FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELAUTERIA ARMENTA, No. 09-71635
Petitioner, Agency No. A075-658-831
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 15, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Elauteria Armenta, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to
remand and dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying
her application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand, de
Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007), for substantial
evidence the agency’s continuous physical presence finding, Landin-Zavala v.
Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1150, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007), and de novo claims of
constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603
F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Armenta’s motion to remand
where Armenta was not eligible for repapering because she was already in removal
proceedings. See, e.g., Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[E]ligibility for repapering is conditioned on aliens being disadvantaged by the
retroactive stop-time rule.” (emphasis in original)).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Armenta failed
to establish the requisite ten years of continuous physical presence for cancellation
of removal at the time she was served with her Notice to Appear. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A), (d)(1).
We reject Armenta’s contention that the BIA’s decision was inadequate
because, contrary to Armenta’s assertion, the BIA adequately articulated its
reasons for dismissing her appeal, see Antonyan v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1250, 1256-57
(9th Cir. 2011), Armenta failed to rebut the presumption that the BIA considered
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the evidence in the record, see Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96
(9th Cir. 2000), and the BIA correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the constitutionality of the statute and regulations it administers, see
Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Armenta’s remaining constitutional claims are also unavailing. See Urbano
de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978) (The argument that “the
deportation order would amount to a de facto deportation of the child and thus
violate the constitutional rights of the child . . . has been authoritatively rejected in
numerous cases.” (citations omitted)); Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir.
2001) (“‘Line-drawing’ decisions made by Congress or the President in the context
of immigration . . . must be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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