UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5094
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARLOS JOSEPH DAVILA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:98-cr-00208-TSE-1)
Submitted: June 14, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory B. English, THE ENGLISH LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, A. Marisa Chun, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Joseph Davila appeals the revocation of his
supervised release, contending that the district court violated
his right of confrontation by limiting his cross-examination of
the arresting officer. We affirm.
During the supervised release revocation hearing, the
government presented evidence of Davila’s involvement in a sale
of cocaine to a confidential informant. After the arresting
officer testified, defense counsel subjected him to cross-
examination, pointing out some inconsistencies in his testimony.
In his defense, Davila—represented by new counsel—called the
arresting officer as a witness and subjected him to further
inquiry about inconsistencies in his testimony. The court noted
that Davila already had conducted cross-examination of this
witness and suggested that counsel narrow the focus of his
questioning. After a recess, counsel continued to question the
officer concerning inconsistencies. At no time did Davila state
that he had further questions, nor does he assert on appeal that
further inquiry would have elicited additional evidence. The
record shows that Davila was afforded ample opportunity to
cross-examine the officer. We conclude that the court’s
directive to Davila’s counsel to prioritize his inquires did not
violate Davila’s right of confrontation. See Black v. Romano,
471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985) (providing for right to cross-examine
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adverse witnesses, unless good cause found for not allowing
confrontation).
In light of the substantial evidence that Davila
violated his supervised release, the district court did not
clearly err by finding that Davila violated his supervised
release terms by possessing and distributing cocaine. See
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992)
(providing for preponderance of the evidence standard of proof
in revocation hearings). The minor inconsistencies in the
officer’s testimony brought forth during cross-examination were
not sufficient to undermine the government’s evidence. We
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s attempts
to sharpen the focus of Davila’s second cross-examination of the
officer so as to move the proceeding along and to require the
inquiries to be relevant. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 679 (1986) (providing that court had wide latitude to
control scope and extent of cross-examination); United States v.
Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1997) (providing
standard and finding not abuse of discretion when court imposed
reasonable limits on cross-examination).
Davila also challenges the district court’s imposition
of a twenty-month term of supervision following the thirty-two-
month sentence of imprisonment. He contends that this portion
of the sentence is illegal. Because the district court
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corrected the judgment to reflect that the supervised release
term following the revocation sentence was seventeen months,
this issue is moot.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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