UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6167
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADRIAN HOWARD JACKSON, a/k/a Dexter,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (0:98-cr-01126-JFA-2)
Submitted: May 18, 2012 Decided: May 24, 2012
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Adrian Howard Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, II,
Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Adrian Howard Jackson appeals from the district
court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion
for a reduction in sentence pursuant to Amendment 750 of the
Sentencing Guidelines. The district court determined that
Jackson was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of 240
months imprisonment and he was, therefore, not eligible for a
reduction in sentence based on Amendment 750. For the reasons
that follow, we vacate the district court’s order denying a
reduction and remand for further consideration.
In 2000, Jackson was convicted by a jury of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine
and cocaine base, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) (Count
One), and conspiracy to provide firearms for use during drug
trafficking crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (o) (2006) (Count Two).
In the presentence report (PSR), applying U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1998), the probation officer
recommended a base offense level of 38 on Count One, based on
more than 1.5 kilograms of crack. Coupled with a four-level
adjustment for his role in the offense, Jackson’s total offense
level was 42. With Jackson’s criminal history category at I,
the probation officer calculated a Guidelines range of 360
months to life imprisonment on Count One. However, because
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Jackson’s maximum statutory exposure was 240 months’
imprisonment, his Guidelines range became 240 months. Count Two
mandated a 60-month consecutive sentence. Accordingly, the
district court sentenced Jackson to 300 months’ imprisonment.
In August 2005, the Government filed a motion pursuant
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) to reduce Jackson’s sentence based on
his substantial assistance. The district court granted the
motion and reduced Jackson’s sentence by 48 months (twenty
percent), resulting in a sentence of 252 months’ imprisonment
(192 months on Count One and 60 months on Count Two).
In November 2011, Jackson filed the subject
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for reduction of sentence, seeking the
benefit of Guideline Amendment 750, which recently lowered the
base offense levels applicable to most offenses involving crack
cocaine. The district court denied Jackson’s motion on the
ground that Jackson was sentenced to “the statutory mandatory
minimum of 240 months’ imprisonment” and, therefore, “[w]hatever
changes Amendment 750 might authorize in the underlying base
offense level calculations, those Guideline changes cannot alter
the ultimate statutory floor of 20 years imprisonment set by
Congress.” In doing so, the district court erroneously
converted the twenty-year ceiling applicable to Jackson into a
floor.
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Under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may modify the
term of imprisonment “of a defendant who has been sentenced
. . . based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered,” if the amendment is listed in the Guidelines as
retroactively applicable. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In the
context of Amendment 750, a defendant whose offense of
conviction involved crack cocaine is eligible for a reduced
sentence only if the amendment lowers the defendant’s applicable
Guideline range. See United States v. Lindsey, 556 F.3d 238,
244 (4th Cir. 2009).
Under Amendment 750, the base offense level for
offenses involving 1.5 kilograms or less of crack is now level
34. Adding the four-level enhancement for his role in the
offense, Jackson’s amended offense level is 38. His amended
Guidelines range is 235-293 months; however, because of the
statutory maximum of 240 months, his Guidelines range under the
new amendment effectively becomes 235-240 months. USSG
§ 2D1.1(c)(1) (2011). Application of Amendment 750 to Jackson
results in a sentencing range that is lower than the range
applicable before Amendment 750. Therefore, a reduction in
Jackson’s sentence is authorized under § 3582(c)(2).
In United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197 (4th Cir.
2010), we held that the “original term of imprisonment” means
“the sentence the defendant is serving at the time he makes his
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section 3582(c)(2) motion.” Id. at 202. Thus, “when a
defendant is serving a below-guidelines sentence as a result of
a Rule 35 motion by the government, if the defendant makes a
motion under section 3582(c)(2), his sentence may be further
reduced comparable to the previous reduction received.” Id. at
203. Here, the district court erroneously concluded that
Jackson was serving a statutory mandatory minimum sentence as
opposed to a statutory maximum sentence and, therefore, did not
believe it had the authority to lower Jackson’s sentence.
Because the district court mistakenly concluded that it was
not so authorized, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand to the district court for a determination of whether a
reduction should be applied in Jackson’s case. ∗ We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
∗
We determine in this opinion that a reduction is
authorized; we express no opinion as to whether a reduction in
Jackson’s sentence is warranted. See United States v. Stewart,
595 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing that determination
of whether to grant reduction of sentence authorized under
Amendment 706 is within discretion of the district court judge);
see also United States v. Fennell, 592 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir.
2010) (noting remand allows the district court to exercise its
discretion “to use any of the reasonable methods . . . to
calculate a sentence comparable to that previously imposed, in
light of the purpose and effect of Amendment 706”).
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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