UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-7630
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY JENKINS, a/k/a Domonique Jenkins, a/k/a Todd
Jenkins, a/k/a Tone,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (2:93-cr-00081-2)
Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: June 15, 2012
Before WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Anthony Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr,
Melissa Elaine O’Boyle, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Anthony Jenkins appeals the district court’s
order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion to reduce
his sentence. Jenkins was sentenced to life imprisonment in
1994 after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district
court subsequently granted the Government’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 35
motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance,
reducing Jenkins’ sentence to 270 months’ imprisonment.
Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 1B1.10 (2011), when a defendant’s applicable Guidelines range
has been lowered by an amendment to the Guidelines, the district
court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment pursuant
to § 3582. We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186
(4th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion when it
relies upon an erroneous factual or legal premise. DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 323 (4th Cir. 2008).
Generally, a district court “may not, upon a motion
for a reduction of sentence, sentence the defendant to a term of
imprisonment that is below the amended guidelines range.”
United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2010).
(citing USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)). However, when the “original
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term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term . . .
provided by the guidelines range applicable to the defendant at
the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the
amended guidelines range . . . may be appropriate.” Id. We
recently held that the “original term of imprisonment” means
“the sentence the defendant is serving at the time he makes his
Section 3582(c)(2) motion.” Id. at 202. Thus, “when a
defendant is serving a below-guidelines sentence as a result of
a Rule 35 motion by the government, if the defendant makes a
motion under section 3582(c)(2), his sentence may be further
reduced comparable to the previous reduction received.” Id. at
203.
Jenkins was held responsible for 5.67 kilograms of
cocaine base. Although Jenkins was subject to an advisory
Guidelines range of life imprisonment at the time of his
sentencing, under the Guidelines as amended pursuant to the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Jenkins’ advisory Guidelines range is
now 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment. 1 USSG § 2D1.1. Although
Jenkins’ current sentence of 270 months is below the amended
Guidelines range, the district court had the discretion to
further reduce Jenkins’ sentence to reflect the reduction
1
Amendment 750, which amended the Guidelines in accordance
with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, became retroactive on
November 1, 2011. USSG § 1B1.10(c) (2011).
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previously granted for his substantial assistance to the
Government.
In denying Jenkins’ motion, however, the district
court failed to provide an explanation for its decision. We are
therefore unable to assess whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying Jenkins’ motion. 2 Accordingly, we vacate
the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration of the
§ 3582 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
It is possible, for example, that the district court
denied Jenkins’ motion under the misapprehension that § 3582 did
not authorize a further reduction of Jenkins’ sentence. Or it
may be that the district court fully appreciated its authority
to further lower Jenkins’ sentence and declined to do so for
sound reasons well within its discretion. We simply do not
know. Our decision to vacate the district court’s order, then,
should not be construed on remand as any indication on our part
that we have prejudged the appropriate resolution of Jenkins’
§ 3582 motion. That decision is properly reserved in the first
instance for the district court.
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