the scene; what occurred next is hotly contested.
Whitehead claims she was calmly asking about her son
when she was accosted by Officer Bond and arrested
by Lt. Stevens for no apparent reason. Sgt. Stack and Lt.
Stevens testified that Whitehead was yelling, being ag-
gressive, and leading the crowd that had gathered in
a charge toward Officer Bond, so they arrested her
and placed her in the prisoner wagon for five to ten
minutes before releasing her. Officer Bond testified that
he never saw Whitehead, Sgt. Stack, or Lt. Stevens at the
scene and left almost immediately after placing Daniel
in the squad car. Sgt. Stack testified that he and Officer
Bond spoke briefly after Whitehead was placed in the
prisoner wagon.
Before trial, Whitehead moved to exclude evidence
of events that preceded her arrival and testimony that
the events took place in a “high-crime area.” The
district court denied the motion. After a four-day trial,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Whitehead moved for judgment as a matter of law on
the false arrest claim, arguing that the officers’ testimony
was inherently incredible and physically impossible.
In the alternative, she sought a new trial on the basis
that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the
No. 11-2225 3
evidence and the district court erroneously admitted
unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The district court denied
her motions. Because we find that this case boils down
to a credibility contest that was properly reserved
for resolution by the jury and because we do not find
reversible error in the district court’s balancing of the
probative value and prejudicial effect of the challenged
evidence, we affirm.
I. Facts
On June 20, 2008, around 4:25 p.m., Chicago police
officers Bond and Geyer pulled over Daniel, the plaintiff’s
adult son, at the 800 block of South Lavergne Street
near West Polk Street in Chicago because the vehicle
he was driving had no license plates. Daniel didn’t have
a driver’s license or proof of insurance, so the officers
handcuffed him and placed him in the squad car. The
officers also placed his passenger, James Jones, in the
squad car. The officers searched Daniel’s car and found
baggies of crack cocaine. When the officers opened
the door of the squad car, Jones pushed his way out and
ran. Daniel, according to the officers’ testimony, made
a similar attempt to flee and, when the officers tried to
stop him, a struggle ensued, during which Daniel
kicked Officer Bond in the chest, knocking him to the
ground. Jones got away, but the officers were able to
subdue Daniel. Whitehead presented eyewitness testi-
mony from neighbor James Finkley that the officers beat
Daniel until he shook badly and stopped moving. Officers
Geyer and Bond testified otherwise.
4 No. 11-2225
A crowd had started gathering from both ends of the
block. While Officer Geyer had Daniel on the ground,
Officer Bond informed dispatch of the situation and
requested backup officers. Although the testimony at
trial was conflicting, anywhere from four to twenty
people had gathered. According to the officers, the
crowd, which was rowdy and yelling at them, was led by
Marcus Mynatt. As the crowd drew closer, the officers
ordered them to stay back, but Mynatt didn’t comply.
The dispatcher heard the commotion at the scene
and declared a “10-1,” which means an officer needs
immediate emergency help; it is the highest-level alert
and requests the immediate presence of officers from
inside and outside the district. Within seconds, Officer
Geyer informed the dispatcher that it was not a 10-1
and said “everything was under control.” But even
when a 10-1 is called off officers within the district gener-
ally come to investigate. Approximately nine police cars
(sixteen to eighteen police officers) were at the scene
within minutes of the call.
Officers Sweeney and Belcher were the first backup
officers to arrive. Officer Sweeney testified that there were
ten or fewer people in the crowd. At the time, Officers
Bond and Geyer were trying to detain Daniel and they
yelled for Officers Sweeney and Belcher to grab Mynatt;
upon hearing this, Mynatt ran. Officers Sweeney and
Belcher chased him, quickly apprehended him, and
secured him in a squad car. More police cars started
arriving. Officer Bond testified that although people in
the crowd were still yelling, he was less concerned with
No. 11-2225 5
them because the assisting officers could handle the
situation; he turned his attention to Daniel.
Before Officer Bond left with Daniel, a neighbor ran
and told Whitehead, who lived a few blocks down the
street, “You have to get down to the corner,” “they’re
killing your son,” without identifying who “they” were.
Whitehead, followed by her husband Donald, left the
house immediately and headed to the scene. Donald
testified that he saw ten to twenty private citizens out on
the street when they arrived. What happened after their
arrival is disputed and is the centerpiece of the trial
controversy.
Lt. Stevens and Sgt. Stack arrived on the scene shortly
after the 10-1 call. Lt. Stevens testified that when he
arrived it was a “chaotic situation” and that there was
a crowd of ten to fifteen people in an alley on Lavergne
and another crowd on the corner of Polk. Lt. Stevens
heard people in the crowd yell “fuck the police.” Sgt. Stack
testified that he saw a group of ten to twenty people
on Lavergne and that the crowd was yelling and
appeared hostile. Both officers testified that Officer Bond
was still on the scene standing outside his squad car
when they arrived.
According to the officers, Whitehead was at the
front of the crowd, flailing her arms, screaming, yelling,
swearing, and completely out of control. Whitehead was
moving toward Officer Bond’s squad car as people in
the crowd were trying to hold her back. Lt. Stevens was
concerned that Whitehead might try to let the offender
out, attack the officers, or had a psychiatric illness.
6 No. 11-2225
Lt. Stevens ordered the crowd to step back and calm
down, but Whitehead refused to comply. According to
Sgt. Stack, Whitehead was twenty to thirty feet from
Officer Bond. She continued to scream, broke free from
the crowd, and began crossing the street toward
Officer Bond. Lt. Stevens stepped between Whitehead
and Officer Bond’s car and ordered Whitehead and the
crowd to step back, but she kept advancing. It was
around this time (at 4:32 p.m.—only a couple minutes
after the first backup officers arrived), that Officer Marisol
Randonis showed up on the scene with the prisoner
wagon. When she arrived she saw Lt. Stevens standing
on the sidewalk talking to Whitehead; she testified that
they (Lt. Stevens and Whitehead) were about twenty
to thirty feet apart. She heard Whitehead screaming and
yelling loudly in an angry tone, loud enough to be
heard a football-field length away. She testified that
Whitehead was belligerent and was moving her hands
aggressively. Other officers were trying to disperse the
crowds and she saw a crowd of ten to fifteen people
dispersing.
Lt. Stevens testified that he grabbed Whitehead,
handcuffed her (or had someone handcuff her), and, with
the assistance of Sgt. Stack, walked her to the prisoner
wagon. Lt. Stevens and Sgt. Stack testified that Officer
Bond was about ten feet away when Whitehead was
handcuffed; neither officer saw Whitehead interact with
Officer Bond or knew whether Officer Bond saw White-
head. Lt. Stevens testified that these events happened
within twenty to thirty seconds after his arrival, that “[i]t
all happened very quickly,” and was a “very fluid, quick
No. 11-2225 7
situation.” Whitehead was detained for obstructing a
peace officer, reckless conduct, disorderly conduct, and
mob action.
Officers Bond and Geyer testified that they left almost
immediately after securing Daniel in the squad car. Ac-
cording to Officer Geyer, they were on the scene less
than fifteen minutes. Both officers testified that they did
not see Sgt. Stack, Lt. Stevens, Whitehead, or a prisoner
wagon at the scene. Officer Bond said he couldn’t say
whether he was on the scene when Whitehead was
there. Sgt. Stack, however, testified that after placing
Whitehead in the prisoner wagon, he went over and
spoke to Officer Bond for a minute or minute and a half
about what happened, whether he was hurt, whether
the offender was hurt, and whether anyone needed
medical attention.
Whitehead’s account of what took place that day is
much different. She testified that she encountered a calm
scene and that Lt. Stevens was talking to the crowd and
laughing. She saw Officer Bond standing outside a police
car, approached him, informed him who she was, and
asked about her son. Whitehead, her husband Donald,
and eyewitness Finkley testified that Officer Bond ex-
ploded, and said, “He’s a fucking idiot.” According to
Whitehead and Donald, Officer Bond ordered her to
step back on the curb, pushing her, kicking her heels, and
belly-bumping her along the way. Officer Bond was
swearing and acting like he was going to hit Whitehead
even though she was fully cooperating and calm. (Finkley
testified that he didn’t see Officer Bond push, kick, belly-
8 No. 11-2225
bump, or physically touch Whitehead. He was dis-
tracted by an officer telling him to get back and the next
time he directed his attention to Whitehead, she was
interacting with Lt. Stevens.)
At that point, according to Whitehead, Lt. Stevens
intervened, trying to hold Officer Bond back, but Bond
kept trying to get around Lt. Stevens to attack Whitehead.
Donald told Whitehead to come toward him and Lt.
Stevens said, “Go ahead, Bitch. Keep walking.” Whitehead
told Lt. Stevens she could expect this language from the
officer, but not from him (a lieutenant). Lt. Stevens
ordered her not to speak and she responded, “I won’t,” and
then Lt. Stevens said “That’s it. You’re under arrest.” Lt.
Stevens grabbed her, had her handcuffed, and requested
Officer Randonis to place her in the prisoner wagon.
(Officer Randonis testified that Whitehead violently
resisted being put in the prisoner wagon, but Lt. Stevens
and Sgt. Stack both testified that Whitehead did not
resist arrest.)
There is conflicting testimony as to how long Whitehead
was in the wagon. The jury heard the following time
estimates from the following witnesses: Lt. Stevens, 2-10
minutes; Sgt. Stack, 2-5 minutes; Randonis, 10 minutes;
Whitehead, 20 minutes; and Finkley, 10 minutes. Lt.
Stevens testified that Donald came up to him and said,
“I’m her husband. She’s acting crazy. Please let her
go. I’ll take care of her.” He informed Lt. Stevens that
Whitehead was the offender’s mother. Lt. Stevens
released Whitehead because she had calmed down. She
was not charged with a crime. Lt. Stevens testified that
he was on the scene for a total of five to ten minutes.
No. 11-2225 9
Numerous other officers testified at trial that when
they arrived the crowd was not acting unruly and that
Officers Bond and Geyer were still on the scene. They
testified that they either didn’t see Whitehead or that
she was already in the prisoner wagon. At least one
officer didn’t recall seeing Lt. Stevens, Sgt. Stack, or the
prisoner wagon at the scene.
II. Analysis
Whitehead raises three issues on appeal. First she
asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant
her motion for judgment as a matter of law because the
officers’ testimony was exceedingly improbable and
physically impossible. Next she contends that even if
the officers’ testimony is not excluded on those grounds,
the district court should have granted her a new trial
because the verdict was against the manifest weight of
the evidence. She also argues that she is entitled to a
new trial because the district court abused its discretion
in balancing evidence under Rule 403. We address
each argument in turn.
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
We review the district court’s denial of the motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, taking “the record
as a whole to determine whether the evidence presented,
combined with all reasonable inferences permissibly
drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict
when viewed in the light most favorable to the party
10 No. 11-2225
against whom the motion is directed.” Clarett v. Roberts,
657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a district court to enter judgment against a party who
has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial but
only if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally suf-
ficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Because the defendants
prevailed at trial, we construe the facts strictly in their
favor. See Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d
372, 376 (7th Cir. 2011). “In cases involving simple
issues but highly disputed facts (an apt description of
this case), greater deference should be afforded the
jury’s verdict.” Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir.
1995) (parenthetical in original).
The trial in this case, simply stated, was a credibility
contest. “Although the court examines the evidence to
determine whether the jury’s verdict was based on that
evidence, the court does not make credibility determina-
tions or weigh the evidence.” Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634
F.3d at 376. A district court can disregard testimony only
if “reasonable persons could not believe” it because it
“contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws.” Latino,
58 F.3d at 315; see also Mejia v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 650 F.3d
631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011); Burger v. Int’l Union of Elevator
Constructors Local No. 2, 498 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2007)
(the objective evidence must show that it would be unrea-
sonable to believe a critical witness for one side).
Evidence is incredible as a matter of law only when it
would have been “physically impossible for the witness
to observe that which he claims occurred, or impossible
No. 11-2225 11
under the laws of nature for the occurrence to have
taken place at all.” United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 665,
675 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also United
States v. Cervante, 958 F.2d 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that we will not disturb credibility determinations
unless the testimony is “exceedingly improbable”).
“Discrepancies arising from impeachment, inconsistent
prior statements, or the existence of a motive do not
render witness testimony legally incredible.” United States
v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424, 435 (7th Cir. 1998).
Whitehead contends that in ruling on her motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the district court should
have disregarded the officers’ testimony as inherently
incredible. She explains that Officers Bond and Geyer
testified that they didn’t see Lt. Stevens, Sgt. Stack, or
Whitehead on the scene and left almost immediately
after placing Daniel in the squad car. According to Lt.
Stevens and Sgt. Stevens, though, Whitehead, standing
ten feet from Officer Bond, was acting aggressively,
yelling, and charging toward him. Sgt. Stack also testified
that he spoke to Officer Bond for about a minute and
a half after placing Whitehead in the prisoner wagon.
There can be no doubt that there were inconsistencies
between Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony and
Officers Bond’s and Geyer’s testimony. Such inconsisten-
cies, however, are not enough to find the testimony
incredible as a matter of law. For instance, the jury was
free to disregard Officer Bond’s testimony and instead
credit Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s version of the events.
See United States v. Colston, 936 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir.
12 No. 11-2225
1991) (“Generally, juries may reject parts of a witness’s
testimony while accepting other parties.”); see also
Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1054 (7th Cir. 1995).
Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony was not internally
inconsistent and was corroborated in most respects
by Officer Randonis.
Although other officers testified that they did not
observe Whitehead or an unruly crowd when they
arrived, the record is unclear when each officer arrived
and where they were in relation to the crowd. The
situation with Whitehead was resolved within twenty
to thirty seconds, quite possibly before the other officers
arrived. Also, the officers were testifying to events that
took place two and a half years earlier and there
were numerous distractions at the scene, which spanned
a block. The officers’ perspectives reasonably varied
depending on the exact time of their arrival, where
they were (squad cars were parked all along the block),
and where they focused their attention (there were nine
police cars on the scene, approximately eighteen police
officers, and two crowds—one in an alley on Lavergne
and another on the corner of Polk).
It would have also been reasonable for the jury to
believe Officer Bond’s testimony that he was not
focused on the crowd and was instead preoccupied with
the events that had just transpired and had turned his
attention to Daniel. Minutes before, Daniel had kicked
Officer Bond in the chest and knocked him to the ground.
While Officers Bond and Geyer tried to subdue Daniel,
a crowd started yelling at and approaching them. Officer
No. 11-2225 13
Bond faced a chaotic, tense, and rapidly unfolding situa-
tion. When Whitehead arrived, the crowds (located in
two places) were still unruly and loud and there were
police cars and officers all along the block. Officer Bond
testified that he was initially concerned with the crowd,
but when assisting officers showed up, he focused his
attention on Daniel. Although Daniel was secured
in the squad car, Officer Bond was responsible for trans-
porting him to the station and completing his formal
arrest. And James Jones, who had escaped the officers’
grasp, was still on the loose, another potentially discon-
certing fact.
Given the other distractions on the scene and that
Officer Bond’s attention was no longer on the crowd, it
would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude
that Officer Bond didn’t notice Whitehead during the
twenty to thirty seconds that she was yelling and
acting aggressively in moving the crowd toward him.
The jury could also reasonably believe that Officer Bond
simply forgot the relatively unremarkable one and a
half minute conversation with Sgt. Stack.
The verdict demonstrates that the jury chose to credit
Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony over Whitehead’s,
Donald’s, and Finkley’s. This was not unreasonable,
particularly considering that the jury could have found
Whitehead’s version of the events unbelievable. White-
head testified that she approached the scene calmly
even though she was just told by a neighbor that “they’re
killing your son.” Further, she testified that Lt. Stevens
attempted to get between her and Officer Bond to prevent
14 No. 11-2225
an altercation, but then Lt. Stevens, for no apparent
reason, called her a “bitch” and arrested her. There were
also certain inconsistencies and, what the jury may have
reasonably believed were, exaggerations in the
plaintiff’s case (which we don’t need to discuss) that
potentially made her claims less credible. The jury
could have concluded that her version of the story
simply didn’t add up.
In any event, the inconsistencies between the officers’
testimony do not lead to the conclusion that Lt. Stevens’
and Sgt. Stack’s testimony was incredible as a matter
of law. The objective evidence does not show that it
would be unreasonable to believe Lt. Stevens’ or
Sgt. Stack’s version, nor was their testimony physically
impossible. Whitehead repeatedly pointed out the incon-
sistencies and weaknesses in the officers’ testimony to
the jurors, and it was within their province to decide
whose testimony to credit. See United States v. Alcantar,
83 F.3d 185, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the incon-
sistencies in the witness’s testimony were “fully aired
to the jury on cross-examination, but the jury still chose
to credit [the witness’s] story; [t]hat was a judgment
the jury was privileged to make, and [the defendant]
has provided us with no basis for disturbing it.”). “When
a jury has chosen to credit crucial testimony with full
knowledge of the many faults of the witness providing
it, we have no basis to interfere, as the jury is the final
arbiter on such questions.” Id. at 189.
Whitehead hasn’t argued on appeal that if we accept
Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony that the evidence
No. 11-2225 15
is insufficient for the jury to find probable cause for her
arrest. Because we find that the jury could consider their
testimony, we conclude that the district court properly
denied the plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law.
B. Motion for New Trial
Whitehead raises two grounds in her request for a
new trial: (1) the evidence was against the manifest
weight of the evidence; and (2) certain evidence
admitted by the district court should have been
excluded as unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. We
review a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion.
See Clarett, 657 F.3d at 674. “A new trial may be granted
if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence
or the trial was unfair to the moving party.” Id. (quota-
tions omitted). A new trial should be granted, however,
“only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict,
on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our
conscience.” Id. (quotations omitted).
1. Against the Manifest Weight of Evidence
When considering whether the verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, “the district court has
the power to get a general sense of the weight of the
evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and
the comparative strength of the facts put forth at trial.”
Mejia, 650 F.3d at 633. “In conducting its own assess-
16 No. 11-2225
ment of the evidence presented, the district court cannot
remove a piece of evidence from the calculus merely
because the court believes it was not credible and then,
with that piece excluded, grant a motion for a new trial
because the verdict is now against the weight.” Id. We
have already found that the district court cannot
disregard the officers’ testimony as physically impos-
sible or inherently incredible, so the district court was
bound by the same evidence the jury considered in
ruling on the motion for new trial. See id. “[A] court will
set aside a verdict as contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence only if no rational jury could have
rendered the verdict.” Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of
Chi., Inc. v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313-14 (7th Cir.
2011) (quotations omitted); see also Galvan v. Norberg,
2012 WL 1570876, *8 (7th Cir. May 7, 2012).
Whitehead relies heavily on Mejia in arguing that the
district court applied the wrong standard to her motion
for new trial by looking at the case in the light most
favorable to the defendants instead of making an inde-
pendent, neutral decision based on the credibility of the
witnesses and evidence. Whitehead’s reading of Mejia,
which places the judge in the role of a 13th juror, is mis-
guided. In Mejia, the district court determined that the
weight of the evidence (not necessarily the manifest
weight) was against the defendants, but concluded that
it could not set aside the verdict unless the defendants’
testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or
laws. 650 F.3d at 633. We held that the “indisputable
facts” analysis comes into play only when considering
whether to remove evidence from the court’s evaluation.
No. 11-2225 17
Id. at 634. This analysis, we explained, “has no application
when the court merely weighs the evidence itself.” Id.
(emphasis in original). The district court in that case
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendants (rather than neutrally) and concluded that
the verdict could not be set aside unless the evidence
supporting it was impossible. Id. Because the power to
weigh the evidence is not limited by such a standard,
we reversed. Id.
Mejia stands for the proposition that the district court
must properly exercise its discretion in weighing the
evidence to determine if it’s against the manifest weight
of evidence. The district court, however, cannot grant a
new trial just because it believes the jury got it wrong.
See Latino, 58 F.3d at 315. “[S]ince the credibility of wit-
nesses is peculiarly for the jury, it is an invasion of the
jury’s province to grant a new trial merely because
the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Id. “Even when
evidence is contradictory, ‘[i]t’s the jury’s job—not the
district court’s job or the job of a panel of appellate
judges—to figure out who’s telling the truth.’ ”
United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 920 (7th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Lowe v. Consol. Freightways of Del., 177 F.3d 640,
642–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The fact that [the defendant]
presented evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s
verdict does not mean that the verdict should be re-
versed. . . . The jury was there; it weighed the witnesses’
credibility, considered the evidence, and reached a sup-
portable conclusion.”)), petition for cert. filed, 80 BNA
U.S.L.W. 3480 (2012). “We will not supplant the jury’s
reasonable and factually supported verdict with our
18 No. 11-2225
own judgment.” Wipf v. Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 385 (7th
Cir. 2008).
The district court acknowledged that it was required
to weigh the facts when addressing Whitehead’s motion
for new trial and concluded:
The jurors . . . were presented with two sharply
conflicting portrayals of the events on June 20,
2008, and they were entitled to believe either
side. Whitehead testified that she was harassed
by Bond and Stevens after calmly inquiring about
her son, and then was thrown in the back of a
[prisoner wagon] despite complying with all of
their orders. Bond testified that he never saw
Whitehead at the scene, and Stevens and Stack
testified that Whitehead acted disruptively and
failed to follow the orders they had issued to
control the hostile crowd that had gathered. Given
this conflicting testimony, none of which “contracts
indisputable physical facts or laws,” . . . the jury
had a reasonable basis to find that the individual
Defendants had probable cause to arrest White-
head and did not use excessive force in doing so.
After weighing all of the evidence presented at
trial, the Court finds that this is not a case in which
“no rational jury could have rendered the ver-
dict.” . . . Because the verdict was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, the Court
declines to grant Whitehead a new trial.
(emphasis added). The district judge’s discussion of the
evidence and comparative strength of the facts wasn’t
No. 11-2225 19
extensive, but we do not fault him because Whitehead’s
arguments on this issue were brief and merely referred
the court back to her arguments on the inherent incredi-
bility of the officers’ testimony. The judge nevertheless,
citing Mejia, applied the proper standard, understood
his role in weighing the evidence, and relying on all
the evidence, including the officers’ testimony, con-
cluded that the jury had a reasonable basis to find in
favor of the defendants. See Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc.,
635 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This court will not
overturn a jury verdict if a reasonable basis exists in
the record to support it.”).
“[O]nce the district court applies the correct law, its
discretion is wide and our review deferential.” Mejia,
650 F.3d at 634; see also Galvan, 2012 WL 1570876, *7 (“Our
review of a decision denying a new trial is “extremely
deferential.”). “[T]he district court is in the best position
to evaluate the evidence and determine whether the
verdict was against the manifest weight; it heard the
witnesses testify, saw the evidence presented, and gained
a better appreciation of the nuances of the case than
could be gleaned from a cold, written record. Mejia, 650
F.3d at 634; see also Aldridge, 635 F.3d at 876-77 (“The
district court, having seen the presentation of the
evidence and observed the witnesses, is in a unique
position to rule on a new trial motion.” (quotations omit-
ted)). Based on this record, we cannot find that the
district court, having observed the witnesses testify to
their different versions of events and having assessed
their credibility, abused its discretion in concluding that
the jury verdict was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
20 No. 11-2225
2. Evidentiary Rulings
Whitehead contends that the district court erred in not
granting her Rule 59 motion for new trial because the
evidence admitted at trial was unfairly prejudicial
under Rule 403. We afford significant deference to the
trial court’s decision weighing probative value against
prejudice. Cerabio LLC v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 410 F.3d
981, 994 (7th Cir. 2005). “We review the district court’s
evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and will
reverse only where no reasonable person could take
the view adopted by the trial court.” Clarett, 657 F.3d at
669 (quotations omitted). And even if the district court
erred, we will not reverse if the error was harmless. Id.
“A new trial is warranted only if the error has a
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the deter-
mination of a jury, and the result is inconsistent with
substantial justice.” Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 994 (internal
citation omitted). “Evidentiary errors satisfy this standard
only when a significant chance exists that they affected
the outcome of the trial.” EEOC v. Mgmt. Hospitality of
Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 440 (7th Cir. 2012).
a. Evidence of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s conduct
The district court (over the plaintiff’s objection)
admitted testimony concerning events that took place
before Whitehead’s arrival on the scene, but agreed with
plaintiff that charges or guilty pleas as to Daniel, Jones,
and Mynatt should be excluded. Whitehead alleges that
evidence relating to Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s con-
duct was irrelevant and highly prejudicial because it
No. 11-2225 21
created a mini-trial-within-a-trial and was used to elicit
sympathy for the police and to impute Daniel’s bad
behavior to her. In allowing the evidence, the district
court explained that the information was relevant to
provide context, assess Officer Bond’s testimony, and
evaluate testimony about the mood of the crowd.
Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. In making this determina-
tion, “[w]e will not substitute [our] opinion for that of
the trial judge merely because we may be inclined to
rule differently on the question of relevancy.” United
States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012) (quota-
tions omitted). Relevant evidence may be excluded “if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Recognizing that “most relevant evidence is, by its very
nature, prejudicial, we have emphasized that evidence
must be unfairly prejudicial to require exclusion.” Boros,
668 F.3d at 909 (quotations omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal). We employ a sliding scale approach: as the probative
value increases, so does our tolerance of the risk of preju-
dice. Id. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in the context
of Rule 403 if it will induce the jury to decide the case on
an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather
than on the evidence presented.” Common v. City of
Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations
omitted). “[A] district court, in exercising its discretion
under Rule 403, must carefully analyze and assess the
prejudicial effect of challenged evidence.” United States v.
Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir. 2011).
22 No. 11-2225
Evidence of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and Mynatt’s conduct
immediately before Whitehead’s arrival was relevant.
“[O]ne measure of relevance is whether its exclusion
would leave a chronological and conceptual void in the
story.” Boros, 668 F.3d at 908 (quotations omitted). Even
where evidence is not directly related to a disputed fact,
it may be relevant when it provides background infor-
mation. Id. The testimony explained why Whitehead’s
neighbor said, “They’re killing your son,” why White-
head hurried to the scene and inquired about her son, why
approximately eighteen police officers were there, and
why a sizeable crowd had gathered. This background
information allowed the jury to put Whitehead’s, the
officers’, and the crowd’s conduct in context. That made
it relevant.
The challenged evidence was also relevant because
it tended to make the defendants’ testimony that the
crowd was hostile more believable. See Common, 661 F.3d
at 945-46. If the jurors hadn’t heard evidence about the
traffic stop, Jones fleeing, Daniel’s attempt to flee and
Officer Bond’s physical altercation with him, or Mynatt’s
refusal to obey police orders and subsequent flight
giving rise to a police chase, they would have had little
basis to understand why people were gathered around
yelling and why the officers had reasonable grounds
to promptly maintain control of the crowd. The evidence
also made Officer Bond’s testimony that he was preoccu-
pied with Daniel even after Daniel was secured in
the squad car more believable.
Accordingly, we find that evidence of Daniels’, Jones’s,
and Mynatt’s conduct (save testimony concerning the
No. 11-2225 23
crack cocaine which we will discuss shortly) relevant
in providing the jurors necessary background informa-
tion and probative in their assessment of the officers’
credibility. Although the district court only addressed
Whitehead’s concerns of undue prejudice briefly, we find
no reversible error. We give “special deference” to the
district court’s evidentiary findings pursuant to Rule
403, see Common, 661 F.3d at 946, and we have no basis
to second-guess the district court’s judgment here.
Evidence that crack cocaine was found in Daniel’s car
is more problematic. The defendants argue that this
evidence was relevant to Daniel’s and Jones’s incentive to
flee. The district court did not address this evidence
separately and we are troubled by the evidence’s
minimal probative value in relation to the danger of
unfair prejudice. But even if the district court erred in
admitting this evidence, we conclude that it was harm-
less. See Cerabio, 410 F.3d at 994.
The district court could have given a limiting instruction
to help alleviate any unfair prejudice, but Whitehead
didn’t request such an instruction and so none was
given. See United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508, 517-18
(7th Cir. 2004) (no error where the district court failed to
give limiting instruction sua sponte). Even without the
instruction, however, the parties told the jury that the
case was not about Daniel or what he did, it was about
Whitehead and her conduct. Whitehead’s counsel ex-
plained in closing that it was important for the jury to
know why Whitehead and the officers were at the
scene, but Daniel is an adult and his conduct cannot be
24 No. 11-2225
attributed to his mother. The jury also heard evidence
that Whitehead was a professional with a steady job and
no criminal record. Nothing in the record indicates that
the jury would have attributed Daniel’s bad acts,
including his possession of crack cocaine, to Whitehead.
In light of Lt. Stevens’ and Sgt. Stack’s testimony of White-
head’s conduct providing probable cause for her arrest,
and the background information of Daniel’s, Jones’s, and
Mynatt’s conduct that was properly admitted, Whitehead
hasn’t shown that there was a significant chance that
the crack cocaine evidence affected the outcome of the trial.
b. Evidence of high-violent-crime area
Whitehead sought to bar reference to the 800 block of
South Lavergne as a high-crime area, arguing that the
evidence had no foundation, had limited relevance, and
was highly prejudicial. Initially, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that
a proper foundation was laid for Officer Bond, Lt. Stevens,
and Sgt. Stack to testify, based on their experience patrol-
ling the area for several years, that it was a high-violent-
crime area. See United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793
(7th Cir. 2005) (stating that “specific data” establishing
that a location is a “high-crime area” is not required).
We also find that the evidence had some relevance.
Contrary to Whitehead’s assertions, an officer’s sup-
ported opinion that an area is a high-violent-crime area
can be considered in a probable cause analysis. See
Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill. 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th
No. 11-2225 25
Cir. 2010) (“[P]robable cause depends not on the facts as
an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the
facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable
person in the position of the arresting officer—seeing what
he saw, hearing what he heard.”) (emphasis in original)
(quotations omitted). When conduct is taking place in a
high-crime area, the characteristics of the location may
be one factor officers consider under the totality of cir-
cumstances when detaining someone.1 See United States
v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th
Cir. 2004). For this factor to carry weight, there should
be a reasonable connection between the neighborhood’s
higher crime rate and the facts relied upon to support
probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Tinnie, 629 F.3d
749, 758 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
1
Both parties assume that Whitehead’s seizure amounted to
an arrest, but whether her short detention in the prisoner
wagon qualifies as an arrest requiring probable cause is de-
batable. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th
Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1228
(7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is not necessarily improper to detain
suspects in a police car during some kinds of investigatory
stops.”). Some force may be reasonable during an investigatory
stop when the circumstances give rise to a justifiable fear for
personal safety on the part of the officer. Jewett v. Anders,
521 F.3d 818, 824-25 (7th Cir.2008). This issue wasn’t raised
by the defendants, though, and thus, is not an issue we need
to explore.
26 No. 11-2225
Here, there was a connection. Lt. Stevens was con-
cerned not just with Whitehead’s behavior, but also with
that of the other people in the crowd (who he
testified Whitehead was instigating). In part, because it
was a high-violent-crime area, the seemingly agitated
crowd posed a greater threat to the officers safety, who
feared that violence was more likely to ensue if prompt
action wasn’t taken to disperse the crowd. The officers
could reasonably consider the characteristics of the area
in assessing the situation and deciding what action to
take to maintain control.
The evidence was relevant, but it was also prejudicial.
As we have said though, most relevant evidence is pre-
judicial, so the issue is whether it was unfairly prejudicial.
We cannot find that the district court abused its wide
discretion in admitting the evidence. Neither party sug-
gests that the probable cause instruction to the jury was
an inaccurate statement of the law and thus the jury
was properly guided. Further, Whitehead and Donald
testified that the neighborhood is mostly compromised
of good hardworking homeowners and retired citizens.
Donald described the block as “[m]ostly bungalows,
retired people, elderly people, . . . working class people . . .
It’s a middle class neighborhood.” Defense counsel
didn’t refute this more specific description of the block.
We do not find that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing the jury to hear the parties’
differing perceptions of the area.
No. 11-2225 27
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we A FFIRM the district court’s
judgment.
5-21-12