Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

Nos. 10-3618, 10-3651, 10-3652 & 10-3798
_____________

JOHN M. DEWEY; PATRICK DEMARTINO;
PATRICIA ROMEO; LYNDA GALLO; RONALD B.
MARRANS; EDWARD O. GRIFFIN, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED

v.

VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT;
VOLKSWAGEN BETEILIGUNGS GESELLSCHAFT
M.B.H.; VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS VOLKSWAGEN OF
AMERICA, INC.); AUDI AG; VOLKSWAGEN
GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., d/b/a AUDI OF
AMERICA, INC.; AUDI OF AMERICA, LLC;
VOLKSWAGEN DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V.

(D.N.J. 07-cv-02249)
_____________________

JACQUELINE DELGUERCIO; LYNDA GALLO;
FRANCIS NOWICKI; KENNETH BAYER,
1
 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

v.

VOLKSWAGEN AMERICA, INC.; VOLKSWAGEN
GROUP OF AMERICA, INC.; VOLKSWAGEN OF
AMERICA, INC., d/b/a AUDI OF AMERICA, INC.;
VOLKSWAGEN AG; AUDI AG; VOLKSWAGEN DE
MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V.; ABC ENTITIES 1-20

(D.N.J. 07-cv-02361)
_____________________

Lester Brickman, Darren McKinney, Michael Sullivan,
Joshua West,

Appellants in 10-3618

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. s/h/a Volkswagen of
America, Inc., Volkswagen AG, Volkswagen de Mexico,
S.A. de C.V., Audi of America, LLC, Audi AG, and
Volkswagen Beteiligungs Gesellschaft M.B.H.,

Appellants at 10-3651

John M. Dewey, Patrick DeMartino, Patricia Romeo,
Ronald B. Marrans, Edward O. Griffin, Jacqueline
DelGuericio, Lynda Gallo, Francis Nowicki,
Kenneth Bayer,

2
 Appellants in 10-3652

Daniel Sibley, David Stevens,

Appellants in 10-3798
_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court Nos. 2-07-cv-02249 & 07-cv-02361
Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Patty Shwartz

Argued March 27, 2012

Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit
Judges

(Filed: May 31, 2012)

Angelo J. Genova
Dina M. Mastellone
Genova Burns Giantomasi & Webster
494 Broad Street
6th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102

Jay P. Saltzman
Samuel P. Sporn [ARGUED]
Schoengold & Sporn
19 Fulton Street
3
Suite 407
New York, NY 10038
Counsel for John M. Dewey, Patrick DeMartino,
Patricia Romeo, Ronald B. Marrans & Edward O.
Griffin

Adam M. Slater [ARGUED]
Matthew R. Mendelsohn
Mazie, Slater, Katz & Freeman
103 Eisenhower Parkway
Roseland, NJ 07068
Counsel for Jacqueline Delguercio, Lynda Gallo
& Francis Nowicki

Jeffrey L. Chase [ARGUED]
Keith A. Frederick
Herzfeld & Rubin
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004

Peter J. Kurshan
Chase, Kurshan, Herzfeld & Rubin
354 Eisenhower Parkway
Suite 1100
Livingston, NJ 07039
Counsel for Defendants Volkswagen of America,
Inc., Audi of America, LLC, Volkswagen AG, Audi
AG, Volkswagen Beteiligungs Gesellschaft M.B.H.,
Volkswagen de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., Volkswagen
Group of America, Inc. & Volkswagen Group of
America, Inc., d/b/a Audi of America, Inc.
4
Theodore H. Frank [ARGUED]
Center for Class Action Fairness
1718 M Street, N.W.
No. 236
Washington, DC 20036
Counsel for Lester Brickman, Darren McKinney,
Michael Sullivan & Joshua West

Gary W. Sibley, Esq.
The Sibley Firm
2414 North Akard
Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201

David M. Nieporent
Samuel & Stein Law Office
38 West 32nd Street
Suite 1210
New York, NY 10001
Counsel for Daniel Sibley & David Stevens

________________

OPINION
________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from the certification of a class,
5
the approval of a settlement, and the award of attorneys’
fees in a products liability suit concerning defective cars
manufactured by Volkswagen of America, Inc., Audi of
America, Inc., and related entities (collectively,
“Volkswagen”).1 As part of the settlement, one group of
class members (the “reimbursement group”) received the
right to reimbursement for certain qualifying damages,
paid from an $8 million fund. The remaining class
members (the “residual group”) were required to wait
until the reimbursement group made its claims. The
residual group could then make “goodwill” claims on the
remaining money in the fund. Those monies were to be
distributed pro rata amongst the residual claimants. The
District Court certified a single class containing both the
reimbursement group and the residual group. On appeal,
objectors Joshua West, Lester Brickman, Darren
McKinney, and Michael Sullivan (collectively the “West
Objectors”) argue that the representative plaintiffs in this
suit, all members of the reimbursement group, cannot
adequately represent the interests of the class members in
the residual group. We agree. We conclude that the
interests of the representative plaintiffs do not
sufficiently align with those of the unnamed plaintiffs in
the residual group, and that the class thus fails to satisfy

1
The full list of defendants includes: Volkswagen of
America, Inc.; Volkswagen AG; Volkswagen
Beteilingungs Gesellschaft M.B.H.; Audi of America,
Inc.; Audi AG; Volkswagen de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.;
Volkswagen Group of America; and Audi of America,
LLC.
6
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). We will
reverse the District Court’s order certifying the class and
remand for further proceedings.

I.
A.

In May 2007, two groups of plaintiffs (the “Dewey
plaintiffs” and the “Delguercio plaintiffs”) filed separate
class action suits against Volkswagen. On June 22, 2007,
the cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes
because they raised substantially similar allegations: that
several models of Volkswagen and Audi automobiles had
defectively designed sunroofs that, when clogged by
plant debris and pollen, allowed water to leak into the
vehicle. While leakage could be prevented through
regular cleaning and maintenance, Volkswagen allegedly
failed to inform car owners of these preventive measures
because such a disclosure would acknowledge a design
defect, and would likely obligate Volkswagen to cover
any resulting damage under their warranty program.
The Dewey plaintiffs allege: (1) violations of New
Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”); (2) violations
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”); (3) common
law fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
Delguercio plaintiffs allege: (1) breaches of express and
implied warranties; (2) improper repairs of vehicles; (3)
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4)
negligent misrepresentations; (5) violations of the
7
NJCFA; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) fraud.

After two years of discovery, the parties notified
the Court that they were entering into settlement
negotiations. The Court suspended pretrial deadlines and
set a deadline for a joint motion for preliminary
settlement approval. On November 10, 2009, the District
Court approved the parties’ request to refer the case to a
magistrate judge “to conduct all settlement proceedings
and enter final judgment.” The case was referred to
Magistrate Judge Patty Shwartz.

B.
On January 29, 2010, the parties filed a joint
motion for preliminary approval of a settlement,
preliminary certification of a class, and appointment of
class counsel. The parties requested certification of the
following class:
(a) all Persons, other than officers,
directors, or employees of the
defendants, who purchased or leased,
new or used, the following settlement
class vehicles:

• 2001-2007 Volkswagen New
Beetle vehicles with Vehicle
Identification Numbers (VINs)
below 3VW---1C-7M514779,
equipped with sunroof;

8
• 2001-2005 Jetta A4 Sedan with
VINs with “9M” in position 7
and 8, and 2001-2005
Volkswagen Jetta Wagon A4
vehicles with VINs with “1J” in
position 7 and 8, equipped with
sunroof;

• 2001-2006 Volkswagen Golf
A4, Volkswagen GTI A4
vehicles with VINs with “1J” in
position 7 and 8, equipped with
sunroof;

• 2005-2007 Volkswagen Jetta
A5 vehicles with VINs with
“1K” in position 7 and 8,
equipped with sunroof;

• 2006-2007 Volkswagen
Golf/GTI A5 vehicles with
VINs with “1K” in position 7
and 8, equipped with sunroof;

• 1999-2005 Volkswagen Passat
B5 vehicles;

• 1997-2006 Audi A4 vehicles,
B5 and B6 Platforms in
MY2005, with VINs with “8E”
in position 7 and 8 with also
“J” or “L” or “V” or “P” or “X”
9
 in position 4, and MY2005 and
MY2006, with VINs with “8H”
in position 7 and 8 (including
Cabrio, S, and RS versions);

• 1998-2005 Audi A6 C5
vehicles with VINs with “4B”
in position 7 and 8 (including
Allroad, S, and RS versions);

[the “reimbursement group”]

and
(b) all persons, other than officers,
directors, or employees of the
defendants, who currently own or
lease the following settlement class
vehicles:

• 1998-2000 and 2007-2009
Volkswagen New Beetle with
VINs 3VW---1C-7M514779 or
higher, equipped with sunroof;

• 1997-1999 Volkswagen Jetta
A3 with VINs with “1H” in
position 7 and 8, 1999-2000
Volkswagen Jetta A4s with
VINs with “9M” in position 7
and 8, and 2008-2009
Volkswagen Jetta A5 vehicles

10
 with VINs with “1K” in
position 7 and 8, equipped with
sunroof;

• 1997-1999 Volkswagen
Golf/GTI A3 with VINs with
“1H” in position 7 and 8, 1999-
2000 Volkswagen Golf/GTI A4
with VINs with “1J” in position
7 and 8, and 2008-2009
Volkswagen Golf/GTI A5
vehicles with VINs with “1K”
in position 7 and 8, equipped
with sunroof;

• 1998 Volkswagen Passat B5
vehicles;

• 1997 Volkswagen Passat B4
and 2006-2009 Volkswagen
Passat B6 vehicles equipped
with sunroof;

• 2004-2009 Volkswagen
Touareg vehicles;

• 2005-2008 Audi A4 B7
Platform vehicles equipped
with sunroof, in MY2005, with
VINs with “8E” in position 7
and 8 and also “A” or “D” or

11
 “K” or “G” or “U” in position 4
(including S and RS versions);

• 1997 Audi A6 C4 vehicles;

• 2005-2009 Audi A6 C6
vehicles equipped with sunroof
with VINs with “4A” or “4F”
in position 7 and 8 (including S
and RS versions);

• 1997-2009 Audi A8 vehicles
(including S versions)
[the “residual group”]
App’x A13-14. All of the representative plaintiffs in the
case are members of the reimbursement group.
The settlement agreement made three types of
relief available to the class. First, the settlement
agreement provided that all class members would receive
“[e]ducational preventative maintenance information.”
App’x A317. This information instructed class members
how to inspect and clean their sunroofs to avoid leakage.

Second, the settlement agreement designated
certain car models in the reimbursement group whose
owners or lessees would be eligible to take their cars to
any authorized Volkswagen dealership for removal of a
problematic valve on the sunroof and for inspection of

12
the sunroof drains and drain hoses. These service actions
would be performed free of charge to the class member.

Finally, the settlement agreement created an $8
million reimbursement fund that would be made
available to reimburse class members for certain
“reimbursable repairs.” 2 The settlement agreement
provided that the claims administrator would satisfy all
claims made by members of the reimbursement group for
reimbursable repairs. If the $8 million reimbursement

2
The agreement defined “reimbursable repairs” as:

cleaning, drying or replacement of
carpeting, including padding, and/or repair
or replacement of [specified components],
and/or repair and replacement of any
component of the sunroof drain system
and/or plenum drain system, in response to a
documented customer complaint or report of
water entering the passenger compartment
through or due to the sunroof drain system
or plenum area . . . of a Settlement Class
Vehicle . . . which cleaning, drying, or repair
or replacement was performed prior to the
date on which Notice is mailed by the
Settlement Administrator and for which
Proof of Repair is timely tendered.

App’x A311.

13
fund was not sufficient to satisfy these claims, the claims
would be “made on a pro rata basis.” App’x A320. If
there was money remaining in the fund after these
reimbursement claims were settled, it would be used to
satisfy “goodwill” claims consisting of: (1)
reimbursement claims made by members of the residual
group; and (2) reimbursements for nonreimbursable
repairs paid for by members of the reimbursement group.
App’x A321. The fund would accept goodwill claims up
to five years after the effective date of the settlement. 3
App’x A321-22. Five years after the effective date, any
money remaining in the fund would be “donated to an
educational, charitable, and/or research facility in the
United States and dedicated to specific projects and
programs benefitting automobile safety and/or
environmental technology . . . .” Id.

The District Court preliminarily approved the
settlement, preliminarily certified the class, and
appointed class counsel. The District Court’s Order
required that notice be communicated in three different
ways: (1) direct mail to all class members for whom
mailing addresses were available; (2) a class website with
an electronic version of the mailed notices and a claim
form; and (3) publication in USA Today. This notice was

3
The effective date was “the first date on which all
appellate rights with respect to the Judgment have
expired or have been conclusively exhausted in a manner
that affirms the Judgment.” App’x A307.
14
sent to approximately 4.2 million Volkswagen owners
and 2.1 million Audi owners.4

The District Court ordered the representative
plaintiffs to file a memorandum in support of final
settlement approval by June 17, 2010, with opposition
briefs due June 28, 2010. 5 The court also scheduled a

4
In June 2010, the parties mailed a second set of notices
to owners of approximately 550,000 class vehicles who
did not receive the first notice.
5
On July 12, 2010, after the June 28, 2010 deadline had
passed, the West Objectors moved for leave to file a
response to plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of final
settlement approval. The District Court denied the West
Objectors’ motion. On appeal, the West Objectors argue
that they were denied due process because the District
Court required that they file their objection before
representative plaintiffs filed their fee petition. As the
District Court noted in its opinion, the West Objectors
misunderstand the court’s scheduling order. The West
Objectors had until June 21 to file an opposition to the
fee petition, and until June 28 to file an opposition to
plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of final certification.
The West Objectors missed both of these deadlines.
Having cited no case law suggesting that due process
requires a District Court to allow objectors to file such
untimely response briefs, we conclude that the West
Objectors had a “reasonable opportunity” to respond to
15
fairness hearing for July 26, 2010. On June 9, 2010, the
representative plaintiffs filed a joint motion for attorneys’
fees in advance of the fairness hearing. In support of
their motion, they attached the expert report of Dr.
George Eads, an economist who placed the value of the
settlement at over $142 million.

On June 11, 2010, objectors Daniel Sibley and
George Stevens (the “Sibley Objectors”) filed an
objection to the settlement and a notice of intent to
appear at the fairness hearing. The Sibley Objectors
raised objections to the notice, the plan of allocation, and
representative plaintiffs’ fee petition. They did not at
that time argue that the Magistrate Judge lacked
jurisdiction over the case.
On June 14, 2010, the West Objectors, represented
by the Center for Class Action Fairness, filed an
objection to the settlement and a notice of intent to
appear at the fairness hearing. The West Objectors raised
several objections to the adequacy of representation, the
presence of an intra-class conflict, the fairness of the
settlement, and the requested attorneys’ fee award.
In total, in a class consisting of approximately 5.5
million members, 203 class members objected to the

plaintiffs’ papers, and that they simply failed to avail
themselves of the opportunity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).

16
settlement or the fee petition.6 Additionally, 1,119
potential class members opted out of the class and the
settlement.

C.

Finally, on July 26, 2010, the District Court held a
fairness hearing on the settlement agreement and the fee
petition. At the hearing, representative plaintiffs called
Eads to testify about the value of the settlement.
Volkswagen did not cross-examine Eads, but the
Magistrate Judge independently and thoroughly
examined Eads about his methodology. First, she asked
about the “subcategories” in Eads’s report—groups of
class members who received different sets of notices
based on their car models and the settlement benefits
available to them. She then asked Eads whether he
divided the class into the subgroups, or whether he knew
the basis for the divisions. Eads responded that the
lawyers had independently grouped the class members,
and that he was not aware of the method they used. He
noted, however, that the grouping did seem to have some
empirical basis grounded in the likelihood of
experiencing leakage. The Judge followed up by asking

6
Notice was directed to the owners of over six million
class vehicles. Because many of these owners were
“fleet buyers,” and owned multiple class vehicles, the
size of the class was appreciably lower than the size of
the class vehicle pool.

17
whether Eads had determined why the residual group was
excluded from seeking reimbursements.7 He responded
that he did not know why the residual group was
excluded, but said he assumed it was the product of
negotiations between counsel. 8

7
The residual group was, in fact, allowed to make
reimbursement claims. They were simply restricted to
making “goodwill” claims from the residual of the $8
million fund after the reimbursement group claims had
been paid. App’x A321.
8
After the District Court completed its questioning,
counsel for the West Objectors sought leave to cross-
examine Eads. The District Court declined to allow the
West Objectors to cross-examine Eads, noting that they
had failed to notify the parties of their intent to cross-
examine Eads prior to the hearing, and that the court had
already sufficiently questioned Eads. The West
Objectors argue on appeal that they were denied due
process when the District Court failed to allow them to
cross-examine Eads.
The West Objectors are correct that they have a
limited right to discovery that can, in certain
circumstances, include the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses before the court. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va.,
418 F.3d 277, 316 (3d Cir. 2005); see Greenfield v.
Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1973)
(noting that “an objector at a [fairness] hearing is entitled
to an opportunity to develop a record in support of his
18
 After Eads finished testifying, the court asked for
argument from the objectors. Counsel for the West
Objectors spoke first, raising several arguments as to why
the proposed class failed to meet the requirements of
Rule 23, and why the settlement should be rejected.
After being pressed by the Magistrate Judge, counsel

contentions by means of cross-examination”). This right,
however, is not absolute. Rather, “[t]he District Court
has discretion to ‘employ the procedures that it perceives
will best permit it to evaluate the fairness of the
settlement.’” Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 563 (D.N.J.
1997), aff’d 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)). The extent to
which the District Court’s procedures limit the objectors’
rights is “predicated on the total inadequacy of the record
upon which the settlement was approved and the ‘totality
of the circumstances surrounding the settlement hearing’
in which the objector was denied meaningful
participation.” Id. (quoting Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d
153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975)). We review for an abuse of
discretion. See id. at 317.
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the totality of the
circumstances did not require further cross-examination
at the fairness hearing. The Magistrate Judge had already
thoroughly and effectively cross-examined Eads, and the
court assured the West Objectors that they could
substantively criticize Eads’ methodology during their
argument to the court.

19
stated that his primary argument was that there was “an
Amchem problem” 9 in that “[c]lass members who are
going to suffer damage in the future . . . are releasing
their claims and have no relief under this settlement and
they’re not represented by any of the current class
representatives because all of the class representatives
have current claims, not future claims.” App’x A1102.
In other words, counsel recast his earlier arguments in
adequacy of representation terms under Rule 23(a)(4).

After the remaining objectors made their
arguments, representative plaintiffs were given time for
further argument. Representative plaintiffs argued that
the class members all suffer common problems with the
drain systems that were “failing for the same reason.”
App’x A1108. Representative plaintiffs also suggested
that even if there were differences between class
members, “we’ve dealt with this through subclasses for
relief purposes.” App’x A1109. 10 The Magistrate Judge

9
Counsel was referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1996).
10
We find it remarkable that the parties continually
referred to different subcategories of plaintiffs in the
certified class as “subclasses.” At oral argument,
Volkswagen characterized the parties’ use of the term as
an “unfortunate choice of language . . . used by the
plaintiffs’ expert.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 23:19-21. We find
the use of the term problematic. The fact is that the
20
then allowed Volkswagen time for further argument.
Volkswagen first argued that there was no adequacy
problem, because “the Class representatives have the
same interest as everyone else . . . .” App’x A1128-29.
Volkswagen also pointed out that there were very few
objectors and opt-outs, and argued that the small number
implied that the settlement was fair.

D.
On August 3, 2010, the District Court issued an
order certifying the class, approving the settlement, and
granting representative plaintiffs’ fee petition. The
Magistrate Judge first addressed class certification,
addressing each of the Rule 23 requirements. Notably, as
to adequacy, the court found that there were no intra-
class conflicts because “[t]he named plaintiffs are in the
same position as the class members because each of them
owned or leased the subject vehicles that contained the
allegedly defective plenum or sunroof drain system,
receiving allegedly inadequate maintenance
recommendations and, as a result, suffered the same
injury.” App’x A82. The court further noted that “[t]he
fact that the relief class members receive may differ

parties did not propose and the court did not certify
separate subclasses. The use of the term is misleading, as
actual subclasses may have mooted the adequacy issue
raised in this very appeal. For purposes of this opinion
we refer to the seven groups identified by Dr. Eads as
“subcategories” rather than subclasses.
21
based upon the vehicle the member owned or leased does
not reflect antagonism or differing interests. Rather, it
reflects the compromise reached to address the frequency
[with which] problems were reported for each model.”
App’x A83.
After concluding that the Rule 23 requirements
were met, the court moved on to consider whether the
settlement was fair and reasonable, pursuant to Rule
23(e). In analyzing the reasonableness of the settlement,
the court considered the so-called Girsh factors:

(1) the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation;
(2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement;
(3) the stage of the proceedings and the
amount of discovery completed;
(4) the risks of establishing liability;

(5) the risks of establishing damages;
(6) the risks of maintaining the class action
through the trial;

(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand
a greater judgment;

22
 (8) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the best
possible recovery; and
(9) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund to a possible recovery in
light of all the attendant risks of
litigation.
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court found that each of these factors either weighed in
favor of the settlement, or was neutral.

In order to analyze the reaction of the class to the
settlement, the second Girsh factor, the court considered
the objections to the settlement. The court noted that:
Several objectors asserted that the division
of class members into subclasses produced
conflicts of interest which led to inequitable
remedies. These divisions and the resulting
remedies are based on objective criteria,
namely the past frequency of failure and the
design of the vehicles. This is a reasonable
basis to decide the relief to be provided,
particularly where complete, individualized
relief for each class member could not be
negotiated. All class members, even those
in the subclass that receives only
preventative care information, receive
something of value. Thus, the division of
class members into subclasses receiving
23
 different benefits based upon the type of
vehicle they own does not necessarily render
the settlement unfair or unreasonable, nor
does it show a conflict of interest that
renders the class representatives unable to
adequately represent the class.

App’x A102. Having concluded that the class met the
requirements of Rule 23 and that the settlement was “fair
and reasonable,” the court certified the class and
approved the settlement.

The court then considered the representative
plaintiffs’ petition for attorneys’ fees and incentive
awards. The court approved a fee award of $9.2 million,
and approved a $10,000 incentive award for each
representative plaintiff.
II.
The West Objectors and the Sibley Objectors
separately appeal from the District Court’s order
certifying the class, approving the settlement, and
granting representative plaintiffs’ fee petition. The West
and Sibley Objectors raise a host of issues on appeal.
Volkswagen and the representative plaintiffs also filed
cross-appeals. Because we conclude that the District
Court improperly certified the class, we limit our
discussion to two issues: (1) whether the Magistrate
Judge possessed, and consequently, whether this court
possesses jurisdiction over this case absent the
affirmative consent of the unnamed plaintiffs; and (2)
24
whether the class, as certified, satisfies the adequacy
requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).

A.

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). A magistrate judge may
exercise jurisdiction over a case in which a federal
district court had jurisdiction “[u]pon the consent of the
parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Where the parties
properly consent to allow the magistrate judge to exercise
jurisdiction over the case, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) permits
the parties to “appeal directly to the appropriate United
States court of appeals from the judgment of the
magistrate judge,” as opposed to appealing to the district
court that referred the case to the magistrate judge.
“Accordingly, [this court’s] final order jurisdiction to
review such an order arises from 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) to
the extent it is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Skretvedt
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 200 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2004).

The failure to satisfy the requirements of
§ 636(c)(1) deprives the magistrate judge of jurisdiction
over the case. See McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433
F.3d 460, 472 (6th Cir. 2006). Similarly, where the
requirements of § 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, we lack
jurisdiction under § 636(c)(3), and the parties must
appeal directly to the district court that referred the case
pursuant to the procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Cf. Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 200 n.7.
25
 The Sibley Objectors argue that they, and other
unnamed class members, are “parties” within the
meaning of § 636(c)(1), and that their consent was
required in order for the Magistrate Judge to exercise
jurisdiction over the case. If the Magistrate Judge lacked
jurisdiction over the case under § 636(c)(1), this court
would lack jurisdiction pursuant to § 636(c)(3). Because
this issue concerns our jurisdiction over this appeal, we
address it even though the Sibley Objectors did not first
raise the issue in their written objection filed with the
District Court. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d
72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that jurisdiction is a
non-waivable issue, and that “courts have an independent
obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in
doubt”). We review the issue de novo. See Great W.
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d
159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010).

The Seventh Circuit rejected such an argument in
Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc.,
159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998). Williams held that
unnamed class members are not “parties” within the
meaning of § 636(c)(1); rather, “they are more accurately
regarded as having something less than full party status .
. . .” Id. at 269. As a result, the court held that the
affirmative consent of all unnamed class members is not
required in order for a magistrate judge to exercise
jurisdiction over a case. If an unnamed class member
objects to trying the case before a magistrate judge, that
class member has two options:

26
 First, she may apply to the district court to
intervene under Rule 24(a), become a party
to the lawsuit, and then exercise her right to
withhold her consent to proceed before the
magistrate. Or, after the entry of final
judgment, the unnamed class member can
raise a collateral attack based on due process
against the named representative’s decision
to consent under § 636(c). . . . Alternatively,
the unnamed class member could try to
show in a collateral attack that the decision
to proceed before a magistrate judge was a
matter on which there was a. . . significant
intra-class conflict and that the notice the
absentee received was inadequate to inform
her of this conflict.11

Id. at 269-70. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that
unnamed class members are not “parties” within the
meaning of § 636(c)(1), and that their consent is not
required for a magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction
over a case.
The Sibley Objectors argue that Williams was
11
The Sibley Objectors do not raise any possible intra-
class conflicts as concerns the decision to proceed before
the Magistrate Judge. The only intra-class conflicts that
they raise concern the interests and incentives of
representative plaintiffs in the process of negotiating the
settlement agreement.

27
implicitly overruled by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1
(2002). In Devlin, the Supreme Court held that unnamed
class members are parties “for the purposes of bringing
an appeal[.]” Id. at 9. Devlin did not consider §
636(c)(1), and in no way disturbed the reasoning in
Williams. Indeed, the Devlin court carefully limited its
holding, noting that “[un]named class members . . . may
be parties for some purposes and not for others.” Id. at 9-
10. The Supreme Court specifically stated that its
holding did not “conflict with any other aspect of class
action procedure.” Id. at 9. The fact that unnamed class
members may be parties for the purposes of bringing an
appeal does not mean that they are, ipso facto, parties
within the meaning of § 636(c)(1). As the Williams court
noted, such a “radical result” would “virtually eliminate
§ 636(c) referrals to magistrate judges in all potential
class actions, because it would de facto transform all
such cases into ‘opt-in’ style actions . . . .” Williams, 159
F.3d at 269. Consequently, we conclude that the
Magistrate Judge properly exercised jurisdiction over this
case.
B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires
that “the representative parties [in a class action] . . .
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 12

12
A similar requirement is found in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
“of course require[ ] that the named plaintiff[s] at all
28
The adequacy requirement has two components: (1)
concerning the experience and performance of class
counsel; and (2) concerning the interests and incentives
of the representative plaintiffs. In re Cmty. Bank of N.
Va., 418 F.3d 277, 303 (3d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
“Community Bank I”]. 13 The West Objectors question
only the second component, arguing that two separate
intra-class conflicts prevent the representative plaintiffs
from adequately representing the entire class.

We review the District Court’s order certifying the
class for an abuse of discretion. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec.

times adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). The West Objectors do not
phrase their argument in constitutional terms, and even if
they did, it is unclear what differences, if any, exist
between the adequacy requirement under the Due Process
Clause and under Rule 23. See Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1676 (2008).
13
“Although questions concerning the adequacy of class
counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . .
those questions have, since 2003, been governed by Rule
23(g).” Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d
Cir. 2010). Because the parties do not dispute the
adequacy of class counsel, we consider the adequacy
requirement strictly through the lens of Rule 23(a)(4).
29
Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 629 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly,
“‘[w]here the district court has declined to certify a
subclass’ and treats all class members as falling within a
single class for purposes of a fund allocation, ‘we will
ordinarily defer to its decision unless it constituted an
abuse of discretion.’” Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d
273, 326 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 271 (3d Cir.
2009)). An abuse of discretion “occurs if the district
court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper
application of law to fact. [W]hether an incorrect legal
standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed
de novo.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552
F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
1.

The Supreme Court has twice considered this
component of the adequacy requirement, first in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1996), and
second in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815
(1997). In Amchem, plaintiffs brought suit against
defendant manufacturers of asbestos products. The
parties reached an agreement to settle the case, then
sought certification from the district court of a settlement
class. Under the terms of the global settlement, the
benefits received varied significantly from class member
to class member. While some members could receive as

30
much as $200,000, others received nothing. The District
Court approved the settlement and certified the class.

This court reversed, concluding that “serious intra-
class conflicts preclude[d] th[e] class from meeting the
adequacy of representation requirement.” Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996).
We acknowledged that all parties had an incentive to
maximize their recovery, but noted that “the settlement
does more than simply provide a general recovery fund[,]
[r]ather, it makes important judgments on how recovery
is to be allocated among different kinds of plaintiffs,
decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over
others.” Id.
Our opinion focused on the conflict between class
members who already manifested injuries and those who
had not yet manifested injuries. We recognized that class
members without manifest injuries would “want
protection against inflation for distant recoveries[,] . . .
sturdy back-end opt-out rights and ‘causation provisions
that can keep pace with changing science and medicine,
rather than freezing in place the science of 1993.’”
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610-11 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d
at 630-31). These incentives contrasted with the
incentives of class members with manifest injuries, who
“would care little about such provisions and would
rationally trade them for higher current payouts.” Id. at
611.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that “[t]he
adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover
31
conflicts of interest between named parties and the class
they seek to represent.” Id. at 625. The court agreed that
“the interests of those within the single class are not
aligned,” and suggested that the problem might be solved
if the class members were divided into “discrete
subclasses.” Id. at 626.

The Supreme Court revisited the issue two terms
later in Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 855-59. Ortiz also concerned a
settlement in a class action suit against an asbestos
manufacturer. The Fifth Circuit approved a settlement
that excluded a number of potential class members with
claims indistinguishable from the claims of the members
of the settlement class, and provided the same benefit for
all class members regardless of the strength of their
claims.
The Supreme Court reversed on adequacy grounds.
Id. The Court cited two specific intra-class conflicts that
rendered the named plaintiffs inadequate class
representatives. First, it noted that under Amchem,
present and future claimants have different incentives in
negotiating a settlement, and that present claimants
cannot adequately represent future claimants. Id. at 856-
57. Second, it noted that the class included plaintiffs
exposed both before and after the defendant’s insurance
policy had expired. Id. at 857-58. Because the pre-
expiration claimants had access to insurance proceeds,
they had access to a bigger pool of money from which to
recover. Post-expiration claimants lacked the incentive
to seriously pursue reimbursement under the relevant

32
insurance policies because they could not benefit from
such proceeds.

The Court again explicitly rejected the argument
that the class members all had the same incentive simply
because all members of the class wished for a maximum
recovery. Id. Rather, the Court concluded that the intra-
class conflicts prevented the representative plaintiffs
from adequately representing the entire class. The Court
reiterated that the adequacy issue could be avoided by
dividing the class “into homogeneous subclasses[.]” Id.
at 856. Further, the Court suggested that subclassing
may be necessary when a class can be divided into
“easily identifiable categories.” Id. at 832.
Since Ortiz, this Court has confronted the
adequacy requirement on several occasions. We have
recognized that the linchpin of the adequacy requirement
is the alignment of interests and incentives between the
representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class. See
Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 307 (“[W]e recognize
that ‘adequate representation of a particular claim is
determined by the alignment of interests of class
members . . . .’” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa
USA Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 113 (2d Cir. 2005))); Sullivan,
667 F.3d at 336 n.5 (Scirica, J., concurring) (noting that
subclasses were not needed because “all indirect class
members have aligned interests”); In re Schering Plough
Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 602 (3d Cir. 2009)
(noting that adequacy focuses on “alignment of
interests”); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel

33
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995)
(requiring that “the class representatives have interests
that are sufficiently aligned with the absentees to assure
that the monitoring serves the interests of the class as a
whole”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 287,
290 (2003) (“Dutifully following . . . the text of Rule
23(a)(4), current law focuses largely on aligning the
‘interests’ of the persons within the class. The idea is
that the ‘representative parties’ will ‘fairly and
adequately protect’ those interests and, in so doing,
legitimately bind absent class members to the resulting
judgment.”). Certain intra-class conflicts may cause the
interests of the representative plaintiffs to diverge from
those of the unnamed class members. The adequacy
requirement “is designed to ferret out” such conflicts of
interest, In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig.,
280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001), superseded by statute
on other grounds, as recognized in Bateman v. Am.
Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 722 (9th Cir. 2010),
“and to ensure that the putative named plaintiff has the . .
. incentive to represent the claims of the class
vigorously.” In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275,
290 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter “Community Bank II”].

Obviously, not all intra-class conflicts will defeat
the adequacy requirement. See 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin,
McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law & Practice § 4:30
(8th ed. 2011) (“Not all allegations of conflict will make
a proposed representative inadequate.”); cf. In re Pet
Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 344 (3d Cir.

34
2010). “The hard question concerning intraclass
conflicts asks which conflicts should matter . . . what
divisions should render the class representation so
defective in structure as to rise to the level of a
constitutional dereliction,” or violation of Rule 23(a)(4).
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1678
(2008). A “conflict must be ‘fundamental’ to violate
Rule 23(a)(4).” In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases
Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2011); see
also Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180
(4th Cir. 2010) (“For a conflict of interest to defeat the
adequacy requirement, that conflict must be
fundamental.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 959 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“An absence of material conflicts of interest
between the named plaintiffs and their counsel with other
class members is central to adequacy . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350
F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Significantly, the
existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat a
party’s claim to class certification: the conflict must be a
‘fundamental’ one going to the specific issues in
controversy.”); 6 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg,
Newberg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed. 2002) (stating
that for a conflict to render representative plaintiffs
inadequate under Rule 23(a), the conflict “must be
fundamental”); cf. Community Bank II, 622 F.3d at 303
(“Here, there is an obvious and fundamental intra-class
conflict of interest . . . .”).

35
 “A fundamental conflict exists where some [class]
members claim to have been harmed by the same conduct
that benefitted other members of the class.” Valley Drug
Co., 350 F.3d at 1189. A conflict is fundamental where it
touches “the specific issues in controversy.” Conte &
Newberg, supra, § 3:26; see also Valley Drug Co., 350
F.3d at 1189; McLaughlin, supra, § 4:30. A conflict
concerning the allocation of remedies amongst class
members with competing interests can be fundamental
and can thus render a representative plaintiff inadequate.
See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27.
A conflict that is unduly speculative, however, is
generally not fundamental. See Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt.
Co. LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 680 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding the
adequacy requirement satisfied because “[a]t this stage in
the litigation, the existence of such conflicts is
hypothetical.”); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); McLaughlin,
supra, § 4:30.

We must thus address two questions: (1) whether
an intra-class conflict exists; and if so, (2) whether that
conflict is “fundamental.” We answer these questions by
independently considering the two intra-class conflicts
cited by the West Objectors to determine whether either
conflict causes a divergence of interests significant
enough to undercut the representative plaintiffs’ ability to
adequately represent the class.
2.

First, the West Objectors argue that there is an
36
intra-class conflict between those class members who
have already suffered leakage, and those who have not
yet suffered leakage. All of the representative plaintiffs
fall into the former category. The West Objectors argue
that this presents a classic Amchem conflict between
“past” claimants (those who have already suffered
damage) and “future” claimants (those who have not yet
suffered damage).
More specifically, the West Objectors argue that
representative plaintiffs had an incentive to prioritize
recovery for leakage-related damage that they sustained
over recovery for the failure to inform that was suffered
by the entire class. The Supreme Court specifically cited
a similar divergence of interests in Amchem, agreeing
with this court’s opinion below that “[a]lready injured
parties . . . would care little about [benefits that may be
important to future claimants] and would rationally trade
them for higher current payouts.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at
611. To properly analyze the intra-class conflict alleged
here, we must look to the class as certified as well as to
the terms of the settlement agreement. Id. at 627. An
intra-class conflict will not necessarily prevent
certification if the settlement agreement contains
sufficient structural protections to ensure that the
interests of the class will be adequately represented
despite the conflict. Id.

This case bears some resemblance to Amchem and
raises some of the same concerns. As in Amchem, there
are members of the putative class who are interested in

37
recovering immediate compensation for existing injuries
they sustained as a result of the defendant’s conduct, and
other members who are primarily concerned with
securing an adequate inflation-protected fund to provide
compensation for future injury caused by the allegedly
defective drain systems. However, the West Objectors
fail to recognize a critical distinction between the
representative plaintiffs here and the representative
plaintiffs in Amchem. The problem with the
representative plaintiffs in Amchem was that they “would
care little” for benefits that would have been valuable to
other members of the class. This is because once a class
member manifested symptoms of asbestos-related
injuries, that class member would be solely concerned
with obtaining a “generous immediate payment[ ]” for
the injury, not securing an “ample, inflation-protected
fund for the future.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626. This
resulted in a misalignment of interests—certain members
of the class had an incentive to pursue protections for
future claims, while the representative plaintiffs lacked
any such an incentive.
Here, on the other hand, the alignment of interests
is not so starkly problematic. A class member who has
already suffered leakage, and is thus a “past” claimant,
can continue to suffer leakage into the future to the same
extent as a future claimant, and can continue to make
future claims. 14 As such, past claimants also have an

14
The Settlement Agreement does distinguish between
leakage that occurs before notice is sent out, and leakage
38
incentive to protect the ability of class members to make
claims for future damage. Moreover, the settlement is
structured to ensure that even past claimants have an
incentive to protect the rights of all members of the class
to make future claims, and thus to align the interests of
the representative plaintiffs with those of the class. As
the District Court recognized, the representative plaintiffs
have “an interest in obtaining redress for future damage
or avoiding future damage caused by the allegedly
defective systems” that aligns with the interests of the
other members of the class. App’x A83. Thus, although
this case raises some of the same concerns that caused
the Supreme Court to invalidate the settlement in
Amchem, the misalignment of interests here is somewhat
different than the misalignment of interests in Amchem.

The West Objectors’ argument is not focused on
the alignment of these interests, but rather on their
magnitude. That is, the West Objectors worry that
because the representative plaintiffs can seek damages
for their past leakage, which makes up the vast majority

that occurs afterwards. The former is a “reimbursable
repair” that is eligible for immediate reimbursement,
while the latter is restricted to goodwill claims out of the
residual fund. The West Objectors have not alleged that
this distinction gives rise to an intra-class conflict.
Moreover, to the extent that any such conflict exists, it is
indistinguishable from the conflict between the
reimbursement group and the residual group, which we
discuss in Part III.B.3, infra.
39
of their damages, they will likely value future protections
less than class members with no leakage-related
damages. We reject this argument for two reasons.
First, it is unduly speculative. The “terms of the
settlement [and] the structure of the negotiations”
incentivized representative plaintiffs to seriously pursue
protections for future claimants. See Amchem, 521 U.S.
at 627. Nothing in the record suggests that representative
plaintiffs had reason to ignore this incentive. We cannot
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion
simply based on speculation about whether the structural
incentives created by the settlement sufficiently
motivated the representative plaintiffs to represent the
rest of the class. See Kohen, 571 F.3d at 680 (declining
to find an adequacy problem on the basis of a speculative
conflict); Robinson, 267 F.3d at 171 (same);
McLaughlin, supra, § 4:30.

Second, even if the representative plaintiffs did
value protections for future claimants less than other
members of the class, we do not believe that, again on
this record, their differing valuations would create a
fundamental conflict sufficient to undermine their ability
to adequately represent the class. See Gooch v. Life
Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 429 (6th Cir.
2012) (“Although significant conflicts make a plaintiff an
inadequate class representative, differently weighted
interests are not detrimental . . . [b]ecause few people are
ever identically situated . . . .”). The West Objectors’
argument—that representative plaintiffs derive less utility

40
from protections for future claims than those who have
only future claims—cannot create, at least on these facts,
a fundamental intra-class conflict sufficient to undermine
Rule 23(a)(4).

As the Sixth Circuit observed in Gooch, each class
member naturally derives different amounts of utility
from any class-wide settlement. Id. An older or even a
particularly myopic representative plaintiff, for example,
might value a front-loaded settlement more than other
members of the class. A coupon-clipping representative
plaintiff may derive more utility from a coupon-based
settlement than other members of the class. To hold that
these differing valuations by themselves render the
representative plaintiff inadequate would all but
eviscerate the class action device. Of course, such
differing valuations may be relevant to the ultimate
determination whether the settlement is fair and
reasonable. See Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157. We do not
think, however, that the difference in valuation here is
sufficient to call into question representative plaintiffs’
ability to adequately represent the class.
3.

The West Objectors argue that there is an intra-
class conflict between plaintiffs in the reimbursement
group and plaintiffs in the residual group. Because all
representative plaintiffs are in the reimbursement group,
the West Objectors argue, they cannot adequately

41
represent class members in the residual group. 15 We

15
Members of the reimbursement group that made out-
of-pocket payments for non-reimbursable repairs were
also eligible to submit claims for reimbursement from the
residual fund. This does suggest that the representative
plaintiffs had some incentive to maximize the residual
that would likely be available to the residual class. This
incentive does not, however, resolve the adequacy issue
raised by the West Objectors. The representative
plaintiffs’ incentive to maximize the aggregate size of the
reimbursement fund is separate from their interests in
allocating that fund amongst the class. The fundamental
intra-class conflict here is allocative in nature, see
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-27, and concerns the
representative plaintiffs’ incentive to shift the dividing
line between the residual and reimbursement groups in
order to maximize their own recovery, at the expense of
other members of the class who lacked a representative to
protect their interests. Even if the reimbursement group
managed to negotiate a reimbursement fund that was
expected to satisfy the claims of the residual group, there
remained a chance, however remote, that the fund would
not be sufficiently large. This risk of loss from any
shortfall lay primarily with the residual group. As such,
even if the reimbursement group had an incentive to
negotiate for a fund large enough to satisfy the required
residual claims, the potential risk of loss from any
shortfall would still create a problematic incentive to
carve out as many class members from the
42
agree.

The structure of the settlement agreement itself,
which divides a single class into two groups of plaintiffs
that receive different benefits, supports the inference that
the representative plaintiffs are inadequate. The
reimbursement group has priority access to the $8 million
fund. Only after their claims are satisfied can the
administrator satisfy goodwill claims from the residual
group. In order to sort the plaintiffs into these two
groups, representative plaintiffs sorted the various car
model runs 16 by their claims rates. On this spectrum of
claims rates, representative plaintiffs drew a line
delineating the boundaries between the two groups.
Those model runs with claims rates above the line were
placed in the reimbursement group. Those model runs
with a claims rate below the line were placed in the
residual group.17 It was this line-drawing exercise that

reimbursement group as possible. This incentive gives
rise to an adequacy problem.
16
Each car included in the class could be sorted into a car
model “run” which included other cars using the same
vehicle platform. App’x A1188-89.
17
There appears to be some dispute over whether or not
the assignment of individual plaintiffs was actually
based, as representative plaintiffs allege, on the relevant
claims rates. The West Objectors note several outlier car
models in the residual group with higher claims rates
43
exacerbated the adequacy problem here.

Every plaintiff in the class had an incentive to
maximize the number of plaintiffs in the residual group,
while ensuring that they themselves were in the
reimbursement group. That is, every plaintiff had an
incentive to draw the dividing line just beneath their
model run, placing as many cars as possible into the
residual group. Doing so would create the least amount
of competition for the first round of reimbursement
claims, and would thus give class members in the
reimbursement group the best chance at having their
claims satisfied in full.
The problem is that the interests of the
representative plaintiffs and the interests of the residual
group aligned in opposing directions. Representative
plaintiffs had an incentive to draw the line just beneath
their model runs, and to relegate everyone below the line
to the residual group. Class members in the residual
group had an incentive to lower the line just below their
model run such that they were included in the
reimbursement group but everyone below the line
remained in the residual group. Put simply,
representative plaintiffs had an interest in excluding other

than certain models in the reimbursement group. We
need not address this issue because we conclude that
even if representative plaintiffs did assign cars into the
various groups based on claims rates, they still could not
adequately represent the class.

44
plaintiffs from the reimbursement group, while plaintiffs
in the residual group had an interest in being included in
the reimbursement group. This is precisely the type of
allocative conflict of interest that exacerbated the
misalignment of interests in Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-
27.

Volkswagen defends the adequacy of the named
representatives by pointing to our decision in In re
Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.3d 241,
271-72 (3d Cir. 2009). In that case, we approved a
settlement in which different members of a single class
received different recoveries, but where no subclasses
were certified. The settlement agreement there calibrated
the amount of recovery based on the type of insurance
policy held by the plaintiff, providing that those class
members who held excess insurance policies received a
larger recovery than those who held other types of
insurance policies. We held that this allocation “is
simply a reflection of the extent of the injury that certain
class members incurred and does not clearly suggest that
the class members had antagonistic interests.” Id. at 272.
We affirmed because we found that subclasses were not
necessary.

That opinion, however, did not address the ability
of the representative plaintiffs to adequately represent the
class. Insurance Brokerage did not cite Rule 23(a)(4)
and cited neither Amchem nor Ortiz in its discussion of
whether subclasses were necessary. It did not discuss the
interests or incentives of the named plaintiffs in the suit.

45
Rather, it applied typicality and commonality principles,
discussing the similarity between the claims brought by
all class members, regardless of the type of insurance
policy held. Absent any discussion of misaligned
incentives or intra-class conflict, Insurance Brokerage
cannot govern our inquiry in this case.

Plaintiffs also argue that there is no fundamental
intra-class conflict here because the subcategories were
drawn up based on empirical data—i.e., the claims rates
amongst the various model runs. As a result, they argue,
the groups were divided based on empirical data, and the
incentives of the representative plaintiffs had no effect.
In support of their argument, they point to Eads’s
testimony at the fairness hearing suggesting that the
model runs in the reimbursement group had higher
claims rates than those in the residual group. Fairness
Hearing Tr. 35:13-36:12.

Any dividing line on the spectrum of claims rates,
however, would produce the same result—those above
the line would, in general, have higher claims rates than
those below the line. The problem with dividing the
class without having any representation from one of the
groups becomes clearly untenable in this case because of
who drew the line. Eads plainly stated that the line “was
decided by the lawyers.” 18 Id. at 35:13. However, the

18
The West Objectors argue that the District Court
should have excluded Eads’ testimony entirely, pursuant
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579
46
representative plaintiffs and their counsel could not
adequately represent the entire class in determining
where the line would lie, because the settlement provided
“no structural assurance” that the class representatives—
all of whom were in the reimbursement group and had
already suffered leakage—could adequately represent the
interests of the class members in the residual group.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627. Thus, on these facts, there is a
fundamental intra-class conflict between the
representative plaintiffs, all of whom are in the

(1993). Under Daubert, a District Court must review an
expert’s testimony to determine whether it may proceed
to the factfinder. Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d
237, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2008). Daubert is not an all-or-
nothing test, however—a District Court can
independently consider whether each “particular
scientific [or technical] methodology is reliable.” Elcock
v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (discretely analyzing
an expert’s various opinions under the lens of Daubert).
That is precisely what the Magistrate Judge did, engaging
in a painstaking analysis of Eads’ report, proceeding line-
by-line through his calculations, and omitting or
adjusting calculations that were inflated or based on
unreliable methods or assumptions. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude Eads’
testimony in its entirety. United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d 215, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing a District
Court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse
of discretion).
47
reimbursement group, and those plaintiffs in the residual
group. We will reverse the District Court’s order
certifying the class because the representative plaintiffs
fail to satisfy the adequacy requirement in Rule 23(a)(4).

We see two ways by which the representative
plaintiffs may satisfy Rule 23(a)(4) on remand. First,
they can simply do away with the distinction between the
reimbursement group and the residual group, and allow
all members of the class to submit reimbursements with
no difference in priority. Without any need to draw a
line between themselves and other members of the class,
representative plaintiffs’ interest in maximizing their own
returns would align with the interests of the rest of the
class. Practically speaking, this does not appear to be a
problem in this case. Representative plaintiffs project
that the $8 million reimbursement fund will be sufficient
to satisfy the claims of those in the reimbursement group
and the residual group, if projected claim rates hold
true. 19 As such, there appears to be no need to create a

19
Volkswagen appears to suggest that the fact that the
residual is likely sufficient to satisfy the claims arising
out of the residual group implies that the representative
plaintiffs adequately represented the class. Such an
argument was made in Amchem, and was explicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court. Amchem, 521 U.S. at
626 (“The disparity between the currently injured and
exposure-only categories of plaintiffs, and the diversity
within each category are not made insignificant by the
District Court’s finding that petitioners’ assets suffice to
48
residual group.

Second, the parties could simply divide the groups
into subclasses that would be certified separately. The
Supreme Court has held that subclassing can resolve
conflicts of interest that might prevent representative
plaintiffs from adequately representing the class. See
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856 (holding that an intra-class conflict
“require[d] division into homogeneous subclasses . . .
with separate representation to eliminate conflicting
interests”); Conte & Newberg, supra, § 3:32 (discussing
the use of subclasses to address “competing interests in
distributing the monetary relief” available to the class).
For example, the class might be divided into a
reimbursement subclass and a residual subclass, each
with representative plaintiffs to ensure that their interests
are being accommodated.
What is clear at this stage, however, is that the
class as certified fails to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4).
Representative plaintiffs simply cannot adequately
represent the interests of the entire class. Despite the
exemplary manner in which the Magistrate Judge

pay claims under the settlement.”). The adequacy
requirement provides structural protections during the
process of bargaining for settlement. The fact that the
stars aligned and the class members’ interests were not
actually damaged does not permit representative
plaintiffs to bypass structural requirements.

49
conducted the fairness hearing, and her painstaking
efforts to adduce information not elicited by the parties
during that hearing, we conclude that she abused her
discretion in certifying the class. Accordingly, we will
reverse the District Court’s certification order.
C.

The parties also raise a host of issues concerning
the District Court’s analysis of representative plaintiffs’
fee petition. First and foremost, Volkswagen argues that
the District Court erred in its choice-of-law analysis
regarding the fee petition. Because our analysis of the
fee petition would turn on the language of the choice-of-
law provision in the settlement agreement, and because
the parties will need to negotiate a new settlement
agreement in light of our holding, we cannot decide these
issues now.20

20
We recognize that, as representative plaintiffs noted at
oral argument, these issues may arise again and may
necessitate another appeal. It is possible, however, that
they will not arise in the same form as currently
presented. The parties may choose to address these
issues if they draft a new settlement agreement. As such,
any decision now would be an impermissible advisory
opinion. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“[A] federal court has neither the power to
render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We thus
50
 III.

Rule 23(a)(4) was designed to ensure that the
representative plaintiffs in a class action suit adequately
represent the interests of the entire class. The structure of
the settlement here provides no such assurances. We
conclude that representative plaintiffs cannot adequately
represent the interests of the members of the class in the
residual group. We will reverse the District Court’s
certification order, and will remand for further
proceedings.

decline representative plaintiffs’ invitation to decide the
issues arising out of their fee petition.
51