United States v. Daniel McNeil

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4865

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

DANIEL JUNIOR MCNEIL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00406-WO-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 25, 2012

Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Daniel Junior McNeil appeals his conviction following

a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, McNeil’s counsel filed

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but

questioning whether the district court erred in denying the

motion to suppress the firearm found during a search of a

vehicle in which McNeil was a passenger. McNeil was advised of

his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not

file one. Finding no error, we affirm.

In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion

to suppress, “[w]e review the district court’s legal

determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear

error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.

2010). When the district court has denied a suppression motion,

“we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government.” Id.

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer

“may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity

is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). While an officer

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generally must have probable cause to search a vehicle during an

investigatory stop, the owner’s consent to a search negates the

probable cause requirement. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,

250-51 (1991). General consent to the search reasonably extends

to “containers within that car which might bear [contraband].”

Id. at 251. Officers also “may inspect passengers’ belongings

found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of

the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999).

“[A] passenger normally has no legitimate expectation of privacy

in a car in which he asserts neither a property interest nor a

possessory interest and where he disclaims any interest in the

seized object.” United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 874 (4th

Cir. 1992); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)

(holding that standing to challenge search to which vehicle

owner has consented requires passenger to have “legitimate

expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile

searched”). Upon review, we conclude that the district court

did not err in denying McNeil’s motion to suppress the firearm

found during the owner-consented search of the vehicle in which

he was a passenger.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

requires that counsel inform McNeil, in writing, of his right to

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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If McNeil requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on McNeil. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED