UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL JUNIOR MCNEIL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00406-WO-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 25, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Junior McNeil appeals his conviction following
a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, McNeil’s counsel filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court erred in denying the
motion to suppress the firearm found during a search of a
vehicle in which McNeil was a passenger. McNeil was advised of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not
file one. Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion
to suppress, “[w]e review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
2010). When the district court has denied a suppression motion,
“we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” Id.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
“may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). While an officer
2
generally must have probable cause to search a vehicle during an
investigatory stop, the owner’s consent to a search negates the
probable cause requirement. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
250-51 (1991). General consent to the search reasonably extends
to “containers within that car which might bear [contraband].”
Id. at 251. Officers also “may inspect passengers’ belongings
found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of
the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999).
“[A] passenger normally has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in a car in which he asserts neither a property interest nor a
possessory interest and where he disclaims any interest in the
seized object.” United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 874 (4th
Cir. 1992); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)
(holding that standing to challenge search to which vehicle
owner has consented requires passenger to have “legitimate
expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile
searched”). Upon review, we conclude that the district court
did not err in denying McNeil’s motion to suppress the firearm
found during the owner-consented search of the vehicle in which
he was a passenger.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform McNeil, in writing, of his right to
3
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If McNeil requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on McNeil. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4