[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-13154
JUNE 15, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00252-JSM-TBM-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WELLENGTON ROLANDO MACIAS LUCAS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 15, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wellengton Rolando Macias Lucas (“Macias Lucas”) appeals his conviction
for possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46
U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1).1 On appeal, Macias Lucas argues that his conviction must
be reversed because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the district
court gave an erroneous jury instruction, and because the government, he claims,
used evidence admitted only for impeachment as substantive evidence of his guilt.
We reject Macias Lucas’s first argument that the district court lacked
jurisdiction because the government failed to prove that the boat in which he was
transporting cocaine was bound for the United States, because we have previously
held that the offense codified at § 70503(a)(1) does not require the government to
show a connection between the offense and United States territory in order to
support subject matter jurisdiction, see United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320,
1
46 U.S.C. § 70503 provides, in relevant part,
(a) Prohibitions. An individual may not knowingly or intentionally manufacture or
distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance on
board--
(1) a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States[.]
It is undisputed in this case that Macias Lucas’s vessel was “subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States” within the meaning of the statute because it qualifies as a “vessel without
nationality” pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c), (d).
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1325 (11th Cir. 2003), and we are bound by our prior precedent rule to apply that
holding here.
Macias Lucas also contends that his conviction must be reversed because
the district court, over objection by Macias Lucas, gave an Allen charge that
differed in several respects from the wording outlined in this court’s pattern Allen
charge.2 A district court abuses its discretion in giving an Allen charge if, in light
of “the language of the charge and the totality of the circumstances under which it
was delivered,” the charge was “inherently coercive.” United States v. Woodard,
531 F.3d 1352, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008). This record does not contain the requisite
evidence of coercion. Among other things, the charge given was modeled on our
court’s pattern Allen instruction, and after the charge was given, the jury
continued to deliberate for an additional ninety minutes before returning its verdict
the next day.
Finally, Macias Lucas also argues that the government was erroneously
permitted to use testimony admitted only for impeachment as substantive evidence
of Macias Lucas’s guilt, and that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
credibility of two of its witnesses. However, the record reflects that the
2
In an Allen charge, the judge instructs the jury to undertake further efforts to reach a
verdict. United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 544 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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prosecutor’s use of this testimony was limited to challenging Macias Lucas’s
credibility as a witness. Moreover, the prosecutor’s assertion that two U.S. Coast
Guard agents had no motive to lie when testifying did not impermissibly vouch for
their credibility because it did not put the government’s prestige or the
prosecutor’s personal imprimatur upon their credibility. See United States v.
Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED
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