FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 21 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-10553
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:10-cr-00461-LJO
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JESSE ALVIN CRIPPS, Sr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jesse Alvin Cripps, Sr., appeals from the aggregate 114-month sentence
imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for 15 counts of mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and two counts of money laundering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cripps contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
consider properly the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and by
failing to explain adequately the reasons for the sentence. We review for plain
error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
2010), and we find none. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“[A]dequate explanation in some cases may . . . be inferred from
the PSR or the record as a whole.”); United States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1063-
66 (9th Cir. 2005) (the district court need not specifically articulate reasons for its
choice between a concurrent and a consecutive sentence).
Cripps also contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing
a consecutive sentence, and that the aggregate sentence is substantively
unreasonable. He argues that the court impermissibly double-counted by imposing
a consecutive sentence on the basis of factors already accounted for in the base
offense level calculation. The record reflects that the court properly sentenced
Cripps on the basis of the totality of circumstances and the section 3553(a)
sentencing factors, and that it did not abuse its discretion in imposing low-end
Guidelines sentences on each count of conviction and ordering two of the
sentences to run consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584; Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
2 11-10553